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Abstract 
 
Recent developments in Scottish historiography have done much to resurrect 
the Restoration from the obscurity in which it had conventionally languished.  Lacunae 
remain, however, and one of these surrounds the Highlands, which has often had to 
make do with broad generalisation.  The present thesis aims to address this deficiency 
through exploration of two general themes. 
Firstly, it considers the place of the Highlands within the broader Scottish and 
British contexts.  Focusing on the linkages between central government and the local 
elite, and on the extent to which the Highlands were socially and culturally distinct, it 
argues that historians’ continuing treatment of the Highlands as a self-contained entity 
is misguided.  Instead, it is suggested that the region should be viewed as simply 
another locality within Britain, a locality which, while displaying a unique hybridised 
identity, was nevertheless heavily integrated with the rest of the country.  
Secondly, the thesis traces the development of government policy towards the 
Highland periphery.  Recognising that policy was usually aimed at curbing the 
perceived problem of endemic animal theft, it uncovers opposing intellectual 
underpinnings – ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ – to the government’s approach.  It then 
considers in detail the various policy initiatives launched over the period, arguing that 
most of these were shaped by the interplay of the underlying strategic impulses.  It 
also acknowledges the influence of wider developments in British politics. 
Ultimately, the thesis seeks to recast the prevailing understanding of the 
Highlands.  Moving away from well-worn stereotypes of endemic lawlessness and 
violence, it also questions the notion of a fundamental cleavage between central and 
local elites.  Instead, it argues that, during the reigns of Charles II and James VII, the 
prevailing pattern was one of partnership and mutual reinforcement.  
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Notes 
 
All dates are given according to the Old Style (Julian) calendar, although the year is 
taken to begin on 1 January, rather than 25 March.  
 
Sums of money are in pounds (£) Scots unless otherwise stated.  A merk is equal to 13s 
4d, or nearly two-thirds of a pound.   
 
John Campbell of Glenorchy (1636-1717) should correctly be designated ‘Earl of 
Caithness’ between 1672 and 1681.  However, to avoid confusion with the Sinclair 
earls, the thesis refers to him as Laird of Glenorchy until his elevation to the earldom of 
Breadalbane in 1681.  The Caithness title is used exclusively to refer to George Sinclair, 
6th earl of Caithness (1643-76) and George Sinclair, 7th earl of Caithness (1681-98). 
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Introduction 
 
Until fairly recently, any historian seeking to investigate Scotland during 
the Restoration faced a daunting task.  Beyond a few scattered biographies dealing 
with some of the major politicians, there were very few texts upon which to draw.1  
This paucity no doubt reflected the apparent difficulty of locating a compelling 
meta-narrative for the period.  While European historians grappled with grand 
themes such as ‘absolute monarchy’ or ‘military revolution’, and English 
commentators could approach the period through any number of colourful and 
compelling topics – the rise of party, the development of court culture, the struggle 
between crown and parliament, or the ever-swelling paranoia about Popery – their 
Scottish counterparts (largely taking their cue from the mammoth antiquarian 
efforts of the eighteenth-century Presbyterian historian, Robert Wodrow) seemed 
unable to perceive anything other than a dreary cycle of pedantic and esoteric 
religious squabbles.  Moreover, those works which were produced tended to 
generate rather more heat than light.  Take, for example, the competing views of 
the Covenanting movement offered at the start of the twentieth century by 
Alexander Smellie and William Mathieson.  For Smellie, the Covenanters were 
heroic opponents of tyranny who refused to surrender their liberty; for Mathieson, 
they were a rabble of vicious, rebellious fanatics.2  This disagreement says much 
                                                           
1 J. Willcock, The Great Marquess: Life and Times of Archibald, 8th Earl, and 1st (and only) 
Marquess of Argyll (1607-1661) (Edinburgh and London, 1903); J. Willcock, A Scots Earl in 
Covenanting Times: Being Life and Times of Archibald 9th Earl of Argyll (Edinburgh, 1907); A. 
Lang, Sir George Mackenzie, King’s Advocate, of Rosehaugh, his Life and Times, 1636(?)-1691 
(London, 1909); W.C. MacKenzie, The Life and Times of John Maitland, Duke of Lauderdale 
(1616-1682) (London, 1923). 
2 A. Smellie, Men of the Covenant: The Story of the Scottish Church in the Years of Persecution 
(London, 1904), p.14; W.L. Mathieson, Politics and Religion: A Study in Scottish History from 
the Reformation to the Revolution, 2 vols (Glasgow, 1902), ii, p.286. 
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more about the ecclesiastical and political circumstances of the Edwardian period 
than it does about the later seventeenth century. 
Fortunately, historiographical developments since the late 1960s have done 
much to enliven this arid landscape.3  The pioneering efforts of Ian Cowan and 
Julia Buckroyd provided fresh scholarly perspectives on the religious issue.4  
Combined with studies of constitutional and political affairs penned by Athol 
Murray, John Patrick and Ronnie Lee, this ensured that, by the end of the twentieth 
century, the Restoration was beginning to reclaim its place in historical 
consciousness.5  Since the Millennium, this steady stream of interest has not abated.  
The work of Raymond Campbell Paterson has attempted to resurrect the period’s 
                                                           
3 At least part of the explanation for this renaissance was the brief vogue of the ‘New British 
History’.  Taking its cue from John Pocock’s 1975 rallying cry, this movement sought to 
replace supposedly myopic histories of England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales with an 
holistic approach that respected the differences between the constituent parts of the British 
Isles while stressing the intimate connections between them.  The result, it was hoped, 
would be a largely new subject that transcended national histories without replacing them.  
Moreover, because it was the first period during which all four British nations shared a 
single monarch, the seventeenth century became a particularly fashionable stomping-
ground for proponents of ‘New British History’.  The approach has now fallen out of 
fashion, largely because it often failed to overturn the entrenched Anglo-centricism against 
which it was ostensibly reacting.  Yet despite being no paradigm-shifter, ‘New British 
History’ did serve to remind historians that national histories are at their most effective 
when placed in wider contexts. Along the way, it also stimulated renewed interest in, and 
research into, the early-modern era, particularly in the previously neglected pastures of 
Scotland and Ireland.  See J.G.A. Pocock, ‘British History: A Plea for a New Subject’, Journal 
of Modern History, 47:4, 1975, pp.601-21.  The impact of ‘New British History’ on 
seventeenth-century studies is best understood through perusing the plethora of multi-
author volumes on the British dimension that appeared in the 1990s.  See, for example, S.G. 
Ellis and S. Barber (eds.), Conquest and Union: Fashioning a British State 1485-1725 (London, 
1995); A. Grant and K.J. Stringer (eds.), Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History 
(London, 1995); B. Bradshaw and J. Morrill (eds.), The British Problem, c.1534-1707: State 
Formation in the British Archipelago (Basingstoke, 1996); G. Burgess (ed.), The New British 
History: Founding a Modern State 1603-1715 (London, 1999). 
4 I.B. Cowan, The Scottish Covenanters 1660-88 (London, 1976); J. Buckroyd, Church and State 
in Scotland 1660-1681 (Edinburgh, 1980); J. Buckroyd, ‘Anti-clericalism in Scotland during 
the Restoration’ in N. MacDougall (ed.), Church, Politics and Society: Scotland 1408-1929 
(Edinburgh, 1983), pp.167-86; J. Buckroyd, The Life of James Sharp, Archbishop of St Andrews, 
1616-1679: A Political Biography (Edinburgh, 1987). 
5 A.L. Murray, ‘The Scottish Treasury 1667-1708’, SHR, 45: 1966, pp.89-104; J. Patrick, ‘The 
Origins of the Opposition to Lauderdale in the Scottish Parliament of 1673’, SHR, 53:155, 
1974, pp.1-21; J. Patrick, ‘A Union Broken? Restoration Politics in Scotland’ in J. Wormald 
(ed.), Scotland Revisited (London, 1991), pp.119-28; R. Lee, ‘Government and Politics in 
Scotland, 1661-1681’ (University of Glasgow, PhD thesis, 1995). 
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profile amongst the general public.6  Within academia, published contributions 
from Clare Jackson, Gillian MacIntosh and Maurice Lee Junior have shed further 
light on political culture, parliament, and high politics respectively.  Kirsty 
McAlister’s doctoral thesis has provided detailed reconstruction of the early- to 
mid-1680s, while another unpublished study by John Toller stresses the political 
importance of the often overlooked royal burghs.7  Other aspects of the period, if 
they have not yet attracted detailed study, have nonetheless benefited from 
inclusion in wider surveys.8 
One area for which the picture remains patchy, however, is the history of 
the Scottish Highlands.  Indeed, there is a long-established tendency, particularly 
in general and popular works, to assume that the Restoration was a period of little 
or no importance in the Highlands. W.C. Mackenzie’s 1937 survey of Highland 
history declares airily that ‘the Restoration which in its disturbing effects turned 
the Lowlands of Scotland upside down, scarcely raised a ripple on the surface of 
Highland life’, and proceeds to dispose of the period in three paragraphs.  John 
MacLeod’s popular history of the Highlands, published in 1996, devotes a chapter 
of twenty-six pages to the seventeenth century, of which just fewer than four deal 
with the Restoration – with the focus exclusively on the national religious question, 
rather than the Highlands.  Alasdair Moffat’s brief survey of Highland history is 
                                                           
6 R.C. Paterson, King Lauderdale: The Corruption of Power (Edinburgh, 2003); R.C. Paterson, 
No Tragic Story: The Fall of the House of Campbell (Edinburgh, 2001). 
7 C. Jackson, Restoration Scotland, 1660-1690: Royalist Politics, Religion and Ideas (Woodbridge, 
2003); G.H. MacIntosh, The Scottish Parliament under Charles II 1660-1685 (Edinburgh, 2007); 
M. Lee, ‘Dearest Brother’: Lauderdale, Tweeddale and Scottish Politics, 1660-1674 (Edinburgh, 
2010); K. McAlister, ‘James VII and the Conduct of Scottish Politics c.1679 to c.1686’ 
(University of Strathclyde, PhD thesis, 2003); J.M. Toller, ‘‘Now of little significancy’?  The 
Convention of the Royal Burghs of Scotland, 1651-1688’ (University of Dundee, PhD thesis, 
2010). 
8 See, for example, W. Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England: A Survey to 1707 
(Edinburgh, 1994) on foreign relations; K.M. Brown, Noble Society in Scotland: Wealth, Family 
and Culture from Reformation to Revolution (Edinburgh, 2000) and K.M. Brown, Noble Power in 
Scotland from the Reformation to the Revolution (Edinburgh, 2011) on the nobility; and J. 
Goodare, State and Society in Early Modern Scotland (Oxford, 1999) on state-building. 
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even less interested; he, like Mackenzie, accords the Restoration only three 
paragraphs.  The only sustained popular treatment has come from John Roberts, 
although even here it is telling that twice as much space is reserved for the 
‘Highland War’ of 1689-92 (four chapters) as for the Restoration (two chapters).9  
In truth, the historian of the Restoration Highlands must be content with a 
mere handful of viable contributions.  David Stevenson and Bruce Lenman have 
offered brief surveys, although in both cases their primary interests lie elsewhere 
and, as a result, their work lacks detail.10  This leaves only two dedicated studies.  
Paul Hopkins, although his main focus is the Glencoe massacre, provides a lengthy 
and meticulously detailed political narrative of the preceding decades.11  The 
influential work of Allan Macinnes offers a stimulating revisionist assessment 
which downplays the lawlessness of Highlanders and emphasises the cynical 
militarism of the Stuart regime.12  Both of these texts, however, have their 
limitations.  Hopkins views the period through the prism of Clan Campbell; his 
narrative is largely, though not exclusively, limited to the two major Campbell 
feuds of the period (Archibald Campbell, 9th earl of Argyll versus clan Maclean, and 
John Campbell of Glenorchy, later 1st earl of Breadalbane, against the Sinclairs).  
Macinnes’ contribution, meanwhile, is not full length, and is more of an 
exploratory thrust into the period than a concerted study.  Neither, as a result, 
offers sustained analysis of Highland policy, or the area’s relationship to central 
government.  This is the gap which the present thesis attempts to address. 
                                                           
9 W.C. MacKenzie, The Highlands and Isles of Scotland: A Historical Survey (Edinburgh and 
London, 1937), p.250 and at p.252; J. Macleod, Highlanders: A History of the Gaels (London, 
1997), pp.121-47; A. Moffat, The Highland Clans (London, 2010), pp.71-72; J.L. Roberts, Clan, 
King and Covenant: History of the Highland Clans from the Civil War to the Glencoe Massacre 
(Edinburgh, 2000). 
10 D. Stevenson, Highland Warrior: Alasdair MacColla and the Civil Wars (Edinburgh, 1980); 
B.P. Lenman, The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen 1650-1784 (Dalkeith, 1995). 
11 P. Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War (Edinburgh, 1990). 
12 A.I. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788 (East Linton, 1996), at 
pp.122-158. 
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The resulting text has two aims.  On a more basic level it seeks to 
understand how the Highlands were governed and controlled.  Just as importantly, 
it also attempts to achieve a broader understanding of the relationship between 
centre and locality.  The thesis can therefore be roughly divided into two parts.  
The opening section, chapters one to three, addresses the more general question of 
how the Highlands related to the rest of Scotland and Britain.  Chapter one is an 
historiographical review which attempts to place existing accounts of the 
Highlands within the wider framework of centre-periphery studies across early-
modern Europe.  Chapters two and three build upon this theoretical framework – 
the former explores the linkages between Highland elites and the rest of Scotland 
and Britain, while the latter assesses the notion of the ‘Highland Problem’ as a 
means of understanding the extent of Highland individualism.   
The second part of the thesis (chapters four to seven), which is more 
chronological in structure, considers the ways in which the government dealt with 
the Highlands.  Chapter four provides something of a baseline by looking at the 
nature of the Restoration settlement.  Chapters five and six then narrate 
developments in policy, dividing in the late 1670s (so that, in general terms, 
chapter five focuses on the ascendency of John Maitland, 2nd earl and duke of 
Lauderdale, while chapter 6 is concerned with the period in which James, duke of 
Albany and later king, guided public affairs).  These chapters analyse how the 
government approached the Highland periphery, why it adopted the strategies it 
did, how they changed over time and how effective they were.  The final chapter 
deals with the extent to which these policies exposed the Highlands to the fiscal 
and military ambitions of the Stuart kings.  
The thesis makes use of a wide range of primary sources, both printed and 
manuscript.  Broadly, this material can be divided into five classes.  First is 
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governmental material, which is vital in providing the period with an overarching 
administrative and political framework.13  Second are judicial records.  These are a 
valuable counterpoint to administrative documents, insofar as they reveal the gaps 
in governmental control, and the ways in which the authorities sought to address 
them.14  Third are ecclesiastic records, principally the minute books of the various 
church courts.  Given that the Kirk in the seventeenth century was the most 
ubiquitous agent of regional control, its records offer unrivalled insights into the 
dynamics of society at its most basic level.15  Literary material, the fourth source-
type, is rather more amorphous.  It incorporates a range of chronicles, memoirs, 
diaries, pamphlets, notebooks and poetry, and can offer unique and idiosyncratic 
perspectives on the period.16  The final class of source is estate collections.  As ad 
                                                           
13 This refers, in particular, to the records of the Scottish Parliament (published as the online 
database RPS) and of the Privy Council (published as RPCS).  Governmental material also 
includes much manuscript material, such as financial records and town council minutes.  
One particular governmental source should be specially mentioned, namely the manuscript 
register of the commissioners for pacifying the Highlands.  This sizeable minute-book has 
never before been comprehensively analysed, and such an exercise forms a substantial 
portion of chapter six.   
14 Amongst the judicial records in print are W.G. Scott-Moncrieff (ed.), The Records of the 
Proceedings of the Justiciary Court, Edinburgh, 1661-1678, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1905) and J. 
Cameron and J. Imrie (eds.), The Justiciary Records of Argyll and the Isles, 1664-1742, 2 vols 
(Edinburgh, 1949-69).  Much judicial material, especially sheriff court processes, exist only 
in manuscript. 
15 A very small number of church records have been printed, most notably W. Mackay (ed.), 
Records of the Presbyteries of Inverness and Dingwall (Edinburgh, 1896).  Most, however, 
remains in manuscript only.  Patterns of survival mean that the middle-layer of the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy, the presbytery, is best represented in the record, but where possible 
the thesis also incorporates session and synod material. 
16 Many important literary sources are available in print, of which the most valuable are 
probably John Lauder of Fountainhall’s Historical Notices of Scottish Affairs and James Fraser 
of Wardlaw’s Chronicles of the Frasers.  Also of importance are the published editions of 
Gaelic poetry written by the likes of Iain Lom, Mary Macleod and Roderick Morrison.  
However, some literary material remains confined to manuscript.  The most obvious 
example is the eccentric but fascinating run of notebooks left by Robert Kirk, minister of 
Balquhidder and later Aberfoyle, preserved at the National Library of Scotland and 
Edinburgh University Library. 
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hoc bundles of documents collected over time by prominent families and 
individuals, they boast unparallel richness.17   
In addition to locating and utilising a sufficient range of source material, 
there is another methodological challenge to be overcome.  Any study dealing with 
the Scottish Highlands must grapple with the question of what ‘Highland’ actually 
means, and where ‘the Highlands’ are, or were, to be found.  Numerous competing 
definitions have been offered.  Some are cultural, equating the Highlands with the 
Gàidhealtachd.18  Others are sociological, assuming that ‘Highland’ refers to that part 
of Scotland where a recognisably Celtic, clannish social structure prevailed.19  Still 
others are geographical, applying the label ‘Highland’ to all lands beyond a given 
boundary, real or imagined.20  Finally, some definitions are political, taking 
‘Highland’ to refer to those parts of the north and west in which the authority of 
central government was weakest.21  Each of these definitions would yield slightly 
different areas of study.  Equally, they are all imprecise; the surviving sources do 
not allow us to gauge exactly where Gaelic gave way to English, where ‘clanship’ 
became ‘landlordism’, or where the writ of central government ran out of steam.  
Nor is there any uniformity as to where a notional ‘Highland Line’ should be 
drawn.  Should it follow the Great Glen fault?  Should it incorporate the 
mountainous terrain of the Grampians and northern Perthshire?  Should it exclude 
                                                           
17 Four estate collections demand special acknowledgment: the Lauderdale manuscripts in 
the British Library; the Breadalbane muniments in the National Records of Scotland; the 
Yester papers in the National Library of Scotland and the Argyll manuscripts at Inveraray 
Castle.  Each one of these vast collections has offered a proverbial goldmine of information 
without which this thesis would have been vastly diminished. 
18 C.W.J. Withers, Gaelic Scotland: The Transformation of a Culture Region (London, 1988). 
19 R.A. Dodgshon, From Chiefs to Landlords: Social and Economic Change in the Western 
Highlands and Islands, c.1493-1820 (Edinburgh, 1998). 
20 M. Fry, Wild Scots: Four Hundred Years of Highland History (London, 2005), p.xvi. 
21 Goodare, State and Society, pp.264-82. 
Introduction 
8 
 
low-lying areas like Easter Ross and Caithness?  Should the Hebrides be included 
alongside the mainland, or kept separate? 
In deciding which areas of Scotland to include in this study, contemporary 
opinion has been used as a guide, and ‘Highland’ is taken to incorporate those 
sheriffdoms which were described by contemporaries as predominantly Highland 
in character.  The Highlands are therefore understood as an essentially 
geographical, rather than ethnic, cultural, or social entity.  The resulting area of 
study is illustrated in map 3.  Caithness, Sutherland, Ross, Cromarty, Inverness and 
Argyll, the six sheriffdoms usually described by contemporaries as indisputably 
‘Highland’, form the core of the thesis.  In addition, there were a number of other 
shires which contemporaries did not regard as truly ‘Highland’, but were 
nevertheless acknowledged to include peripheral zones displaying ‘Highland’ 
characteristics.  In this category were Nairn, Moray, Banff, Aberdeen, Angus, Perth, 
Stirling, Dumbarton and Bute, together forming a ‘Highland fringe’ with which the 
thesis also engages where relevant.  The rest of Scotland, understood at the time as 
being the Lowland core of the kingdom, is not considered in the thesis, except for 
comparative or contextual purposes.   
Using this definition, and exploiting the range of sources discussed above, 
the thesis will attempt to outline the relationship between central government and 
the Highlands.  Of course, exhaustive treatment of this topic would require a very 
broad approach incorporating issues such as the Church, social structures and 
commercial relationships.  While all of these were profoundly important in shaping 
the relationship between core and locality, their inclusion would have entailed a 
shift in focus away from the intitutional and political linkages with which the 
thesis is primarily concerned.  As a result, the text restricts itself to civic 
government, while remaining conscious that this represented only one facet of the 
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centre-periphery relationship.  Nonetheless, it is hoped that this will provide an 
original perspective on the Restoration regime and its impact at a local level.  At 
the same time, it may also help to modify the widespread perception of Highland 
parochialism by setting the area firmly within its broader Scottish, British and 
European contexts.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Centre-Periphery Historiography and the Highlands 
 
Historians’ attention to the process of state-formation in the European world 
of the seventeenth-century has traditionally focused heavily on the erection of 
bureaucratic government structures.  From such a perspective, one cannot help but 
view Europe’s ‘absolute’ monarchs as the most significant state-builders of their age.  
Yet the growth of central government, absolutist or otherwise, cannot be the only 
focus of attention.  The development of ‘states’ also involved a complex dialogue 
between those emergent bureaucracies and outlying peripheries which, in boasting 
their own traditions and systems of authority, were sometimes radically different 
from the core state.1  Naturally, this relationship between centre and periphery has 
stimulated a considerable stock of historical writing and this chapter will attempt, 
with particular reference to the Scottish Highlands, to analyse that literature.  It will 
be divided into three broad sections.  The first will look at the general conceptual 
approaches that have been adopted by historians for understanding the relationship 
between central authority and peripheral regions.  The second section will then 
discuss the various mechanisms of interaction that have been posited in the 
historiography.  The final section will analyse one particular sub-genre of centre-
periphery historiography, which has recently emerged as a crucial motif of 
seventeenth-century British historiography – namely, the idea of a ‘British Problem’.  
 Centre-periphery historiography is by definition rather amorphous, since the 
nature of the relationship varied between states and localities.  Nevertheless, at a 
conceptual level it is possible to discern two general approaches that have informed 
                                                           
1 M. Greengrass, ‘Conquest and Coalescence’ in M. Greengrass (ed.), Conquest and Coalescence: 
The Shaping of the State in Early Modern Europe (Sevenoaks, 1991), pp.1-24, at p.6. 
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historians’ thinking.  The first of these may be labelled ‘imperial’, and posits a 
colonial, one-way relationship between peripheral regions and the core state.  This 
approach can be seen clearly in the work done by Anthony Upton on Sweden.  
Upton identifies three distinct zones within the Swedish empire, and for each he 
maintains that the relationship involved Sweden acting and the peripheries reacting.  
In the Danish and Norwegian frontier provinces won from the Oldenburg monarchy, 
Danish elites were made to assimilate with Swedish political and social mores, while 
in the territories of the Eastern Baltic taken during the various Northern Wars, as 
well as in the German lands conquered during the Thirty Years War, local estates 
were forced, sometimes brutally, to accept decisions passed down from Stockholm.2  
Two related observations underlie Upton’s assessment.  The first is the victimisation 
of the peripheries, or at the very least their subordination to the interests of the 
centre.  For Upton, Karl XI’s (r.1660-97) interest in his German and Eastern Baltic 
territories was strictly limited to ensuring that he squeezed as much money from 
them as possible through his reduktion, the policy of reclaiming royal lands alienated 
prior to 1680.3  The second observation is the emasculation of the locality.  Upton 
stresses that no part of the empire had either the right or the strength to defy the 
crown, and those which tried – like Livland – found that Karl ‘steamrollered the 
opposition and asserted the fullness of royal power’.4  Upton’s picture is therefore 
unequivocal; Sweden’s peripheral possessions were treated as colonies, ruled by and 
in the interests of the bureaucracy of the core state.5   
                                                           
2 A. Upton, Charles XI and Swedish Absolutism (Cambridge, 1998), pp.179-99. 
3 Ibid., p.185 and at p.198. 
4 Ibid., p.197. 
5 This kind of approach has been applied by other historians to a diverse range of peripheral 
regions in the seventeenth century.  See C. Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy 1618-1815 
(Cambridge, 1994), pp.69-87 on Hungary; A. Lottin, ‘Louis XIV and Flanders’ in M. 
Greengrass (ed.), Conquest and Coalescence: The Shaping of the State in Early Modern Europe 
(Sevenoaks, 1991), pp.84-93, at pp.86-92 on Flanders and J.G. Simms, ‘The Restoration, 1660-
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The second overarching approach to centre-periphery interaction may be 
termed ‘collaborative’, because it tends to argue for a more mutual and consensual 
relationship than is allowed under the ‘imperial’ umbrella.  An important example of 
the collaborative approach is William Beik’s study of Languedoc.  Beik stresses that 
the French monarchy lacked the resources to impose a fully rationalised or 
centralised administrative structure, and consequently could not adopt an ‘imperial’ 
attitude.  At the same time, he argues that the structure of provincial government 
was too fragmented, and power too widely dispersed, for the locality to govern itself 
effectively.  Put simply, Beik’s argument is that neither the core nor the periphery 
could control Languedoc without help.6  From this basis, Beik offers a vision of 
Languedocian government centred on cooperation, the kernel of which was that 
Louis XIV allowed established local elites and institutions to retain (in his name) the 
functions of day-to-day government, while simultaneously intruding a light 
supervisory machinery in the form of the intendants.7  The result was that ‘the king 
and the rulers had been linked in one larger unit which guaranteed the king support 
and lent the rulers glamour and favour as never before’.8  If this emphasis on 
collaboration sets Beik apart from the ‘imperial’ school, equally striking is his 
insistence that the impetus behind the process of integration came as much from the 
locality as from the centre.  The provincial elite, he argues, sought to use the power 
of the crown to reinforce and entrench their accustomed privileges.9  Beik’s 
assessment is therefore strikingly distinct from those ‘imperial’ readings discussed 
                                                                                                                                                                      
85’ in T.W. Moody, F.X. Martin, and F.J. Byrne (eds.), A New History of Ireland, iii, Early Modern 
Ireland 1634-1691 (Oxford, 1976), pp.420-53, at pp.438-43 on Ireland. 
6 W. Beik, Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial 
Aristocracy in Languedoc (Cambridge, 1998), pp.177-219. 
7 Ibid., pp.243-316. 
8 Ibid., p.244. 
9 Ibid., p.332. 
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above: Languedoc consented to and co-operated with the integrationist policies of 
the crown, which in turn worked through established local power structures.10  
 If the ‘imperial’ and ‘collaborative’ schools represent general theoretical 
approaches to the problem of centre-periphery relations, more detailed examination 
of how historians have approached the actual mechanisms of interaction reveals 
three distinct models.  The first of these is political, a clear exemplar of which has 
been offered by J.L. Price in reference to the Dutch Republic: 
 
Political authority was more clearly established at local and provincial levels, 
and the nature of the Dutch polity was determined by the degree to which 
circumstances compelled these bodies in practice to cede powers to a central 
government.11 
 
 
For Price, the relationship between centre and periphery in the Republic was 
conditioned by the disparate nature of political power, and the authority of the States 
General was in constant balance with the autonomous pretensions of the provinces 
and towns.  There is an overlap here with the treatment of Swedish imperialism.  
Upton’s account implies throughout that Sweden’s relationship with its exterior 
territories rested essentially on asserting the authority of government institutions, 
and David Kirby makes this point explicit: 
                                                           
10 Again, Beik’s ‘collaborative’ approach mirrors that taken by a number of other historians 
working on different regions.  See R.J.W. Evans, ‘The Habsburg Monarchy and Bohemia, 
1526-1848’ in M. Greengrass (ed.), Conquest and Coalescence: The Shaping of the State in Early 
Modern Europe (Sevenoaks, 1991), pp.134-54, at pp.143-45 on Bohemia;  H. Kamen, Spain in the 
Later Seventeenth Century 1665-1700 (London, 1980), pp.16-17 on the Spanish kingdoms; H.W. 
Koch, ‘Brandenburg-Prussia’ in J. Miller (ed.), Absolutism in Seventeenth Century Europe 
(Basingstoke and London, 1990), pp.123-56, at pp.141-42 and at p.147 on Brandenburg-Prussia 
and M.J. Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, c.1500-1700 (Cambridge, 2000), 
pp.45-46 and at pp.92-93 and J.R. Kent, ‘The Centre and the Localities: State Formation and 
Parish Government in England, Circa 1640-1740’, Historical Journal, 38:2, 1995, pp.363-404, at 
p.403 on England. 
11 J.L. Price, The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century (Basingstoke and London, 1998), 
p.55. 
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Karl XI was content to reduce the political power of the Baltic nobility and to 
strengthen his grip on the provinces through the introduction of Swedish 
church law and the Swedish legal system.12 
 
The complexity and ambiguity of politics as a medium of interaction is a major 
theme in Anthony McFarlane’s account of early colonial North America.  He argues 
that the political ties between the British Crown and its colonies were minimal for 
most of the seventeenth century, consisting largely of a shared ideological 
attachment to liberty and representative government which, in practice, meant that 
each colony was largely self-governing.13  After 1670, however, McFarlane detects a 
very different impulse emanating from London: 
 
The policy of tightening royal control over colonial government was part of a 
wider political pattern, based on the desire of the Stuart monarchy to exercise 
greater power over its subjects and to increase its revenues, coupled with the 
interests of powerful politicians who were personally interested in the 
colonies and their trade.14 
 
This more interventionist policy – which, for McFarlane, lasted until the Glorious 
Revolution (1688-89) – was enforced in a number of ways, such as the establishment 
of the Lord Commissioners of Trade and Plantations (1675), the military occupation 
of Virginia (1677), the erection of New Hampshire as a Crown colony (1679) or, most 
infamously of all, the rearrangement of the entire north-east into the Dominion of 
New England (1685).  Alan Taylor is in agreement with the narrative thrust of 
McFarlane’s work, although he is more robust in attributing the turmoil of the 1670s 
and 1680s to a desire on the part of James VII and II in particular to use ‘the 
                                                           
12 D. Kirby, Northern Europe in the Early Modern Period: The Baltic World 1493-1772 (London, 
1990), p.281. 
13 A. McFarlane, The British in the Americas 1480-1815 (London and New York, 1994), p.193 
14 Ibid., p.200. 
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American colonies as cash cows to fund a more authoritarian crown’.15  If the 
American example shows how volatile and brittle political integration could be, it 
nevertheless remains true that historians have tended to view institutional linkages 
as the most fundamental form of interaction between centre and periphery. 
The political model is well established in the historiography of the Highlands, 
and has been utilised by historians working from both the ‘imperial’ and 
‘collaborative’ positions.  The ‘imperial’ line, much the more traditional, is well 
summed up by Gordon Donaldson’s vision of centre-periphery relations in the 
Highlands in terms of ‘the extension of the power of central government.’16  A more 
extensive restatement of this view has been offered by Julian Goodare in his 
exploration of Jacobean policy: 
 
The primary aim, of course, was to get the Highland chiefs to submit to the 
authority of the state.  James [VI] recognized that they would not do so 
voluntarily; they would have to be coerced.17 
 
According to Goodare, the Scottish state’s Highland policy took the form of the 
forcible imposition of central government’s power upon a reluctant populace.  
Moreover, he is adamant that the political institutions intruded by the Crown 
deliberately excluded local elites and sought to exploit the resources of the 
Highlands for the benefit of the core; an ‘imperialistic’ relationship in the purest 
sense.18  If Goodare offers a rather hypothetical vision – and once which, despite the 
author’s claim to the contrary, has little relevance beyond the adult reign of James VI 
(r.1567-1625) – most historians adhering to an ‘imperial’ political position focus more 
                                                           
15 A. Taylor, American Colonies: The Settling of North America (London, 2001), p.276. 
16 G. Donaldson, Scotland: James V to James VII (Edinburgh, 1965), p.227. 
17 Goodare, State and Society, p.264. 
18 Ibid., pp.280-82.  For an alternative view, which shares Goodare’s ‘imperial’ understanding 
of the political relationship between centre and periphery but is much less impressed by the 
government’s effectiveness at securing obedience, see Brown, Noble Power in Scotland, p.222. 
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specifically on the concept of law and order.  For example, Isobel Grant and Hugh 
Cheape view seventeenth-century Highland policy as a gradual process of co-opting 
clan chiefs as agents of the law through expedients such as bonding, oaths of 
allegiance and enforced arbitration of land disputes, a thesis which, if considerably 
less colonial than Goodare’s, is nonetheless ‘imperial’ and exclusively political in 
focus.19  Roberts, on the other hand, maintains that government interaction with the 
Highlands after 1660 was limited almost entirely to containing the region’s 
supposedly endemic lawlessness, a view which, while echoing Grant and Cheape in 
focus, is ideologically closer to Goodare.20  Despite such nuances, there is a very clear 
thread connecting all these readings; the centre’s relationship with the Highlands 
involved the imposition from above of political mechanisms for control and 
integration. 
 The ‘collaborative’ vision of political interaction is subtly different, if rather 
less widespread.  Lenman offers perhaps the most sustained statement of it, and his 
argument is based upon a much more restrained assessment of Highland lawlessness 
than is usually allowed under the ‘imperial’ position.  For Lenman, the landowning 
status of the Highland elite meant that their interest in peace and order accorded 
with the government’s.  From this basis, Lenman argues that closer political 
integration, especially after 1660, was fundamentally a consensual process: 
 
In the last analysis, there was no serious alternative to cooperation with the 
local elites […] Cooperation offered both state and chiefs great benefits.  The 
state increased its effectiveness, while decreasing its costs.  The chiefs could 
participate in a Scottish social and economic system which for most of the 
Restoration was buoyant and satisfying, while retaining vast local 
autonomy.21 
                                                           
19 I.F. Grant and H. Cheape, Periods in Highland History (London, 1997), pp.140-43. 
20 Roberts, Clan, King and Covenant, pp.134-40. 
21 Lenman, Jacobite Clans, p.43. 
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If Lenman’s tone is manifestly distinct from those of Goodare, Roberts, and Grant 
and Cheape, a more mixed assessment is that of Ian Whyte.  He concurs with 
Goodare’s ‘imperial’ position insofar as he considers the extension of political links 
between Edinburgh and the Highlands under James VI to have been imposed on an 
unwilling locality.  Yet he also maintains that the relationship altered over the course 
of the seventeenth century, so that, after the 1640s, many leading families came to 
appreciate the advantages of allying with the crown and became themselves 
proponents of political integration.22  If Whyte illustrates that there is scope for 
overlap between the ‘imperial’ and ‘collaborative’ understandings of political 
integration, the two nevertheless display substantive differences.  On the one hand, 
an ‘imperial’ approach views the periphery as the passive recipient of an acquisitive 
centre; on the other, the ‘collaborative’ understanding emphasises the vested interest 
of local elites in strengthening the relationship.  In both cases, however, the emphasis 
is placed on high-level or institutional linkages, the implication being that the 
assimilation of the Highlands was a product of Scotland’s ‘state building’ experience. 
The second model is socio-economic in focus, and perhaps the most obvious 
theatre within which historians have applied such theories is early colonial America.  
Nuala Zahedieh argues that, as early as the Elizabethan period, England had 
developed a concept of empire which stressed the value of colonial possessions in 
distinctly economic terms: 
 
                                                           
22 I.D. Whyte, Scotland before the Industrial Revolution: An Economic and Social History c.1050-
c.1750 (London, 1995), p.268. 
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The colonies provided Britain [sic] with substitutes for a wide range of 
imports and an overplus for sale in European markets [...] The colonies also 
provided a growing market for British manufactured goods.23 
 
For Zahedieh, this economic justification of empire shaped the socio-political 
landscape of colonial America, since the need to service English and later British 
wants stimulated many of the colonies to adopt commercial agricultural practices 
based on staple crops – tobacco in Virginia, sugar in the West Indies and rice in the 
Carolinas.24  In this view, economic factors both facilitated and conditioned the 
relationship between the British core and the colonial periphery.25  Zahedieh’s model, 
although definitely imperial, is not exploitative; both England and America, by her 
reading, gained lucrative and captive markets for their produce.  Toby Bernard’s 
assessment of post-Restoration Ireland, however, offers a much more brutal 
understanding of socio-economic integration: 
 
New English victories opened Ireland to enforced settlement from Britain, 
rather than the gentler infiltration which had been bringing immigrants for 
generations.  In early modern Ireland land abounded; people, especially with 
capital or specialized skills, were scarce.  After prolonged warfare, the 
population reduced by famine and disease, many of the indigenes dead, 
exiled, or marked down for expropriation and resettlement, opportunities 
beckoned to new British settlers.26 
 
For Bernard, schemes for integrating Ireland involved attracting British settlers with 
the promise of land and economic opportunity, and then relying on these people to 
                                                           
23 N. Zahedieh, ‘Economy’ in D. Armitage and M.J. Braddick (eds.), The British Atlantic World, 
1500-1800 (Basingstoke, 2002), pp.51-68, at p.67. 
24 This was especially true after the Navigation Acts of the later seventeenth century 
enshrined in law both the subordination of the colonies to the mother country, and the 
exclusivity of their economic relationship. 
25 Ibid., passim. 
26 T. Bernard, ‘New Opportunities for British Settlement: Ireland, 1650-1700’ in N. Canny 
(ed.), The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century 
(Oxford, 1998), pp.309-27, at pp.309-10. 
Centre-Periphery Historiography and the Highlands 
19 
 
augment the Protestant ruling class and slowly ‘Briticise’ the island – economic 
integration would, therefore, ultimately lead to social and cultural revolution, all of 
which would benefit native society not at all.27  Of course, the idea of offering the 
adventurous spirit betterment in a virgin land has also been seen as crucial in the 
colonisation of the New World: Taylor, for example, notes that the opportunity of 
generating money was one of the most powerful stimulants to the earliest schemes 
for the settlement of Virginia from the 1580s, while Kamen observes that ‘the 
expansion of horizons in the imperial age offered to Spaniards an almost endless 
range of opportunities to better themselves’.28  Essentially, Zahedieh and Bernard are 
dealing with the same process from different ends.  In both cases, they highlight the 
use of economic pressures to initially attract volunteers, who would replace a 
familiar social system with an alien one and, latterly, to regulate the relationship 
between mother country and colony.  Both models, however, pivot on asserting that 
the process of integration between centre and periphery was carried forward by 
socio-economic factors. 
Again, Scottish historiography contains a notable clutch of socio-economic 
arguments about Highland integration, both ‘imperial’ and ‘collaborative’.  Perhaps 
the most notable ‘imperial’ approach is that of Michael Hechter, who advances the 
idea of the British state practicing ‘internal colonialism’ on its peripheries.  The 
foundation of Hechter’s thesis is that Britain contained two distinct socio-economic 
systems by the early-modern period.  The first, found in all Highland areas, was 
‘Celtic’, marked by a pastoral economy and sparse, kin-based social structures.  The 
second, found in the Lowlands, was ‘English’ and marked by a more centralised, 
                                                           
27 Ibid., pp.310-15. 
28 Taylor, American Colonies, p.119; H. Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire: The Making of a World 
Power 1492-1763 (London, 2002), p.239. 
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bureaucratic society and arable economy.29  Integration between the two, which 
occurred at different times in each of Britain’s ‘Celtic’ regions, involved the forcible 
realignment of the periphery’s society and economy so that they became addendums 
to those of the core.  In practice this meant agricultural specialisation, so that all 
Celtic regions, beginning with Wales in the sixteenth century and spreading to 
Ireland and Scotland thereafter, rapidly came to concentrate even more heavily on 
pastoral farming, financed by English money and geared towards the English 
market.  This, in turn, had the significant social consequence of forcing substantial 
migration away from Celtic areas, because the consolidation of land into 
commercially-orientated farms necessarily involved the eviction of peoples who had 
previously lived by subsistence.30  Hechter’s thesis is problematic in a number of 
ways, most significantly because it is excessively schematic, which often leads either 
to gross generalisation (the very notion of clear-cut ‘English’ and ‘Celtic’ socio-
economic structures is highly questionable, as is the idea that Scotland, Wales and 
Ireland formed one homogeneous culture zone ranged against England) or uncertain 
terminology (his definition of ‘Celtic’ is vague, and he seems to assume that all of 
Scotland can be labelled ‘Celtic’ for political purposes, but only the Highlands can be 
so called in economic terms).  There are, however, other, less extreme readings which 
overlap ideologically with Hechter.  One of the most bullish is James Hunter’s, who 
maintains that the Statutes of Iona (1609) inaugurated a deliberate policy of attacking 
and undermining the social system of the Highlands, a policy which would remain 
intact, with modification, right up to the Highland Famine of 1846.31  Jenny Wormald 
adopts a comparable, though less shrill, approach to Jacobean Highland policy, 
                                                           
29 M. Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 
(London, 1975), p.58. 
30 Ibid., pp.30-4 and at pp.81-87. 
31 J. Hunter, Last of the Free: A Millennial History of the Highlands and Islands of Scotland 
(Edinburgh, 1999), p.176 and at p.264. 
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stating explicitly that the abortive experiment of settling Fife merchants on Lewis 
between 1602 and 1606 ‘closely paralleled’ the Irish plantations discussed by 
Bernard.32  For Hechter, Hunter and Wormald, then, integration involved the 
deliberate manipulation of socio-economic structures with a view to subordinating 
the periphery to the authority of the core. 
 The ‘colloborative’ position on socio-economic integration, by contrast, tends 
to stress the formative role of both the locality and impersonal factors.  Douglas Watt 
has explored the impact of debt, and argues that rising expenditure and easier access 
to credit after the Reformation plunged much of the Highland elite into chronic 
indebtedness in the seventeenth century.  Strategies for servicing these debts (such as 
commercialisation, rent raising and agricultural improvement) had the additional 
effect of undermining traditional ties of kinship and lordship.33  Watt’s thesis builds 
upon earlier work focusing on specific regions.  Macinnes, for example, has studied 
the estates of the Campbells of Argyll after 1660, and concluded that the need to 
service debts caused the clansmen themselves to implement commercial styles of 
land management; economic change, and by implication social realignment, 
therefore began with the locality.34  Frances Shaw concurs, maintaining that the 
prevalence of short-lease rentals in the southern Hebrides reflected the drift towards 
commercialism as a mechanism for raising liquidity, again to service debts and again 
initiated by the Campbells.35   
However, the most extensive study of socio-economic interaction from a 
‘collaborative’ standpoint has been offered by Robert Dodgshon.  He accepts the 
                                                           
32 J. Wormald, Court, Kirk and Community: Scotland 1470-1625 (Edinburgh, 1991), p.164. 
33 D. Watt, ‘‘The laberinth of thir difficulties’: the Influence of Debt on the Highland elite, 
c.1550-1700’, SHR, 85:219, 2006, pp.28-51, passim. 
34 Macinnes, Clanship, pp.143-48. 
35 F.J. Shaw, The Northern and Western Isles of Scotland: Their Economy and Society in the 
Seventeenth Century (Edinburgh, 1980), p.45 and at p.51. 
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validity of the ‘imperial’ approach to the extent that he views the Statutes of Iona as 
part of a general governmental drive towards eradicating clanship as a socio-
economic construct through attacking its keystone, which for him was the control 
and conspicuous consumption of food.36  But this, he argues, was only part of the 
story, since ‘at best, the Crown and its commissioners can only be credited with 
helping to start this process’, and the impulse away from food-orientated display 
behaviour (essentially, feasting and feuding) and towards a commercial, cash-based 
socio-economic model was reinforced by internal pressures.37  For landlords, cash 
rents were more useful for servicing the debts incurred through increasing interest in 
Lowland social mores, while for tenants, the option of paying in cash made for 
greater flexibility in how they could manage the land.38  The distance between these 
accounts and those of Hechter and Hunter is stark, for while the latter view socio-
economic change as a tool employed deliberately by government for enforcing 
national unity, the ‘collaborative’ vision is that the implementation of this change 
was not solely the work of the core state.  Nevertheless, what all socio-economic 
readings share is a conviction that integration between the Highlands and the wider 
Scottish (or British) polity represented more than merely the extension of 
government competence, and that some form of deeper assimilation was involved.39 
 The final model of centre-periphery integration is cultural.  A clear 
application of this motif in a European context has come from Ingrao in his study of 
Bohemia.  He is in alignment with Evans’ thesis of Bohemian ‘provincialisation’ after 
                                                           
36 Dodgshon, Chiefs to Landlords, pp.102-7. 
37 Ibid., p.107. 
38 Ibid., pp.108-15. 
39 It should be noted, incidentally, that the work of these historians, and others, has 
comprehensively discredited the traditional thesis that socio-economic integration in the 
Highlands was a phenomenon of the post-1746 era.  For an example of the older view, see E. 
Cregeen, ‘Tradition and Change in the West Highlands of Scotland: A Case Study’ in S. 
Dyrvik, K. Mykland, and J. Oldervoll (eds.), The Sattelite State in the 17th and 18th Centuries 
(London, 1979), pp.99-120, at pp.117-18. 
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1627, but offers the further argument that the Czech elite (willingly) adopted German 
as their main language and sought to ape the artistic tastes of the Austrian court and 
aristocracy.  This ‘Germanisation’ was crucial not only for reconciling Bohemia to 
firmer imperial control, but also for allowing the provincial elite greater access to 
office and patronage in Vienna.40  A less mutual arrangement has been traced by 
James Merrell in his assessment of Native relations with English colonists in North 
America.  He notes that Indians living within the boundaries of English settlements 
struggled against ‘the insults, the laughter, the abuses spawned by the conqueror’s 
hatred’, and this, alongside the necessity of dealing with alien linguistic, trading and 
legal traditions forced many Natives to adopt a kind of camouflage, outwardly 
conforming to colonial norms while privately retaining a sense of distinctiveness.41  
Although there is a clear division between these two accounts in terms of why local 
peoples are considered to have aped the mores of the core state, Ingrao and Merrell 
arrive at broadly similar conclusions – namely that integration and consolidation 
were carried forward by cultural alignment. 
This motif links to another vital cultural theme in the historiography.  Taylor 
points out that in English political thought ‘social cohesion and political order 
depended on ethnic and religious uniformity’, which is what made governing the 
heterogeneous ‘Middle Colonies’ of New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania after 
1664 such a challenge.42  This idea, of course, was not limited to the English.  Ingrao’s 
account of Czech ‘Germanisation’ depends upon a similar impulse existing in 
Central Europe, and Paul Douglas Lockhart argues that Swedish aims of 
‘standardization and incorporation’ throughout its empire had ‘a necessary cultural 
                                                           
40 Ingrao, Habsburg Monarchy, p.64. 
41 J.H. Merrell, ‘"The Customes of Our Countrey": Indians and Colonists in Colonial America’ 
in B. Bailyn and P.D. Morgan (eds.), Strangers within the Realm: Cultural Margins of the First 
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component’ (especially in terms of imposing the Swedish language), even if he 
agrees with Upton that this policy was only implemented with any consistency in the 
old Danish provinces such as Skåne.43  But the implications of pursuing cultural 
homogeneity have been traced further in Braddick’s work on the notion of ‘civility’.  
For Braddick, civility was believed to express itself through ‘settled, commercial 
agriculture’, and achieving this mode of social organisation was seen as a vital 
prerequisite for order and good government.  Therefore, ‘claims to legitimacy’ in 
alien culture zones could be powerfully reinforced by denigrating native society for 
its lack of organised agriculture and, by extension, its lack of civility.44  The crucial 
point highlighted by Braddick is that the direct connection drawn by contemporaries 
between cultural uniformity and political stability was reinforced by an equally 
unequivocal belief in the innate superiority of European society and culture.  Thus, if 
diversity was a political problem, the theory of ‘civility’ offered a solution, and it 
became legitimate, if not obligatory, to replace (barbaric) Native culture with its 
(civilized) European counterpart. 
Such ideas do indeed powerfully mark the historiography.  J.M. Powell offers 
a succinct application of them to the North American theatre: 
 
The Europeans clearly entered the New World with a vital sense of mission.  
Part of that mission entailed a conversion of the native peoples to ‘civilized’ 
ways, and it incorporated a strongly ethnocentric application of the 
increasing emphasis in post-Reformation Europe on the ‘perfectibility of 
man’.  So, for example, the Indians could only be ‘improved’ if they were 
settled upon their own cultivated farms.45   
 
                                                           
43 P.D. Lockhart, Sweden in the Seventeenth Century (Basingstoke and London, 2004), p.135. 
44 M.J. Braddick, ‘Civility and Authority’ in D. Armitage and M.J. Braddick (eds.), The British 
Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (Basingstoke, 2002), pp.93-112, at pp.100-3. 
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Similarly, Nicholas Canny argues that English rule in Ireland during and after the 
reign of Elizabeth I (r.1558-1603) was predicated upon conceptualisation of the native 
Irish as pagan and barbaric, which led in turn to an idea of ‘cultural process’; the 
Irish were ‘far behind the English on the ladder of social development’’ and would 
have to be ‘painfully dragged to modernity’.46  The thesis of denigration to justify 
cultural extirpation is not limited to the historiography of British expansion, 
however.  In Brazil, the the perception of barbarity – particularly relating to the 
cannibalistic rites of the coastal Tupi tribes – convinced Portuguese settlers that the 
indigenous peoples were a lower form of humanity.  This, in turn, variously justified 
enslavement, aggressive missionary endeavour, and, by the later seventeenth 
century, wholesale extirpation to make way for cattle ranches.47  Connecting all of 
these points is the idea that a stark division between the civilised and the uncivilised 
was a fundamental means of reinforcing and legitimising central claims to hegemony 
over distant or culturally distinct peripheries.  This, in turn, meant that integration 
necessarily involved ensuring not just cultural uniformity, but uniformity under the 
metropolitan culture, something which could either take the form of voluntary 
assimilation in the locality (as in Ingrao’s account of Bohemia) or the forcible removal 
of native elements (as in Merrell’s vision of North America).  Either way, the 
suppression of peripheral distinctiveness was crucial. 
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In the context of the Highlands, the most frequently cited cultural factor is the 
spread of Scots or English at the expense of Gaelic, and the vast majority of historians 
have adopted an ‘imperial’ position on this issue.  Hunter, for example, maintains 
that an integral component of the reforming policies which he identifies as having 
started in 1609 was to root out Gaelic and replace it with English, as a means of 
undermining the separate identity of the Highlands.48  In a similar vein, Grant and 
Cheape argue that the school-planting policy which evolved throughout the 
seventeenth century was based upon a belief that schools could act as beacons for 
disseminating English, which was in turn deemed vital because Gaelic culture was 
seen to foment lawlessness.49  Macinnes is almost alone in offering a dissenting 
‘collaborative’ voice by arguing that: 
 
The erosion of Gaelic was an insidious development, a by-product of the 
assimilation of the chiefs and leading gentry into the Scottish landed classes: 
not the direct result of an official declaration of war against the language.50   
 
Thus, either the decline of Gaelic was a crucial prerequisite to ‘imperial’ drives 
towards political and socio-economic integration, or it was emblematic of the 
successful completion of ‘collaborative’ assimilation.   
The idea of cultural transformation in the Highlands has received its most 
rigorous treatment from Charles Withers, whose analysis combines the theme of 
cultural assimilation with an investigation into the underlying intellectual processes 
used to justify it.  He argues that there developed in the seventeenth-century 
Lowlands a distinct mental construct of Gaeldom and the Gaels as backward and 
lawless, which development he considers to have been crucial:  
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This ideological and intellectual production had two principal functions: of, 
firstly, identifying the region and its people as inferior, an ‘inferiority’ which 
demanded amelioration by ‘superiors’; and secondly, of legitimating and 
rationalising those processes of change directed by superiors at cultural forms 
in which rested, to the outside (‘superior’) eye, the region’s material and 
intellectual backwardness.51 
 
So, according to Withers cultural transformation implied the wholesale eradication of 
the ideological foundations upon which Highland society was based, and their 
replacement with Lowland or English variants.  Anglicisation was certainly part of 
this – indeed, Withers sees the spread of English through education and the Kirk as a 
vital first step because effective transformation had to be ‘mediated and legitimated 
through the same language’ – but in its entirety it involved all aspects of Highland 
life, including the distribution of political power and agricultural production.52  
Moreover, despite the fact that local collusion could be relied upon for each 
individual transformative project, the strategy of which they were all part was 
emphatically ‘imperial’ in nature, since it was driven forward by a core state which 
found the distinctiveness of the Highlands offensive and threatening.  Yet Withers’ 
thesis is not entirely convincing, partially because his underlying idea of a 
transformative discourse emanating from the centre attaches an implausible degree 
of homogeneity to the attitudes of successive governments towards the Highlands, 
and partially because his geographical area of study includes some regions which 
cannot comfortably be described as ‘Gaelic’ in the period he considers (seventeenth 
to twentieth centuries), including Caithness, Easter Ross and, especially, Moray.  
Nevertheless, his key point of the Highlands becoming increasingly synonymous in 
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the minds of Lowlanders with barbarity and incivility has found widespread 
support.  Stevenson, for example, gives sweeping expression to these preconceptions: 
 
To the Lowlanders who formed the majority (perhaps two thirds) of 
Scotland’s population the Gaelic culture of the Highlands, with its close links 
with native Irish culture, hardly seemed worthy of the name ‘culture’ at all 
[...] And, like most people in most ages, the Lowlander assumed that a culture 
different from his own must be inferior.53 
 
If few historians have offered a model of cultural integration as bold as Withers’, 
there is a clear general trend to such readings; cultural uniformity, backed up by the 
denigration of the Gaels, acted to reinforce political and socio-economic forms of 
integration, either as a prop to them, or a marker of their success.54 
It will be obvious from the forgoing discussion that the three models of 
centre-periphery interaction – political, socio-economic and cultural – are rarely 
proffered in isolation, least of all in reference to the Highlands.55  Dodgshon, for 
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example, primarily champions the socio-economic theory, but leaves room for 
political pressures as a catalyst for change and, moreover, links the whole process to 
a culture-shift away from native and towards Lowland mores – essentially, the 
abandonment of conspicuous consumption of food in favour of conspicuous 
consumption of consumer goods.  Goodare, whose ideas of state expansion are 
thoroughly political in focus, nevertheless hints at an economic impulse as well, 
claiming that ‘government policy also had a secondary aim: to open up the economic 
resources of the Highlands to exploitation by lowlanders’.56  Withers, the most 
important proponent of cultural integration in the early modern Highlands, ties his 
model into a barrage of political, social and economic transformative projects.  It is 
Newton, however, who provides one of the clearest examples of an historian 
drawing upon all three models, for he argues that the assimilation of Gaeldom from 
the sixteenth century was driven by a ‘Scottish Crown [which] became more 
organised, intrusive and demanding’.57  At the same time, he acknowledges the 
socio-economic and cultural aspects of the process, as well as illustrating the 
potential overlap between the ‘imperial’ and ‘collaborative’ approaches: 
 
Between being educated in English in the Lowlands, frequent and extended 
sojourns outside of their home territories, and mounting debt, Gaelic 
chieftains increasingly compromised the social contract of clanship.58 
 
It can be said, in other words, that historians’ treatment of centre-periphery 
interaction tends to involve a blend of the different means of state consolidation, 
with differences usually being of emphasis rather than kind.  By contrast there is a 
much more sharply defined spectrum of opinion as regards the 
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‘imperial’/‘collaborative’ dichotomy – something which can be seen running 
through every level of Highland historiography, from the rabidly ‘imperialist’ 
visions of Goodare and Hunter to the much gentler ‘collaborative’ approaches of 
Dodgshon and Lenman.  The real debate, then, is not over the nature of integration 
as a process (which, it is widely agreed, was complex and multifaceted) but centres 
on where the impulse towards consolidation originated, and why. 
 An important subsection in the centre-periphery historiography of early 
modern Britain is the debate over the ‘British Problem’. In simple terms, discussion 
pivots on the nature of the relationship between the three kingdoms of England, 
Scotland and Ireland, and the difficulties involved in moulding them into a single 
coherent polity.  Within the historiography of the post-1660 ‘British Problem’, three 
themes have been accorded special significance.  The first concerns the degree of 
similarity, or otherwise, between the three kingdoms.  Ronald Hutton stresses that 
the various Restoration Settlements ensured that there were a number of points of 
convergence, such as the rehabilitation of traditional elites, episcopal church 
government and radical fiscal innovation.59  Yet Hutton also acknowledges that these 
superficial similarities concealed important differences, and it is this idea of 
divergence that is much the more dominant.  As has already been noted, one of the 
crudest delineations is that of Hechter, who boldly divides the British Isles into two 
incompatible socio-economic systems; ‘Celtic’ and ‘English’.60  Hardly more 
sophisticated is the old-fashioned understanding, restated by some modern 
historians such as John Miller and Gary De Krey, that the ‘British Problem’ involved 
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a bureaucratic and advanced English state struggling in vain to coexist with two 
much more primitive satellite kingdoms.61   
Others, however, have offered more nuanced and convincing assessments, 
especially with regards to England and Scotland.  Mark Goldie rejects the notion that 
the union of 1707 was the climax of a slow-burning process of convergence between 
the two kingdoms, focusing instead on five broad differences that ‘drove a wedge 
between the two nations’ in the thirty years after 1660.62  These are: the failure of the 
Cromwellian union; the vitality of Presbyterianism in Scotland; the greater extremity 
of the Royalist reaction in Scotland and, by extension, its experience of royal 
absolutism; the vitality of the Scottish legal system; and the more primitive social 
structures of the northern kingdom.  All this leads Goldie to believe that union 
resulted not from the similarity of the Scottish and English kingdoms, but from the 
need to paper over their differences in the wake of post-1688 dynastic crises.63  A 
similar thesis of divergence has been offered by Keith Brown in his analysis of 
Scottish lordly culture in the seventeenth century: 
 
What is clear is that the Scottish aristocracy retained a very strong attachment 
to their own national identity.  A distinct aristocratic Scottish culture did not 
simply roll over and die in 1603, or even in 1707.64 
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Brown looks at three broad channels of possible Anglo-Scottish elite integration – 
marriage, education and office-holding – for each of which he concludes that a 
degree of interaction and cross-fertilisation did take place, but never in a manner, or 
to an extent, that threatened the independent identity of either Scots or English 
aristocrats. 65   
 However, Brown provide an important caveat elsewhere in his work, since he 
argues that the growth of a ‘British’ military establishment, especially after 1660, 
allowed Scottish nobles to win commissions and so become ‘integrated into a British 
military elite committed to [...] a view of the world shaped by the interests of a 
British state’.66  Similarly, Jackson’s examination of judicial torture in post-1660 
Scotland makes the crucial point that difference did not necessarily mean divergence.  
Torture was illegal in England but still used occasionally in Scotland.  Jackson shows 
that this stark difference in fact helped to create a political culture which transcended 
national borders, both because official Scottish thinking gradually came to accord 
with England by attaching ‘a broader range of juridical, political, moral, and 
epistemological anxieties’ to the use of torture, and, more crucially, because the 
availability of torture as a tool to the monarchy in Scotland aroused universal fears 
about the potential emergence of Stuart tyranny.67  This idea has been broadened out 
by Braddick.  He observes that, from the mid-sixteenth century, Scotland underwent 
a process of state formation which ran independently from England’s and which 
took it in some different directions.  Yet he maintains that the overall Protestant, 
Anglophone ethos of Scotland’s state building experience ‘did create the possibility 
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[...] of coalescence’.68  Such points illustrate that historians must be careful of 
applying simple labels like ‘convergence’ or ‘divergence’ to developments after 1660, 
but an awareness that the situation was complex and fluid does not alter the general 
consensus that the British polity was in the Restoration composed of three distinct 
and in some ways very different kingdoms. 
Work highlighting the differences in socio-political structure between the 
discrete units of the British monarchy should be read alongside that of Barnard, who 
has sketched out divergences in their relations to one another, specifically the 
different approaches taken by Whitehall to the governments of Scotland and Ireland 
after 1660.  Bernard’s thesis is rooted in the different constitutional positions of the 
two outlying kingdoms – Scotland was an ostensibly separate and independent 
kingdom, while Ireland was a long-standing dependent of the English crown.  As a 
result, although government policy in each country stressed devolution to traditional 
elites, the outcomes were radically different; for Ireland, it heightened elite 
dependence on London, while for Scotland, it reinforced the sovereignty of 
Edinburgh’s governmental machinery.  Delegation, in other words, sustained 
Scottish autonomy but heightened Irish subordination.69  A related point has been 
made by Macinnes through his analysis of Gaelic poetry in both Ireland and 
Scotland.  He traces a notable difference in the subject-matter of the two corpora, 
because while Ireland concentrated on criticising and denigrating English settlers 
and the English government, Scottish Gaelic poets were much more inclined to 
criticise native elites who involved themselves too freely in Lowland or English 
affairs.  This, for Macinnes, reflected the differing positions of Gaelic elites within the 
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Scottish and Irish polities; while Scottish Gaeldom had undergone a partial 
assimilation into the Scottish state, native Irish remained comprehensively excluded 
from public life.70  There is therefore a broad consensus that the decades after 1660 
generally witnessed strong divergences between the three kingdoms, not only in 
their internal structures but also in their modes of interaction.  This, in turn, is seen as 
producing a degree of tension which made the British regal union a decidedly 
problematic arrangement. 
The second major theme in the historiography of the ‘British Problem’ after 
1660 is the concept of an intimate interplay between national interests and those of 
the broader British state.  Jim Smyth offers a detailed discussion of this tension in the 
religious sphere.  For him, the erection of monolithic, episcopalian and Erastian 
systems of church government in each kingdom after 1660 was viewed by the 
imperial monarchy as a vital mechanism of control.  At the same time, however, 
pressures from within each kingdom pushed towards the same end, as political elites 
reacted against the confessional toleration of the Commonwealth or, in Scotland, the 
theocratic pretensions of the Covenanting movement.71  Smyth concedes, of course, 
that the ecclesiastical settlements led to destabilisation in the medium- to long-term, 
especially in Scotland, but the point of an initial convergence of interest remains.  
Smyth emphasises the potential accord between English, Scottish or Irish needs on 
the one hand, and British requirements on the other, but the alternative view is 
vocalised by Macinnes, who signposts the central weakness of the relationship when 
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he states that ‘the extent to which non-anglocentric interests could be accommodated 
within the English body politic was the historic nub of the British problem’.72  To this 
can be added Wormald’s argument that the overriding importance of English issues 
in the eyes of the Crown directly and negatively impacted on Scotland: 
 
The chill wind of neglect was now fully felt.  Under Cromwell, there had been 
a measure of order in the way in which Scotland was ruled.  For the rest of 
the century, it became very clear that it was English, not Scottish, interests 
which were paramount.  Political life was chaotic.73 
 
At a more forensic level, Hutton highlights the occasional damage done to the 
Scottish and Irish economies under the regal union: the interests of the London-based 
monarchy in fighting the Dutch Wars of the 1660s and 1670s directly conflicted with 
Scottish trade patterns, for which the Low Countries were crucial, while Ireland 
suffered a more direct setback through the banning of Irish cattle imports as a means 
of boosting the livestock industry in England.74   
If Macinnes, Wormald and Hutton emphasise the problems faced by the 
Stuarts’ two smaller kingdoms in dealing with the larger, the inverse has been 
explored by Jackson, for whom it was a frequent tactic of the Restored monarchy to 
exploit its ‘British identity’ for domestic gain in England – not least by advertising 
the relatively stable loyalty of the Scottish political elite as a means of cowing 
opposition, most notably during the Exclusion Crisis (1679-82).75  This theme of the 
monarchy becoming more aware of the potential value of the British dimension has 
also informed the work of Bernard on the military: 
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By the early 1670s, as royal policy was more loudly disputed, the political 
tractability of the regular forces encouraged Charles II and his advisers to 
regard army officers as reliable agents of a supranational monarchy.  All three 
kingdoms, together with overseas outposts, were increasingly organized as a 
single military unit through and between which men moved freely.76 
 
Bernard points out that the early years of the Restoration had seen the building up of 
national militias, especially in England and Scotland.  The partial replacement of 
these with a more professional force, recruited from, and deployed throughout, the 
entirety of the Stuart lands represented not only the government’s monopolisation of 
violence, but also (and much more sinisterly) the development of a coercive 
machinery that could be used to override national interests - as, indeed, Barnard 
considers to have happened when Richard Talbot, 1st earl of Tyrconnell established a 
militarised, Catholic regime in Ireland for James VII and II.77  Taken together, 
interpretations such as these illustrate the sometimes convergent but more often 
conflicting outlooks of the three British kingdoms, as well as the tension between 
‘national’ and ‘imperial’ interests, and the extent to which these stresses shaped the 
Restoration polity. 
The final major issue prominent in historiographical discussion of the 
Restoration ‘British Problem’ is the divergence between English, Scottish and Irish 
attitudes to, and hopes for, union.  This was not of course a new issue, and Wormald 
has shown that James VI and I’s attempts to create a united imperial monarchy 
before 1607 foundered on the fact that Scots considered their kingdom to be 
England’s equal while the English emphatically did not.78  Pursuing a similar theme, 
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Smyth argues that the issue of union was after 1660 treated very differently in each of 
the three kingdoms.  England remained enthusiastic about its partial unions with 
both Ireland and Scotland, since ‘the status quo […] afforded the English court real 
political and […] commercial advantages’ because “John Bull’s other kingdoms’ were 
both, in their different ways, subordinate’.79  Scotland shared English conservatism, 
but for a very different reason; she was disinclined to consider fuller union because 
of the taint of national humiliation associated with the last such project under the 
Commonwealth.  Ireland was the most receptive of the three, largely because a more 
formalised union was seen as a means of tackling the constitutional anomaly 
whereby the Irish crown was at once separate from and subordinate to the English 
monarchy.80  Union, therefore, meant different things in each of the three kingdoms, 
and for Smyth these aspirations were sufficiently irreconcilable to preclude Anglo-
Scottish and Anglo-Irish union until contexts were altered by emergency 
circumstances in 1707 and 1801 respectively.   
Macinnes shares this idea of differing agendas, and he theorises that there 
existed in the seventeenth-century four distinct models of union – ‘Britannic’, 
‘Gothic’ (both originating in England), ‘Scottish’ and ‘Irish’.  The ‘Britannic’ vision 
advocated the creation of a fresh imperial entity out of the constituent nations of the 
British Isles; the ‘Gothic’ outlook aimed at fashioning a state based upon English 
dominance over the lesser kingdoms; ‘Scottish’ ideas ran towards a federal union of 
equals; and the ‘Irish’ position, like the ‘Scottish’, emphasised equality, but within a 
much looser, ‘associative’ relationship.  For Macinnes, the Restoration, which 
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witnessed the triumph of English ideas (with both ‘Britannic’ and ‘Gothic’ elements 
in evidence) across the three kingdoms, challenged only by a brief resurgence of the 
‘Scottish’ alternative in the form of the abortive Anglo-Scottish negotiations over 
commercial confederation in the late 1660s, should be seen as one episode in the 
ongoing rivalry between these programmes.81   
The most in-depth discussion of seventeenth-century conceptions of union 
has been offered by Brian Levack, who views the issue in terms of four distinct types 
of Anglo-Scottish union: parliamentary, royal, executive and religious.  All four 
models, in Levack’s view, were discussed at some point during the Restoration 
period, but all foundered because English and Scottish attitudes towards union were 
shaped by the different historical experiences of the two kingdoms, as well as by the 
shared, but usually incompatible, desire to ensure that national integrity was not 
compromised.  This reinforces the idea that union meant different things to different 
groups, and that the lack of an agreed agenda made the relationship between the 
Stuart kingdoms highly fluid and volatile.82 
The themes that mark the historiography of the Restoration ‘British Problem’ 
– divergence, competing interests, and incompatible aspirations for union – have led 
many historians to conclude that the three-way regal union injected a bewildering 
degree of complexity into British politics after 1660 and was, therefore, a source of 
insuperable destabilisation.  Yet this focus on difficulties should not disguise the fact 
that some have offered far more optimistic readings.  Conrad Russell is the most 
notable, maintaining that the Stuarts’ ‘unwieldy combination of states […] must be 
counted a success’, mainly because all the tensions working towards immediate 
incompatibility – such as religious and legal plurality, competing oversees interests 
                                                           
81 Macinnes, Union and Empire, pp.54-61, pp.81-83, pp.107-8 and at pp.120-25. 
82 B.P. Levack, The Formation of the British State: England, Scotland, and the Union 1603-1707 
(Oxford, 1987), pp.45-49, pp.52-57, pp.59-64, pp.103-22 and at pp.130-32. 
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and English constitutional rigidity – tended to bring about stability in the long 
term.83  If Russell’s contribution serves as a reminder that the destabilising impact of 
the British multiple monarchy has not been universally accepted, there is 
nevertheless a general consensus that the vast differences between England, Scotland 
and Ireland in the period after 1660 made it highly problematic for the Stuart kings to 
rule each simultaneously, let alone construct an overarching ‘British’ interest that 
incorporated all three within a single whole. 
The historiography of centre-periphery interaction in the seventeenth-century 
is highly multifarious, as would be expected from a topic that incorporates such a 
diverse range of experiences. Nevertheless, the two schools – ‘imperial’ and 
‘collaborative’ – provide a robust and helpful means of organising the corpus, for 
they reflect a very real division between those studies which focus on the role of the 
centre in initiating and driving integration, versus others which accord a more 
substantial role to the locality itself.  The contrast is particularly valid in the 
historiography of the Scottish Highlands, and can be traced running through the 
more detailed discussion on the mechanisms of interaction.  Yet if this latter 
discourse, involving the political, socio-economic and cultural models of 
assimilation, has served to reinforce the ‘imperial’/‘collaborative’ dichotomy, it has 
also, perhaps more importantly, illustrated the range of factors involved in centre-
periphery assimilation, and the extent to which the interplay of these pressures 
shaped the process of state formation.  All this is a crucial prerequisite for 
understanding the historiography of the ‘British Problem’, probably the most 
powerful motif in the recent historiography of seventeenth-century Britain, and one 
whose dominant contention is variety.  The sheer divergence of traditions, interests 
                                                           
83 C. Russell, ‘Composite Monarchies in Early Modern Europe: The British and Irish Example’ 
in A. Grant and K.J. Stringer (eds.), Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History 
(London, 1995), pp.133-46, passim. 
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and aspirations between England, Scotland and Ireland have led many (although not 
all) historians to emphasise the inherent instability of the Stuart multiple monarchy, 
as well as the difficulties involved in fashioning from it a ‘British’ state.  The most 
striking feature of this historiography, however, is the extent to which the instability 
of the British union is ascribed to the lack of firm political, social or cultural links 
between the ruling elites of the three kingdoms, or at least any which tied all three 
and not just two.  The ‘British Problem’, then, represents a case of the centre-
periphery problem writ large, a project in state-formation whose weaknesses, 
whatever their extent, have been attributed to the inability of an as yet ill-defined 
centre to maintain any of the machinery of interaction which is normally considered 
to sustain centre-periphery assimilation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Highlands in Britain 
 
In May 1965, Donaldson argued that there existed in Scotland a ‘conservative 
north’ throughout the early-modern period.  As part of his model, Donaldson offered 
an assessment of the role of the Highlands during this era: 
 
The highlands proper barely come into the subject under discussion, for they 
played hardly any part in the main stream of Scottish affairs in the sixteenth 
century and intervened only occasionally in the seventeenth.1  
 
Donaldson’s bold assessment neatly encapsulates one of the most enduring motifs of 
historical writing in Scotland – the notion that the Highlands supported a distinct 
and insular society, remaining isolated from the British mainstream until at least the 
second half of the eighteenth century (and, some would argue, never quite managing 
to integrate).2  Yet historians are becoming increasingly willing to question this 
orthodoxy, and to recognise signs of Highland integration pre-dating the ‘45.3  This 
chapter seeks to balance these differing perceptions through a detailed exploration of 
the place of the Highlands within the Restoration polity.  It begins with an 
assessment of the region’s image, as constructed both by external and native 
observers.  It then proceeds to analyse the identity espoused by the Highland elite, as 
well as the degree of their integration into wider Scottish society.  Finally, it 
considers the role of the government bureaucracy in binding the locality to the 
centre. 
                                                           
1 G. Donaldson, ‘Scotland’s Conservative North in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series, 16: 1965, pp.65-79, at p.74. 
2 A more recent restatement of this position, complete with romantic nostalgia for the 
Highlands’ lost contentment, can be found in Hunter, Last of the Free, pp.382-83. 
3 See, in particular, Dodgshon, Chiefs to Landlords; Macinnes, Clanship; S. Nenadic, Lairds and 
Luxury: The Highland Gentry in Eighteenth-century Scotland (Edinburgh, 2007). 
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Contemporary conceptualisation of the Highlands was dominated above all 
by a sense of its peripheral status.  Part of this was simple physical inaccessibility.  
Archibald Campbell, Lord Lorne was perhaps guilty of some affectation when he 
explained to Lauderdale that ‘I liue at such a distance [tha]t I know nothing of what 
is doing at London scarce at Ed[inbu]r[gh]’, but his refrain was not unique.4  The 
Irish Catholic priest John Cahassy, who spent several years as a missionary in the 
western Highlands during the early 1680s, was equally aware of the region’s 
challenging geography: 
 
The uayes are the more paine full [tha]t a man cannot goe from one countrie 
to another but by climbing hye and Rockie mountains uhose uerie tops are so 
boggie and uatrish that neuer a man can tr’auaile their uith dry foot and 
much lesse make use of a horse.5 
 
The practical constraints imposed by this geographical isolation were a constant 
headache.  The Scottish Parliament declared in 1661 that the landscape was so wild 
that ‘it is impossible for heraulds to travell’ there; Lorne, now 9th earl of Argyll, noted 
in 1665 that ‘it is much harder catching men in the Highlands’; and in 1680 Colonel 
James Menzies, commander of one of the two Highland companies, reported that a 
military commission intended for Glenorchy had been lost en route to the north.6  
Moreover, it had long been recognised that these difficulties could have potentially 
sinister results.  One-time archbishop of Canterbury George Abbot (1562-1633) noted 
that: 
 
                                                           
4 BL, Lauderdale Papers 1630-60, Add. Mss. 23113, f.86r. 
5 SCA, Blair Letters, BL/1/90/2. 
6 RPS, 1661/1/29; G. Sinclair (ed.), Letters from Archibald, Earl of Argyll to John, Duke of 
Lauderdale (Edinburgh, 1829), p.30; NRS, Breadalbane Muniments, GD112/39/131/13. 
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[Scotland] is generally divided into two parts […] the High-land, which lyeth 
further the North […] is more rude and savage, and whither the King hath 
not so good accesse, by reason of Rocks and mountains, as to bring the 
Noblemen, which inhabite there to such due conformity of Religion, or 
otherwise, as he would.7 
 
Abbot’s recognition that topographical challenges had political implications struck a 
cord, and the possibility that the Highlands might act as a ‘black hole’, harbouring 
unsavoury or seditious elements, constantly exercised the government.  John Leslie, 
7th earl of Rothes, frustrated in 1666 by the difficulties involved in catching those who 
had been involved in the Pentland Rising, reported rumours that some of them had 
fled ‘to our owne Highlands, ther to lurke’.8  Similar concerns were also voiced by 
the Ogilvies of Airlie regarding thieves.9  All this was hardly paranoid, since the 
protection of geography was often invoked.  In 1662, the Catholic priest Father 
Winster, employed by the marchioness of Huntly, was advised that, in order to 
escape governmental attention, he should simply ‘goe home quyetlie towards the 
hylands; wher they will neuer looke after [you]’.10  Similarly, Argyll himself, when 
pressed in 1676 by the advocate Rory Mackenzie for repayment of an 8,000 merk 
debt, scuppered the citation simply by retreating to Inveraray, and carrying ‘away all 
his plenishing to a secure place in the Hylands above Stirling’.11 
 In addition, the Highlands were seen as economically peripheral.  The 
English cleric Joshua Childrey dismissed the ‘Soil in the High-lands’ as ‘very poor 
and barren generally’.12  Cahassy offered more detail: 
                                                           
7 George Abbot, A briefe description of the whole world (London, 1664), pp.206-7.  This tract was 
originally published in 1617, but reprinted in its fifth edition in 1664. 
8  O. Airy (ed.), The Lauderdale Papers, 3 vols (London, 1884-5), i, p.257. 
9 NRS, Airlie Papers, GD16/41/379. 
10 SCA, BL1/26/1. 
11 John Lauder, Historical Notices of Scottish Affairs, 2 vols ed. D. Laing (Edinburgh, 1848), i, 
p.109. 
12 Joshua Childrey, Britannia Baconica: or, The natural rarities of England, Scotland, & Wales 
(London, 1662), p.175. 
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The countrie is one of the roughest and uithout any exception the barenest 
that is in europe they haue no corn at all but some litle oats uhich they soue in 
the litle parcels of land uhich they comonly dige uith spades for no pleugh 
can stand uher they haue them because of the precipices, thes oats is scarce 
rype to perfection euer because of the frequent Raines hail snou and thunder 
so that comonly their pouision of bread is consumed by Patrick messe or 
sooner.13 
 
Similar expressions of poorness were made by some Highlands landlords; Sir Hugh 
Campbell of Cawdor complained in 1674 that ‘Bot for this countrey, ther is noe 
money in it at all’, while in 1683 John Campbell, 1st earl of Breadalbane agreed that 
‘these poor highland places’ were not ‘desyrable’.14  A rather different complaint 
exercised the burgh of Cromarty in 1672, when it applied to the Scottish Parliament 
to be relieved of its status as a royal burgh.  Local trade, it claimed, was so poor that 
many of its inhabitants had moved to other burghs, leaving the town to sink into 
abject poverty.15  Perhaps the most strident expression of the Highlands’ reputation 
for economic backwardness came in 1690 from the English statistician Sir William 
Petty.  He suggested that the populations of both Ireland and the Highlands should 
be transported to England and Lowland Scotland.  Petty calculated that this exodus 
would cost the crown some £17 million sterling in costs and lost revenues, but would 
ultimately yield some £75 million sterling, thanks to the greater value of rents in 
England and the Lowlands.  As an added bonus, it would free up more people to 
work in trade and manufacturing, generating yet more income.  Petty’s partially 
                                                           
13 SCA, BL/1/90/1. 
14 Hugh Rose, A Genealogical Deduction of the Family of Rose of Kilravock ed. C. Innes 
(Edinburgh, 1848), p.371; NRAS234, Atholl Estates, box 29/I/3a, item 8. 
15 RPS, 1672/6/24.  The Convention of royal burghs did not recognise Cromarty’s removal 
from the roll of royal burghs until 1685, at which point it became the only burgh to be so 
excused during the Restoration.  It should also be noted that two other burghs – Anstruther 
Wester and Kilrenny – made similar, unsuccessful petition also in 1672.  Toller, ‘‘Now of little 
significancy’?’, pp.152-54. 
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jocular proposal principally concerned Ireland, but the fact that the Highlands were 
also included emphasises the perceived barrenness and economic uselessness of the 
region.16 
Awareness of the Highlands’ peripheral status existed in tandem with a 
pervasive sense of its difference.  Of this the physician and geographer Sir Robert 
Sibbald was keenly aware in 1683: 
 
[Scotland] is also divided by the Mountains, and by the Qualitie of the Soil, 
and Nature of the Inhabitants and their different manner of life, into the 
High-Lands and Low-lands, and the Highlanders and Low-land-men.17 
 
But the discourse went further, and the Highlands were often characterised not just 
as distinct, but as ‘other’.  This manifested itself in a willingness to associate the 
region with the strange and unusual.  Childrey felt comfortable in 1662 asserting the 
waters of Loch Ness were miraculously warm throughout the year, that Loch 
Lomond supported a mobile floating island, that Sutherland and Caithness were 
peppered with mountains made entirely of white marble, and that Atholl was 
infested by ‘witches, and wicked women’.18  Still more outlandish was the cautionary 
tale set down by an anonymous author in 1674, which asserted that a usurer in John 
o’ Groats had been abducted by the Devil and flown around the skies above ‘the cold 
and barren Countrey’ of Caithness for several days, being tortured all the while, 
before his mutilated corpse was finally dropped back to earth.19  A common 
component of the Highlands’ supposed ‘otherness’ was the reputed longevity of its 
inhabitants, particularly in the western isles.  Even the Skye-born writer Martin 
                                                           
16 William Petty, Political arithmetick, or, A discourse concerning the extent and value of lands, 
people, buildings (London, 1690), pp.65-73. 
17 Robert Sibbald, An account of the Scottish atlas, or, The description of Scotland ancient & modern 
(Edinburgh, 1683), p.5. 
18 Childrey, Britannia Baconica, pp.177-79. 
19 Anonymous, Terrible and Wonderful News from Scotland (London, 1674), passim.  
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Martin, generally a sober chronicler, succumbed to this notion.  The inhabitants of 
Jura, he swore, were almost never unwell, and it was relatively common for them to 
live well beyond 100 years – one, Gillouir MacCrain, had recently attained the near-
biblical age of 180.20  Irishness was another, rather less fanciful, marker of Highland 
‘otherness’.  The mathematician John Taylor declared quite baldly in 1687 that 
‘the Highlands are Irish-Scots, and the Lowlands English-Scots’, while the Irish 
historian Edmund Borlase, looking back on the Irish rebellion of 1641, opined that 
‘Highlanders, Redshanks in Scotland [are] for the most part descended out of 
Ireland, holding the Irish Language and Manners still’.21  Taken together, all of this 
added up to a powerful characterisation of Highland Scotland as different, alien and 
mysterious. 
Native commentators were often keen to reinforce this perception, none more 
so than Gaelic poets.  They often dwelt upon the ethnic and cultural distinctiveness 
of their people – Roderick Morison, the ‘Blind Harper’ in the service of the MacLeods 
of Dunvegan, sweepingly dismissed Lowlanders as ‘southron strangers’ in a poem 
from the 1680s.22  Rather more combatively, the bombastic Iain Lom, of the Keppoch 
MacDonalds, relished the idea that the clans of Lochaber might ‘strike fear into men 
of the English speech’.23  The Irish connection was significant in this context.  The 
anonymous author of a song in praise of the MacNaughtons was at pains to highlight 
the strength of their Irish links: 
                                                           
20 Martin Martin, A Description of the Western Islands of Scotland circa 1695 ed. C.W.J. Withers 
(Edinburgh, 2002), pp.144-45. 
21 John Taylor, Tresaurarium mathematicae, or, The treasury of mathematicks (London, 1687), 
p.142; Edmund Borlase, The history of the execrable Irish rebellion trac’d from many preceding acts 
of the grand eruption the 23 October, 1641, and thence persued to the Act of Settlement (London, 
1680), p.19. 
22 Roderick Morison, ‘Oran do Iain Breac Mac Leòid’ [A Song for John Macleod of Dunvegan] 
in An Clarsair Dall ed. W. Matheson, (Edinburgh, 1970), pp.4-11, at pp.4-5. 
23 John MacDonald, ‘Cumha do Mhac Mhic Raghnaill na Ceapaich agus a Bhràthair’ [A 
Lament for MacDonald of Keppoch and his Brother] in Orain Iain Luim: Songs of John 
MacDonald, Bard of Keppoch ed. A.M. Mackenzie (Edinburgh, 1964), pp.108-13, at pp.180-89. 
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Ge b’e thagradh ort gun reusan, 
Bu cham a chòmhdhail da nuair dh’èireadh, 
Thig iomadh connspann leat à Eirinn: 
Thig Iarl Anndram nan each ceumnach 
Bheir a bhàrcan is còig ceud leis’ 
 
[Whosoever would accuse you without reason, rough on him the tryst when 
it happened.  Many a hero will rise with you from Ireland: the Earl of Antrim 
of the stepping horses will bring his ships and five hundred].24    
 
At the same time, poets retained a strong sense of Gaelic solidarity.  Mary MacLeod, 
a poetess from Harris, upon hearing false rumours in 1699 that the male line of the 
MacLeods of Dunvegan had become extinct, greatly feared that the family would 
lose its lands, but consoled herself with the belief that the rest of Gaeldom would 
naturally leap to its defence: 
 
Gun éireadh ‘nad aobhar 
Clann Raghnaill ‘s Clann Domhnaill 
Agus tigh Mhic Ghille Eathain 
Bha daingeann ‘nur seòrsa, 
Agus fir Ghlinne Garadh 
Nall thairis á Cnòideart, 
Mar sud is Clann Chamshroin 
O champ Inbhir Lòchaidh. 
 
Is beag an t-iongnadh Clan Choinnich 
Dhèanamh oireachd mu d’ ghualainn 
Is gun robh thu ‘nam fineachd 
Air t-fhilleadh trì uairean. 
 
[To thy cause would rally Clan Ranald and Clan Donald, and the house of 
Maclean firmly knit to friendship with thee; over from Knoydart the men of 
Glen Garry would come, and Clan Cameron withal from the stronghold of 
                                                           
24 Anonymous, ‘Luinneag Mhic Neachdainn’ [Mac Neachdainn’s Song] in Gàir nan Clàrsach 
ed. C. Ó Baoill (Edinburgh, 1994), pp.166-73, at pp.168-69. 
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Inverlochy.  No marvel though the Mackenzies should gather round thy 
shoulder, since thou hast a threefold bond of kinship with their clan].25 
 
Gaelic poetry, therefore, tended to complement the work of exterior image-makers 
by investing the Highlands with a distinct identity which was consciously different 
from the rest of Scotland. 
The sense of peripheral ‘otherness’ rendered the Highlands vulnerable to 
denigration.  As discussed in chapter one, this was a common feature of centre-
periphery relations across Europe.  Sweden, even during its ‘age of greatness’, was 
painfully aware that mainland Europe viewed it as a cultural backwater.  Its 
inhospitable climate and geographical isolation were widely held to preclude any 
form of cultural or intellectual sophistication; Swedes were good at war, but not 
much else.26  Farther south, urban dwellers in medieval and early-modern Italy 
readily poked fun at the peninsula’s rural mountain communities, appalled by their 
failure to embrace the habits and values of the great cities.27  Indeed, even within 
Britain, Highlanders were hardly the only group to suffer abuse.  Scottish nobles in 
London remained the butt of English jokes throughout the seventeenth century, 
caricatured as penurious and greedy, and criticised for their uncouth accents, while 
Cornwall was regularly derided throughout the medieval and early-modern periods 
as rude, poverty-stricken and alien.28  In a society where civility was defined in 
                                                           
25 Mary Macleod, ‘Cumha do Mhac Leoid’ [Lament for Macleod] in Gaelic Songs of Mary 
Macleod ed. J.C. Watson (Edinburgh 1965), pp.52-9, at pp.56-57. 
26 Kirby, Northern Europe, p.288; Lockhart, Sweden, pp.85-86.  For Lockhart, this perception 
was broadly accurate. 
27 S.K. Cohn, ‘Highlands and Lowlands in Late Medieval Tuscany’ in D. Broun and M. 
MacGregor (ed.), Mìorun Mòr nan Gall, ‘The Great Ill-Will of the Lowlander’?: Lowland Perception 
of the Highlands, Medieval and Modern (Glasgow, 2009), pp.110-27, at pp.110-12. 
28 Brown, ‘British Aristocracy’, at p.226 and at pp.232-3; M.J. Stolye, ‘‘Pagans or Paragons?’: 
Images of the Cornish during the English Civil War’, English Historical Review, 111:441, 1996, 
pp.299-323, at pp.299-302. 
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opposition to barbarity, belonging to a peripheral society almost always invited 
sneering dismissal from core cultures.29 
 For the Highlands, denigration began with the notion of primitivism.  
Highland society was portrayed as archaically tribal.  For Duncan Forbes of 
Culloden, writing shortly after the 1688-89 Revolution, Highland clans were a throw-
back to Scotland’s medieval past.  Tribal structures had, he claimed, been the normal 
form of social organisation before the Reformation, but had been largely eradicated 
across Scotland in the century after 1560.  In the Highlands, however, progress had 
been dramatically halted after the Restoration: 
 
But the designes of the two last reignes being to introduce Popery and 
arbitrary power [...] it was found necessary to overturn all the good 
establishment already made in the nation, and act contrary to the Pollitick of 
former Kings, by setting up Superiors and Cheeffs again, demolishing the 
streinths built amongst the Highland Clanes; so giving them loose reines to 
rob, and reassume ther former barbarity; whereby they became fitt 
instruments for destroying Men of conscience, who were like to stand in the 
way of thes alterations that were intended to be made upon the Religion and 
liberty of the Nation.30 
 
For Culloden, then, the social structure of the Highlands was antiquated not simply 
because it was outdated, but because it failed to embrace Lowland ideals of order 
and personal liberty.  As a confirmed supporter of William and Mary, Culloden had 
an obvious axe to grind, but the notion of an obsolete value system was upheld 
elsewhere.  In his treatise on the occult, published in 1685, George Sinclair scoffed at 
Highlanders’ ongoing belief in the existence of brownies and faeries, which he 
                                                           
29 J. Leerssen, ‘Wildness, Wilderness, and Ireland: Medieval and Early-Modern Patterns in the 
Demarcation of Civility’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 56:1, 1995, pp.25-39, at p.34. 
30 H.R. Duff (ed.), Culloden Papers (London, 1815), p.14. 
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considered more appropriate for the ‘ignorance and superstition’ of years past.31  The 
Highland convention of charming, which involved using incantations or tokens to 
treat a wide variety of physical and mystical ailments, attracted similar 
opprobrium.32  Robert Kirk, minister of Balquhidder, dismissed it as irrational 
because it violated the laws of nature.  Worse, it was also blasphemous, being 
explicitly forbidden in the Bible; any cure which did follow upon the use of a charm 
could thus only signal intervention from the Devil.33  Attention was also attracted to 
the militaristic ethos of Highland society, as expressed in 1685 by the Scottish 
historian William Alexander:   
 
The Highlanders live in the North and West Parts, or in some out Islands; 
being a bold and hardy People, much given to Warlike Exercises; being 
alwayes in readiness, when ever Commanded by their Cheif [...] they are a 
People that can endure as much hardships of War, as any People in the 
World.34 
 
These accounts all suggest a prevailing discourse which viewed Highland society as 
both structurally anachronistic and intellectually backward. 
 Again, Gaelic poets added to the stereotype by celebrating those features of 
chiefly display which had underpinned conventional clan society and praise 
                                                           
31 George Sinclair, Satan’s invisible world discovered, or, A choice collection of modern relations 
proving evidently against the saducees and atheists of this present age, that there are devils, spirits, 
witches, and apparitions (Edinburgh, 1685), pp.215-16.  Today, of course, it seems ironic that 
Sinclair should have been so scathing about Highland folk beliefs, while vehemently 
asserting the existence of witches, ghosts, and other supernatural happenings perpetrated by 
the Devil. 
32 Anonymous, ‘A Collection of Highland Rites and Customs’ in M. Hunter (ed.), The Occult 
Laboratory: Magic, Science and Second Sight in the Late Seventeenth-Century Scotland 
(Woodbridge, 2001), pp.54-76, at pp.67-68. 
33 NLS, Notebook of Reverend Robert Kirk, MS.3932, p.182. 
34 William Alexander, Medulla historiae Scoticae (London, 1685), p.212. 
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poetry.35  Iain Lom, for instance, gloried in the lavishness of the household kept by 
Sir James MacDonald of Sleat before his death in 1678:   
 
Biodh do ghillean mu seach 
A’ lìonadh dibhe b’fheàrr blas, 
Fìon Spàinteach dearg aca ‘s beòir. 
 
Uisge-beatha nam pìos, 
Rachadh ‘n t-airgead g’a dhìol, 
Ghibhte ‘n glain’ e mar ghrìogan òir. 
 
[Your servants one after one poured out liquor of choicest taste; Spanish wine 
crimson-hued they had and beer.  Whisky that fills the silver cups – it would 
be paid for with silver – could be had, glistening like golden beads in glass].36 
 
Martial prowess was still more central, and Gaelic praise-poetry invariably dwelt 
upon the fighting ability of its subjects.  Mary MacLeod lauded John MacLeod of 
Raasay (d.1671) as her ‘dear warrior’ who could skilfully ‘bend a bow from behind 
[his] head’; Roderick Morison celebrated John MacLeod of Dunvegan (d.1693) as ‘a 
manly, active soldier’ who could fight equally well with sword or pistol; and Iain 
Lom, in praising around 1663 Angus MacDonald, 1st lord Macdonnell as the 
legitimate chief of Clan Donald, painted him as ‘a skilled rider of a battle charger’ 
and ‘an excellent leader of hundreds’.37  In lieu of actual warfare, a chief’s prowess in 
the hunt could be viewed as an equally crucial marker of his virility.  As Martin 
reported, ‘the chieftain is usually attended with a numerous retinue when he goes a-
                                                           
35 Dodgshon, Chiefs to Landlords, pp.84-92; Newton, Warriors of the Word, pp.148-54. 
36 John MacDonald, ‘Marbhrann do Shir Seumas Mac Dhòmhnaill’ [An Elegy to Sir James 
MacDonald] in Orain Iain Luim: Songs of John MacDonald, Bard of Keppoch ed. A.M. Mackenzie 
(Edinburgh, 1964), pp.136-41, at pp.136-37. 
37 Mary Macleod, ‘Marhbrann do Iain Garbh’ [Dirge for Iain Garbh] in Gaelic Songs of Mary 
Macloed ed. J.C. Watson (Edinburgh, 1965), pp.26-31, at pp.28-31; Morison, ‘Oran do Iain 
Breac Mac Leòid’, at pp.8-9; John MacDonald, ‘Oran do Aonghas Og Morair Ghlinne 
Garaidh’ [A Song to Angus Og Laird of Glengarry] in Orain Iain Luim: Songs of John 
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hunting, this being his first specimen of manly exercise’.38  Such enthusiastic 
celebration of the ‘feasting and fighting’ culture of traditional Gaelic lordship 
strikingly paralleled the Lowland perception that Highland society was a relic of a 
past age. 
This observation links to another important theme.  As discussed in chapter 
one, historians have long recognised that notions ‘barbarity’ and ‘civility’ were 
crucial prerequisites for the development of colonial relationships in the early-
modern period.  Some historians, most notably Hechter and Withers, have applied 
this model to Highlands, arguing that cultural denigration was exploited to justify 
‘civilising’ policies on the part of early-modern governments – the Highlands, in this 
view, were essentially treated as internal colonies.39  But before Restoration attitudes 
towards the Highlands can be accorded the imperialistic overtones suggested by 
Hechter and Withers, the extent to which ‘old-fashioned’ was equated with ‘uncivil’ 
must first be understood. 
There certainly was an established rhetoric of Highland barbarism.  Randle 
Holme, a Cheshire herald painter, declared in 1688 that the ‘Irish Scots’ were ‘a Wild 
and Barbarous people, worse than the Wild Irish’.40  William Cleland, a prominent 
Covenanter, who after the Revolution served in the Earl of Angus’ Regiment, offered 
a rather more detailed (and amusing) outline of Highlanders’ ‘barbarous’ character 
traits: 
 
It’s marvelous how in such weather,  
Ov’r hill and hop they came together,  
How in such stormes they came so farr,  
The reason is, they’re smear’d with Tar.  
                                                           
38 Martin, Description of the Western Islands, p.75. 
39 Hechter, Internal Colonialism, pp.112-15;  Withers, Gaelic Scotland, p.404. 
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Which doth defend them heel and neck,  
Just as it doth their Sheep protect;  
But least ye doubt that this is true,  
They’re just the colour of tar’d Wool:  
Nought like Religion they retain,  
Of moral Honestie they’re clean.  
In nothing they’re accounted sharp,  
Except in Bag-pipe, and in Harpe.41 
 
Cleland’s mocking assessment was delivered in the aftermath of the deployment in 
1678 of the ‘Highland Host’ raised to subdue the Covenanters of the south-west.  
This policy played upon the Highlanders’ fearful image as ‘a barbarous savage 
people, accustomed to rapine and spoil’ in an effort to terrify south-western 
nonconformists into submission.42  In turn it strengthened the stereotype, ensuring 
that Highlanders, particularly in the Presbyterian historiographical tradition, became 
synonymous with cruelty and incivility.43  The alarmist account of the Host’s 
activities offered by the Presbyterian Alexander Shields is perhaps the most 
notorious example of this: 
 
But all this is nothing to what followed: when, thinking these blood-hounds 
were too favourable, they brought doun from the Wild Highlands a host of 
Savages upon the western Shires, more terrible than Turks or Turtars, men 
who feared not God nor regarded man; And being also poor pitiful Skybalds, 
they thought they had come to a brave world, to waste [and] destroy a 
plentiful Country, which they resolved before they left it to make as bare as 
their oun.44 
 
                                                           
41 William Cleland, ‘A Mock Poem, Upon the Expedition of the Highland Host, Who came to 
destroy the Western Shires, in Winter 1678’ in A collection of several poems and verses composed 
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the Revolution, 4 vols (1828-40), ii, p.375. 
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Warrior, pp.284-5; J.R. Elder, The Highland Host of 1678 (Glasgow, 1914), pp.126-38. 
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It should be noted, of course, that not all commentators agreed with Shields’ 
interpretation; George Hicks, a one-time chaplain to Lauderdale, maintained for 
instance that the Highlanders had been models of restraint and loyalty.45  
Nevertheless, the sheer power of the Highlands’ barbaric image more generally can 
be understood by considering the frequency with which the name was used, 
particularly by Englishmen, as a byword for incivility.  In 1661, the royalist Roger 
L’Estrange asserted the villainy of Presbyterians by declaring that ‘ye shall never find 
with any Highlands or Border-thieves, greater ingratitude, and more lies and vile 
perjuries, than with these Phanatique spirits’.46  Even more obscurely, the English 
pamphleteer George Care, criticising in 1685 the style of another author, asked 
rhetorically ‘What stuff is this!  Could a man fetch any thing more savage out of the 
Highlands of Scotland’.47  That the Highlands should have been invoked in this 
manner illustrates not only that they were viewed as barbarous, but that this 
perception must have been very widespread. 
Notions of Highland rudeness informed attitudes towards the relationship 
between the Highlands and the law.  ‘In those remote places’ sneered Argyll in 1668, 
‘they knew not the order of processe’, and this attitude naturally fostered an 
assumption that the law could be applied less scrupulously in the Highlands than 
elsewhere.48  John Lauder of Fountainhall captured this mood eloquently in his 
assessment of the treatment meted out by Sir James Campbell Lawers to three 
Highland thieves in 1676: 
                                                           
45 George Hicks, The spirit of popery speaking out of the mouths of phanatical-Protestants (London, 
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He cheated them and cullied them by a forg’d remission, which was scarce 
pia fraus; only it was thought, such robbers and enemies to mankind and 
humane society deserved to be hunted and caught, as we doe with wild 
beasts, by netts and all means.49 
 
Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh’s legal writings reveal a similar attitude on a 
number of occasions.  He noted, for example, that, in the interest of self-defence, 
travellers to the Highlands were tacitly exempted from laws against carrying 
firearms, and that ‘in favours of the publick quiet’, remissions could be granted in 
the Highlands without the normally-required consent of a wronged party.50  More 
generally, it is telling that one of the criticisms levied against Lauderdale in 1679 was 
that he had during the 1670s forced ‘an exorbitant and illegal Bond’ upon the people 
of the south-western shires, making them responsible for preventing their families 
and subordinates from attending conventicles, ‘By which Bond, those which signed it 
were made liable for every mans fault that liv’d upon their ground’.51  The bond had 
been introduced in studied emulation of the policy dominating Highland 
government since 1587, but because ‘in the Highlands the feuds among the families 
were still so high’, there was never a comparable sense of outrage on behalf of 
Highlanders.52  The notion that the law could legitimately be applied more loosely in 
the Highlands powerfully reinforced the perception that the region was neither as 
settled nor as advanced as the Lowlands. 
However, in some ways the Highland experience, during the Restoration if 
not at other points in time, diverged from the colonial norm.  For a start, not 
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everybody shared the perception of Highland incivility.  Hicks, for example, rejected 
it unequivocally: 
 
For they are not Barbarians, as you Styled them, unless it be in the same sence 
that the Greeks and Romans called all other People Barbarous, that spoke not 
their Languages, and wore not the Pall, and Gown. No, I assure you, they are 
a very Civil, Generous, and Governable People.53 
 
Cahassy similarly characterised Highlanders as ‘naturally ciuill’, while Robert Kirk 
opined that they were as a rule ‘more tame than thair rude plain Fathers’.54  It is also 
important to note that, although contemporaries made liberal use of the language of 
incivility when discussing the Highlands, the meaning attached to it by those with 
direct experience of the region was usually a limited one.  Thus, a petition to the 
Scottish Parliament in 1661, which bemoaned the ‘barbarous Insolencies’ committed 
by Highlanders, was concerned only with cattle-theft; ‘barbarous’ simply meant 
‘lawless’, rather than uncivil.  Indeed, it should be recognised that the tendency to 
use the emotive language of incivility to refer merely to mundane law and order 
issues was hardly restricted to the Highlands.  Jean Lockhart, from Fife, asked 
Parliament in 1661 that she be allowed to separate from her husband on account of 
the ‘severall outrages and barbarous usages’ she had suffered at his hands, while in 
1681, during a property dispute in Aberdeenshire between Magnus Mowat and 
George Forbes, both parties described the other as ‘barbarous’.55  Another crucial 
point was made in passing by the English theologian Richard Baxter while 
attempting to explain why he, a nonconformist, nevertheless attended Anglican 
services: 
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And I take it for such a Crime against Christ to say, that almost all his Church 
is not His, but Satans; as it would be against the King to say, that almost all 
his Kingdoms are none of his, but his Enemies.  I may say, that the Irish, the 
Highlanders, or Orcades, are the most ignorant barbarous part of his 
Dominions; but not that they are none.56 
 
Nobody would have dissented from Baxter’s assertion that the Highlands was an 
integral component of the Stuart dominions, a perception which naturally altered 
contemporaries’ attitudes towards Highland ‘barbarity’.  This can be understood by 
considering one of the Restoration Privy Council’s earliest statements on Highland 
affairs, delivered in August 1661: 
 
Often tymes the greatest out breakings and rebellions happen [in the 
Highlands] by occasione of diverse, who imagine that there great distance 
from the seatt of the supreme judicatories and the difficulty of access is a 
security from punishment.57 
 
The problem here was not that Highlanders were too uncivilised to be counted as 
part of the kingdom, but simply that they tended to break the law.  The construct of 
‘barbarity’ did not then necessarily have the grandiose, transformative implications 
in the Highlands which it carried in the New World, at least during the Restoration.   
This limited understanding of Highland ‘barbarity’ made for equally limited 
ambitions as regards government policy.  Proposals written in 1661 by John 
Campbell, elder of Glenorchy, sought to ‘delyver the cuntrie from this disease’ of 
cattle raiding; further advice from his son in the 1670s aimed to preserve ‘the peace 
of [th]e Cowntrey’; an anonymous set of recommendations produced in the 1660s, 
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although speaking of the need for ‘a general reforma[ti]one’, restricted this aim to 
‘[th]e repressing of the broken hilandmen’; and proposals tabled by John Hay, 2nd 
earl of Tweeddale in 1669 similarly worked only towards ‘taking order with Broken 
men and Suppressing thift in [th]e highlands’.58  There was little evidence here of 
transformative intent.  Rather, the focus was on pacification, or even on the still more 
limited aim of containing disorder.  The government’s own pronouncements were 
couched in equally circumspect language, exemplified most fully in the extensive 
preamble to the commission for securing the peace in 1682: 
 
The quieting of the Highlands and Isles and the dutifull and peaceable 
carriage and deportment of the inhabitants within the same is of great 
concernment not only as to the peace and interest of the shires and bounds 
where they live, being a large and considerable part of our ancient kingdom 
of Scotland, but also of the nighbouring and adjacent countries and shires 
which ly open and are subject to the incursions, depredations and the 
barbarous cruelty and oppression of thieves, sorners and broken men when 
the Highlands are in disorder.59 
 
The shadows cast by the much more overtly colonial policies of James VI and the 
Hanoverian governments have tended to persuade historians that the relationship 
between Edinburgh and the Highlands during the early-modern period was 
invariably a pseudo-imperialistic one.60  Yet there is little evidence of this for the 
Restoration.  If the Highlands were described as ‘barbarous’ (in any case hardly a 
unique label), this was generally understood to mean merely that they were 
disorderly, rather than to imply an inherent lack of civility.  As a result, there was no 
real sense that wholesale transformation was needed, no overarching discourse 
pushing for the ‘Lowlandisation’ of Highland society.  Instead, attention was focused 
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merely on curbing the perceived excesses of lawless behaviour.  Restoration 
Highlanders, in other words, did not need to be ‘civilised’; all that was required was 
that their wilder impulses be curbed. 
If it is important not to overstate governmental aims in the Highlands, it is 
equally crucial to recognise that the image of Highland distinctiveness, as 
constructed by both external and internal commentators, masked a much more fluid 
situation on the ground.  The families of the eastern Highlands, whatever the 
perception in Edinburgh, did not tend to regard themselves as ‘Highlanders’.  In 
1665, for instance, the Rosses of Balnagown complained to the Privy Council that 
Kenneth Mackenzie, 3rd earl of Seaforth, while attempting to uplift fines he had 
imposed on them in his capacity as sheriff of Ross, had ‘intended a convocation of 
Hielanders, whereof the compleaners in the low countrey were justly afraid.’61  
Similarly, when Hugh Fraser, 8th lord Lovat, after a visit to Glenelg in 1666, came 
back to his home estates in the Inverness area, he was described as having ‘returnd 
from the Highlands’.62  Certainly, such men were perfectly familiar with the elite 
culture of the Lowlands.  Jonathan Urquhart of Cromarty hired Robert Smith of 
Edinburgh as his gardener in 1677, promising him a salary of £72 along with a suit of 
clothes and two pairs of shoes, while Sir Hugh Campbell of Cawdor in 1672 spent 
£54 on 6 ells of ‘floured lemon brocad’, £36 16s on sixteen ells of ‘silver cloath’ and 
nearly £70 on ‘silver and gold lace’.63   
At the same time, east-Highland society displayed a number of ‘Gaelic’ 
cultural markers.  The presbytery of Caithness, for instance, was repeatedly vexed by 
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the ‘heathenish [and] barbarous custome’ of ‘pyping at Lykvakes’, and fined at least 
four individuals for doing so in the decade after 1663.64  Meanwhile, the supposed 
Lowlander, Lovat, was not above donning Highland dress during his Glenelg visit, 
nor did he pass up the opportunity afforded by the funeral in 1668 of Sir Robert 
Munro of Foulis to show off his family’s martial vigour by sending a mourning party 
of fifty horsemen.  The Rosses and the Munros themselves did likewise, outfitting 
1000 and 600 foot respectively.65  Even amongst the higher nobility, anxious to wield 
influence at a national level, Highland components of identity were not ignored.  
Upon hearing in March 1680 that his parents, the Earl and Countess of Moray, were 
due to return home, Charles Stewart, lord Doune made arrangements to provide 
them with an escort composed of their ‘Vassels in the Hylands’.66  Farther south, a 
hunting expedition in 1682 saw John Murray, 2nd earl of Atholl, field an entourage 
including a number of Highlanders in traditional dress, while the marquis’ daughter-
in-law, Katherine Hamilton, felt it appropriate to send her brother James Hamilton, 
earl of Arran, a present of some ‘Hyland cloathes’ in 1683.67  Clearly, in the 
supposedly more Lowland east identities continued to owe something to Highland 
culture. 
 In contrast, the western Highlands have tended to be seen as more hardened 
in their attachment to Gaelic social and cultural mores.  Iain Mackenzie of Applecross 
(d. c.1684) was famous for the lavishness with which he patronised Gaelic bards; the 
Macleans of Duart employed two pipers at their castle of Duart in 1674; and Donald 
MacDonald of Moidart retained close ties with the Irish branch of Clan Donald, to 
the extent that Alexander Macdonnell, 3rd earl of Antrim proclaimed in 1684 that he 
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had ‘a reall keendnes for yow more than for any o[the]r of his [...] name’, going so far 
as offering to foster Moidart’s eldest son.68  Yet even here, identities were not fixed.  
Towards the end of the seventeenth century most Hebridean elites were fluent in 
English and tended to have adopted Lowland dress as their habitual garb.69  On the 
mainland too, bilingualism had come to be seen as essential.  Of Angus Mackean of 
Ardnamurchan it was observed in 1662 that ‘he not knowing soe mutch of our 
Languadge [was unable] to buy meal [and] drink and not able to persue after his 
oune just rights’.70  More generally, John MacLeod of Dunvegan fully shared in the 
cosmopolitan tastes of his eastern counterparts, spending more than £174 on 
medicines in 1661, and buying copious volumes of luxury goods such as lace, 
muslim, silk, cinnamon, nutmeg and raisins.71  In the west as in the east, then, there 
was little evidence of a monolithic culture, and equally little evidence that 
involvement in one cultural environment precluded involvement in the other.  
Instead, there was across the Highlands a tendency to draw from both Highland and 
Lowland traditions to create a mixed identity straddling both. 
The hybrid identity of the Highlands was hardly unique in a European 
context.  Within the sprawling empire of the Austrian Habsburgs, the decades after 
the end of the Thirty Years War (1618-48) had witnessed provincial elites in Bohemia 
embrace enthusiastically the world-view of their imperial masters, to the extent that 
most adopted German as their primary language and began to dominate many of the 
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institutions of central government.  Yet they retained a high degree of cultural 
independence, and their support of a distinctly local brand of baroque culture 
(particularly in terms of visual art) ensured that their identity remained as much 
Bohemian as German.72  Even within Britain, there were parallels.  The gentry of 
Wales, for example, had by the seventeenth century substantially absorbed the 
cultural and social mores of their English counterparts, not least as regards 
landholding patterns, office-holding and Anglican piety.  Yet there remained a 
robust and distinct Welsh identity, expressed not least in the continuing vitality of 
the Welsh language and vernacular poetry.73  The crucial point about these examples 
is not simply that hybrid identities existed elsewhere in early-modern Europe, but 
that in general they did not preclude substantial involvement in, and integration 
with, core society.   
Certainly, the existence of a hybrid identity in the Highlands was hardly an 
impediment to its involvement in the wider Scottish scene.  Perhaps the readiest 
example of this was its representation in Parliament and Conventions of Estates.  
Table 1 (overleaf) summarises the Highlands’ levels of attendance at each session 
after 1663.  These figures reveal a number of patterns.  Firstly, attendance was much 
more ubiquitous on the part of the shire and burgh commissioners than amongst the 
nobility.  Representatives from the earldom of Argyll (until 1681) and Caithness were 
almost always in evidence, as was Macdonnell (until he began to slip into armed 
conflict with Argyll in the mid-1670s) and Sir George Mackenzie of Tarbat (after his 
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elevation to a viscountcy in 1685).  On the other hand, a number of eligible nobles 
almost never attended, although this can probably be explained by personal, rather 
than political factors: the 3rd and 4th earls of Seaforth were chronically indebted; the 
13th earl of Sutherland had retired from public life; the 8th and 9th lords Lovat were 
minors, as was the 3rd lord Reay; and the 2nd lord Reay seems to have been generally 
content to eschew the national stage in favour of the local.   
 
Session Nobility Shires Burghs Totals 
 Potential Actual Potential Actual Potential Actual Pot. Act. % 
1665 (C) 7 1 12 4 8 2 27 7 26 
1667 (C) 7 3 12 1 8 2 27 6 22 
1669 (P) 7 3 12 9 8 5 27 17 63 
1670 (P) 7 3 12 8 8 6 27 17 63 
1672 (P) 7 2 12 10 8 6 27 18 67 
1673 (P) 7 2 12 9 8 7 27 18 67 
1678 (C) 7 2 12 10 8 8 27 20 77 
1681 (P) 7 3 12 9 7 6 26 18 69 
1685 (P) 7 3 12 10 7 7 26 20 77 
1686 (P) 7 2 12 9 7 7 26 18 69 
Table 1: Highland attendance at Parliaments (P) and Conventions of Estates (C), 1665-86.74 
 
Turning to those who did attend, representation at Parliament was relatively 
stable at around two-thirds, although with a spike for James VII’s first Parliament in 
1685, presumably reflecting the heightened excitement of a new reign.  These figures 
were marginally more stable than the general Scottish experience (overall attendance 
fluctuated from 192 in 1669 to 190, 179, 194, 186, and 182 in subsequent sessions), 
although this was probably a function of the relatively small number of Highland 
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commissioners.75  Attendance at Conventions of Estates was more volatile.  Very low 
levels of attendance in 1665 and 1667 contrasted with extremely high levels in 1678, a 
pattern which mirrored (albeit in somewhat exaggerated form) the national trend 
(attendance of 142 in 1665 became 150 in 1667 and 180 in 1678), suggesting that, in 
common with the rest of Scotland, the Highlands were more energised by the 
disputed supply levy of 1678 than with the less controversial grants of the 1660s.76  In 
short, even if Highland involvement in Parliament’s committee structure was limited 
(see below), the respectable levels of representation in each session speak of a degree 
of engagement between centre and periphery not noticeably different from the 
Scottish norm.  
Another marker of Highland involvement in the wider Scottish scene, at least 
as far as the elite was concerned, was an appetite for news.  Admittedly, there is little 
evidence of any formal news services, but correspondence provided a rich channel 
for the acquisition of news.  David Ross of Balnagown in 1667 solicited a newsletter 
on the progress of the Dutch Wars, while John MacLeod of Dunvegan acquired this 
information through his Edinburgh agent, George Graham.77  George Gordon, lord 
Strathnaver learnt about the details of Charles II’s death, and the accession of James 
VII and II, through the letters of George Gordon, 4th marquess of Huntly and 1st duke 
of Gordon.78  Glenorchy acquired snippets of news from a wide range of personal 
correspondents, including Sir James Campbell of Lawers, who in 1679 sent him a 
printed newsletter which had been circulating around Edinburgh.79  Others retained 
the services of a specific news provider.  Moidart received regular updates from a 
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lawyer named Robert Barbour, who in the 1670s sent letters containing information 
about the proceedings of the Scottish Parliament and Privy Council, the Third Dutch 
War (1672-74), the Franco-Dutch War (1672-78), the business of the English 
Parliament, and the affairs of the Royal Family.80  Such studious information-
gathering hardly speaks of an insular or parochial society. 
Similarly, the practical necessity of maintaining frequent contact with the 
Lowlands, and Edinburgh in particular, was by the later seventeenth century 
becoming increasingly apparent.  In 1664, for instance, the burgh of Inverness, 
‘haueing tacken to ther considderatione the prejudice they haue susteined thir zeirs 
bygone throw the want of ane advocat to plead ther causes [and] actiouns’ before the 
‘Lords of Counsell [and] Sessioun’, employed the advocate George Mackenzie as 
their permanent representative in the capital.81  Four years later, the gentlemen of 
Caithness made a similar move by nominating John Sinclair of Ratter and William 
Dunbar of Hempriggs as their representatives in Edinburgh.82  More profound still 
was the tendency to make lengthy personal sojourns.  Lovat took a two-month trip to 
Court in 1665 ‘on design to salut his sovereign, the Kings Majesty’, and Mary 
Campbell, countess of Caithness complained the following year that her husband 
had been absent for fourteen weeks tending to his affairs.83  The Privy Council’s 
attachment to the policy of bonding clearly amplified this trend.  Pursuit of personal 
protections, allowing chiefs and landlords to travel unmolested to Edinburgh in 
order to give their bonds, shows that between 1669 and 1672 alone, enforced 
absences of this kind affected Loup, Duart, Dunvegan, Lochiel, Moidart, Sleat and 
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MacDonald.84  Absenteeism could have a baleful effect at home; Glenorchy suspected 
that his sustained service with the Highland Host in 1678 had allowed his rents to be 
‘Imbasld by my tennents and to me as good as for ever lost’.  It could also arouse 
adverse comment, such as Iain Lom’s famous castigation of Macdonnell for his 
increasingly Lowland tastes and habit of spending long periods in England.85   But 
physical contact with the Lowlands ensured that Highland elites were very far from 
being parochial rustics insulated from the outside world. 
Just as striking, Highland landlords were increasingly enthusiastic in their 
exploitation of the legal system – as Robert Kirk noted, ‘to persue a Law-Quarrell’ 
had become ‘an universal infirmity now among all Ranks’.86  The law, indeed, was 
recognised as a potentially powerful weapon, and not just by the notoriously 
acquisitive Campbells.87  Moidart’s concern for the niceties of the law prompted him 
in 1674 to seek professional advice over how best to raise citations against deceased 
individuals.88  Alexander Chisholm of Comar had allegedly been still more proactive 
twelve years before, when he had used a malicious witchcraft allegation to extirpate 
a group of Macleans living on disputed lands in Kilmorack and Kiltarlity.  Comar, 
for his part, claimed that this accusation was itself a cynical ploy.89  The 
Mackintoshes were equally able to spot the potential of such engagement.  In a 
petition to the Scottish Parliament in 1663, they were quick to recognise that, in their 
protracted dispute with the Camerons over the estates of Glenluie and Locharkaig, 
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exploiting the legal system could both enhance their legitimacy and heighten their 
chances of success: 
 
If mcintosche Wer alowed only the assistance of his own followers the saim 
would appear to be a nighbours feud And that woald strengthen the hands of 
the rebells and mak the trouble to continowe the Longer q[uhai]ras the kings 
Royall authority would soon quash the rebells.90 
 
Highlanders were also adept at using the legal system as a means of protection.  
Caithness during the 1660s complained that his attempts to capture a group of men, 
who had been outlawed at the instance of the burgh of Wick, were hampered by 
their tactic of raising legal citations against him from both local and national courts.91  
Protection through exploiting loopholes was also possible, as in 1683 when Coll 
MacDonald of Keppoch sought to escape incarceration by claiming, apparently 
falsely, that he was still a minor.92  Highlanders’ general attitude towards the law 
was summed up in a laconic observation made by Lachlan Mackintosh to his father, 
Torcastle, in 1682.  When involved in litigation, Mackintosh observed, it was wise to 
find out who would be charged with hearing the case, and then take steps to ‘se they 
be your freinds’.93  Highlanders, then, were no more backward than other Scots at 
recognising that the legal system could offer them support, protection and 
legitimacy.  Many were highly adept at turning it to their advantage. 
Indebtedness constitutes perhaps the most widely discussed point of contact 
between the Highland elite and the structures of wider Scottish society.94  Certainly, 
a propensity for running up eye-watering deficits was virtually ubiquitous.  Argyll in 
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1668 lamented that ‘I am [...] I confesse, a great deall in arire’ – a situation which 
manifestly did not improve, since by the time of his forfeiture in 1681, his total debts 
were calculated to stand at almost £300,000.95  Neither did humbler individuals 
escape.  John MacLeod of Dunvegan inherited debts of around £130,000 upon his 
succession in 1664.  Balnagown complained in 1678 that his debts had grown so 
unmanageable that he was in ‘a verie sad conditione being lyable to personal and 
real diligence’.  The inventory of James Fraser of Mucklegarth (d. 1686) revealed that 
his assets of £86 13s 4d were dwarfed by debts of £834 13s 4d.96   
In general historians have focused on the impact of elite indebtedness on 
Highland social structures – specifically, its importance in stimulating commercial 
systems of landholding and thereby facilitating ‘the process by which chiefs were 
transformed into landlords’.97  Yet it is just as important to note that indebtedness 
acted as an agent of integration, not least because it often destabilised lordship 
patterns.  So severe were Seaforth’s debts that he periodically fled from his 
accustomed residences at Brahan and Chanonry to his most distant possessions in 
Lewis, ‘for the more convenient way of living, and improveing his interest in the 
Low Countries’.98  Sir William Sinclair of Mey’s failure to service his deficit forced 
him into still more drastic action; in 1684 he turned over his estate to the control of 
Dunbeath and Tarbat, the latter of whom had already six years earlier been engaged 
to perform similar services for Sleat.99  Such stresses forced local elites to look beyond 
the Highlands for relief.  Some pursued outside credit.  Argyll in 1675 secured a 
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99 NRS, GD96/673/126, 134; W. Fraser (ed.), The Earls of Cromartie: Their Kindred, Country and 
Correspondence, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1874), i, pp.27-29. 
The Highlands in Britain 
69 
 
3000-merk loan from Sir Archibald Primrose, lord Carrington.100  William 
Mackintosh of Connage was in 1682 imprisoned in the Tolbooth of Inverness after 
defaulting on a loan of £340 he had taken from Rosehaugh.101  Donald Mackay, 2nd 
lord Reay looked even further afield, attempting in 1662 to exploit his family’s 
traditional military connections with the Danish monarchy by soliciting a pension 
from Frederick III.102  In other cases, penurious lords sought influential protectors.  
Lady Caithness in 1666 asked Lauderdale’s favour on behalf of her husband, the 6th 
earl, bewailing that ‘he did fall an younge heir to the ruened fortune of an ancient 
familie’. 103  Lawers, noting the ‘truble I am in for the debts of the Earls of Argyll and 
Loudoune’, appealed to Tweeddale for assistance in 1670.104  Setting up fairs was 
another means by which impoverished Highland elites (usually, it has to be said, 
towards the Highland fringe) could seek to raise extra capital through tolls, customs, 
and duties, while having the simultaneous effect of integrating their lands into the 
more market-orientated economy of the Lowlands.  Thus, between 1669 and 1686 
Parliament accepted petitions to set up fairs from Blanagown (at Carryblair), John 
Forbes of Culloden (Ferintosh), Lord Neil Campbell (Lorne), Robert Campbell of 
Glenlyon (Innerwick), Argyll (Mull), Lovat (Beauly), George Ross of Morangie 
(Inverbreakie), Torcastle (Moy, Dunnauchtoun, Inneromoyer and Essich) and 
Glenorchy (Dysart, Strathfillan, Glendochart, Killin and Achinreir).105  If then the 
pressures of chronic indebtedness worked, as many historians have argued, towards 
injecting commercial attitudes into Highland lordship, they also ensured that local 
                                                           
100 NLS, MS.975, f.18r. 
101 Mackay et al, Records of Inverness, ii, p.312. 
102 NRS, GD84/2/222. 
103 BL, Add. Mss. 23124, f.124. 
104 NLS, Yester Correspondence, 1670, MS.7004, ff.16-17. 
105 RPS, 1669/10/48, 1670/7/28, 1672/6/42, 1681/7/211, 1681/7/213, 1685/4/139, 
1686/4/100 and at 1686/4/101. 
The Highlands in Britain 
70 
 
elites were forced consistently to engage with wider Scottish society in order to meet 
their obligations. 
The process of regional socio-economic integration with wider norms 
necessarily had political implications, which can most readily be understood by 
briefly considering English historiography on the topic.  On a conceptual level, 
Braddick insists that ‘the process of state formation went hand-in-hand with the 
process of elite formation’.106  His thesis is that the extension of the English state’s 
power into distant localities – Wales, Cornwall and the far north, for example – 
depended in the first instance upon local elites identifying common interests (social, 
political and economic) between themselves and the state.  With this in place, they 
were then free to recognise the potential value of holding local government offices in 
terms of enhancing their own status and influence.107  For Joan Kent, this penetrated 
even more deeply, to the extent that even at the most elementary level of English 
local administration, the parish, local communities were adept at exploiting the 
structures of the state.108  Put another way, the development of an affinity of interests 
between the core society and peripheral elites facilitated political and administrative 
integration.  Such dynamics became especially pronounced after 1660, when the 
English gentry tended to retreat from the pressures of policy-making at the centre, 
but only in return for heightened authority and independence in the periphery.109  
Thus, by locking itself into pre-existing regional hierarchies, English magistracy 
served a dual function.  Elite office-holding bound the localities more closely to the 
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state.  At the same time, it provided a channel for diffusing public authority back out 
across the land, and modulating it in a manner acceptable to regional sensibilities.110     
Scotland did not stand aloof from this pattern.  The jurisdictional power of 
the Scottish nobility was notoriously extensive, both in terms of their hereditable 
jurisdictions (like barony courts) and their near-monopoly of the key office of local 
government, the sheriffship.111  Highland elites certainly recognised the potential 
advantages of acquiring local government offices.  When in 1661 George Sinclair, 6th 
earl of Caithness, petitioned Lauderdale to be appointed sheriff of Caithness, his 
desire was rooted firmly in self-interest: 
 
How behoouffull And proper that office is For me, the great sufferingis off 
my tenents by others excercising that office haith frome sad experience 
sufficentlie taught me [...] My Ancestors for manie generationes haue enjoyed 
[and] exerced that office by heritabille right frome the king, The Reneweing 
and confirmatione of giffts of this Natur to others hauing Not bein Reffoused 
by his Maj[es]tie, I ame hopfull by yo[u]r Lo[rdships] means To haue the 
same fauo[u]r frome my prince [...] Manie haue trubled his Maj[es]tie by 
petitioneing for reparatione for ther Losses with good success too: and 
Though I Cane demonstrait My Losses [and] Sufferingis to be infferior To non 
in this na[tio]ne [...] yett I will now forbear mentioning of them, And shalbe 
Contented with a grant of this gift.112 
 
Caithness’ awareness of the importance of local government office underlay the 
fierce jostling for positions which marked the Restoration settlement in the 
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Highlands.113  Nor was such anxiety confined to the early 1660s; Moray’s erroneous 
belief in 1673 that a judicial commission shared between himself and Lachlan 
Mackintosh of Torcastle (amongst others) awarded Torcastle greater rights to 
examine witnesses caused the earl to become ‘hotely alarumed’.114  Competition for 
jurisdiction between different offices could be just as acute.  The Earls of Sutherland 
and Caithness disputed over control over western Sutherland in 1661, the former by 
right of his position as sheriff, the latter on account of a justiciary commission for the 
diocese of Caithness.115  The Sheriff Court of Ross in 1664 sparred with the burgh 
court of Tain over the right to try Neil Roy, who after capture had been delivered 
into the burgh’s care for crimes committed within the sheriff’s jurisdiction.116  Further 
south, Torcastle and Huntly throughout the Restoration battled for primacy in 
Lochaber, where Huntly was proprietor but Torcastle was hereditary stewart.  Their 
rivalry came to a head in the 1680s, when Huntly attempted to bypass Torcastle’s 
authority by erecting Lochaber into a regality.117  Highland elites, in short, recognised 
the advantages of enjoying officially-sanctioned jurisdiction, and were prepared to 
fight doggedly to secure it. 
If office-holding represented another avenue through which the Highland 
elite could engage with and exploit the structures of the state, it also worked to 
expand the reach of central government.  Royal authority on its own was potentially 
brittle.  The problem was neatly expounded in 1688 by John Bain of Dalneigh, after 
he had been accused of dereliction of duty because, as a justice of the peace, he had 
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failed to apprehend John Sutherland, 2nd lord Duffus for the alleged murder of 
William Ross of Kindeace: 
 
Dufus wes a powerfull man [...] so it wes Impossible for the pannall to have 
in the Least contribut to the apprehending of Duffus [and] his pretendit 
accomplices if they hade bein guilty, for that same furie which possest them 
when they killed the defunct hade caryed them to have done the like to the 
pannel the provoca[tio]n being greater and the pannall having but an servant 
could have made no resistance either to the number or rage and no man 
(whatever o[the]r salarie or other incouragement he hade) cane be obleidged 
to doe that by vertue of his office wherby he most inevitablie lose his lyff and 
if the justice of the peace should be found obleidged to this.118 
 
Local elites remained hugely powerful in their own right, and they could use this 
influence in a wide variety of ways.  They could act as personal advocates for their 
tenants; Huntly in 1666 appealed to Lauderdale for the release of one of his, Lachlan 
Mackintosh, from imprisonment in Edinburgh.119  They could undertake more 
general protection; Glenorchy in 1676 characterised himself as duty-bound to guard 
his tenants from theft.120  They could stand surety for their subordinates; Thomas 
Sutherland in 1684 appealed to Sir James Sinclair of Mey to help him recover a debt 
of £8 owing from Donald Robertson, one of Mey’s tenants.121  They could act as 
arbitrators; immediately prior to the battle of Mulroy in 1688, the combatant parties, 
led by Torcastle and Keppoch respectively, submitted to the (ultimately 
unsuccessful) mediation of two other MacDonald chiefs, Glengarry and Glencoe.122  
Their influence could even spread into urban areas.  The burgh of Inverness, 
concerned about Macdonnell’s hostile attitude, appealed in 1665 for the help and 
protection of ‘certain particular gentlemen and noblemen (speciallie [...] the Earle of 
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Murray) desyring ther presence hier vith such as they will be pleasit to bring along 
with them’.123    In a similar vein, Fortrose sought to place itself under the influence of 
the Seaforth Mackenzies; Seaforth was offered an incentive of 500 merks to serve as 
the burgh’s patron and protector.124   
Local elites, then, acted as informal foci of authority, and were therefore 
prime candidates for appointment to offices within the regional administration.  
Naturally this approach was not without risk.  Strathnaver, for instance, sponsored a 
campaign of persecution and expropriation against the Murrays of Abirscorce 
between 1668 and 1671, exploiting his position as sheriff of Sutherland to inflate their 
taxation dues, impose exorbitant fines and issue decreets of removing.125  
Nevertheless, awarding local offices to local elites was in general a mutually 
beneficial arrangement, and one which hardly demonstrated unique weakness of 
government.  Highland lords eagerly seized upon the honour and lucrative 
patronage potential offered by involvement in the royal administration, while the 
government itself was able to spread its influence, at least notionally, across the 
region.  ‘Magistracy’ therefore offered both the extension of public authority and the 
integration of personal power.   
 The importance of local office-holding can be demonstrated quantitatively.  
Table 2 (overleaf) gives the total number of local offices accrued by the major family 
groups in the Highlands between 1660 and 1688.  This data raises two striking points.  
Firstly, the preponderance of the native elite was overwhelming.  In all classes of 
local office-holding, around three-quarters of appointees were members of major 
Highland kindreds.  The proportion rises beyond 90 per cent if those outwith the 
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major kin networks but still living in the Highlands – principally burgesses and east-
coast lairds – are added. 
 
Family or Group  Administrative 
Office 
Judicial Office Financial Office 
Cameron 0 1 2 
Chisholm 1 1 0 
Campbell 20 17 51 
Clan Donald 4 1 10 
Fraser 3 4 17 
Gordon 2 1 2 
Gordon of Sutherland 8 8 25 
Grant 1 1 7 
Gray 2 1 5 
MacAllister 1 2 5 
MacDougall 0 1 3 
Mackay 3 2 11 
Mackenzie 24 17 75 
Mackintosh 3 4 12 
MacLachlan 1 2 3 
Maclean 2 4 20 
MacLeod 0 2 5 
MacNeill 0 1 1 
Macpherson 0 1 1 
Munro 4 1 15 
Ross 2 3 16 
Sinclair 16 20 51 
Sutherland 6 4 12 
Urquhart of Cromarty 7 1 13 
Other Highland Resident 26 23 99 
Non-Highland/Unknown 12 3 12 
Totals 148 126 473 
Table 2: Local Office-holding in the Highlands, 1660-88.126 
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In all, less than one in twenty of those awarded local government office were not 
identifiably Highland residents.  The second key point is that a wide range of the 
major Highland kindreds – twenty-four – were involved in local bureaucracies, 
although clearly some families – Campbells, Mackenzies and Sinclairs in particular – 
were called upon more frequently than others.  All of this suggests a robust tradition 
of relying upon established local authorities to staff the institutions of local 
government. 
 Further analysis of one particular office, commissioner of supply, can develop 
this conclusion still more fully.  Empowered to collect assessment levies, 
commissioners of supply were amongst the Restoration regime’s most important 
local officials.  Moreover, because they were always accorded a specific jurisdiction, 
they allow shire-by-shire appointment patterns to be traced.  Thus, of the forty-two 
individuals appointed as commissioners of supply in Argyll, nineteen belonged to 
Clan Campbell, who held their positions alongside six Macleans, three MacDonalds, 
three MacNaughtons, two MacAllisters, one each of the MacLachlans, MacLeods, 
Stewarts and Sutherlands, three other lairds and two ‘fringe’ noblemen.  In 
Caithness, where there were fifty-nine appointments, the biggest haul, thirty-five, 
went to the Sinclairs, but there were also three Campbells, three Sutherlands, one 
Munro, twelve further lairds, two burgesses and three more, uncategorised 
individuals.  Smaller Cromarty yielded only twenty-seven commissioners of supply, 
composed of seven Mackenzies, six Urquharts, three Frasers, a Grant, a Mackintosh 
and seven other lairds and two burgesses.  Inverness-shire’s forty-three 
commissioners were made up of nine Frasers, six Mackintoshes, five MacDonalds, 
four Mackenzies, two Gordons, two Grants, two MacLeods, two Urquharts, a 
Macqueen, a MacGillivray and six further lairds, two ‘fringe’ noblemen and one 
burgess.  Ross-shire boasted the largest contingent of appointees, seventy-four in all, 
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of whom fully thirty-eight were Mackenzies.  There were also nine Rosses, seven 
Munros, two Frasers, one Mackintosh, one Sutherland, one Urquhart, fourteen other 
lairds and one burgess.  Finally, amongst Sutherland’s forty commissioners of supply 
were seventeen Gordons, eight Mackays, four Grays, three Munros, three 
Sutherlands, a MacLeod, a Ross and three other lairds.  The key point here is that, in 
each shire, the largest and most dominant kindreds (respectively Campbell, Sinclair, 
Urquhart, Fraser, Mackenzie and Gordon) secured the largest number of 
appointments, while room was also left for recognising lesser but still important local 
influence (like the Gaelic families of the Hebrides, or the burghs).  Commissioner of 
supply appointments, in other words, illustrate and confirm the propensity of royal 
government in the locality to bolt itself onto pre-existing power networks.  This, in 
turn, demonstrates that the phenomenon of ‘magistracy’ was no more alien in the 
Highlands than it was anywhere else in late-seventeenth century Europe. 
Highlanders’ involvement in the structures of central government offered 
something of a contrast to the situation in the locality.  Service in the most senior 
roles was very limited.  For instance, only five Highlanders – Argyll, Breadalbane, 
Tarbat, Caithness and Sir George Munro of Culcairn – secured positions on the Privy 
Council.127  A similar pattern can be discerned for appointments to the various 
committees and commissions created by Parliament or Privy Council.  In total 134 
instances of Highlanders holding such offices have been recorded, 107 with 
administrative functions and twenty-seven with a judicial capacity.  These 
appointments were shared between ten individuals, who between them represented 
only the families of Campbell, Gordon, Mackenzie, Munro, Sutherland, and 
Urquhart, as well as the burgh of Inverness – a considerably more restricted range 
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than held office locally.128  A more important point, however, concerns the 
distribution of office between individuals.  Nearly half of them (sixty) went to a 
single man, Tarbat, reflecting the fact that the Fife-born Tarbat – a senior member of 
the government between 1661 and 1663 and again after 1678, appointed an 
extraordinary Lord of Session in 1661, Justice General in 1678, Justice Clerk in 1681 
and an ordinary Lord of Session the same year – was by far the best example of a 
Highland landlord integrating seamlessly into the state apparatus.129  A further 
quarter of them (thirty-six) were awarded to Argyll, like Tarbat a likely suspect given 
his position as the government’s key Highland agent in the 1660s and 1670s.130  The 
remaining thirty-eight appointments were shared between a cluster of more 
occasional office-holders; Breadalbane (twelve), Sir John Urquhart of Cromarty 
(seven), Seaforth (seven), Sir George Munro of Culcairn and Newmore (three), 
William Duff of Inverness (three), John Gordon, 13th earl of Sutherland (two), Sir 
John Urquhart of Craigston (two), and John Mackenzie, master of Tarbat (one).  What 
these patterns indicate, in other words, is that, although central government was by 
no means closed to the regional elite, office-holding was dominated by a tiny cadre 
of especially prominent men, all of whom, strikingly, haled from the southern or 
eastern extremities of the Highlands. 
A still more striking illustration of Highlanders’ detachment from the 
institutions of central government was afforded by the membership of the Privy 
Council’s Committee for the Highlands.  This body was first created as a one-off 
expedient in July 1661 for deciding ‘what is fitt to be done anent the chiftans of 
clanns’, but by 1669 had been re-established on a semi-permanent basis, and 
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continued to meet intermittently throughout the reign of Charles II.131  Its core 
function remained to offer recommendations on Highland policy, although it was on 
occasion given additional responsibilities; it was empowered to receive bonds of 
caution in 1669 and 1672, and in 1671 it received specific instructions to investigate a 
‘slaughter and ryot’ between the MacDonalds and Camerons.132  In total, eighty-
seven commissions to sit on this committee have been recorded, shared between 
forty-one men.  A mere thirteen commissions went to Highlanders (Argyll, 
Archibald Campbell, lord Lorne, Breadalbane, Tarbat, and Culcairn), with a further 
twenty going to men from the Highland fringe (Alexander Sutherland, 1st lord 
Duffus, Alexander Stewart, 5th earl of Moray, Charles Erskine, 5th earl of Mar, Charles 
Gordon, 1st earl of Aboyne, Atholl, Sir George Gordon of Haddo, James Ogilvy, 2nd 
earl of Airlie, and William Drummond of Cromlix).  Thus, fifty-three commissions – 
more than 60 per cent – went to Lowlanders, principally peers like Tweeddale, 
Alexander Bruce, 2nd earl of Kincardine and William Douglas, 2nd earl and 1st 
marquis of Queensberry, but also officials such as the Lord Clerk Register, Sir 
Archibald Primrose, or the Lord Advocate, Rosehaugh.  The voice of Highland 
affairs in national government, therefore, was largely Lowland and aristocratic, 
reinforcing the perception that Highlanders themselves played little part at the 
centre.  Admittedly, this cannot be taken to reflect a distinctly Highland response.  
Scotland’s central administration was generally dominated by a tiny clique of 
individuals – in Brown’s estimate, a mere 100 Scots ‘could command a voice in 
national affairs’ at any one time – and, by way of comparison, it is instructive to note 
that the Committee for the West, appointed in 1678 to oversee the pacification of that 
region, was peopled by noblemen (Atholl, Moray, Airlie, George Livingstone, 3rd earl 
                                                           
131 RPCS, i, p.11.  The last extant commission to the Highland Committee was in May 1682, 
and there is no record of it meeting thereafter. 
132 RPCS, iii, p.37, p.341, p.490 and at p.542. 
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of Linlithgow, James Drummond, 4th earl of Perth and Patrick Lyon, 3rd earl of 
Strathmore) with scant personal link to it.133  Yet the crucial observation, that 
Highland office-holding generally did not extend proportionally to the central 
administration, remains valid. 
With these observations in place, the character of Highland ‘magistracy’ is 
clear.  Despite a few notable exceptions, Highlanders’ involvement in central 
government – and thus the formulation of ‘Highland policy’ – was very limited.  
Exclusion from the centre was however balanced with a formidably active role in the 
locality, where the Crown administration exploited personal authority as a means of 
spreading its influence, while at the same time providing local elites with a lucrative 
source of patronage and prestige.  This pattern of detachment from central 
government, but dominance in local government, paralleled the situation throughout 
Scotland and indeed Britain.  Any notion that the Scottish state’s interaction with the 
Highlands was qualitatively different from the early-modern norm, let alone that the 
region was an ‘internal colony’, must therefore be treated with the utmost caution. 
The conventional historiographical notion that Highland Scotland was an 
archaic backwater within the Scottish and British polities certainly echoes 
contemporary opinion during the Restoration.  Lowland and English commentators 
readily branded the region as ‘other’, a strange and alien land characterised by 
backwardness, and in this they were assisted by the parallel agenda of native 
polemicists.  Yet some historians’ attempts to deduce from this a colonial relationship 
between centre and periphery are unconvincing, largely because, in restricting itself 
to the issues of violence and lawlessness, contemporary understanding of Highland 
‘barbarity’ fell some way short of the stereotypes attached to genuine colonies.  As a 
result, Highland policy was underpinned by a more restricted agenda than that 
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found in the New World, or even in Ireland.  In any case, the simplified image 
constructed for the Highlands should not be allowed to obscure the much more fluid 
situation on the ground.  Restoration elites across the Highlands espoused a hybrid 
identity which drew at least as much upon Lowland norms as Gaelic tradition, and 
this allowed for a high degree of integration.  Government office-holding furthered 
this trend by offering a lucrative source of prestige, patronage and power.  The 
crucial point of all this is that, notwithstanding the misleading pronouncements of 
both external and native image-makers, Highland Scotland behaved and was treated 
as simply another locality within the Stuart dominions.  It was a distant and, as we 
shall see, frequently troublesome locality, to be sure, but it was a locality nonetheless. 
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CHAPTER 3  
The Nature of the Highland Problem 
 
In the final quarter of the nineteenth century, William Forbes Skene published 
his great survey of the ‘Celtic’ era in Scottish history.  His work was based upon the 
assertion that, from the earliest periods of recorded history, Scotland had been 
predominantly Gaelic in character.  From the mid-twelfth century, however, this 
identity had, according to Skene, begun to shift:  
 
Though the connection between Scotland with her Celtic population and 
Lothian with her Anglic inhabitants was at first but slender, her monarchs 
indentified themselves more and more with their Teutonic subjects, with 
whom the Celtic tribes maintained an ineffectual struggle, and gradually 
retreated before their increasing power and colonisation, till they became 
confined to the mountains and western islands.1 
 
Simplistic as this characterisation may seem, Skene’s notion of an unending struggle 
between the ‘Teutonic’ Lowlands and the Highland rump of ‘Celtic’ Scotland 
underpins one of the most enduring motifs of Scottish historiography.  The resulting 
‘Highland Problem’ is a ubiquitous concept, and is often used as a blanket 
characterisation of the Highlands’ place within the Scottish and British polities 
throughout the medieval and early-modern periods.  Yet it is a fluid and ill-defined 
construct, revealing little about the true state of the Highlands, at the same time as 
masking the need for more in-depth analysis.  This chapter will seek to explore the 
reality of the ‘Highland problem’ during the Restoration by focusing on two themes.  
Firstly, it will consider the general issue of lawlessness, with particular reference to 
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banditry and animal theft.  Secondly, the challenge of clanship, and the related issue 
of feuding, will be assessed.   
The supposed emergence of a general and endemic problem of lawlessness is 
much the most prominent theme in the historiography of the Highlands, and not just 
during the Restoration. In broad terms, Michael Fry argues that in the years after 
1660 ‘the Gaels destroyed law and order in the Highlands’ and ‘the glens became 
havens of impunity’.2  Fry’s argument is that this explosion of lawlessness was 
occasioned by the removal of the stringent government structures imposed under the 
Commonwealth, and this idea of an exuberant release from unwelcome scrutiny is 
very widespread.  Caroline Bingham’s assertion that ‘change towards a more 
peaceful society was halted [after 1660] and the martial character of clanship 
reasserted’ is perhaps rather amorphous, but other historians, including Stevenson, 
Hopkins and Lenman, have, after more sustained discussion, reached broadly 
similar conclusions.3  The most recent re-statement of the ‘Highland problem’ has 
been offered by Lee.  For him there were two main challenges.  The first concerned 
Lochaber, whose uncertain jurisdictional status allowed the Camerons of Lochiel to 
wreak perpetual havoc.  The second concerned caterans, ‘robber bands of men 
mostly from broken clans’ who systematically plundered the cattle trade.4  There has, 
however, been a revisionist drive led above all by Macinnes.  He argues that 
clanship’s association with ritualistic violence, especially cattle raiding, declined in 
the course of the seventeenth century, leaving only a few families associated with it 
by the Restoration.  For Macinnes, indeed, notions of Highland lawlessness were 
cynical inventions on the part of central government.  Authority had after 1660 been 
                                                           
2 Fry, Wild Scots, p.34. 
3 C. Bingham, Beyond the Highland Line: Highland History and Culture (London, 1991), p.125; 
Stevenson, Highland Warrior, p.277; Hopkins, Glencoe, pp.28-29; Lenman, Jacobite Clans, p.39. 
4 Lee, ‘Dearest Brother’, p.178. 
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‘left in the hands of political opportunists’ who ‘deliberately created a climate of 
disorder to sanction the raising of regiments’, largely because the outfitting and 
running of militia units was ‘a lucrative form of private enterprise’ for the ruling 
aristocracy.  Although Macinnes concedes that it was in fact the covenanters of 
southern Scotland who bore the brunt of this policy, he argues that it was 
deliberately applied to the Highland theatre as well.  Moreover, he sees it as the 
guiding principle of Highland governance until at least the late 1670s.5  
Notwithstanding such correctives, the general thrust of the historiography remains 
that the Highlands after 1660 really were a wild and lawless place, and one which 
was consistently beyond the authorities’ control.  
 It certainly is the case that there developed in Restoration Scotland a 
pervasive public discourse regarding the lawlessness of Highland society.   Central 
government led the chorus.  The Privy Council complaining as early as 1661 that 
some ‘perverse and obstinat offenders’ within the Highlands ‘dare yet adventure to 
trouble the peace of the kingdom by committing theifts, robberies, murtheries, 
depredationes, spuilzes, and other haynous crymes’.6  Soon after becoming 
Chancellor in 1664, Rothes seemed a little more hopeful, declaring that ‘the haylands 
of Scotland ue hear is pesabell’, but by the following January, when he observed 
wearily that ‘the haylands ar so brockin that I nou not uhat to du’, his confidence had 
evaporated.7  This perception was not limited to Edinburgh.  Writing at the end of 
the 1670s, Robert Kirk, minister of Balquhidder, lamented the ubiquity of theft – ‘that 
base trade of life’ – amongst the ‘Scotsh-irish’, and was certain that it was having a 
corrupting impact upon society:  
 
                                                           
5 Macinnes, Clanship, pp.32-35, pp.124-25 and at p.133. 
6 RPCS, i, p.25. 
7 BL, Lauderdale Papers, 1664-5, Add. Mss. 23122, f.45v and at f.249r. 
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For Bordering enemies to invade other so, is no wonder; but to bordering 
neibours, men of the same language [and] extract, tis Barbarous; mars all 
traffic and converse, as wel as Religion, being a kind of secret civil war, and 
unmanly Treachery; worse then the savageness of beasts who prey not on 
their own Kind.8   
 
Kirk’s anxieties were echoed by observers on the ground.  The heritors of Strathspey, 
led by James Grant of Freuchie, complained to Parliament in January 1661 that 
several ‘notorious theeves and robberis’ in the area ‘do not cease vpon all occasiones 
[...] to Infest the boundis and duellingis of yo[u]r petitioneris w[i]t their s[e]rvantis 
and complices dryving from thence all that may come in [thair] handis’.9  Rosehaugh, 
writing in 1683, summed up the situation when he declared that the frequency of 
‘Thefts and Robberies in the Highlands’ was so great that it stood as ‘a Reproach to 
the Government’, and threatened ‘Ruine to the People’.10   
 The Highlands were not of course the only region which developed a 
reputation for lawlessness.  Within Scotland, its notoriety was during the Restoration 
rivalled (and, from the late 1670s, possible surpassed) by that of the strongly 
Presbyterian south-west, particularly Galloway.11  Other peripheral regions across 
Europe attracted similar reputations.  Ireland, like Scotland, had areas of 
exceptionally hostile terrain, especially in Connacht and Munster (the extreme south-
western county of Kerry was generally considered the worst), which were recognised 
                                                           
8 NLS, MS.3932, f.153r-v. 
9 NRS, Seafield Papers, GD248/458/4.  By 1687, fully twenty-six years later, such concerns 
had clearly not abated: in that year, Breadalbane received a petition from his tenants and 
other dependants in Perthshire, claiming that their lands were ‘Frequently Inffested with 
Theives [and] Robbers’ to such an extent that they were being slowly reduced to penury.  
NRS, GD112/43/15/19. 
10 George Mackenzie, A vindication of His Majesties government, & iudicatures, in Scotland; From 
some Aspersions thrown on them by scandalous Pamphlets, and News-books: and especially, with 
Relation to the late Earl of Argiles Process (Edinburgh, 1683), p.9. 
11 Jackson, Restoration Scotland, p.134; Macinnes, Clanship, p.133. 
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as offering shelter to the feared bands of outlaws known as ‘tories’.12  On the 
southern tip of the Swedish peninsula, the provinces of Blekinge, Skåne, and 
Halland, ownership of which had long been contested between Denmark and 
Sweden, became widely associated with depredations by roving groups of thieves, 
especially during the Scanian War (1674-79).13  But perhaps the most striking 
example of the peripheral association with criminality was provided by the disparate 
Spanish kingdoms.  Catalonia was especially notorious, linked in particular with 
high levels of banditry, but other territories towards the distant south of the 
peninsula, such as Murcia and Andalucía, were almost as infamous.14  The 
designation of peripheral regions as incorigibly lawless was therefore not unusual in 
the seventeenth century, and the Highlands’ unsavoury image had parallels across 
Europe. 
There was, however, another strand within the discourse of Highland 
lawlessness that was peculiar to Scotland.  Disorder was assumed to have become 
much worse since the withdrawal of the Cromwellian administration, 
notwithstanding the government’s own rather disingenuous insistence that it was 
actually the non-enforcement of royal policy between 1637 and 1660 which had 
nurtured lawlessness in the region.15  On 12 July 1661, for instance, Parliament 
received a petition from the gentleman of all the Highland and Highland-fringe 
shires (with the exception of Argyll): 
 
                                                           
12 J.H. Andrews, ‘Land and People, c.1685’ in T.W. Moody, F.X. Martin, and F.J. Byrne (eds.), 
A New History of Ireland, iii, Early Modern Ireland 1634-1691 (Oxford, 1991), pp.454-77, at p.455. 
13 J.R. Ruff, Violence in Early-Modern Europe, 1500-1800 (Cambridge, 2001), p.223. 
14 Kamen, Spain, pp.207-11. 
15 RPCS, iii, p.55.  This was not only glib but untrue; the Commonwealth had in fact 
deliberately modelled its Highland policy on established Scottish legislation, particularly 
from the reigns of James V and James VI. R. Steele (ed.), Tudor and Stuart Proclamations, 
volume 2 (Oxford, 1910), p.349; NRS, GD176/451. 
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Sewerall depredationes slaughters and wther enormous practices have bein 
laitlie co[m]mitted and mor at this day than in former tymes by sundire laules 
broken persones liveing in and resorteing to the saids shyres against many of 
their peaceable neighbouris liveing in the low lands.16 
 
Crucially, the petitioners observed that things had been much more settled ‘dureing 
the tyme of the lait wssurpers’, when ‘such cair wes taken [and] persewed to 
restraine and prevent such Insolencies barbaraties and crewalties’.  Another petition, 
written later in the 1660s, was still more specific.  It argued that the republican 
garrison at Inverlochy in particular had ensured that ‘the places now Most lyable to 
the thiefts, robberies and depredationes of the broken hylanders’, defined in this 
instance as all the shires north of the Forth, ‘wer so farr from being infested by ther 
incursiones, That on[e] single beast was seen to stray for divers weeks without ane 
owner’.17  The tenor of all this was clear and unequivocal. Demilitarisation after 1660 
occasioned a boom in lawlessness and banditry, and this trend persisted throughout 
the bulk of the Restoration.  
 However, revisionists such as Macinnes are certainly correct to stress that a 
degree of circumspection is needed.  Argyll noted irritably in 1664 that some of his 
political enemies deliberately sought to inflate reports of Highland lawlessness in 
order to damage him (he was still making similar claims, this time directed 
specifically at James Graham, 2nd marquis of Montrose, on the very eve of his fall in 
1681), and five years later Lauderdale recalled that the English Chancellor, Edward 
Hyde, 1st earl of Clarendon had been wont to use the same tactic against him.18  
Lauderdale’s later political nemesis, William Douglas, 3rd duke of Hamilton, 
                                                           
16 NRS, PA7/9/1, Supplementary Parliamentary Papers, 1661, f.76.   
17 NRS, GD176/475.  Precisely the same problem occupied James Fraser of Wardlaw, who 
declared baldly that ‘the Highlanders are now brekeing out’ because ‘the strick restraint 
which the English kept uppon their necks’ had been removed.  Fraser, Wardlaw, p.457 
18  Airy, Lauderdale Papers, i, p.201; NRAS1209, bundle 52; H.M. Paton (ed.), ‘Letters from John, 
Second Earl of Lauderdale, to John, Second Earl of Tweeddale, and Others’ in Miscellany of the 
Scottish Historical Society, Sixth Volume (Edinburgh, 1939), pp.113-242, at p.195. 
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continued this tradition.  In November 1670 he wrote to the Secretary with an 
alarmist account of Scotland’s supposed instability, included within which was the 
assertion that ‘I shall not need to Insist to tell yow of the disorders in the highlands’.19  
In his reply, Lauderdale was clearly irritated: 
 
Yow say you need not insist to tell me of the disorders in the Highlands, but I 
know none Excepting what fell out of the Court kept at Inverlochy some 
moneths agoe, which is under the Councells tryall.  If there be any others I 
ame yet ignorant of them.20 
 
Deriving political capital from exaggerated claims of Highland lawlessness was not 
the sole preserve of outsiders, however; according to Tweeddale, Macdonnell was 
perfectly content ‘to boast [and] brag uhat the higlands can doe’ in the belief that 
heightened notoriety would augment his authority.21 
If the discourse of Highland lawlessness requires careful handling, the same 
is true of the argument that removing the republican garrisons occasioned an 
explosion in disorder.  It is too simplistic, and ignores the fact that the episodes so 
complained about after 1660 had exact parallels under the Commonwealth.  For 
instance, Archibald dow McNeill, a resident of Clachaig in Cowal, was known to 
have led a cattle-lifting ring in 1656, but the Commonwealth authorities were unable 
to deal with him.22  Similar low-level banditry was suffered by the Ogilvys of Airlie, 
who lost £1,000-worth of cattle between 1657 and 1659, and were still trying to 
reclaim it by 1666.23  On a larger scale, the Sinclairs in 1668 complained that several 
hundred animals had been stolen from various lands in Caithness by a large cateran 
                                                           
19 NRS, Hamilton Papers, GD406/1/2072. 
20 NRS, GD406/1/2073.  The disorders at Inverlochy concerned the abortive attempt by the 
earl of Moray to hold courts there, for which see below.  
21 NLS, Yester Correspondence, 1660-1669, MS.7024, f.153r. 
22 Cameron et al, Justiciary Records, i, p.13.  It was in fact not until 1672 that McNeill was tried, 
convicted and hanged. 
23 NRS, GD16/41/379. 
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composed mostly of tenants of the Gordons of Sutherland, and that these raids had 
begun as far back as 1653.24  In short, assertions about the lawlessness of the 
Restoration Highlands should be treated circumspectly, partly because they were 
often politically motivated, and partly because they overestimated the peacefulness 
of the years before 1660.   
At the same time, it should be noted that contemporary opinions about the 
endemic lawlessness of the entire Highlands were off-set by a second discourse 
espousing a more limited view.  Alexander Burnet, the hard-line archbishop of 
Glasgow, declared in 1665 that Highland disorders were merely the results of minor 
localised quarrelling – in stark contrast, as he predictably saw it, to the widespread 
and genuinely seditious problem of Presbyterian nonconformity.25  More specifically, 
discussion tended to concentrate on one region above all others.  In 1667, the 
Sutherland laird, John Murray of Aberscore, whose estates had recently suffered a 
spate of robberies, exclaimed that ‘such barbaritie and inhumanitie was not vsit in 
Lochaber or the most barbarous pairt of Scotland these hundreth yeires bygoun’.26  
Lochaber’s reputation as the epicentre of Highland lawlessness had been in evidence 
from the earliest days of the Restoration.27  In September 1660, John Campbell, elder 
of Glenorchy noted that ‘the out lawes and brokin men q[uh]o now troubles [th]e 
cuntries’ were active ‘in and about lochaber [and] [the] braws [the]rof for [th]e most 
p[ai]rt’.28  A similar opinion was offered in an anonymous memorandum on the 
Highlands written in 1677, which stated quite straightforwardly that:  
 
                                                           
24 RPCS, iii, pp.404-6. 
25 CSPDC, v, p.24. 
26 Fraser, Sutherland Book, ii, p.187. 
27 For a more long-term discussion of Lochaber’s association with lawlessness, see A.I. 
Macinnes, ‘Lochaber - The Last Bandit Country, c.1600-c.1750’, Transactions of the Gaelic Society 
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Lochaber is the nurserie [and] the refuge of all the theeves [in the Highlands] 
And from thence comes parties to theeve in most of all the shyrs be north 
Forth And may o[the]r placs [sic] of the Kingdome.29 
 
Such thinking endured, and the commissioners for pacifying the Highlands in 1684 
described Lochaber as ‘the seatt and cheiff residence of the greatest theives and 
resaitters of all Scotland’ – by 1686, they were suggesting that only a rigorous diet of 
Justiciary Courts at Rannoch, Inverlochy and Keppoch could hope to maintain 
order.30  With striking consistency, then, this one area at the southern extremity of 
the Great Glen was characterised as, by a considerable margin, the most troublesome 
region of the Highlands. 
This notoriety rested upon the unsavoury reputations of a small core of 
especially troublesome families.  As early as 1661, Parliament was informed that 
‘Clan Chamron [...] are notourlie knoune to have been from the begining, and 
continewes still, a most rebellious and lawlesse people, given to depredations, thefts 
and oppressions’.31  A comparable point was made by Tweeddale when he claimed 
in 1669 that ‘the Magrigor ar a clan I apprehend most traibel from’.32  Lachlan 
Mackintosh of Torcastle added a third group to the roster by noting that the 
MacDonalds of Keppoch were ‘in effect the only nurserie of broken men in this 
whole Kingdome’, and that their chief was ‘the only person as yet insecured to the 
peace of a broken hyland man in all the North of Scotland.33  All of these groups, 
                                                           
29 NRAS832, Papers of the Maitland Family, Earls of Lauderdale, Bundle 63/55, Memoranda 
and Overtures for the Peace of the Highlands, 1662-78, item 2.  This memorandum is one of 
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that year commissioned to produce a report on the Highlands is suggestive.  RPCS, v, p.87. 
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at f.25v. 
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Camerons’ traditional enemies, the Mackintoshes. 
32 NRS, GD112/39/115/9. 
33 NRS, GD176/593; NRAS217, box 6, item 467. 
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with the exception of the MacGregors, had been included in the elder laird of 
Glenorchy’s analysis from 1660, alongside a fourth kindred, the MacDonalds of 
Glencoe.  Any measures which successfully curbed the excesses of these families, 
Glenrochy argued, would effectively solve the problem of Highland lawlessness.34   
Fuller discussion was offered in two anonymous memoranda, both dating 
from the late 1670s.  The first emphasised the rebellious credentials of five groups, 
focusing on their penchant for illegally occupying other people’s lands.  The 
Camerons had seized land in Ardnamurchan, and had earlier attempted to do 
something similar in Lochaber.  The Macleans were guilty of embedding themselves 
in territory belonging to the Earl of Argyll.  The Keppoch MacDonalds, like the 
Camerons, occupied estates in Lochaber pertaining to the Mackintoshes.  The 
Glencoe MacDonalds, meanwhile, had possessed themselves of ‘certaine lands 
belonging to [th]e Lord Lovitt’.  All of these lawless groups had banded together in a 
rebellious alliance ‘to resist the execution of his Ma[jes]ties Lawes’, and at their helm 
was Macdonnell, a sort of bandit-in-chief who was ‘known to influence all these 
Combinations’.35  Despite its detail, and despite according in some degree with other 
assessments of Highland lawlessness, this contribution must be treated with caution.  
It was clearly a partisan broadside designed to drum up support for the House of 
Argyll during its struggle for control of Mull.  Its purpose was to denigrate the anti-
Campbell confederation, to paint it as a hoard of land-hungry rebels, rather than to 
offer a realistic assessment of the ‘Highland Problem’.  
The second report – another anonymous contribution, dated 1677 – is rather 
more considered.  It gave a roll-call of all the major family groups in the Highlands.  
The Stewarts, Robertsons and MacLeods it described as ‘verie peaceable men’; the 
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Campbells were ‘verie obedient to the Laws’; the Mackenzies were ‘verie peaceable 
and restrains theeffing [and] stealling in [the]r bounds’; all Highlanders under the 
earl of Moray’s jurisdiction were ‘verie quiet [and] peaceable’; the Farquharsons 
were ‘Indifferentlie peaceable’, as were the Grants and the MacDonalds of 
Clanranald; most of the tenants of the earl of Perth, Lovat, and the laird of Glenorchy 
were well-behaved; the Mackintoshes and Macleans were for the most part peace-
loving; the MacDonalds of Sleat were ‘peaceable’; and the MacDonalds of Glengarry, 
despite being ‘rude [and] disorderlie’, were effectively restrained through the efforts 
of Macdonnell.  The memorandum’s only negative judgements were reserved for 
‘the Name of Cam[e]ron [and] the MacDonald[s] in Lochaber [and] Glencoan’, who 
were ‘verie disobedient [and] disturbs the peace of the heighlands more than any 
other of the Clans [...] so that the people in al thes bounds com[m]itts daylie thiffts 
[and] Roberries’.36  Notwithstanding the wider public perception of endemic 
lawlessness, then, more informed discussion almost universally restricted this 
appellation to the Lochaber region, and to the four clans of MacGregor, Cameron, 
MacDonald of Keppoch, and MacDonald of Glencoe. 
Indeed, the particular opprobrium in which Lochaber was held can be 
discerned from the readiness with which disorders were attributed to its people.  
Thomas Houston, minister of Boleskin in Inverness-shire, complained that he had 
been attacked and robbed at his home in 1669.  He was quick to pin the outrage on 
‘Lochaber Robbers’, and the heritors of another Inverness parish, Daviot and 
Dunlichity, stated in 1676 that  during the summer months they were ‘necessitat to 
abyd in the Glens to shelter and keep ther bestiall and goods From the Lochabber 
and Glencoa Robbers’.37  Perth in February 1688 expressed his anxiety that ‘the 
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Lochaber [and] Glencoan men to the Number of betuixt 2[00] [and] 300 men’ were 
preparing to ‘Come doune [and] plunder [and] destroy’ his lands in Rannoch.38  
Lochaber men were even seen at work on the eastern fringes of the Highlands.  In 
1667 Magdalene Scrimgeour, lady Drum raised an indictment against a band of 
raiders principally drawn from the Glencoe MacDonalds, accusing them of lifting 
several hundred oxen, cows, horses and sheep from her lands in Aberdeenshire.39  
They were even accused of conducting raids into Fife in the spring of 1686.40  Not 
only, then, were Lochaber men considered the most lawless in the entire Highlands, 
but they were also believed to range very widely, and to be responsible for almost all 
major disorders throughout the region. 
 At least part of the explanation for Lochaber’s poor reputation was its 
eccentric patchwork of jurisdictions.  Three different individuals claimed superiority.  
The first was Huntly.  The traditional Gordon patrimony included the lordship of 
Lochaber, and the return of these estates in 1662 restored Huntly to his position as 
the major regional landholder.  With ownership went authority, and Huntly claimed 
legal jurisdiction over Lochaber.41  His most consistent rival was Lachlan Makintosh 
of Torcastle.  The Mackintosh chiefs had been hereditary stewarts of Lochaber since 
at least 1447, and they too claimed substantial jurisdictional power – indeed, in 1679 
Torcastle sought legal advice from Rosehaugh in order to prove that his stewartry 
was the equivalent of a regality and, thus, subject to no jurisdiction but the king’s.42  
The final claimant was Moray.  Lochaber lay within Inverness-shire, and Moray’s 
argument was that he, having been confirmed as hereditary sheriff of Inverness in 
                                                           
38 WSRO, Gordon Letters, Goodwood Mss 1166, item 32. 
39 RPCS, ii, pp.219-20 and at pp.329-32. 
40 RPCS, xii, p.136. 
41 RPS, 1681/7/140;  WSRO, Goodwood Mss 1166, item 1; B.G. Robertson, ‘Continuity and 
Change in the Scottish Nobility: The House of Huntly, 1603-90’ (University of Aberdeen, PhD 
thesis, 2007), pp.163-64. 
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October 1660, held superlative jurisdiction.43  From the very beginning of the 
Restoration, then, the challenge of maintaining law and order in Lochaber was 
complicated by the existence of three overlapping jurisdictions, all of which were 
claimed by their holders to be paramount. 
For many contemporaries, this uncertainty weakened social and political 
control, leading inevitably to lawlessness.  The soldier William Mackintosh, in his 
report to Huntly (elevated since 1684 to the dukedom of Gordon) on the MacDonald-
led rebellion of 1688 which culminated in the battle of Mulroy, implied very strongly 
that the lack of an undisputed line of authority in Lochaber fostered ‘dangerous 
consequences’ that were ‘hatefull among christians’ because it allowed troublesome 
elements to stir up disaffection.44  Into this vacuum, it was argued, stepped the 
informal hierarchy of clanship.  On this point the 1677 memoranda are clear: 
 
In reguard thes broken men [and] Clanns are Influenced be therr Cheiffs on 
whom they depend principallie They give no obedience [...] And being 
Contenanced [and] defended by ther Cheefs They take libertie to co[m]mitt 
all disorders they please, and have no regard to authoritie nor Law.45 
 
Lochaber’s jurisdictional imprecision also stimulated disorder at an elite level, as the 
competing superiors periodically attempted to assert their rights.  The earliest major 
example was in August 1670, when the Privy Council commissioned Moray to hold 
courts in Lochaber.  Moray’s attempts to do so failed, apparently through the 
resistance of the Camerons, and by November 1671 the commission had been 
                                                           
43 RGSS, xi, p.5.  Jurisdictional confusion was not helped by the fact that Lochaber straddled 
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rescinded upon Torcastle’s insistence.46  Although this seems to have been the end of 
Moray’s active interest in Lochaber, friction between the Gordons and Mackintoshes 
persisted.47  In February 1683, Huntly attempted to buy out Torcastle for the sum of 
15,000 merks.  Torcastle was initially receptive, but apparently changed his mind, for 
by 1684 Huntly was instead attempting to nullify the Mackintosh claim by having his 
own estates in Lochaber erected as a regality.48  Complex jurisdictional disputes 
undoubtedly fomented tension in Lochaber, and this in turn made it much more 
difficult to establish a clear line of authority.  If this goes some way towards 
explaining the particular problems associated with that region, it also highlights the 
perils associated with characterising the supposed lawlessness of the Highlands as a 
general and endemic ‘problem’. 
If the ‘Highland problem’ was neither as novel nor as widespread as some 
contemporary propaganda might suggest, the shadowy origins of the major 
troublemakers did render it highly complicated.  Usually law-breakers were 
characterised as ‘broken men’, meaning that they acknowledged no lord.  This placed 
them within the category of the vagrant.  Even if vagrancy was of particular concern 
in the Highlands – and the Privy Council certainly thought so in 1666, when it 
declared that ‘they so abound and are sheltered that the publick lawes cannot be 
execut against them’ – it was hardly unknown elsewhere.49  Indeed, when in 1672 the 
Scottish Parliament sought to combat the problem by establishing correction houses, 
there was no indication of a particular concern for the Highlands; of the thirty-two 
                                                           
46 RPCS, iii, p.222 and at p.403; James Drummond, Memoirs of Sir Ewen Cameron of Locheill ed. 
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47 Robertson, ‘Continuity and Change’, pp.173-75. 
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institutions mooted, only four were in this region.50  Vagrants, in fact, were a much-
discussed, and much-maligned, component of early-modern society across Europe.  
Hostility towards them clearly owed something to practical concerns; groups of 
wandering unemployed were unsightly and potentially criminal.51  More 
importantly, in a world structured around social relationships (particularly lordship 
and worship in a set parish), ‘masterless men’ were an anomaly, and were 
understood to pose what Braddick has called a ‘normative’ threat to the very fabric 
of society.52  Neither the existence of ‘masterless men’ in the Highlands, nor the near-
hysterical official response to them, should therefore occasion much surprise.  Rather 
than viewing caterans as a peculiarly Highland problem, they should be understood 
as the Highlands’ version of a much wider social issue endemic to early-modern 
society.53 
Historians investigating these phenomena have tended to reject the 
contemporary dogma that vagrants were simply lazy misfits, and have sought other 
explanations, stressing instead the importance of poverty.54  A number of pressures 
could in fact push Highlanders towards vagrant and bandit lifestyles, of which 
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poverty was certainly one.  Aggressive begging was a marked problem facing the 
commissioners for pacifying the Highlands in 1686: 
 
This being ane open yeir [...] cattell for want of fodder are forced to be out 
upon the mountans But these theives come down in tens and Tuelves to the 
braes of Strathein and the Och[y]ells In armes thigging and if they be denyed 
there they steall and robbe So [tha]t the gentlemen in these cowntries have 
not safety nor securitie.55 
 
Although the tone of this extract mirrors the broader contemporary understanding of 
vagrancy as a lifestyle choice, individual cases reveal a more complex pattern.  Mary 
nic Killop, a resident of Kilmore in Lorne, was reported in July 1674 to have ‘gone 
out of the country begging for bread’, and to have done so ‘by reasone of the 
Indigency and the generall skarcity of victuales in the country’.56  If this example 
highlights the link between poverty and vagrancy, an earlier experience of the 
soldier Lachlan Mackintosh illustrates the ease with such pressures could lead to 
criminality.  Mackintosh had served in the Royalist armies during the 1640s, and had 
lived in exile in France during the Interregnum.  Upon returning to Scotland after the 
Restoration, he found himself ‘defrauded of any portione [he] might hawe expected 
by [his] fathers decease’, and had as a consequence been ‘forcit to liwe for a tyme 
vpone the charitie of my freindis In the highlands’.  Subsequently he was ‘dryven by 
necessitie to liwe as ane out law’, and he stressed that he had not taken this step ‘out 
of any Mulitius Inclinatione’.  He was ultimately found guilty of conniving in ‘one 
alleidgit robrie and way taking of some kowis’ from John Lyon of Muiresk, and 
seems to have been executed.57   
                                                           
55 NRS, PC8/7, f.26r. 
56 NRS, Records of the Presbytery of Lorne, 1651-1681, CH2/984/1, ff.261-62. 
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Other forms of social anxiety also had a role to play.  Tenants could suffer 
eviction through no fault of their own.  In Ardullie in Easter Ross, the infeftment in 
1668 of a new landlord, Robert Munro, left the existing tenants – including Archibald 
Baillie, Alexander Baillie, John Dow and John MacGregor – landless because Munro 
wished to replace them with his own kin and servants.58  Such sudden removal from 
one’s lands could necessitate a degree of raiding, as Argyll found out to his cost in 
1666: 
 
It is commonly said none will stealle from me and yet whithin this yeare 
horse and cowes haue beene stolen from the tenants of my property w[i]tin 
two or three miles of my house and some of them by those I had the yeare 
before discarded on suspition who are now receate on other mens grounds.59 
 
The problem was frequently exacerbated by the standard practice of putting criminal 
groups or individuals to the horn, which left them little opportunity to conduct 
themselves peaceably.  In 1662, the Scottish Parliament outlawed John Campbell of 
Ardkinglass and James Campbell of Orinsay as punishment for their actions during 
the 1640s and 1650s.60  By October of that year, it had come to the attention of the 
Privy Council that this sanction had forced the two Campbell lairds into desperate 
action: 
 
[They] are still continuing to prosecut their former treasonable and rebellious 
courses by gathering to themselves deperat and wicked persons, their 
accomplices, in ane hostile maner, who are ready to disturb the peace and 
trouble our good subjects to the hazard of their lyves and fortunes.61 
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Ardkinglass and Orinsay were responding to a specific instance of outlawry, but the 
particularly intractable lawlessness of the MacDonalds of Keppoch was blamed, by 
Torcastle at least, upon a longer term lack of social and legal respectability:  
 
[The]r predicessors have been declaird traitors and Comissione of fire and 
soward hawe been given againest them for dissobeying the ultimat diligenc 
of the law [...] knowing themselves to be broken men upon that account they 
stell robb and oppress in all the Countrie about [...] nor do these tennents pay 
any pairt of the Kings pub[lic]t dwes nor the petitioner his rents.62 
 
Dodgshon has argued that animal theft in the Highlands ‘had a powerful sub-text’ in 
that it was a calculated weapon used by clansmen to undermine the power and 
prestige of their rivals.63  Yet the above examples also make it clear that, in some 
cases, theft was not so much an expression of the in-built mores of a supposedly 
semi-tribal society as an expedient necessitated by straitened circumstances. 
Nevertheless, Dodgshon’s thesis reflects a very real phenomenon, since 
forays did remain a prominent component of land and property disputes.  John 
Grant of Dunskaith became embroiled in an altercation with a group of men - John 
Dunbar, Malcolm MacFinlay, Robert Logan, David Robb, George Ross, Duncan 
Mckray and Alexander Gow – over ownership of the ‘toune [and] lands of dibadill’ 
in Easter Ross.  In his complaint to the Sheriff Court of Ross in June 1678, Dunskaith 
emphasised his opponents’ use of raiding: 
  
The formaned p[e]rsons having shakin of the fear of God [and] all regaurd to 
his ma[jes]ties Lawes [and] acts of parlia[men]t Did most violently [and] 
woefully eject the tenents of the s[ai]ds droune [the]r fyres put out [the]r 
plenishing beat abuse [and] threaten [the]m in [the]r persons [and] did hand 
doges [and] mastives to [the]r catell [and] goods.64 
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Indebtedness could stimulate similar reprisals.  John Macrichie of Craigskorie in 1679 
took four animals from Alexander MacIain, to the value of £44, in settlement of a 
debt owed to him, although he claimed that this action had been legally sanctioned 
by a precept of poynding issued by the sheriff of Ross.65  The case of Margaret 
Campbell of Drumdarroch was rather more internecine.  She complained in 1681 
that, in settlement of debts owing to her, she had recently inherited livestock worth 
£100 from her late father.  These animals, however, had been forcibly confiscated by 
her brother, Donald Campbell, who likewise sought repayment of money he had lent 
to their father.66  It is of course important not to overstate this trend.  Highlanders 
were perfectly comfortable using the legal system to settle disputes, and it is 
noteworthy that the sheriff courts of Argyll, Ross, and Wick have left voluminous 
records of debt and property litigation in which violence played no discernable 
part.67  Nonetheless, it is clear that in some cases banditry and animal theft continued 
to be used as a means of pursuing rights and privileges.   
If poverty, social dislocation and interpersonal disputes all stimulated 
banditry, another cause was naked opportunism.  On a small scale, the case of John 
dow Mackendrick, who was convicted in 1678 of two counts of animal theft, is 
instructive.  On both occasions, he had stolen a single animal – one from Lindally in 
1675, and one the following year from Drumlie – and proceeded to sell it on.  
Between them, these exploits earned Mackendrick twenty-one merks.68  More serious 
opportunism accompanied the widespread disorder occasioned by Argyll’s rebellion 
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in 1685.  John Murray, 1st marquis of Atholl, in his capacity as lieutenant of Argyll, 
claimed that the war had provided cover for ‘thrie or four thousand robers and 
rascalls’ to commit depredations ‘on good subjects in the Highlands’.69   Given that 
the marquis was attempting to justify his desire for increased powers in Argyllshire, 
this alarming estimate was probably an exaggeration, but there is no doubt that a 
number of cynical forays were made.  The Macleans, MacNeills, MacAllisters, and 
Keppoch MacDonalds were all reported to have continued raiding long after Argyll’s 
defeat in June 1685.70  Elsewhere, Breadalbane complained furiously that ‘Lochaber 
men’ had stolen 100 goats from his tenants in Glenorchy; the Campbells of Inverliver 
accused a number of their fellow Campbells of sponsoring thefts against them, under 
the pretence of reclaiming their own lost livestock; and John Campbell of Carrick, 
who had been imprisoned during the rebellion, complained that every one of his 
horses, cows and sheep had been stolen.71  This kind of opportunism plainly 
reinforced the standing assumption that Highland animal thieves were wilfully 
criminal, but it should not be allowed to obscure the generally more complex nature 
of the problem.  Banditry was not simply the lifestyle choice of a few incorrigible 
clansmen, but also a personal response to a range of complex social challenges. 
Disorder resulting from these diverse pressures was relatively common 
throughout the Highlands.  Sheriff court records, despite their extremely unstable 
survival rate, can provide some insights.72  From Ross-shire, for instance, records 
survive for thirty-three criminal trials.  Of these, sixteen dealt with animal theft, 
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making it easily the most common single offence.73  Only two processes have been 
identified from Cromarty sheriff court, both of which involved theft, one of ‘severall 
cows and sheep’.74  A rather different pattern emerges from the thirty-three surviving 
criminal processes originating in Caithness.  Here, only three accusations of animal 
theft are extant, with the vast majority of cases – twenty-two – involving assault.75  
All of these samples are extremely small, but a more substantial analysis can be 
offered using the much more extensive records surviving from the various 
jurisdictions in Argyll.  Figure 1 displays the number of cases recorded, broken down 
by case-type and by jurisdiction: 
 
                                                           
73 MacGill, Old Ross, i, pp.94-5; NRS, SC34/1/1, f.1r-v, 2v-3r, 6r-v, 12r-13v, 15r-v, 25v-26r, 95v-
96v, 172v-173r , 199r-200r  and at 218r-v.  
74 MacGill, Old Ross, i, p.94. 
75 NRS, SC14/4/1-2; SC14/75/1. 
The Nature of the Highland Problem 
103 
 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Animal Theft
Assault/Hamesucken
Crimes against Authority
Crimes against Property
Handling Stolen Goods
Invasion
Murder
Poaching
Religious Offences
Sexual or Marital Offences
Theft
Witchcraft
Unknown/Other
Sheriff Court
Justiciary Court
Lieutenancy Court
 
Figure 1: Criminal cases in Argyllshire, 1660-8876 
 
 Contemporary opinion generally held that when individuals embarked upon 
bandit careers, they tended to drift together into gangs.77  The government certainly 
thought so; on 25 August 1670 it issued a proclamation prohibiting large groups 
from travelling through the Highlands.  It also stipulated that Highlanders ‘of 
whatsomever degree or quality’ must not ‘travell in the Highlands or keep any 
meitinges there having any in their retenue and company who are not their ordinar 
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domestick servants’, an order which, following endorsement from the Highland 
Committee, was re-issued in 1671 and 1678.78  Certainly, a significant number of 
livestock thefts in the Restoration Highlands were committed by groups.  In 1665, a 
four-strong gang was convicted of stealing multiple horses belonging to William 
Forbes of Skelliter; Robert Hunter in 1670 was charged with leading a cateran of 
unspecified size in a series of depredations in Barnlongart in Kintrye; in 1685, Colin 
Campbell of Ardkanley and his tenants suffered a series of raids perpetrated by a 
group of at least seven men, mainly Stewarts and Macintyres.79  However, the role of 
the solo criminal should not be ignored.  In Caithness, a lone vagrant woman, 
Eslpeth Rugg, was accused in 1665 of a string of thefts in the Castle Sinclair area.80  
Further south, the burgh of Nairn in 1669 sentenced John Roy to public scourging 
after he had been convicted of ‘coming thiftously under the silence of night to 
Alex[ande]r Mcphail in Belnachairdach his sheip coat’ and spiriting away ‘an whit 
ewe’.81  Likewise in Argyll, Hugh MacDonald was in 1670 ordered to provide 
compensation to John MacNeill of Ardbeg for three horses he had stolen.82  In some 
cases, lone individuals were capable of perpetrating miniature crime-sprees, as in the 
case of the Cromartyshire ‘tinker’ Andrew Forbes, hanged in 1676 for a litany of 
misdemeanours including adultery, prison-break, petty theft, murder, perjury and 
‘false cunzieing of money’.83  If these examples show that large caterans by no means 
had a monopoly over Highland banditry, they also reinforce the point that crime was 
often an individual activity, rather than an in-built dynamic of ‘clan’ society. 
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Bandit activity was generally small-scale.  In 1664, Robert Bruce of Stanstell 
was accused of stealing a single gray horse from the Thurso merchant Thomas 
Sinclair, resulting in a lost income for the latter of £580, while in 1685 a group of eight 
men were cited before the Justiciary Court of Argyll for the theft of just four cows 
from Malcolm Campbell.84  Nevertheless, there were examples of more hardened 
criminal careers, and the exploits of the two most notorious cateran leaders of the 
Restoration illustrate the potential seriousness of the problem.  Donald MacDonald, 
better known by his sobriquet of ‘Halkit Stirk’ (streaked or spotted bullock), was 
already an established bandit before the Restoration, and was described by Sir John 
Campbell of Glenorchy as the ‘ring leader’ of Highland cattle thieves.85  In August 
1660, James Grant of Freuchie was asked by the newly-reconvened Committee of 
Estates to apprehend him.  Freuchie had done so by October, but was clearly nervous 
about the consequences.  The Committee attempted to soothe his concerns: 
 
The Com[m]ittie of Estates [...] will be very desireous to protect [and] 
maintaine yow [and] your followers for doeing so good a work for his 
Ma[jes]tie [and] the peace of the Kingdome And will be very Readie to recant 
and repare ane wrong or iniurie that shall be done to yow or your followers 
vpon this accompt.86 
 
Released in November under surety of £12,000 given by Donald MacDonald, fiar of 
Sleat, ‘Halkit Stirk’ soon reverted to type.  In 1671, he was cited by Sir Alexander 
Menzies of Weem for a series of depredations committed upon his estates in 
Rannoch.  After significant pressure from the Privy Council, Sleat eventually 
presented him for imprisonment in Edinburgh, but he was again released, this time 
with Macdonnell as cautioner, about a year later.  More disorders followed, and 
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‘Halkit Stirk’ was again apprehended in 1676, this time by Lawers, for involvement 
in a spate of robberies in Perthshire.  This most tenacious of cateran leaders was, 
along with his sons, apparently still active in the 1690s!87   
 The career of Patrick Roy MacGregor – ‘a plague and scurge upon the country 
[...] a vile Scithian rude outlaw’ – was briefer, but if anything still more notorious.88  
A monoglot Gaelic-speaker, at least according to his trial documents, MacGregor 
operated on the eastern fringes of the Highlands, and by the mid-1660s had carved 
out a substantial sphere of influence between Alford and Forfar.  Reputedly he 
extorted protection money from all those within his range, pillaging the estates of 
any who resisted.  Yet John Lyon of Muiresk, from whom MacGregor stole some 
eighty cows and oxen in 1665, did resist.  Criminal letters raised before the Justiciary 
Court of Edinburgh were ignored; MacGregor was put to the horn in November 
1665, and a commission of fire and sword was issued against him (alongside other 
bandits) in December.  It was at this point that MacGregor’s notoriety peaked.  In 
April 1666, as Muiresk was attempting to fulfil his commission, he and his son were 
kidnapped and murdered by their quarry.  MacGregor himself was captured a few 
months later following an ill-considered attack on the town of Keith – although 
clearly not without difficulty, since his captors later received £1,200 ‘for ther pains 
takenm and wounds received’.  After a brief spell of imprisonment at Banff (and at 
least one attempted prison-break), MacGregor was transported to Edinburgh in 
February 1667.  Tried on 25 March, he was convicted of murder and sentenced to 
death.  Execution was delayed twice, in March 1667 and April 1668, because the 
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government wished to question MacGregor over his reputed noble patrons, but it 
was eventually carried out on 13 May 1668.89   
The careers of Donald MacDonald and Patrick Roy MacGregor encapsulate 
many of the key features of the ‘Highland Problem’ as perceived by contemporaries; 
landless men, lacking an effective lord, who gathered in large groups to pillage at 
will, and who wilfully ignored the government’s authority.  Yet if these two 
examples show the potential seriousness of the problem, it should be remembered 
that they were wholly exceptional.  Few Highland bandits were so prolific, and still 
fewer gained comparable infamy.  Most were obscure, and tended to operate on a 
much more modest and sporadic scale. 
Despite the consistent association of Highland lawlessness with ‘masterless 
men’, there were recurrent suspicions throughout the Restoration that more august 
individuals were at least partly to blame.  The Privy Council certainly thought so in 
1664: 
 
The Lords of his Majesties Privy Councill, [have] receaved frequent and 
credible information of the many herships, theiftes, robberies and 
depredations daylie committed upon his Majesties peaceable and obedient 
subjects be severall louse and lawless persons in the Hielands, men, tenents, 
servants or dependers upon cheiftanes of clannes, landslords and other 
persons of power and credit.90 
 
Some Highland elites were suspected of direct involvement in such activities; John 
Grant of Ballindalloch reputedly allied himself with a cateran led by two well-known 
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Aberdeenshire outlaws, Lachlan MacAllan and Andrew Shaw, in 1663.91  More usual, 
however, was the occasional employment of Highlanders in personal disputes.  
Often this was very small in scale.  Janet Nicolson, a widowed shopkeeper from 
Thurso, complained in 1666 that her shop had been destroyed by ‘ane Crue of 
heillanders’ hired by a rival merchant, Patrick Gordon.92  Similarly, John MacEwan 
confessed in 1673 that he had stolen ‘a four yeer old gray horse’ from Lachlan 
Maclean, fiar of Torloisk, but that he had only done so ‘by the Laird of Lochbuys 
directions’.93  Yet there were examples of more serious support.  Neil MacLeod of 
Assynt led an insurrection in western Sutherland between 1669 and 1672, apparently 
in an attempt to defend himself from a major creditor, Seaforth.  He was accused, 
among other misdemeanours, of employing twenty members of an infamous 
Sutherland bandit family, the Neilsons, to garrison his castle of Ardvreck.94  Aboyne 
was still more notorious for his suspected involvement in the career of Patrick Roy 
MacGregor.  Indeed, MacGregor’s confession of May 1668 explicitly stated that 
Aboyne had not only offered funding and protection, but had personally chosen 
MacGregor’s targets, including the laird of Muiresk.95  But Aboyne was not alone; 
during the 1660s Lauderdale suspected both Seaforth and Tarbat of secretly 
consorting with broken men.96    
Suspected complicity also involved turning a blind eye.  In 1667, Thomas 
Mackenzie of Pluscarden complained that he and his tenants had over the previous 
year suffered a spate of thefts at the hands of Highland robbers, none of whose 
landlords – including Huntly, Hugh Rose of Kilravock, Ludovick Grant of Freuchie, 
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and Duncan Macpherson of Cluny – had made any effort to apprehend them.97  
Cluny was again accused of laxness in 1680, when he was requested by Macdonnell 
to capture a number of ‘notorious thiewes’ hiding on his lands, but hesitated to such 
an extent that Macdonnell threatened to go over his head and contact Huntly.98  
Moreover, local elites were occasionally willing to overlook depredations when they 
were committed against their enemies.  John Forbes of Culloden was outraged in 
1670 when a number of ‘lewd lawless persons’, who had stolen animals from his 
estates in Ferintosh on The Black Isle, were allowed to escape through the lands of 
his long-standing rivals, the Frasers of Lovat and the Chisholms of Strathglass 
‘without any stop or challenge, though they were in a capacitie to have stopped 
them’.99  Macinnes’ revisionist thesis states that Highland elites were largely 
determined ‘to dissociate their clans from the protectionist rackets of the cateran 
bands’.100   This is perhaps a little overdone, and a more fitting reading would be 
that, even if most bandit activity was physically perpetrated by ‘masterless’ men, 
many Highland (and some non-Highland) elites recognised the potential benefits of 
maintaining covert ties to such groups. 
Lawlessness and cattle theft dominate historiographical accounts of the 
Restoration Highlands, but they are not the only components of the ‘Highland 
Problem’ model.  Clanship is equally central.  In general terms, Roberts posits that 
Highlanders’ focus on kinship as an organisational agent fundamentally 
distinguished them from Lowlanders, whose socio-economic structures were 
considerably more fluid.101  Dodgshon offers a similar general understanding of 
clanship, arguing that clans introduced a significant degree of separation between 
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centre and locality because the interests of the clan, rather than the Crown, tended to 
be uppermost in chiefs’ minds.102  Stevenson presents a rather subtler picture.  For 
him, Highland and Lowland society shared a number of common features, not least 
because ties of kinship remained crucial to many Lowland elites.  However, he 
balances this with the assertion that, thanks particularly to the growth of commercial 
land markets and the emergence of an urban ‘middling sort’ in towns, the two 
societies were beginning to diverge.103  Hopkins in many ways echoes Stevenson’s 
thesis, only in reverse, arguing that a theoretical distinction persisted between the 
clanship of the Highlands and the pseudo-feudalism of the Lowlands, but that the 
two social structures had begun to intermingle by the later seventeenth century.  In 
particular, he cites the growing popularity within the Highlands of written land 
leases.104  The general weight of these readings is that Highland and Lowland social 
structures were fundamentally opposed, even if a degree of hybridisation was 
possible.  Macinnes, however, offers a different understanding, maintaining that 
‘political, social and cultural developments within Scottish Gaeldom were not 
antipathetic to, merely differing in emphasis from, contemporaneous Lowland 
values’.105  Alison Cathcart adopts a still more robustly revisionist stance, and argues 
that the nature of clan society, especially its need to preserve and protect landed 
assets, actually worked to stimulate integration.106  Yet these are minority voices, and 
have not yet overturned the prevailing consensus that clanship, by introducing into 
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the Highlands a form of social organisation which challenged the Lowland norm, 
was to a greater or lesser extent a central component of the ‘Highland Problem’.107 
Contemporary observers certainly assumed that clanship was a straight-
forward construct, characterised by a rigid and archaic tribal structure.  The poet 
John Phillips described Highlanders as ‘slaves’ to their chiefs, and Englishman Roger 
L’Estrange later echoed this sentiment by opining that, amongst ‘Highland Scots [...] 
the Honour and Interest of the Chief is the Glory of the whole Clan’.108  The implicit 
assumption that clanship represented an alternative authority system was shared by 
other, more securely informed commentators.  An anonymous pamphlet, arguing in 
1661 against the restoration of the House of Argyll, made a key point of this 
potentially seditious feature of clanship: 
 
The restoring of this Family is in a special manner most dangerous, by reason 
of the scituation and vast bounds of the Estate of Argyle, in the High-lands, 
the great Claim, many Vassals and Tenants that depend on it; all, or for the 
much greater part, ill principled, and inured to Rebellion these last 20 years, 
who blindly follow their Masters commands, without any regard of their 
duty to God or the King.109 
 
A telling indication of the way clanship was viewed was included in one of the 1677 
memoranda.  It noted that families such as the MacDonalds, Macleans, MacLeods, 
Camerons, Mackintoshes, Grants and so on could all legitimately be described as 
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‘clans’, but that the Campbells and Mackenzies could not.  Its explanation for this 
distinction was that ‘most of them [Campbells and Mackenzies] are landit men [and] 
heritors and are not in such subjectione to ther cheefs as to be accunpted [sic] 
Clanns’.110  This then reinforces the sense that, in contemporary eyes, clanship was a 
distinct form of social organisation which disrupted the normal hierarchies of 
lordship and intruded a powerful authority figure – the ‘chief’ – between centre and 
locality.  While this does not mean that clanship was seen as necessarily subversive, 
it is certainly the case that a potential conflict was detected. 
 Gaelic poets likewise constructed a very distinct image of clanship.  In their 
narratives, the chief was conventionally portrayed in a benign, patriarchal light.  An 
anonymous elegy to Iain Mackenzie of Applecross (d.c.1685) was a case in point: 
 
A’ chraobh thu b’àirde a’ choille, 
That gach preas bha thu soilleir, 
A’ cumail dìon air an doire 
Le d’ sgèimh ghuirm fo bhlàth dhuilleag. 
 
(You were the highest tree in the forest, over every thicket you stood 
distinctive, affording shelter to the oakgrove with your vigorous beauty 
under heavy foliage).111 
 
If the chief was expected to behave as the protector and nurturer of his clan, 
clansmen were exhorted to offer him loyalty in return.  Iain Lom’s professed horror 
at the Keppoch murders was based, in part at least, on a sense that this paternal 
contract had been broken: 
 
‘S iomadh murt bha ‘san t-seaghal 
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O mharbhradh Abel le bhràth ‘ir, 
Ach b’e samhladh a’ ghnìomh so 
Mar gum marbhta leis Adh’mh: 
‘N uair rinn na h-eucoraich dhaoiun’ ud 
An ceann teaghlaich a mhurt 
 
(Many have been the murders committed in the world since Abel was killed 
by his brother, but this act was as though Adam had been killed by him – 
when those impious ones murdered the head of their household).112 
 
Such an intensely familial view of clanship meant that Gaelic commentators tended 
to perpetuate a sense of a collective identity and inheritance.113  In the estimation of 
poetess Mary MacLeod, the connection between the MacLeods of Dunvegan and 
their clan lands went far beyond simple proprietorship on the part of the chiefly line: 
 
Cuime an tigeadh fear coigreach 
Do thagradh ur n-oighreachd? 
Gar nach ‘eil e ro dhearbhta 
Gur searbh e ri éisdeachd; 
Ged tha sinne air ar creachadh 
Mu chloinn mhac an fhir fhéilidh, 
Sliochd Ruairidh mhóir allail, 
Is gur airidh iad féin oirr’ 
 
(Wherefore should a stranger come to implead your heritage? Though it be 
well proven, it is bitter to hear.  Though we are despoiled of the sons of the 
generous one, the race of Roderick great and renowned, they alone are 
worthy thereof).114   
 
Iain Lom similarly exhorted the MacDonalds to reclaim by force what he perceived 
to be their natural lands in Ross-shire (the territory of the long-defunct earldom of 
Ross), despite the fact that these estates now legally pertained to the Mackenzies of 
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Seaforth.115  Such poems echoed negative Lowland stereotypes by portraying clans as 
self-contained, independent structures.  In this view, they were held together solely 
by the bonds of kinship, producing a closed corporate agenda which did not require 
outside channels of authority.116 
In practice, of course, the situation was more fluid.  Admittedly, kinship ties 
(real or putative) remained during the Restoration a vital source of strength for many 
Highland elites.  At the most basic level, they offered a useful support network.  As 
Seaforth observed in 1668, ‘we [tha]t lives at [th]e back of gods elbow desyres to haue 
o[u]r relationes in a conditione to doe a good turne or ane ill for us’.117  James Fraser 
of Wardlaw went further when he claimed that failing to exploit the natural reservoir 
of supporters provided by one’s kin was abject folly: 
 
It was the preposterous practice of the nobility in the north, especially 
Seaforth and Lovat, to bring in strangers to be their servants, and get that 
mony which our own kinsmen should have.  These prove but spyes amongst 
us, discovers our weakness, takes all the advantage of us they can, fledg their 
wings with our wealth, and so fly away and fixes it in a strange country.118  
 
Argyll’s involvement in Mull from the mid-1670s represented perhaps the most 
striking single instance of a chief exploiting his kin network.  His campaigns 
involved mobilising most of the major Campbell gentry – Glenorchy (albeit 
reluctantly), Sir Hugh Campbell of Cawdor and Sir Alexander Campbell of Lochnell 
all accompanied him to Mull, with their retinues, at least once.119  But Argyll’s 
reliance on Clan Campbell was not restricted to just the major cadets.  In the first half 
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of 1679 alone, he issued three commissions to John Campbell, the son of the baillie of 
Jura.  The first ordered him to capture Moy castle, the second required him to 
produce an inventory of the men and arms commanded by Glenorchy and the third 
asked him to convey to the earl ‘ane Chist and two litle Coffers’ from Moy.120  This 
intense reliance on the Campbell gentry characterised all expeditions to Mull, and 
exemplified the ongoing importance of kinship to the exercise of power in the 
Highlands. 
 The use of one’s kin as a support network was possible because a sense of 
family solidarity remained pervasive throughout the Highlands.121  Fraser of 
Wardlaw, who feared in the 1660s that the Frasers were likely to die out, betrayed a 
continuing attachment to the concept of a corporate clan identity:  
 
What a famous flourishing famely was this! [...] Lord Lovat hath but one 
sone; the Laird of Strachin but one sone; the Lord Salton but one sone; Laird 
of Inveralochy but one sone; Sir Alexander [Fraser of] Dorris one sone; and 
the Lord Fraser Muchell but one sone.122 
 
The Sinclairs retained a similar sense of wider association, and it was argued in 1677 
that any alterations to the political status quo in Caithness ‘can onlie be satisfactorie’ if 
‘the Bodie of the shyre or the Name of Sinclair at least’ had given their consent.123  
Martin Martin, writing in the 1690s, detected this impulse even amongst common 
clansmen, who, he claimed, ‘have a great respect for their chiefs’, and would ‘in case 
of a decay of estate, make a voluntary contribution on their behalf, as a common duty 
to support the credit of their families’.124  The corollary to such solidarity was the 
                                                           
120 NRS, Campbell of Jura Papers, GD64/2/25, 26, 28. 
121 Newton, Warriors of the Word, pp.154-57. 
122 Fraser, Wardlaw, p.467. 
123 NRS, GD112/39/123/10. 
124  Martin, Description of the Western Islands, p.130. 
The Nature of the Highland Problem 
116 
 
expectation that it should not be breached.  In 1664, Walter Ross of Invercharron 
committed the ‘misdemeanor’ of destroying the cruives of David Ross of Balnagown.  
Faced with this betrayal, the remaining Rosses rallied behind Balnagown: 
 
Wee B[alnagown]’s kinsmen undersubscribers doe unanimouslie consent that 
B[alnagown] persew I[nvercharron] legalie for the Riot [and] that he goe as 
far as the law will permit [...] and wee does faithfullie oblidge ourselffs that 
we will assist [and] contribut with o[u]r Cheiff for effectuating of his 
designe.125 
 
In some cases, these kinds of corporate loyalties superseded all others.  Ewan 
Cameron of Lochiel was suspected of seeking ‘dominion, power and jurisdiction’ 
over ‘all of that name in what bounds or lands soever they duell’.126  Such 
accusations were a standard component of the Camerons’ black image, but in the 
case of another family, the Grants, the primacy of loyalty to the kin was conceded by 
the chief himself.  When asked to perform military service, noted Ludovick Grant of 
Freuchie in 1685, ‘Highlanders signifie nothing unless ther native officers be at their 
head’.127 
Again, however, it was within the vast Campbell conglomerate that corporate 
identity flourished most clearly.  Argyll tended to portray himself as the protector 
and patron of his kinsmen.  In 1665, he lobbied Lauderdale assiduously in an attempt 
to secure the rehabilitation of James Campbell of Ardkinglass, who had been 
forfeited for his actions during the 1640s, stating that ‘the old man [...] is very 
sencible of his fault’ and claiming that ‘all that family will be very thankfull and 
usfull in whatever service his Ma[jes]tie can find them capable of’.128  In return, there 
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was an implicit understanding that Campbell gentry should avoid any actions 
displeasing to the earl; Tweeddale found that his design of appointing Sir James 
Campbell of Lawers to catch broken men in the Highlands in 1669 was almost 
derailed because ‘lauers [...] desird I uold first speak [to] argyle for without his 
aprobatione beeing of his nam de darst not [accept]’.129  More broadly, though, it was 
expected that all Campbells would present a united front.  In 1671, James Menzies of 
Culdares, accused of murdering Colin Campbell of Lochinell, petitioned the Privy 
Council that he should be tried not in Inveraray, where the alleged crime had taken 
place, but in Edinburgh, because ‘he finds it very unsafe for him to passe to the 
knowledge of ane assyse in these places’ since ‘the defunct is so related to all the 
gentlemen of that countrey as that they are neir of kin [...] and the gentleman being 
so generally beloved in that place’.130  Campbell solidarity, in Culdares’ estimation, 
would condemn him before his trial even began.  This dynamic exemplified the 
pervasive importance of kin identities. 
The notion of ‘clan lands’, a territorial base linked to the entire kindred, rather 
than simply the chief, also persisted.  In 1669, the MacGregor chief, James 
MacGregor, felt unable to settle a dispute with the Laird of Weem because ‘the name 
uer not at all uilling to it’, while in 1676 Lochiel excused his failure to conclude an 
alliance with Argyll by noting that clansman ‘absolutelie declyne to seriue yor 
lo[rdshi]p’.131  This attitude could become particularly important when estates were 
under threat.  The chief of the MacDonalds of Sleat, Sir James MacDonald, and his 
son Donald, had amassed significant debts by 1678.  Their failure properly to service 
these obligations led a group of eleven clansmen to seize control of their lands as a 
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means of preserving the estate.132  Notions of collective ownership caused inevitable 
problems when estates changed hands.  Many of the Sinclairs resisted Glenorchy’s 
encroachments upon Caithness’ estates because they did not wish these lands ‘to fall 
in any strangers hand’.133  Similarly, Tarbat in 1684 had himself recognised by 
Jonathan Urquhart of Cromarty as his heir, but this development was challenged by 
other members of the Urquhart kindred, who attempted to sabotage Tarbat’s 
projected succession by refusing to surrender the estate’s charter chest, and by 
raising spurious citations against him for debt.134  Both the Sinclairs and the 
Urquharts were resisting the imminent separation of legal from accustomed 
ownership, but in some cases ‘clan lands’ had never been accompanied by 
proprietary right.135  This too could muddy the channels of authority, as the case of 
the Lochaber MacDonalds illustrated: 
 
The Laird of McKintosh his tenants in the Brae of Lochaber doe pretend that 
were wer in tuto by the quality of a band granted by the Lord McDonald not 
to remove at their masters instance untill they get lawfull advertisment.136 
 
‘Clan lands’ were then a physical expression of the collective, corporate identity 
espoused by many Highland kindreds.  Moreover, this trend was in evidence right 
across the region, and was by no means limited to the more securely ‘Gaelic’ clans of 
the western seaboard.137 
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 Eloquent testimony to the ongoing importance of kinship was provided by 
the sense that an incoming landlord could strengthen his position by adopting the 
name of his tenants.  In 1677, while attempted to consolidate his grip on the earldom 
of Caithness, Glenorchy submitted a proposal to the Sinclairs, suggesting that he 
might ‘assume the Name and bear the Armes of the Sinclairs off Caithnes’, a plan 
greeted with cautious enthusiasm by at least a section of the kin group.138  Four years 
later, George Gordon, 14th earl of Sutherland petitioned that he be allowed to 
emphasise his family’s ancient right to that earldom by changing his name back to 
Sutherland, an appellation that had been lost in the sixteenth century.139  In a similar 
vein, Tarbat, upon being ennobled in 1685 as Viscount Tarbat, with the subsidiary 
title of Lord MacLeod, was rumoured to have ‘intended to assume the sirname of 
Maccloud’ in an attempt to bolster his position in the western Highlands.140  As a 
corollary, proscribing a surname, as James VII briefly considered with regard to the 
Campbells in 1685, was an obvious mark of disgrace.141  These notions were not mere 
fripperies.  Throughout the Restoration, Lachlan Mackintosh of Torcastle and 
Duncan Macpherson of Cluny both claimed to be the legitimate chiefs of clan 
Chattan.142  The seriousness with which name-changes were regarded can be 
deduced from considering the reaction of Lachlan Mackintosh of Kinrara to the 
Macphersons’ suggestion as to how Torcastle might secure pre-eminence: 
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If [...] you should engage yorselfe to add the word Cattmach [Cattanach] to 
yor surnam (after 520 yeirs keeping the surname of Mcintosh with credit 
without any addition or ground for it) And also to move thos of yor clan 
[and] followers to subscryve [the]mselvs cattmachs for ther surnames 
(q[uhi]lk is acting Imprestable be you [and] q[uhai]rvnto many of [the]m will 
never consent) Truly if thes things should be granted, The mcphersones 
might warrantally say that they have gained a considerable pairt both as to 
means [and] credite.143 
 
Ties of kinship and clanship therefore retained a central place in the lordly culture of 
the Restoration Highlands.  They provided a sense of authority, identity, solidarity, 
and accustomed right which powerfully bound disparate individuals together.  
Equally, they did so independently from (although obviously often in concurrence 
with) the formal structures of proprietary lordship. 
 Yet it is important not to overstate the uniqueness of clanship as a social 
construct.  Kinship was important outwith the ‘clans’.  The Caithness heritor David 
Bruce expressed this sentiment in a letter to his cousin, also David Bruce, in 1665, 
urging that ‘ws keipe correspondence so Long as we are heir that we may Live and 
die toggider’.144  The organisational power of kinship was equally on display in the 
burgh of Inverness, where there was a long-standing feud between two burgess 
families, the Forbeses and the Cuthberts.  The latter dominated the town council for 
most of the 1660s and 1670s, and used this position to attack their rivals by, for 
example, summarily imprisoning them for non-payment of stents, banning them 
from serving as magistrates and blocking members of the family from settling in the 
burgh.145   
None of this differed greatly from the established dynamics of Lowland 
society, where family affairs continued to inform public life.  The fall from power in 
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1674 of Tweeddale, was largely the result of a family dispute between his daughter-
in-law, Mary Maitland, and her father, Lauderdale – as Lee observes, ‘Scottish 
politics was family politics’.146  Even at the very pinnacle of Lowland society, kinship 
persisted.  The dukes of Hamilton throughout the seventeenth century saw 
themselves as heads of an extended family network which they were bound to 
support and protect.147  Indeed, one anthropological observer felt comfortable using 
the word ‘clan’ to describe both Highland kindreds and Lowland families such as the 
Hamiltons, Kennedys, Maxwells and Scotts.148  All of this held true beyond 
Scotland.149  Kinship remained a crucial social and political lubricant across 
seventeenth-century Europe, and the differences in the Highlands were largely of 
emphasis. 
 If they were not unique to the Highlands, ties of kinship and clanship were 
also far from inviolable.  Argyll observed obliquely in 1667 that ‘clan Camerone have 
latly fallen in blood amongst themselves’.150  The exact altercation to which the earl 
was referring is obscure, but the notion that clan hierarchies could be unstable is an 
important one.  The experiences of two large and disparate clans, the MacDonalds 
and clan Chattan, illustrate this point.  The chieftainship of Clan Donald had been in 
dispute since the collapse of the Lordship of the Isles in the fifteenth century, and 
various branches of the kindred continued to claim the honour into the 
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Restoration.151  The most vigorous candidate was Macdonnell, head of the Glengarry 
branch.  He gained an outspoken champion in Iain Lom who, despite his famous 
criticism of Macdonnell’s cosmopolitan lifestyle, identified him as the likeliest 
candidate to reunite the clan.152  But Macdonnell’s rights did not go uncontested.  He 
did not help matters by occasionally repudiating the chieftainship to avoid giving 
expensive cautions, and, in any case, there were other Clan Donald chieftains, 
particularly Sleat and Moidart, with better claims.153  Indeed, in the late 1670s Sir 
James MacDonald of Sleat secured the backing of four other MacDonalds – Moidart, 
Ardnamurchan, Glencoe and Largie – for his claim to pre-eminence, and his 
successor, Sir Donald MacDonald, added Coll MacDonald of Keppoch.154  These 
divisions are a striking reminder that a sense of blood ties did not guarantee 
solidarity, nor did it in any way preclude internecine disagreement.  
 The case of clan Chattan, another major grouping over which control was 
disputed, highlights more broadly the political frailty of clanship.  Originating in the 
Middle Ages – traditionally 1291 – the Chattan alliance was in essence an example of 
clanship without kinship, since it involved a voluntary association between a range 
of distinct families, none of whom were closely related, either in reality or 
putatively.155  The chieftainship of this confederation had usually lain with the 
Mackintoshes, but this inheritance was by no means secure.  Indeed, as early as 1663 
Lachlan Mackintosh of Torcastle himself was already admitting that some of Chattan 
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kindreds refused to obey him ‘wethut spe[ci]all co[m]mand from authority’, while 
others actively rebelled against him.  One hostile observer went still further, 
suggested that fully two-thirds of the Chattan confederation refused to submit to the 
Mackintosh chief.156  This challenge originated with Andrew Macpherson of Cluny 
(d.1666), who refused to serve with Mackintosh in his campaign against the 
Camerons unless he was recognised as chief of clan Chattan, and unless all lands 
pertaining to the Mackintoshes but which had at some point belonged to the 
Macphersons were returned.  Cluny was eventually bought off for the sum of £100 
sterling, but the respite was only temporary.157  In 1672, his son Duncan Macpherson 
of Cluny attempted to break free from the Chattan alliance by having himself 
recognised as chief of an independent Macpherson kindred.  Only after a bitter 
dispute before the Lyon King of Arms was Torcastle able to assert both his control 
over clan Chattan, and the Macphersons’ membership of the confederation.158  But by 
1688, when the Macphersons refused to answer Torcastle’s summons to serve in the 
Mulroy campaign, the rift was clearly still unhealed.159  Instability within the Chattan 
alliance was hardly a new phenomenon; the Macphersons had split from the 
confederation once before, in 1591, in response to the stresses caused by the feud 
between the Gordons of Huntly and the Stewarts of Moray.  They only renewed their 
association after the Statutes of Iona in 1609.160  But this long-term friction, enduring 
throughout the Restoration, underscores the potentially fragile nature of clan 
                                                           
156 NRS, GD176/473/18; Drummond, Memoirs, pp.183-84. 
157 Ibid., pp.187-88; Lachlan Mackintosh of Kinrara, ‘Epitome of the Origin and Increase of the 
Mackintoshes, 1679’ in Walter Macfarlane, Genealogical Collections concerning Families in 
Scotland, made by Walter Macfarlane ed. J.T. Clark, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1900), i, pp.144-404, at 
pp.337-46 and at pp.353-55.  For more detail on the Mackintosh/Cameron feud, see below. 
158 Ibid., pp.387-95; NRS, GD176/546/1-6. 
159 BL, Add. Mss. 39200, f.2r. 
160 Cathcart, Kinship and Clientage, pp.192-94 and at p.206. 
The Nature of the Highland Problem 
124 
 
associations, and highlights the extent to which clanship as a political construct was 
susceptible to destabilisation.  
Personal disagreements were a particularly potent source of tension within 
clan or family units, and it is hardly surprising that even the most closely-related 
individuals were capable of engaging in serious disputes.  In 1660, Sir John Campbell 
of Glenorchy surrendered control of his debt-ridden estates to his son, also John 
Campbell (the future 1st earl of Breadalbane).  Within months, the vigorous debt-
tackling policies of the younger laird had generated intense resentment, as his father 
complained in February 1662: 
 
I find the affaires of my estaitte much worse then they wer some of my best 
landes being of late wedsett, where some of the former wedsetts might have 
beine redeimed, my rents in a great measoure misplayed, Casualties lost, my 
tennents extremlie impoverished by a number of mercieless instruments 
whom my sonn dooth too much trust [and] employ over all our countrie 
affaires, I sall not say much as to the indignities [and] prejudices that I 
susteine my selfe, q[uhi]ch a parents affectione [and] human modestie 
hinders me to express on paper.161 
 
Various schemes for reconciling father and son – including arbitration by named 
third parties, intervention from the Chancellor, William Cunnighman, 9th earl of 
Glencairn, and even legal proceedings – all came to nought, and by 1666 the two had 
established rival households, one at Balloch, presided over by the elder laird, and the 
other at Finlarig, controlled by the younger.162   
The career of the younger Glenorchy in another way illustrates the potential 
for personal friction.  During the 1670s his relationship with Argyll grew increasingly 
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frosty, primarily because of his lukewarm enthusiasm for the Mull campaigns.163  
This, combined with his tenacious pursuit of noble status in Caithness and his 
growing voice in Highland affairs, made Argyll suspicious that his kinsman was 
seeking to challenge his superiority over the Campbell kindred.  In a letter to 
Glenorchy of May 1680, he wrote: 
 
I understand D[ominu]s de Campbello to be of Lands called Campbell but I 
understand D[ominu]s Campellus to be D[ominu]s Campbellorum primus 
and this I doe pretend to and will not willingly allow D[ominu]s 
Campbellorum to any other [...] let us not differ about words and names 
seing you may helpe it nobody will deny you nor y[ou]r son Campbell as a 
surname but as a title I cannot agree.164 
  
Glenorchy’s breach from Argyll was graphically confirmed in 1685 when, despite 
some fears that ties of kinship might lead him to support the earl’s rebellion, 
Breadalbane, as he now was, became one of the government’s most important local 
supporters.165  Breadalbane’s fraught personal relationships with both his father and 
the leader of his wider kin group is a striking reminder that disagreements between 
individuals were just as likely amongst Highland kindreds as amongst Lowlanders.   
The undermining of kin solidarity through personal friction was not however 
the exclusive preserve of the Campbells.  Huntly saw his dominance over the wider 
kindred challenged by two powerful relatives.  The first was his uncle, Aboyne, with 
whom Huntly was throughout the 1660s and early 1670s embroiled in a dispute 
concerning ownership of various lordships in Aberdeenshire and Banffshire.166  The 
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second was Haddo, created earl of Aberdeen in 1684, upon whose personal coldness 
Gordon commented in his memoirs: 
 
[A]bout that tim I descowred that now Earll Aberdeen uas not [as] frindly to 
me as I might justly haw expected hawing doen him uery good offices in 
many actions yitt I continoued to oblige him all I culd in hopps to gain him 
hee being certainy a man off good partts [...] and off a famely off anciant 
Loyalty.167  
 
Similar issues plagued the far north.  George Sinclair, 6th earl of Caithness, was on 
poor terms with Dunbeath, one of the most powerful Sinclair lairds who was 
rumoured to have challenged him to a duel as early as 1652.168  The two engaged in a 
protracted power-struggle throughout the 1660s (a brief reconciliation in 1668 
notwithstanding), and by 1669, when the Privy Council issued a commission of fire 
and sword against Dunbeath, the earl was complaining that the dispute threatened 
to undermine his control of the wider kindred, many of whom were ‘ueri Laik’ to 
‘oun his [Dunbeath’s] wickdnes’ and ‘put themselues in his Conditione’.169  Further 
west, the Macleans were split in their response to Argyll’s rebellion, to the extent that 
Lachlan Maclean of Lochbuie found himself kidnapped, and his estates plundered, 
by his own son, Hector Maclean.170  By illustrating the ease with which family ties 
could break down, these examples highlight the fragility of kinship as an 
organisational model.  This, in turn, emphasises the dangers inherent in relying on 
the construct of ‘clanship’.  Kin groups were not stable and homogenous units 
structuring Highland society independently of the wider Scottish polity.  Rather, 
clanship was a supplementary structure which, while usefully reinforcing the 
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authority of local elites, was secure enough neither to survive in isolation, nor to 
represent a standing challenge to the power of the state. 
 In terms of the historiography, however, the role of clans as alternative 
authority systems is a secondary concern.  Much more prominent is the notion that 
clanship fomented endemic feuding, which in turn rendered the Highlands 
notoriously troublesome. Stevenson’s reading is one of the most strident.  He 
maintains that inter-clan feuding was fundamentally distinct from the kinds of 
conflict witnessed in the early-modern Lowlands, not only because it was much 
larger in scale, but because it was an end in itself – Lowland feuds, for Stevenson, 
were invariably local responses to ‘national political issues’.171  Dodgshon, writing 
from a largely sociological perspective, argues that clanship was by nature a 
competitive system, and that, since a clan’s relative power rested upon its landed 
possessions, aggressive expansionism was an integral component of Highland 
society.  Equally, this dynamic ensured that destruction of an opponent’s property 
would remain a viable recourse.172  Cathcart reinforces this perspective, arguing that 
the centrality of land as the focus of clan power and identity, combined with the 
often hazy nature of landholding rights, ensured that competition and tension were 
rife.173  Modifications to this orthodoxy have however been offered by Brown and 
Macinnes.  Neither of them denies the existence of feuding, nor do they question the 
importance of land and resource disputes.  They do, however, stress that such 
clashes had by the later seventeenth century become increasingly exceptional, and 
that legal expedients were gaining traction.174 
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 There certainly were examples during the Restoration of competition for land 
spilling over into violence.  Many of these disputes were fairly trivial.  A quarrel 
between William Robertson of Inshes and John Grant of Glenmoriston, centring on 
the disputed ownership of the barony of Culcabock, culminated in 1664 with 
Glenmoriston burning two of Inshes’ barns, and subsequently kidnapping him, to be 
imprisoned for several months.175  Also in the vicinity of Inverness, John Forbes of 
Culloden in the 1670s secured control over the former Fraser lands of Bunchrew.  His 
attempts to exercise his lordship (by, for example, repairing Bunchrew house, and 
building a mill) were violently opposed by a small group of ‘desperat yowng men’ of 
the Fraser kindred.  The dispute was apparently only settled in a compromise, 
whereby Culloden agreed to tack the estate to a Fraser ally, Alexander Chisholm of 
Comar.176  Other conflicts fomented more serious disorder.  In Perthshire, Patrick 
Stewart of Bellachen (acting on behalf of Atholl) was accused of gathering in 1675 a 
400-strong posse to attack and destroy the mills built on the river Tummel by 
Alexander Robert of Struan, assaulting Struan’s heavily pregnant wife in the 
process.177  
 Yet the classic land-based feud was not the only kind in the Restoration 
Highlands.  A more amorphous pursuit of influence lay behind another infamous 
altercation, this time involving Macdonnell.  He complained to the Privy Council that 
a group of his dependents had in August 1665 been unjustly attacked while 
attending a fair at Inverness, and he succeeded in having the magistrates fined £400 
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sterling.178  Earlier, however, Macdonnell had attempted to exploit this tumult by 
presenting a set of seven demands to the town, backed up by a muster of his 
clansmen.  Most of these were concerned with locating those held responsible for the 
violence, as well as extracting massive compensation.  But Macdonnell also included 
provision for an offensive and defensive alliance between himself and the burgh, and 
he clearly intended that, under this new relationship, the town would be brought 
under his influence: 
 
Q[uhai]rsoever the people of Innernes or any persone off them sees my Lord 
McDonald, his friends, followers, or any ane of them, that then and 
immediatelie they should lay doune ther armes one the ground in tokin of 
obedience [and] submission.179 
 
 
These terms were promptly rejected by the town council as soon as the MacDonalds 
disbanded.  The episode is nevertheless a revealing insight into the use of violence – 
or the threat of violence – as a tool for extending influence, as well as a means of 
protecting perceived interests.  
However, the greatest feuds of the later seventeenth century were rooted not 
just in competition for land and influence, but in indebtedness – as Kirk observed, 
‘This is an universal infirmity now among all Ranks, That a plea of a shilling or two 
breaks all Christian bonds, and makes a base feud and reproachful talk among the 
parties’.180  The importance of debt in Assynt’s rebellion of 1669-74 has already been 
noted.  The more familiar conflicts between Argyll and the Macleans, and between 
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Glenorchy and the Sinclairs, were both occasioned by debt.181  In the case of Argyll, 
the story began as far back as the 1630s, when the marquis had bought up the 
Macleans’ arrears of taxation, allegedly amounting to £85,000 Scots.  A decreet 
obtained in 1659 had granted the Duart estates to the marquis in lieu of this sum, and 
this grant was confirmed when his son was restored in 1663.  The new earl 
augmented his position by buying up further debts from more minor members of the 
Maclean gentry, including several thousand merks from the laird of Kinlochallan, 
and 400 merks from the laird of Torlisk.  Repeated attempts throughout the 1660s to 
secure payment of these liabilities failed, and Argyll resorted to legal means, 
beginning in 1672 with a decreet, obtained from the Court of Session, ordering the 
Macleans to pay to him the Duart rents.  The family’s resistance to this and 
subsequent decreets precipitated the conflict that would endure, with increasing 
ferocity, for nearly a decade.182  
Glenorchy’s involvement in Caithness was of a more recent vintage.  In the 
early 1670s he began buying up the earl of Caithness’ debts, making himself one of 
the estate’s two principal creditors, alongside the lawyer Sir Robert Sinclair.  
Sinclair’s aggressive pursuit of satisfaction caused Caithness to become increasingly 
reliant upon Glenorchy, so much so that, in 1672, he agreed that the Campbell laird 
should succeed to his estates in settlement of the liabilities.  Glenorchy duly came 
into this inheritance when the earl died in 1676, whereupon he became embroiled in 
a protracted conflict with the nearest Sinclair claimant, George Sinclair of Keiss, a 
conflict which became violent in September 1677 when Keiss invaded the disputed 
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lands.183  If these Campbell feuds illustrate the manner in which indebtedness could 
precipitate violence, they are also a reminder that feuding was by the later 
seventeenth century not a direct corollary to ‘clanship’.  Rather, the impulse to 
protect one’s interests through violence was underpinned not by a culture of inter-
clan competition, but by a much more general pursuit of personal advantage which 
hardly reflected a specifically ‘Highland’ agenda. 
That said, feuding on the basis of traditional enmities clearly persisted; as 
Gilbert Burnet laconically observed, conflict between Argyll and Atholl was 
inevitable because Atholl ‘had a hereditary hatred of the lord Argyll and his family’ – 
the two men were even rumoured to have arranged a duel in 1677.184  The centrality 
of customary rivalries was clearly displayed in the early 1660s by the conflict 
between the Mackintoshes and Camerons.  Their feud was recognised as an ancient 
one, and at its core lay the Lochaber estates of Glenluie and Locharkaig.185  The 
Camerons considered these lands part of their duthchas, but the Mackintosh chiefs 
claimed to have acquired legal superiority over them in the fourteenth century.  
These competing claims ensured that relations between the families had been 
punctuated by sporadic outbreaks of violence ever since, and this friction bubbled to 
the surface once more during the Restoration.186  In July 1661, Torcastle obtained a 
decreet from the Scottish Parliament instructing Lochiel to surrender the disputed 
estates.187  He was able to bolster his case by contrasting the Camerons’ collaboration 
with the Commonwealth regime, particularly after 1654, to what they claimed was 
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his own much more honourable record.188  Lochiel initially managed to hold off this 
challenge by allying himself with the Middletonian faction at Court, but the fall of 
John Middleton, 1st earl of Middleton allowed Torcastle to secure a substantial, 
although ultimately abortive, commission of fire and sword in 1663.189  Rothes, in his 
capacity as Chancellor, made unsuccessful attempts to broker a settlement 
throughout 1664 and 1665, as did both Argyll and Moray, before Glenorchy was able 
to negotiate a compromise in September 1665.  At a ritual meeting between the two 
adversaries on the banks of Loch Arkaig, it was agreed that Lochiel should buy the 
disputed territories from Torcastle for 72,500 merks – although Lochiel’s inability to 
raise this level of capital meant that the agreement was ultimately reworked so that 
Argyll would buy the lands, and feu them to the Cameron chief.190  Although the 
ancient roots of the Cameron/Mackintosh dispute make it a striking example of the 
ongoing link between clanship and feuding, it should be noted that it was ultimately 
settled not by bloodshed, but by arbitration.  Equally, the feud at every stage 
involved substantial intervention from both local power-brokers and central 
government, indicating that clan feuds were no longer the scourge of orderly 
government that they may once have been. 
As the Mackintosh strategy of appealing for assistance to both Parliament and 
the Privy Council shows, local elites were aware that invoking the authority of the 
state offered a powerful means of strengthening one’s hand.  Argyll famously 
secured judicial commissions against the Macleans in 1674, 1675, and 1678, as well as 
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a commission against their MacDonald allies in 1679.191  Inshes likewise won a 
commission against Glenmoriston in October 1665, as in March 1672 did Seaforth in 
his struggle with Assynt.192   Glenorchy, although never wielding a formal 
commission of fire and sword against Keiss, did enjoy solid moral support from the 
Privy Council until late 1680.193  It has tended to be assumed that this trend of using 
public authority to legitimise private feuds undermined the power of the 
government by destroying its ability to behave impartially or stand aloof from 
squalid local quarrels.194  Yet this is arguably an anachronistic reading, based upon a 
misunderstanding of the function of early-modern government.  The Restoration 
regime did not seek to establish a notion of transcendent or exclusive public 
authority; rather, it aimed to govern in intimate partnership with the personal power 
of local elites.195  This lent it a largely managerial ethos, so that reinforcing local 
clients, far from undermining control, was in fact a logical strategy.  Again, therefore, 
care should be taken before accepting the persistence of feuding as evidence of weak 
or ineffectual government. 
In any case, the association between Highland society and violent feuds must 
not be over-stated.  Highlanders were as adept as any other Scots at settling disputes 
through the legal system, as evidenced by the large number of surviving sheriff court 
processes (402), most of which were initiated privately.196  Submissions to Edinburgh 
– Parliament, Privy Council or Justiciary Court – were also routine; indeed, Argyll 
observed in 1665 that there were so many disputes pending adjudication in the 
capital that ‘highland matters are to be much of my L[ord] Com[missioners] work for 
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a whill’.197  Of course, as the overlap between feuding and judicial commissions 
indicates, legalistic and violent expedients were not mutually exclusive – Glenorchy 
accompanied his military campaign against the Sinclairs by citing at least eight 
individuals before the Justiciary Court of Edinburgh in 1681 alone.198  Nevertheless, 
the numerous instances in which Highlanders responded to a perceived wrong by 
raising a legal citation rather than by exacting bloody revenge illustrates that feuding 
should not be viewed as the only, nor even the pre-eminent means of settling 
disputes. 
Moreover, inter-family relations were much more often marked by a range of 
peaceful expedients than by violence.  The ante bellum practice of holding a series of 
horse races at Tomnahurich hill (to the west of the river Ness) was revived in the 
early 1660s, giving all the major luminaries of the central Highlands – including 
Moray, Seaforth, Lovat, Macdonnell, Balnagown, Foulis, Grant, and Torcastle – an 
annual arena for social interaction.199  Marriage alliances also continued to thrive, 
and there existed a complex web of matrimonial links between the major Highland 
kindreds.  Through Argyll, Glenorchy and Cawdor, the Campbells were tied to the 
Stewarts, Mackenzies and Sinclairs; Lovat maintained links with the Mackenzies, 
Murrays and Rosses; through his children, Reay forged ties to the Munros, Frasers 
and Mackintoshes; Lochiel was the son-in-law of Sir Allan Maclean of Duart; both 
John and Donald MacDonald of Moidart wedded senior ladies from the MacLeods of 
Dunvegan; and Tarbat married into the Sinclair kindred.200  For the marquis of 
Argyll, a judicious choice of marriage alliance would add ‘a firm monument to both 
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Houses’ and would augment the honour and glory of each.201  More practically, a 
well-chosen spouse could bring useful political advantages.202  The marriage between 
George Sinclair, 6th earl of Caithness and Argyll’s sister, Mary Campbell, ensured 
that, in 1663, Caithness vocally supported the idea that the House of Argyll should 
be restored.  In return, the match offered Caithness valuable access to the Campbells’ 
network of allies; the countess appealed on his behalf to Lauderdale at least twice, 
once directly in 1666, and once through Lady Lauderdale in 1673, on both occasions 
seeking alleviation of her husband’s substantial debts.203 
Bonds of friendship and manrent provided a rather more formal means of 
maintaining social relationships.  These agreements, which had been common across 
Scotland in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, have been subject to detailed 
analysis by Wormald.  For her, bonds of friendship (between two equals) and 
manrent (given by a lesser individual to a greater) were designed to reinforce kinship 
ties, and to extend analogous obligations beyond the kin-group.  She also asserts, 
crucially, that such bonds were usually designed to secure peace, rather than to give 
advantage in war. 204  Within a specifically Highland context, the most detailed study 
of these issues has been offered by Cathcart.  She broadly concurs with Wormald that 
bonds could either augment existing kin obligations (a process she calls ‘internal 
clientage’) or provide political allies beyond the kin-group (‘external clientage’).  In 
either case, in a further echo of Wormald’s reading, they were intended to produce 
stability and security without recourse to violence.205 
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There remained a visible culture of bonding throughout the Restoration 
Highlands.  Straightforward bonds of friendship were one manifestation of this.  
Seaforth and Reay entered into one such agreement in 1672.206  The following year, 
Cluny and Macdonnell, acting as heads of their respective kindreds, did likewise, 
promising to ‘owne aide Love fortifie assist and defend’ each other.207  Humbler 
individuals could behave in a similar manner, as exemplified by the bond of 
friendship entered into in 1679 by Archibald Campbell of Inverawe, Alexander 
MacDonald of Poulliveik and John MacDonald of Achetachetan.208  Bonds of 
manrent remained equally in evidence.  In May 1669, Paul Macbean, on behalf of all 
the Macbeans, pledged himself to serve Lachlan Mackintosh of Torcastle above all 
men, with the exception of the king and Macbean’s immediate superiors, Huntly and 
Cawdor.209   
The most extensive surviving record of bonding culture in the Restoration 
period concerns the Campbells of Glenorchy, a family with a long history of using 
bonds of manrent very heavily.210  Six survive, involving twelve individuals and all 
given to the younger laird: two from 1664, one from 1667, three from 1668 and three 
from 1681.  In each case, the bonds were couched in conventional terms, promising 
service and obedience in return for protection.  In two instances, this was 
supplemented by a specific promise on the part of the granter to help prevent animal 
thefts on Glenorchy’s lands.211  There also exists one bond given by Glenorchy to 
Argyll, signed in October 1679, and involving specific promises of wide-ranging 
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support for Argyll’s campaign against the Macleans.212  If the Glenorchy bonds reveal 
that family’s ongoing expansionist ambitions, they also undoubtedly reflect a more 
general peculiarity in the lordly culture of the Highlands, where bonds of friendship 
and manrent persisted long after they had died out in the rest of Scotland.  Wormald 
argues that the decline of bonding had owed a great deal to the increasing 
assertiveness and effectiveness of the Scottish state.213  This would seem to imply that 
the persistence of the phenomenon in the Restoration Highlands reflected both the 
relative weakness of the government’s authority in the region, and the semi-
independent character of the local elite.  This, however, would be a blinkered 
assessment, for the studied decentralisation of Scottish government must again be 
borne in mind – that men kept the peace by making agreements between themselves 
probably suited the regime rather well.214  In terms of a ‘Highland problem’, the 
penchant for ordering local society through formal agreements undermines the 
simplistic equation often drawn between ‘clanship’ and violence.  In the same vein, 
the fact that local elites felt it necessary to augment their positions with bonds 
underscores the limitations of clanship as an organisational structure.  Far from 
providing evidence that the Highlands were wild and untamed, bonding actually 
reflects the existence of a society which, while undoubtedly rather different from the 
rest of Scotland, was arguably just as well-ordered, and just as concerned to preserve 
peace.  
The ‘Highland problem’ remains one of the most ubiquitous constructs in 
Scottish historical scholarship, and continues to be used as convenient shorthand for 
the various peculiarities of Highland society throughout the early-modern period.  
Moreover, its use for the Restoration clearly mirrors a strand of contemporary 
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opinion which willingly characterised the region as uniformly anarchic, not to 
mention inherently subversive thanks to the existence of clans.  Yet even at the level 
of polemic, the situation was not straightforward.  The notion of general Highland 
lawlessness was mitigated by a more limited discourse focusing on Lochaber.  The 
lazy assumption made by some contemporaries (and historians) that clanship 
represented a fundamental challenge to the authority of the state cannot conceal the 
more limited role of kinship ties as merely one facet of lordly authority.  Even 
feuding, the most infamous of Highland disorders, was not as unique, ubiquitous or 
destabilising as is sometimes assumed.  This is not to say that there were no law and 
order challenges in the Restoration Highlands.  Theft of livestock may well have been 
more widespread than elsewhere in Scotland, and the use of violence as a tool for 
personal advancement remained common.  What is crucial, however, is not to 
overstate the peculiarly ‘Highland’ origins of these challenges.  Animal theft was at 
least as much a response to personal social difficulties as it was a clannish ritual, 
while violent feuds were often sparked not by great clan rivalries, but by a range of 
more mundane issues which would have been as familiar to Lowland elites as to 
Highlanders.  In short, while there were certainly challenges to order within the 
Restoration Highlands, it is not at all clear that these were either unique or endemic 
enough to merit the dubious honour of being designated a ‘Highland problem’.
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CHAPTER 4 
The Restoration Settlement in the Highlands 
 
 On Tuesday 29 May 1660, Charles Stuart entered London, from whence his 
father had fled nearly twenty years before.  The newly-restored king was greeted 
ecstatically by the city’s inhabitants; indeed, so rapturous was his welcome that he 
famously quipped (with more than a hint of characteristic cynicism) that his lengthy 
exile on the Continent must clearly have been his own fault, since everyone he met 
fervently declared they had always wished for his return.1  Mischievous as this 
comment may have been, historians have tended to uphold the view that the 
Restoration of the monarchy was overwhelmingly popular in 1660, largely because 
the king seemed to offer respite from the increasing turmoil of the Commonwealth’s 
dying years – although in Scotland, there was the added incentive that a return to the 
ante bellum constitution would end the ten-year humiliation of military occupation 
by, and forced union with, England.2  The present chapter will attempt to reconstruct 
the ways in which the transition from republican back to monarchical government 
impacted upon the Highlands.  It will begin with a general historiographical review 
which, in teasing out the main issues preoccupying historians, will provide a 
framework for what follows.  Three broad topics will then be discussed in turn.  
First, the immediate aims of the Restoration regime in its dealings with the 
Highlands will be assessed.  Second, the Highland response to the re-emergence of 
the monarchy will be analysed.  Finally, the chapter will explore the attempts of the 
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new regime to reward those who had upheld its corner over the previous years, and 
conversely, to punish its erstwhile enemies. 
 Discussion of the Restoration settlements in the three Stuart kingdoms has 
tended, above all, to emphasise their conservatism.  Tim Harris, for example, 
considers the political resolution in England to have represented ‘a self-conscious 
attempt to put the clock back’, meaning that nearly all the constitutional innovations 
imposed by the Long Parliament were annulled, and that the king was recalled 
without precondition.3  For Miller, too, conservatism was crucial.  He considers the 
willingness of the Cavalier Parliament to let Charles II govern freely and without 
constitutional encumbrance to have reflected a general perception that the 
turbulence of the preceding twenty years had been caused by the traditional 
structure of English government becoming destabilised; peace, in other words, 
demanded ‘a return to the old constitutional balance between the powers of the king 
and the rights of his people’.4  Historians of Ireland have similarly stressed the extent 
to which the Restoration witnessed an attempted return to the norms of the early 
seventeenth century.  Harris traces a basic constitutional restoration akin to that of 
England, involving the resurrection of Ireland’s status as a separate kingdom with its 
own Parliament.5  More specifically, Jane Ohlmeyer argues that local government in 
Ireland quickly reverted to its pre-1642 pattern of dependence upon the cooperation 
of regional grandees such as Randal Macdonnell, 1st marquis of Antrim.  Mike 
Cronin and Bernard have assessed the restored monarchy’s attitude to land 
plantation, showing that it abandoned the grandiose Cromwellian scheme, expressed 
in the 1652 Act of Settlement, to gift two-thirds of Irish land to English Protestants, in 
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favour of resurrecting the more piecemeal, equivocal policy of the early Stuarts – 
marked, in particular, by a more flexible attitude to Catholic landholding.6   
Yet the consensus that conservatism was the dominant ideological impulse of 
the Restoration settlements must not be allowed to obscure the fact that many 
historians have spotted subtle innovations creeping into the political landscapes of 
both England and Ireland at this time.  Lionel Glassey, for example, has pointed out 
that in 1660 no Englishman sought a return to the ‘defunct’ financial structure of 
Charles I.  Instead the introduction of a permanent revenue amounting to £1,200,000 
sterling, based on customs, excise and hearth tax, was a genuine attempt to provide 
the monarchy with an adequate financial base (whatever its successes or failures in 
practice).7  In reference to Ireland, the historiography similarly leaves room for 
pragmatic innovation.  Gary De Kray, for instance, echoes Glassey’s point about 
financial innovation, while both Sean Connolly and Pádriag Lenihan argue that the 
king’s desire to resurrect (some) Catholic landholding had to be reconciled with the 
fact that Cromwell had overseen a substantial transfer of land towards incoming 
Protestants, all of whom would have to be compensated if their newly-won lands 
were to be taken away.  The eventual (ultimately unsuccessful) formula for 
settlement, the 1665 Act of Explanation, was not therefore a wholesale return to the 
ante bellum situation, but an exercise in balancing that inheritance with the more 
recent one of the 1650s.8  Taken together, works such as these give a very strong 
impression that political realignment during the early 1660s was deliberately 
conservative in nature, aiming ultimately to overturn the innovations of both the 
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Civil War and the Interregnum and return to the status quo of the 1630s, but that this 
existed in tandem with a willingness to embrace change where expedient or 
necessary. 
The idea of conservatism is also of very clear importance to the 
historiography of the Scottish Restoration settlement.  Brown argues that the 
humiliation of English domination in the 1650s ensured that the intellectual climate 
of 1660s Scotland was thoroughly in favour of wiping out anything that smelt 
remotely innovative.9  In practical terms, Harris notes that this led to a reactionary 
impulse which was even more pronounced than in England and Ireland, insofar as 
Scotland turned the constitutional clock back not to the early 1640s, but to 1633.10  
With a closer focus, MacIntosh has shown that the first three years of the new reign 
were characterised by a strong royalist reaction in the Scottish Parliament, whereby 
‘the radical innovations of the civil war period’ were comprehensively rejected in 
favour of ‘stability and order under a strong monarchy’.11  By these readings, the 
early 1660s in Scotland were marked by a knee-jerk dismissal of everything that had 
been implemented since 1637. 
Yet the juxtaposition of conservatism and change is perhaps an even more 
striking feature of Scottish historiography than either English or Irish.  For a start, 
Frances Dow cautions against forgetting that ‘it was years rather than months’ before 
the Cromwellian administration was fully dismantled; the reaction, whatever its 
extent, did not simply sweep all before it.12  To this can be added the view that there 
was a greater degree of innovation about the Scottish settlement than may at first be 
apparent.  Donaldson, writing more than forty years ago, argues that the regime of 
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Charles II was in some ways radically different from that of Charles I and that, 
indeed, ‘in so far as the revolt against that monarch had been aristocratic and anti-
clerical it found its fulfilment rather than its negation under Charles II’.13  More 
recent writers have also stressed the importance of change, particularly in terms of 
the reinvigorated power of the crown.  Rosalind Mitchison argues that the settlement 
in fact worked to strengthen the monarchy by providing it with more formidable 
financial and military resources, so that Scotland was during the Restoration 
considerably more amenable to royal authority than it had been under James VI and 
Charles I.14  Lee shares this view, claiming that the settlement should be seen as 
‘dynamic and aggressive’, especially in terms of its provisions for a peacetime 
standing army.15  A broadly similar point has been made by Patrick: 
 
The King was the real ruler of Scotland.  Though Charles II was often casual 
and easy-going in personal matters, he took the powers and privileges of the 
monarchy very seriously indeed.  He had a clear idea of his rights as King of 
Scotland, and had no intention of devolving any of them north of the border.  
So long as he was King, all important decisions on Scottish affairs had to be 
made in London […] The heart of Scotland’s government was to remain in 
London.16 
 
Moreover, Jackson has shown that such trends accorded with the wider intellectual 
climate of Scotland in the early 1660s.  By Jackson’s reading, the turmoil of the mid-
century troubles ensured that Scots viewed the preservation of civil order as an issue 
of paramount importance.  This became entwined with older strains of political 
philosophy which stressed the divine rights of monarchy, based upon such factors as 
hereditary succession, biblically-sanctioned patriarchalism and military conquest.  
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Together, these impulses created, for Jackson, a strong intellectual predilection 
towards powerful, even absolute monarchy.17  The impression left by Mitchison, Lee, 
Patrick and Jackson is that the Restoration in Scotland actually went beyond merely 
raising Charles II to the position enjoyed by his father – in some ways it raised him 
further, and was therefore innovative, as well as conservative.  Accordingly, in 
common with the historiography of England and Ireland, the Restoration settlement 
in Scotland has tended to be viewed as a self-conscious reaction against the 
developments of mid-seventeenth century.  But, again in common with the rest of the 
British Isles, historians have not taken this to imply a slavish re-imposition of the 
political status quo as it had stood in the first three or four decades of the century.  
They have seen conservatism, in other words, as providing the guiding principle 
behind the Restoration, rather than a rigid template.18 
 Historiographical assertions about the reactionary, conservative nature of the 
Restoration settlement naturally imply that the strategies and structures of the 1650s 
were consciously rejected under Charles II.  This is particularly interesting regarding 
the Highlands because the consensus is that, especially after the defeat of Glencairn’s 
rising (1653-54), the Cromwellian Protectorate could boast a positive record in the 
region.  Donaldson’s view is that the republic introduced ‘a degree of order [...] 
which would have rejoiced the heart of James VI’, and despite its age, his thesis has 
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not been significantly challenged.19  Dow notes that George Monck, after assuming 
control of Scotland in 1654, managed to pull off a trick which had eluded the Stuart 
kings by ensuring the cooperation of local elites without having to concede to them 
‘a fair measure of independent power’.20  Fry, meanwhile, claims that Monck was the 
first person to achieve any real success in the pacification of the Highlands, while 
Lenman similarly observes that the Commonwealth achieved a position of strength 
there which had been beyond the reach of all previous regimes.21  Although a 
cautionary interjection has been made by Macinnes, warning that the activities of the 
Cromwellians did not achieve total success in eradication banditry, the 
overwhelming weight of the historiography remains that, after 1654, the Protectorate 
was able to secure an unprecedented degree of real authority in the Highlands.22 
In very broad terms, the strategy employed by Monck had been two-headed.  
Firstly, he relied upon local elites to enforce order within their respective spheres of 
influence.  Ewan Cameron of Lochiel, for example, agreed in May 1655 that: 
 
What robbery shalbee committed by any of the Laird of Loughyell’s servants 
or tennants that belong to him, hee shalbee ingaged either to produce the 
robbers, or give satisfaction to the people injured in case it bee required.23 
 
This, of course, was hardly novel: the Statutes of Iona had envisaged something 
similar in 1609, while the Restoration regime itself would come to rely upon these 
tactics as well.  What was new was the second prong of Protectoral governance.  In 
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September 1657, Monck recorded that he had a total of 1,085 foot and 180 horse 
garrisoned in the Highlands, divided between forts at Inverness, Ruthven, Castle 
Sinclair, Inverlochy, Dunstaffnage and Duart (a further 3,595 foot and 803 horse were 
stationed at a number of posts on the Highland periphery and in the Lowlands).24  
The point of this expansive military presence, he later informed the second Lord 
Protector, Richard Cromwell, was unambiguous: 
 
It would bee a meanes to keepe the enemy from rendezvouzing at those 
places, which were heretofore the cheife places of their meeting.  Besides 
having these forts among them they durst not draw out any men of those 
parts, least these garrisons should destroy them, which would bee a meanes 
to keepe those parts in good order.25 
 
It is this feature to which historians have credited much of Monck’s success.  Dow, 
for one, is in no doubt that it was the government’s oppressive military supervision, 
more than anything else, which ensured that the policy of delegation to chiefs ran 
smoothly.26  The point, then, is that the broad approach of both the Commonwealth 
and the Protectorate to governing the far north and west was not markedly different 
from the strategies employed before 1651, but that it was rendered more effective by 
the stronger coercive machinery at its disposal.  The forts, in other words, were the 
crucial defining feature of republican governance. 
It is unsurprising, therefore, that almost the first impulse of the restored 
monarchy was to dismantle the garrison network, notwithstanding Parliament’s 
recommendation that at least one be maintained at Inverlochy.27  On 13 July 1661, the 
day it reconvened, the Privy Council issued a number of warrants for the demolition 
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of citadels around the country, including one to Alexander Stuart, 5th earl of Moray 
regarding Inverness.  Just over two weeks later, a similar commission was given to 
the Laird of Ardchatten for Dunstaffnage.28  Rosehaugh believed the merits of such a 
policy were twofold – it would, firstly, save the king money, and, secondly, 
symbolise Scotland’s ‘aversion from [...] former rebellious principles’.29  Certainly, it 
seems to have been implemented tolerably quickly.  The Dunstaffnage garrison was 
gone by October, and in December the Secretary of State, Lauderdale noted 
approvingly that ‘the slighting’ of the citadels was ‘in a good measur already 
obeyed’.30   
A major exception, however, was the fort at Inverness.  Macdonnell wrote in 
June 1661 that the removal of the Invernessian garrison was ‘as yet so oncertan’, and 
by January 1662 the Privy Council expressed its irritation at the slow pace of the 
demolition work.  The fort, in fact, was never fully removed.31   Local resistance may 
have played a part in this.  The town council, lamenting (not for the first time) that 
the burgh lay ‘in the mouth of the hylands’, feared that losing the English soldiers 
would leave it dangerously exposed to banditry.32  Moreover, James Fraser of 
Wardlaw claimed that the garrison, having been stationed at Inverness for over ten 
years, had developed something of an emotional bond with the townspeople: 
 
Never people left a place with such reluctancy.  It was even sad to see and 
heare sighs and teares, pale faces and embraces, at their parting farewell from 
that town.  And no wonder; they had peace and plenty for 10 yeares in it.  
They made that place happy, and it made them so.33 
 
                                                           
28 RPCS, i, p.6 and at p.15. 
29 George Mackenzie, Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland from the Restoration of King Charles II 
(Edinburgh, 1821), pp.24-25. 
30 RPCS, i, p.62 and at p.125. 
31  NRAS1209, bundle 97; RPCS, i, p.149; Lenman, Jacobite Clans, p.39. 
32 Mackay et al, Records of Inverness, ii, p.211. 
33 Fraser, Wardlaw, p.447. 
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Invernessian reticence may of course have had a more practical basis, since the 
garrison had been something of a boon to the local economy.  Hugh Fraser of Struy 
apparently sold 30,000 merks of timber to the garrison during its construction, some 
£80,000 sterling was paid out to local craftsmen before 1657, and the garrison’s 
importation of English goods gave the locals unprecedented access to such luxury 
items as claret, fine cloth and medicine.34  Yet there were other reasons, beyond local 
intransigence, for the slow abandonment of Inverness, not the least of which was the 
difficulty of finding workers.  Moray, for example, attempted to recruit men from 
Badenoch and Strathspey, but the most important local laird, James Grant of 
Freuchie, refused to accept his authority so to do.  Ultimately the Grant chief did 
cooperate, but only after reaching an agreement with the Privy Council directly.35  
Money too was a problem, since the workers responsible for building the citadels in 
the first place had still not been paid, forcing the government to allocate the materials 
from Inverness for settling the debt (no doubt to the annoyance of Moray, to whom 
these resources had initially been gifted).36  If the restored monarchy’s determination 
to distance itself from the Cromwellian period was exemplified by its assault on the 
garrisons, the Invernessian experience illustrates not only the ill-planned and knee-
jerk nature of the policy, but also the practical constraints on its implementation. 
The same dynamic can be observed in the regime’s drive to resurrect the ante 
bellum administrative structure, embodied in its decree of April 1661 that all local 
legal jurisdictions were to revert to their pre-1637 status.37  The process of turning 
back the jurisdictional clock proved difficult.  There was predictable uncertainty over 
the sheriffship of Argyll, vacant on account of the marquis’ forfeiture (see below), 
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(Edinburgh, 2007), p.43. 
35 NRS, GD248/363/3/13; RPCS, i, p.220. 
36 RPCS, i, p.279; RGSS, xi, p.451; Mackenzie, Memoirs, p.25. 
37 RPS, 1661/1/235; Lee, ‘Government and Politics’, p.27. 
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and in November 1662 Montrose was requested temporarily to discharge the duties 
of that office – he presumably remained in post until the restoration of the 9th earl of 
Argyll eleven months later.38  Much more protracted confusion emerged in 
Caithness, where the lack of a widely accepted administration became intertwined 
with a power-struggle between two factions of the Sinclair family.  Both the earl of 
Caithness and William Sinclair of Dunbeath claimed to be the legitimate successors 
of the former sheriff of Caithness, Sir James Sinclair of Murkle.39  The two held rival 
courts throughout 1661 and 1662, and each also made a point of violently 
interrupting their opponent’s sittings.40  Caithness ultimately emerged as the 
government’s choice for sheriff, although Dunbeath was still resisting (as part of a 
much wider law-breaking career) in 1669.41  From 1663, moreover, the dispute spilled 
over to affect the shire’s justice of the peace courts, to which both Dunbeath and 
Caithness had been appointed.42  Caithness complained that Dunbeath, as convenor, 
had refused to allow him to take his seat and, thereafter, had stolen the court books 
from the legally appointed clerk.  Dunbeath, for his part, accused Caithness of 
holding a break-away justice court from which Dunbeath and his allies were 
excluded.43   
There was disarray further south as well, based on the fact that Parliament in 
April 1661 legislated for the separation of Ross from Inverness-shire, and the 
former’s elevation to the status of a fully independent sheriffdom, on the grounds 
that it would be ‘verie usefull for the more convenient and speedy administration of 
                                                           
38 RPCS, i, p.293. 
39 BL, Add. Mss. 23120, f.153. 
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42 RPS, 1663/6/144. 
43 RPCS, i, pp.435-38.  
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justice’.44  Yet a sheriff was not immediately named.  The Mackenzies, marshalled by 
Tarbat, promptly mounted a robust campaign to have Seaforth appointed to the new 
office, but this caused friction with Moray, the hereditary sheriff of Inverness.  Moray 
argued that, since he had acquired his office while Inverness and Ross had still been 
conjoined, he should remain in possession of both jurisdictions.  He proceeded to act 
upon what he perceived to be his rights by holding courts at Tain and Dingwall 
throughout the winter of 1661, accompanied by a heavily armed retinue.  The 
Mackenzies duly complained to the largely Middletonian Privy Council which, 
apparently viewing Moray as a potential cipher for Lauderdale in the north, 
censured him and recommended to the king that the sheriffship of Ross should be 
bestowed upon Seaforth.  This it duly was in April 1662, although eight years later 
Moray was still scheming to regain his lost influence by allying with the Balnagown 
Rosses.45  In each of these cases, the fundamental problem was the failure of the 
government to take firm, proactive measures for the settlement of the Highland 
administration.  The resultant conflicts illustrated that without such supervision the 
process would inevitably become mired in the intricacies of local (and sometimes 
national) politics.  Ironically, then, the regime’s determination to leave the Highlands 
to its own devices actually undermined the ability of the regional infrastructure to 
function independently.    
While the government focused heavily on repudiating its Cromwellian 
inheritance, the response of the locality to the Restoration was rather more complex.  
Iain Lom was famously exultant: 
 
                                                           
44 RPS, 1661/1/197.  This separation had first been mooted as far back as 1503, and successive 
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Mi ‘n air m’uilinn 
An àrdgleann munaidh, 
‘S mór fàth mo shulais ri gàire. 
 
‘S ge fad am thosd mi, 
Mas e ‘s olc leibh, 
Thig an sop a m’ bhràghad. 
 
On bha sheanns oirnne chluinntin, 
Ged bu teann a bha chuing orinn, 
Gun do thionndaidh a’ chuibhle mar b’àill leinn. 
 
 (As I lie on my elbow in a high mountain glen, I have good reason to find joy 
in laughter.  Although I have long been silent, if that is what displeases you 
most, I shall remove the silencing wisp out of my throat.  Since we have 
chanced to hear, although the yoke was tight upon us, that the wheel of 
fortune has turned propitiously for us).46 
 
Iain Lom can hardly be considered the most balanced of witnesses, but his glee was 
not unique.  Fraser of Wardlaw stated that the population of the Highlands was so 
firmly behind Monck when he marched south in 1659 in support of Charles II that 
none of the English soldiers garrisoned there dared oppose him,47  while two years 
later Archibald Campbell, lord Lorne declared that: 
 
I ame now resolued allmost with all Scotland to seeke the satisfaction to kisse 
his Ma[jes]ties hand [there is] no man in this country so old or sikly or sullen 
or poore or peevish but is making readie.48 
 
More concrete was the behaviour of the Town Council of Inverness which, on 25 
May 1663, made arrangements for a military parade through the streets of the burgh, 
both to celebrate the birthday of Charles II and, simultaneously, to ‘testifie [and] 
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euidence ther joy [and] thankfulnes to God for so ferme [and] palpable a favor done 
to this kingdome as to restore our gratius King’, the same ‘haueing beine practised 
yeirlie since his ma[jes]ties ingress’.49  If all this tends to confirm that the Restoration 
was ‘in the Highlands [...] almost universally welcomed’, it is nevertheless necessary 
to sound a note of caution.50  On the very day that Charles II entered London, George 
Sinclair, 6th earl of Caithness wrote a letter ‘desyring that the presb[ytery] [of 
Caithness] wol[d] appoynt a day for publick thanksgiving for that mercie to the land 
in restoring our king in such a peacable way’.  Far from responding with unbounded 
enthusiasm, a deeply cautious presbytery decided to refer the earl’s letter to the 
consideration of the next provincial assembly.51   
At the same time, the Restoration was for many marked less by honest 
jubilation than calculated jockeying for position.  One tendency can be detected in 
Montrose’s suggestion of April 1661 that John MacCombie, a Highlander accused of 
stealing cattle from James Ogilvy, 1st earl of Airlie during the 1650s, should be 
excused because his father had seen active service with the royal army.52  Reay, in a 
petition of 1664, also sought to convert a Royalist record into material gains by 
pushing for action to be taken against an old enemy, Robert Gray of Arboll, at whose 
hands Reay had suffered during the Interregnum: 
 
The saids Robert Graye Joyned with [th]e vsurper [and] conducted ane pairtie 
to Strathnaver to Garissone [th]e house of Tounge [and] to reduce [tha]t 
Country from [the]r former Loyaltie Therby yo[u]r pet[itione]r wes necessitat 
to burne his houses [and] vaist his Countrye for [th]e ferderance of yo[u]r 
Maiesties Service.  May it [the]rfor please yo[u]r Sacred Maiestie to Send and 
                                                           
49 Mackay et al, Records of Inverness, ii, pp.215-16. 
50 Stevenson, Highland Warrior, p.277. 
51 NRS, CH2/47/1, ff.46-7. 
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ordour to yo[u]r Maiesties Com[m]issioner [and] Parliament That [th]e 
fornamed Robert Graye may be brought to tryall.53 
 
Opportunism was not, however, restricted to erstwhile Royalists.  Sutherland told 
his son in September 1660 that the expected flurry of fresh governmental 
appointments should be exploited to insert kinsmen or allies into key local 
administrative positions, as this would naturally work for the best interests of the 
family and its tenants.54  Accordingly, it may well be accurate to say that the 
Restoration was broadly welcomed in the Highlands, but it is probably also the case 
that that support was largely cautious and pragmatic. 
This conclusion can be fleshed out by analysing the region’s engagement with 
the Restoration Parliament, which sat at Edinburgh between 1 January 1661 and 9 
October 1663.  MacIntosh has observed that, across Scotland as a whole, the patterns 
of representation spoke of a widespread rejection of the revolutionary inheritance of 
the 1640s, because ‘the vast majority of commissions were given to ‘new men’, 
individuals who had no previous experience of serving in Parliament’.55  More 
precisely, John Young has calculated that only some 30 per cent of those elected to 
the Restoration Parliament had also sat in its Covenanting predecessors.56  These 
observations are clearly valid for the Highlands specifically.  Of the eighteen 
commissioners known to have been elected, only three – Sir James Sinclair of Murkle, 
Sir Robert Gordon of Embo and John Campbell of Ardchatten – had had previous 
careers in Parliament, and a further two – Sir William Sinclair of Dunbeath and 
Tarbat – were the sons of Covenanting Parliamentarians.  Thus, with a contingent of 
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‘new men’ amounting to thirteen, or some 70 per cent of its total representation, the 
Highlands shared fully in the wider pattern of electing novices.57  Also telling is the 
fact that there was an election dispute in Inverness-shire, with two individuals, Hugh 
Fraser of Belladrum and Colin Mackenzie of Redcastle, both claiming to have won 
the right to sit as the shire’s second commissioner (Sir John Urquhart of Cromarty 
had already been elected as the first representative).  Neither man had ever sat in 
Parliament before, but Belladrum was from a staunchly Covenanting lineage while 
Redcastle was not; ultimately the latter won through.58  On the surface this says 
much about the extent to which the Highlands embraced the general ideological shift 
away from Scotland’s radical past. 
Nevertheless, the patterns of attendance throughout the life of the Restoration 
Parliament introduce a rather different perspective.  Table 3 summarises these 
trends: 
 
Session Nobility Shires Burghs Totals 
 Potential Actual Potential Actual Potential Actual Potential Actual 
1661 6 5 12 9 8 8 26 22 
1662 6 3 12 8 8 3 26 14 
1663 6 3 12 8 8 4 26 15 
Table 3: Highland attendance in Restoration Parliament, 1661-63.59 
 
Overall, attendance was relatively solid.  All those with a right to participate did so 
in at least one of the three sessions, the only exceptions being Cromartyshire, which 
failed to elect commissioners, and the still under-age Lovat.  The Highlands were 
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represented by, on average, seventeen individuals in each session – an attendance 
level of around 65 per cent.  Yet these headlines conceal important nuances.  Firstly, 
the second and third sessions were much more poorly attended than the first, with a 
participation level of 85 per cent in 1661 dropping away to about 54 per cent and 58 
per cent in 1662 and 1663 respectively.  This mirrors the national pattern, which saw 
attendance fall by some 15 per cent in 1662 compared to the previous year, with a 
modest rally for the final session.60  Secondly, there was a great deal of variation 
between the estates.  The gentry – that is, the shire commissioners – remained 
consistent, save that Caithness and Sutherland both lost one commissioner after the 
first session (Sir James Sinclair of Murkle, the missing commissioner in the case of the 
former, probably stayed away due to age and infirmity) while Argyll gained one.  
The small group of nobles performed a little worse, since both Sutherland and Reay 
stayed away after 1661 (Sutherland, indeed, retired from public life altogether in 
1662).  But it was the burgh estate that was the most volatile, and after fielding a full 
complement in 1661, Cromarty, Dornoch, Inveraray and Wick all failed to send 
commissioners to either of the succeeding sessions, while Tain was unrepresented in 
1662.  This, again, shadowed wider trends, since burgh attendance at both the 1662 
and 1663 sessions was around a third below the 1661 peak.61    
As MacIntosh has observed, these phenomena cannot plausibly be attributed 
to ideological opposition to Parliament’s legislative programme, because nearly all 
the commissioners later held government offices from which they would have been 
excluded had they actively opposed the regime.  Instead, she observes that most of 
the post-1661 absentees were from the north of Scotland, and on this basis concludes 
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that cost was the primary motivation for staying away.62  Certainly, the financial 
pressure of supporting representatives in Edinburgh could be prohibitive – the earl 
of Sutherland noted that his shire was ‘werie vnable to find chairges for on much less 
for two’, no doubt because of the formidable cost involved in the commissioners’ 
allowance of £5 per day, combined, in the case of Caithness and Sutherland, with an 
extra sixteen days travel money at the same rate.63  But too much should not be made 
of this, since Fortrose managed to sustain a representative at every session, despite 
complaining, as late as 1665, that it remained heavily impoverished through the 
‘demolishing of [its] tolbooth, schoole house, and steaple, and vthair desolatiouns’ 
dating from ‘the tyme of thair late rebellion’.64  What should be recognised is that the 
1661 session had made the mood of the political nation clear for all to see.65  Some 
had already gained what they wanted during this sitting.  The charters and 
privileges of the royal burghs, for example, had received blanket ratification in April, 
and at least one latterly absentee burgh – Cromarty – had won a specific 
endorsement of its rights.66  Similarly, Reay’s desire to get some compensation for the 
losses his family had suffered in the 1640s had been legitimised, at least in theory, by 
June (see below).67  For others, it may have become rapidly obvious that they were 
unlikely to wring much personal advantage from the Estates, and such was the tenor 
of a letter written to James Sinclair of Canisbay in May 1661, observing that ‘[y]o[u]r 
w[orshi]p hes bein wyss in tareing at hom at this tym, [because] this parliament will 
ly sadlie to sum off them yea to the most pairt off them’.68  Two points are worthy of 
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note here.  Firstly, it would seem that one of the main forces shaping attendance 
patterns between 1661 and 1663 was self-interest.  Highlanders flocked to Edinburgh 
in 1661 with a view to securing their private or sectional advantage.  By 1662, the 
imperative to exercise one’s voice in Parliament had grown less pressing.  Secondly, 
and by way of a caveat, one should be cautious about overplaying the specifically 
‘Highland’ nature of this response, since in many ways the patterns of attendance 
closely mirrored the behaviour of the Scottish political community more generally.   
 Nevertheless, the sense that the Highlands’ relationship with the Restoration 
Parliament was notably less than passionate can be reinforced by considering the 
involvement of the region’s representatives in the many committees and 
commissions set up during its lifetime.  Many of these did have Highland members; 
there were, in fact, twenty-one such appointments spread across thirteen bodies.  
This, however, was less impressive than it sounds, since twelve of these commissions 
went to Tarbat (a close ally of the High Commissioner Middleton), and a further nine 
were for Sir John Urquhart of Cromarty (the head of a consistently Royalist family).  
This means that these two Easter Ross lairds hoarded no less than 95 per cent of all 
Highland committee appointments between 1661 and 1663, and only one other 
individual – Seaforth – was able to secure a position.  Thus, whatever their 
attendance record, the Highland representatives in the Restoration Parliament do not 
seem to have become too deeply involved in its administrative business.  Such a lack 
of engagement is on the face of it hardly indicative of a close relationship between 
the Highlands and government.   
 Historians have tended to agree that, with certain notable exceptions – 
especially his condemnation of the regicides, and the grisly exhumation of Cromwell, 
Henry Ireton and John Bradshaw – Charles II adopted a remarkably even-handed 
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attitude in regards to ‘settling the score’.69  Indeed, with regard to the Highlands, it 
has been suggested that he was too cautious – Stevenson, for one, argues that in 
failing properly to reward the loyalist families of the Highlands, the king squandered 
a potential reservoir of goodwill.70  James Fraser’s assessment of Charles’ actions was 
certainly caustic.  He complained that Reay and Seaforth – both of whom belonged to 
kindreds that had suffered greatly in the Royalist cause – attended the king soon 
after his restoration, each ‘expecting some favour’ for their services.  Instead, the 
former had to be content with the fact that his wife was greatly admired, while ‘all 
that Seaforth gained at Court was the kings countenance’.  Only Angus MacDonald, 
chief of clan MacDonald of Glengarry was, in Fraser’s estimation, properly treated.71  
This latter observation, at least, is accurate.  Glengarry had been a prominent 
adherent to Glencairn’s rising, and Charles had as early as 1655 suggested that he 
could expect a suitable reward.72  Moreover, an order from the king in March 1661 
illustrates the strength of his feelings with regard to Glengarry: 
 
[He] hath given great and eminent proofs of his loyalty to us and our father of 
ever glorious memory, for the which he hath suffred exceedingly [...] and wee 
being willing and desirous that [he] may be repaird and rewarded for his sad 
and heavy losses, wee do therefore heartily recomend him to yow and our 
parliament.73  
 
Accordingly, on 10 December 1660 Glengarry was ennobled grandly as Aeneas, Lord 
Macdonnell and Aros, and awarded a pension of £3,600 per year.  Not satisfied with 
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this elevation, he continued to press, unsuccessfully, for the yet grander title of ‘Earl 
of Ross’.74   
 Yet if Macdonnell was the most prominent Highland winner in the 
Restoration settlement, he was not the only one.  A second Highland laird, James 
Grant of Freuchie, was in 1663 considered worthy of elevation to the nobility as ‘Earl 
of Strathspey, Lord Grant of Freuchie and Urquhart’, although his death that year 
rendered the idea redundant.75  In general, however, Charles’ rewarding of past 
service took three forms.  The most straightforward was to rescind forfeitures 
imposed before 1660.  In April 1661, Parliament approved a petition from clan 
Gregor, asking to be relaxed from all punitive legislation previously passed against 
them because they had ‘vpon all occasiones bene ever readie’ to show ‘their loyaltie 
to his sacred Ma[jes]tie in the dayes of his Ma[jes]ties extremitie w[i]t[h] lyffes and 
fortunes’ – a reference to the clan’s royalist past and, in particular, its accession to 
Glencairn’s rising.76  The MacGregors’ outlawry of course long pre-dated the 
Covenanting revolution, but 1661 also saw the rescinding of forfeitures passed in the 
1640s against Angus MacDonald of Largie, Hector Maclean of Lochbuie, Hector 
Maclean of Kingairloch, the MacDonalds of Colonsay (the kin of Alasdair MacColla) 
and Archibald MacDonald of Sandy.77   
Rather less common was the issuing of direct payments to individuals 
deemed deserving.  The most significant beneficiary here, on paper at least, was 
Reay.  Charles II had already in January 1655 promised the Mackay chief that he 
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would, in deference to his strong Royalist record, endeavour to fix ‘such a marke of 
Our fauour on you, as may both repayre what you hauw suffered for vs, and be a 
Record to posterity of your fidellity and Loyalty’.78  Consequently, the king wrote to 
the Scottish Parliament in January 1661, recommending that some compensation be 
awarded for these losses, calculated six months later to stand at £20,000.79  This, 
however, was unique, and payment was generally restricted to much smaller sums 
awarded to ministers ejected from their parishes during the troubles: Patrick 
Durham, sometime minister of Ardersier, was ordered to be paid the outstanding 
stipend for the year 1658-59; pensions were given to Hector Maclean of Morvern, 
John Boig of Kirkilston, and the Dean of the Isles; and William Davidson, minister of 
Canisbay was awarded a lump sum of 1,000 merks.80   
Finally, the government sometimes ordered the repayment of monies levied 
by the Covenanting and Commonwealth regimes.  In April 1661, Laurence Dundas 
was ordered to repay to Seaforth £205 sterling, extracted after the earl’s forfeiture by 
the Commonwealth in 1659, and two similar awards were made the following year, 
one to Rory MacLeod of Dunvegan, ordering several individuals to repay a total of 
£2,500 sterling extracted from him in 1655, and another to James MacDonald of Sleat 
decreeing that he be reimbursed for 5,800 merks (plus interest) paid in 1649 in 
obedience to an order of the Covenanters’ second Triennial Parliament.81  The most 
striking feature about all of this was its modesty.  With very little public money 
changing hands and few prominent individuals involved, it did not cost the 
government very much, either financially or politically.  It served, instead, as a gentle 
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reminder that former Royalists were now to be openly considered favoured subjects 
of the crown. 
In terms of punishments, Lee has argued that there was no strong ‘desire for 
blood’ in Scotland.82  This may be true – and certainly Moray’s agent, Alexander 
Mackintosh, advised against over-zealous persecution of former Covenanters for fear 
‘it wold make ill blood in the Cuntrey’ – but it should not imply that no punitive 
measures were taken in the Highlands.83  In many cases, punishment simply took the 
form of publicly censuring past actions.  Thus, in September 1662, Parliament 
endorsed a petition entered by Thomas Mackenzie of Inverlauell against John 
MacLeod, brother to the laird of Assynt, condemning the fact that: 
 
Haueing conceaved ane deadlie hatred and prejudice against [th]e petitioner 
for his loyaltie He and many v[the]r his accomplices did in [th]e moneth of 
october 1654 yeires In a hostile maner without anie warrand or authoritie 
invade the landes of Inverleall And did violentlie robb and take away from 
[th]e petitioner and his tennents Fourtie seven peice of horse [and] mears and 
Fourtie cowes [and] Fourtie Four Folls.84 
 
This kind of action was also used to great effect to punish various Campbell gentry 
for their involvement in two infamous conflagrations in the late 1640s.85  In July 1661 
Parliament endorsed a petition from the MacDougalls against the lairds of 
Ardkinglass, Invereray and Ballichorrie, pivoting on the treatment meted out to the 
MacDougalls during the Scottish civil war of the mid-1640s, especially the massacre 
of the 500-strong garrison of Dunaverty in 1646 and the subsequent seizure of many 
clan holdings.  In accepting the complaint, and ordering the return of the lands in 
question, the Estates bemoaned: 
                                                           
82 Lee, ‘Government and Politics’, p.23. 
83 NRAS217, box 6, item 449. 
84 NRS, PA7/22, ff.33-36. 
85 Macinnes, Clanship, pp.105-6; Clarendon State Papers, v, p.83. 
The Restoration Settlement in the Highlands 
162 
 
 
The crymes, facts and deids of heigh treason and other acts of murther, 
slaughter, oppression, robrie, fyre raiseing and other misdeids and 
maleversations [...] against [...] his majesties frie subjects, for their adherence 
and loyaltie to his majistie and his said umqhile dearest father.86   
 
Closely comparable was a petition against a number of Campbell lairds, principally 
James Campbell of Ardkinglass and James Campbell of Orinsay, claiming that, 
during their attack in 1646 on the Lamont strongholds of Toward and Ascog in 
Cowal, they committed the crime of murder under trust by killing the majority of the 
garrison after it had surrender to them.  This complaint too was endorsed by 
Parliament, leading to the production of a substantial indictment in August 1662, and 
the forfeiture of Ardkinglass and Orinsay in September.87  In addition to the strategy 
of official condemnation, a number of Highlanders – John Munro of Lamlair, Neil 
MacLeod of Assynt, Colin Mackenzie of Kilcowie and Robert Murray of Pulrossie – 
faced individual treason processes in the course of 1661, although all of this was 
rendered moot by the passage the following year of the Act of Indemnity (see 
below).88   
None of these activities, therefore, achieved very much in terms of material 
punishment, but they did have an important symbolic significance.  When, in 1661, it 
appeared that James Grant of Freuchie would be summoned before Parliament in 
reference to an ongoing land dispute with his brother, he received a letter from his 
agent in Edinburgh, who attempted to fortify him for the ordeal ahead: 
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Ye are wnjustly soght, but persuad your selff quhen yow cum heir ye will 
find als mani frindis as any gentillman in Scotland will.  It is not your honour 
to be cited, I confess, but seing so it is, let yow compeer and windicat your 
honor and reputatione.89 
 
By subjecting specific individuals to the embarrassment of public censure, the regime 
advertised what it considered to be an honourable record and what was to be 
deemed dishonourable.  In this way, it reinforced the intellectual reaction against 
Covenanting thinking, and was able subtly to augment its own claim to legitimacy. 
Much the most significant victim of the Restoration, certainly in Scotland and 
possibly across the three kingdoms, was himself a Highlander: Archibald Campbell, 
marquis of Argyll.  Believing that ‘yeilding pacified grat offences’, he determined to 
travel to Whitehall in the summer of 1660 and submit to the king.90  Once there, 
however, he was arrested and imprisoned in the Tower of London, before being 
transported back north in December to be held at Edinburgh Castle.91  By January 
1661, a truly ferocious indictment had been compiled against him.  Beginning with a 
long list of the laws – some going back to the reign of James I (r.1406-37) – that Argyll 
was accused of contravening, including statutes against failing to uphold royal 
authority, raising arms, leasing-making, slandering Parliament, arson, murder under 
trust and regicide, it then set out fourteen specific charges, in four broad classes.92  
Firstly, it accused the marquis of being a leading combatant during the Bishops’ 
Wars (1639-40), and in particular of attacking Airlie and Dumbarton Castles.  
Secondly, it attempted to paint Argyll as the guiding force in the Covenanting 
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movement of the 1640s, according to him a leading role in the formulation of the 
Solemn League and Covenant (1643), the surrender of Charles I to the English 
Parliament (1647), the Whiggamore raid (1648) and the ill-treatment of Charles II 
during his first reign (1649-51), as well as accusing him of attacking Menstrie, 
Dunaverty and Cowal in the mid-1640s. Thirdly, it claimed that Argyll had willingly 
collaborated with the Cromwellians, especially by opposing Glencairn’s rising, 
sitting in the third Protectorate Parliament (1659) and making repeated public 
statements endorsing the republican regime.  Lastly, it argued that the marquis had 
been complicit in the execution of Charles I in 1649.93  Yet despite this lengthy, 
complex and legalistic content, the underlying message of the dittay (indictment) 
was starkly simple: 
 
You the said Marquis of Arguile [...] trayterously intended and purposed the 
eradication [and] subverting [of] the fundamental Government of this 
Kingdom: At least the ennervating, violating, derogating, or impairing [of] 
the Soveraign Authority, Royal Prerogative of his Majesty, and priviledge of 
the Crown.94 
 
Essentially, the indictment sought to characterise Argyll as the diabolical 
mastermind behind everything that had happened to the detriment of the monarchy 
in Scotland since 1637. 
The trial began in Parliament on 13 February 1661, when the dittay was read 
aloud.  Argyll was given until the start of March to construct his defences, 
examination of which then occupied the Estates until the end of April.95  These 
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defences, running to over 100 pages when printed, were considerably weightier than 
the original indictment.  His advocates – led by Mackenzie of Rosehaugh, a future 
Lord Advocate – answered the indictment in forensic legal detail, and cited 
numerous procedural and technical irregularities in its preparation and presentation.  
In addition, each individual article was met with at least three or four separate 
rebuttals.96  The crux of the defence, though, was easily understood.  It pointed out 
that none of the actions in question were either unique to Argyll or had been 
considered treasonous at the time.  Equally, it asked that Argyll not be judged by the 
‘sad and unexpected consequences’ of any of his actions; he had, it claimed, simply 
attempted to respond to the unprecedented circumstances of the time.97  Parliament 
was unmoved, and it rejected the defences on 29 April.98   
Throughout the following month, a succession of witnesses, no fewer than 
fifty-two in total, offered depositions on most of the articles of the indictment.99  
Ultimately, however, the Lord Advocate, Sir John Fletcher, was forced to drop all of 
the charges save those (articles eleven, twelve and thirteen) associated with Argyll’s 
conduct during the Commonwealth and Protectorate.100  This was hardly from lack 
of testimony, since at least twenty-four of the depositions dealt with articles one to 
ten.  Contemporaries offer a number of explanations.  Baillie and Burnet both 
pointed out that many of the actions attributed to the marquis had in fact been 
carried out by subordinates without his knowledge, and that therefore the charges 
could not be made to stick.101 Rosehaugh, meanwhile, was adamant that Fletcher’s 
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hand had been forced by an order from the king insisting that the Act of Indemnity 
he had granted in 1651 should be respected – an instruction procured by Lauderdale 
(allegedly without the king’s knowledge by having it ‘shuffled in amongst other 
papers when his Majesty was in haste’) in an effort to destabilise the Middletonian 
regime in Edinburgh.102 
More widely, it seems that Argyll’s defences were genuinely affecting.  
Fraser, no friend of his, admitted that he was ‘very bold and confident in his own 
defence’; the English Chancellor, Edward Hyde, 1st earl of Clarendon – a similarly 
unsympathetic witness – conceded that ‘the Proofs were not clear enough to convict 
him’; and the Catholic priest Alexander Gordon noted on 11 April, that ‘it is feared 
[Argyll] will be absolued’.103  Indeed, Rosehaugh suggested that ‘the probation [was] 
not full enough’ even in regard to those articles upon which Fletcher had insisted, 
and that the prosecution’s case was ultimately carried solely by a last-minute 
intervention from Monck, now 1st duke of Albemarle.104  Albemarle submitted to 
Parliament six letters sent by Argyll to the Cromwellian authorities in Scotland 
between July 1653 and September 1654, which together showed that he had thrown 
himself into the suppression of Glencairn’s rebellion with a great deal more 
enthusiasm than may have been expected from a reluctant collaborator.105  Armed 
with this new evidence, Parliament on 24 May found Argyll guilty, in full or in part, 
of articles eleven, twelve and thirteen, adding the general judgement that: 
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The pannell his crymes of Treason ar aggravat by his constant and malicious 
opposition to the au[th]o[ri]tie and commands of his Maj[es]tie and his royall 
father ever since the beginning of these troubles in the yeir 1637.106 
 
Albemarle’s letters could do nothing to prove the final, most serious article – 
regicide.  Despite the strenuous assertion of Andrew Gilmour (brother to Argyll’s 
counsel, Sir John Gilmour) that ‘his hand hes being palpablie deep in the counsels 
[amd] wayes taken in the death of his own Soverain Lord [and] king, Charls the first 
of ever blesses memorie’, Argyll was cleared of this charge.107  Although certainly 
some comfort to his family, this was of little practical benefit to the marquis, who, 
protesting his innocence to the end, was executed on 27 May.108  His severed head 
was displayed from Edinburgh’s Tolbooth, a grizzly warning that remained in place 
until January 1664.109 
There is more than a passing impression that Argyll’s conviction was a 
foregone conclusion.  Robert Baillie had recognised as early as December 1660 that 
Argyll’s head would be the price of peace, and this was reinforced two months later, 
when James Sharp wrote that the marquis was already ‘a gone man’.110  The marquis 
himself was apparently little more optimistic: while imprisoned in London in 
November 1660, he resigned all his lands and writs in favour of his son, Archibald 
Campbell, lord Lorne, a transparent attempt to preserve the family estates in the 
event of his forfeiture.111  The apparent hopelessness of Argyll’s position was further 
confirmed at the very beginning of his trial, when his desire to employ the ablest 
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lawyers in Edinburgh foundered because none would agree to represent him.  He 
was forced into supplicating that Parliament appoint advocates on his behalf.112 
Other commentators, looking back on the event of 1660-61, were similarly 
convinced that the marquis had been doomed from the start.  Fraser claimed that 
there was throughout Britain a ‘general hatred and detestation’ for him which made 
survival impossible; Gilbert Burnet lamented that ‘the [Scottish] parliament was so 
set against’ him that ‘every thing was like to pass that might blacken his name’; and 
for James Kirkton, many ‘ignorant people’ eagerly anticipated his fall because his 
career had occasioned ‘a great deal of envy’.113  This ingrained hostility found its 
most virulent expression in an anonymous poem of 1660: 
 
No words can serve to utter what I think, 
No world of Paper, nor Sea of Ink, 
Can well point out these Villanies which he 
Hath acted by infernal Trechery 
Against his God, his Countrey, and his Prince, 
His Father, Friends, and Kindred, all at once.114 
 
The most significant prejudice came from the king himself.  Charles largely blamed 
Argyll for his unhappy experiences during his brief first reign in Scotland, and from 
this developed hearty personal dislike.115  This fact alone was almost enough to 
guarantee the marquis’ condemnation, something which he himself recognised when 
he complained that ‘if his Ma[jes]ties preiudice wher laid asyd my accusations 
otherways ar [the] Comon failing of the nation’.116  Argyll, in other words, was from 
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the start handicapped by widespread dislike and a general belief throughout the 
political nation that he really did deserve to be condemned. 
In 1661, a second anonymous pamphleteer hit upon another strong impulse 
working towards the conviction of Argyll, observing that ‘many of his Majesties 
loyal Subjects [...] can expect no other reparation of their losses, but from the 
forfeiture of the said estate’.117  Middleton himself confirmed that this impulse did 
indeed exist in Parliament, and the process was facilitated by the fact that the Argyll 
estates were placed under arrestment even before the conviction in May 1661.  
Throughout that year, a succession of civil actions succeeded in achieving a huge 
redistribution of the marquis’ supposedly ill-won wealth.118  On 16 April he was 
ordered to pay Montrose more than £70,000 which he had accrued through his 
possession, after 1645, of part of those lands forfeited from Montrose’s father.119  
Similarly, possession of the estates of the late George Gordon, 2nd marquis of Huntly, 
which had been enjoyed by Argyll since 1649, was in May transferred back to the 
royalist Gordons.120  All this continued after Argyll’s death.  On 12 July, some of his 
lands were handed back to their former owner, John Scrymgeour, 1st earl of Dundee, 
while in May 1662 Parliament asked permission of the king to examine both those 
‘well affected persons’ who had suffered ‘violence and oppression committed upon 
them be the late marques of Argyll’, and ‘the interests of the creditors of the said late 
marques’.121  By November, an edict had been issued ‘desyrand all persones quha 
heirtofoir wer ony wyfe injured, opressed, or wronged by the lait Marques of Ergyll’ 
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to present their claims to the Privy Council.122  This redistributive climate was 
naturally exploited by some – as John Campbell, 1st earl of Loudoun observed, there 
were always some who sought to ‘rais themselfes vpon the Ruine of others’.123  The 
MacDougalls, for example, secured in 1661 the return of numerous estates in western 
Argyll seized by tenants of the marquis during the 1640s.124  Soon, however, this 
became a pretext for attempting to appropriate some former MacDougall lands 
which had been acquired legally by other scions of the Campbell gentry before 
1637.125  Writing to Iain MacDougall of Dunollie in May 1663, Glencairn was not 
amused: 
 
It was exspected that yow wold have wsed the favour done yow by [th]e 
parli[amen]t very moderatly And that yow wold have bein obsequias to any 
ane of these many Letters sent yow vpon Duncan campells accompt […] If 
therfore the said Duncan be hindered from posessing the s[ai]ds lands as he 
posessed [the]m before the obteineing of [th]e decreat by yow or any els 
Asswre yowrself the Counsell will recent and punish the same as ane hie 
ryot.126 
   
By 1665, the king himself had been forced to get involved in order to protect 
Argyllshire’s feuers from over-eager creditors.127  The perception, then, that Argyll 
had profited unduly at the expense of former Royalists, and the attendant 
determination to reverse this trend, certainly contributed to his fall.   
Yet there were other more subtle factors at work.  The fact that Argyll had a 
partially Highland identity was not lost on contemporaries, and if there is little direct 
indication that this contributed towards his condemnation, it clearly did inform the 
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rhetoric against him.  The 1661 pamphlet, for example, noted that the vast numbers 
of tenants and clansmen he could potentially command in his guise as MacCailein 
Mór made his lands ‘a most fit place to be the Nest and Seminary of Rebellion’, 
meaning that the marquis was a uniquely dangerous figure.128  Slightly differently, 
Argyll himself complained in January 1661 that the libel ‘repeat[ed] all that hath been 
done by Kirk or Kingdom, to be the Marquiss of Argyles deeds’, and several months 
later he further objected that his enemies sought ‘to lay the blaime at one mans doir 
(tho moir inocent then many others) raither then to putt it wher it ought Iustlie to 
lye’.129  Kirkton developed this concept when he wrote that Argyll was selected by 
the new regime ‘partly to be a sacrifice for revenge’.130  Alongside this image of 
Argyll as scapegoat, contemporaries also recognised the warning implicit in his fate.  
Perhaps predictably, the anonymous pamphleteer of 1661 was the most enthusiastic 
advocate of this exercise:  
 
The exemplary punishment and eradicating of this Family, (especially at this 
first happy appearance of his Majesties justice) will be a Scar-crow to all 
others, and serve as a Beacon, to make them shun the rocks of Rebellion.131 
 
If, therefore, widespread envy and personal dislike facilitated Argyll’s forfeiture, the 
underlying reasons for his fall from grace were much more fundamental.  As the 
most prominent member of the Scottish leadership in the 1640s and 1650s, he was 
essentially doomed as a sacrificial lamb, the spilling of whose blood would be 
doubly symbolic: it would draw a line under the turmoil of mid-century, while 
sating the Royalist desire for revenge.    
                                                           
128 Anonymous, Some Reasons, p.2. 
129 Archibald Campbell, The Marquess of Argile his Answer to his Charge (Edinburgh, 1661), p.1; 
Bod., Clarendon State Papers, volume 82, f.261r. 
130 Kirkton, History, p.54. 
131 Anonymous, Some Reasons, p.3. 
The Restoration Settlement in the Highlands 
172 
 
After the execution of Argyll – whose fate was ultimately shared by a number of 
other prominent Covenanters such as James Guthrie and Archibald Johnston of 
Wariston – the main recriminations for past actions surrounded the Act of 
Indemnity, passed on 9 September 1662.132  This legislation was designed to pardon 
all misdemeanours committed during the Covenanting and Commonwealth periods, 
but it did list a small number of people who were to be exempted absolutely from its 
terms.  Three of them were Highlanders: Argyll, whose troubles were apparently not 
over despite being dead, James Campbell of Ardkinglass and James Campbell of 
Orinsay.  However, a second act, also passed on 9 September, listed fully 896 
individuals from whom punitive fines – totalling more than £1,000,000 – were 
demanded before indemnity would be granted to them.133  Those who had sat, or 
were sitting, in the Restoration Parliament were generally freed from any fines for 
which they may otherwise have been liable, something which explains why a 
number of very prominent Covenanters – most notably Sutherland, who had been 
amongst the most consistently Covenanting peers in the realm – escaped censure.  
Nevertheless, a total of eighty-seven individuals from the core Highland shires were 
named.  Table 4 (overleaf) displays the total liabilities incurred by each shire.134  In 
total, the financial burden imposed on the Highlands amounted to nearly £111,000.  
Although the average value of fines was therefore around £27,689 per shire, liability 
in fact varied wildly, and, in terms of totals, there was a clear division between 
Argyll and Inverness-shire on the one hand, and Sutherland and Caithness on the 
other – the former were made liable for sums several times greater than those 
expected from the latter.  Naturally this reflected the number of fines imposed, since 
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Argyll and Inverness-shire between accounted for nearly 90 per cent of all 
exemptions.   
 
Shire Number of 
Exemptions 
Total Fines (£ 
Scots) 
Average Fine (£ 
Scots) 
Argyll 51 55,554 1,089 
Caithness 3 1,800 600 
Inverness, Ross 
and Cromarty 
27 42,000 1,556 
Sutherland 6 11,400 1,900 
Totals 87 110,754 1,259 
Table 4: Exemptions from the Act of Indemnity in the Highland Shires, 1662.135 
 
The reality of the mid-century troubles was clearly reflected in this pattern.  
Argyll and Inverness-shire had, after all, witnessed a great deal more activity and 
disruption before 1660 than the more northerly shires, and equally, their leading men 
had been stalwarts of both the Covenanting regime and, especially in the case of 
Argyll, had collaborated significantly with the Cromwellians.136  These points are 
further reinforced when one considers exactly who was fined.  Of those who can be 
positively identified, the vast majority – around seventy-six – were lairds, and about 
eleven were burgesses (almost all from the Covenanting stronghold of Inverness).  
Fifty of the lairds – nearly 60 per cent – belonged to major families (the Campbells in 
particular, but also Munros, Rosses, Frasers, Sinclairs, Grays and Sutherlands) which 
had gravitated towards the Covenanting cause before 1651.  Clearly, the distribution 
of fines in the Highlands generally conformed to the expressed intention of the 1662 
act – namely, to single out those who had ‘concurred in the contriveing, fomenting or 
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carieing on of the late most unnaturall rebellion’ and ‘did therby render themselffs 
eminently instrumentall in all his majesties’ troubles’.137  
 Yet if the pattern of exemptions was broadly logical from this point of view, 
there were peculiarities, especially given the official guidelines that fines should be 
roughly equivalent of one year’s rent.138  Caithness remained the region with the 
smallest liabilities – their mean fines being half the Highland average – but the 
gentlemen of Argyll were in fact in the next-best position, and they were cited to pay, 
on average, slightly less than was standard for the Highlands.  The inhabitants of 
Inverness-shire were rather worse off, but it was the gentlemen of Sutherland who 
suffered most, paying roughly 50 per cent above the Highland average.  A great deal 
of further research into Scottish landholding is needed, but there are nevertheless 
some hints that these patterns did not accurately reflect variations in rental income.  
Shaw and Macinnes have for instance shown that Argyll proprietors tended to hold 
unusually large blocks of land, but this peculiarity was not reflected in the modest 
levies imposed upon the shire.139  Moreover, comparison with surviving rental rolls 
reveals some peculiarities.  For example, Alexander Campbell of Lochnell was fined 
£3,000, but in the 1680s his estates were valued at less than £2,000.  A similar 
situation faced Hector Maclean of Torlisk (fined £4,000, valued at £635), Neil 
Mackellor of Letter (fined £3,000, valued at £92) and Alexander Maclean of Otter 
(fined £2,000, valued at £674).140  In Inverness-shire, too, such over-charging was not 
uncommon: John Forbes of Culloden, whose valued rent was about £760 in 1671, was 
fined £1,200; Thomas Shives of Muirton, fined £1,800, had land valued at £145; and 
the Mackintosh lairds of Killachie and Connage both endured fines of £3,600 on land 
                                                           
137 RPS, 1662/5/96. 
138 Airy, Lauderdale Papers, i, p.104 
139 Shaw, Northern and Western Isles, pp.16-20; Macinnes, Clanship, pp.142-48.    
140 NRS, Exchequer Records: Valuation Rolls, E106/3/1, f.6, ff.11-12, ff.17-18, f.20 and at ff.25-
26. 
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worth £594 and £1,470 respectively.141  Admittedly these comparisons are not 
without difficulty, largely because the extant valuation rolls are not precisely 
contemporary with the Act of Indemnity, and it is possible (particularly in the case of 
war-torn Argyll) that the intervening period had witnessed a reduction in the value 
of land.  Nonetheless, it seems clear that, in many cases, fines exceeded the statutory 
level on one-year’s valued rent.    
At the same time, the government’s declared intention to impose 
punishments which were proportionate to perceived crimes does not seem to have 
been observed terribly scrupulously.  Perhaps the most actively Covenanting 
burgesses in Inverness had been Duncan Forbes of Culloden and his son, John 
Forbes, both of whom had sat on numerous committees, both centrally and locally, 
during the 1640s and had been their town’s commissioner to the Covenanting 
Parliaments at least twice each.  Yet both of them were fined £1,200, when their 
fellow Invernessian burgess, the much more low-profile Alexander Dunbar, was 
expected to pay three times that.  It also seems odd that one member of the Gray 
family – Robert Gray of Arbo – was cited to pay £4,800, when another – Robert Gray 
of Skibo – escaped with just £1,200, when Skibo is known to have had held office 
under the Covenanters but there is no record of Arbo ever having done so.142  
Analysing the value of individual fines, in other words, reveals a haphazard and 
rather bizarre pattern which does not comfortably fit with the official guidelines. 
This confusion is in fact hardly surprising.  For Wodrow, the whole process of 
indemnity was shamefully handled by the government, not least because the 
                                                           
141 NRS, E106/17/1, ff.2-3 and at ff.5-6.  In the absence of extant valuation rolls it is impossible 
to assess the relationship between rents and fines in Sutherland, although, given the pattern 
laid out here, it seems likely that the unusually high liabilities imposed upon that shire did 
not reflect rental values. 
142 RPS, 1643/6/91, 1644/6/225, 1645/1/124; 1646/11/34, 1646/11/409; M.D. Young, The 
Parliaments of Scotland: Burgh and Shire Commissioners, volume 1 (Edinburgh, 1992), p.246. 
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decision to delay the passage of the Act until late 1662 was a transparent mechanism 
for stifling opposition to Middleton’s legislative programme.143  More particularly, 
however, Wodrow railed against the injustice of the exemptions list, arguing that 
those named were ‘arbitrarily fined [...] without any libel, probation, or pretended 
crime, but what was common to the whole nation during the usurption’, and that, 
moreover, ‘a good many were put in, as much from little private pique, as from any 
activity in the late times’.144  Wodrow was echoing earlier sentiment.  Kirkton 
claimed that the list was both unjust and illogical, since many of those named were 
either dead, impoverished or (perhaps slipping into hyperbole) had never existed.  
The point of the exercise, he concluded, was to furnish ‘a sort of drink-money’ for 
Middleton and his allies.145  Burnet too stated that the list was composed in secret 
and with ‘no proofs’, with the result that the value of fines was entirely arbitrary and 
‘no consideration was had either of men’s crimes or of their estates’.146  It would, 
therefore, be misguided to seek a logical pattern in the imposition of fines because 
exemption from indemnity was, like the execution of Argyll, as much about the 
present as the past.  But whereas Argyll’s death had been intended to cement the 
position of the Restoration regime by illustrating the dangers of disloyalty and 
symbolically bringing to an end the mid-century troubles, the fines of 1662 were 
more about using the general climate of royalist sentiment in Scotland to facilitate a 
cynical exercise in fiscal exploitation, something which the Highlands did not escape.   
 In general, then, the pattern of rewards and punishments in the Highlands, as 
across Scotland, was thoroughly moderate.  Certainly there was one big winner – 
                                                           
143 Wodrow, History of the Sufferings, i, pp.278-79. 
144 Ibid., p.271 and at p.277. 
145 Kirkton, History, p.84.  The veracity of this latter accusation would seem to be reinforced 
by a letter of Charles II to Middleton in March 1661, rebuking the commissioner for taking 
private bribes in return for pardons. Airy, Lauderdale Papers, i, pp.92-93. 
146 Burnet, History, i, p.262. 
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Macdonnell – and one big loser – Argyll – but beneath these headlines, there was no 
great bonanza for former Royalists, and no systematic attempt to destroy those who 
had fought against the Crown before 1660.  What there was, instead, was a more 
low-key pattern of small-scale gifts and mild censures, all of which were concerned 
more with shaping the present than setting the past to rights.  The various 
mechanisms for rewarding loyalists – ennoblement, payment, rescinding of 
forfeitures and returning of taxation dues – all served to honour those whose records 
were considered to merit it, without actually ceding much of substance, while the use 
of public condemnations and abortive treason processes allowed the young and still 
insecure restored monarchy to show its displeasure without causing any major social 
or political upheavals.  The same focus on the present can be observed in the two 
major retribution initiatives of the period.  The historical justification for executing 
Argyll was tenuous, but its political value, as sacrifice and warning, was immense, 
while the bizarre pattern of indemnity exceptions can only really be understood if 
one approaches it as an exercise in fiscal opportunism.  The whole process, then, was 
a balancing act between score-settling on the one hand and entrenching the regime 
on the other.  The result as far as the Highlands were concerned was a policy that 
sacrificed substantive achievements in favour of symbolism. 
 Historians dealing with the Restoration settlements on a national (or even 
international) scale have reached a broad consensus based upon a number of 
premises.  First, that the return of the monarchy was popular.  Second, that both 
centre and locality worked hard to produce a conservative settlement tempered by 
pragmatism.  Third, that there was a conscious effort to minimise the need for 
retribution.  These themes were certainly crucial in the Highlands, but they were 
allied to a distinct sense of drift and half-heartedness.  Support for Charles II seems 
to have been largely ubiquitous, but so too was caution and self-interest.  There was 
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a conscious attempt to eradicate the governing infrastructure of the Cromwellian 
period, but the lack of a clear strategy for replacing it led to local administrative 
muddle, and the pattern of rewards and punishments relied so heavily on modest 
acts of approbation and censure (the execution of Argyll notwithstanding) that 
arguably it achieved very little in practice.  An explanation for all this can be found 
in the fact that the Restoration (like the Revolution of 1688-89) was essentially an 
English phenomenon, exported of necessity to Scotland.147  The Stuarts’ northern 
kingdom therefore experienced the process at one remove, and the Highlands even 
more distantly than that.  Put simply, the sedate and lackadaisical nature of the 
Highland Restoration reflected the region’s ambivalent relationship with central 
government.  Over the succeeding two decades, official policy in the Highlands 
would be shaped by the uncertainties which this dynamic generated. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Engagement and Containment, 1660-78 
 
Duke Lauderdale’s insolence, and his engrossing every thing to himself and 
to a few friends, and his wife and his brother setting things to sale, raised a 
very high discontent all over the nation [...] so that in all respects we were 
quite out of joint.1 
 
Gilbert Burnet’s unflattering description of the regime overseen by Lauderdale, is 
hardly a maverick voice.  Rather, thanks largely to the Whiggish ideology which 
dominated British history-writing until the early twentieth century, it reflects a 
powerful traditional perception of Scotland in the 1660s and 1670s.  This 
characterisation had its most profound impact on historians’ understanding of 
religious policy, but it also had implications for the Highlands.  Lauderdale’s 
corruption, the thinking ran, meant that the Highlands were simply ignored, left to 
their own devices until the reign of James VII.2  More recent historiography has of 
course done much to undermine the simplistic understanding of Lauderdale’s 
government, and in light of this, a more measured re-examination of Highland policy 
during his ascendancy is necessary.  Seeking to provide such a revaluation, this 
chapter will trace the government’s responses to the perceived problem of Highland 
lawlessness from 1660 until the end of Lauderdale’s regime.  It begins by exploring 
the strategic underpinnings of the government’s approach, before assessing how 
these ideas influenced the actual development of policy until 1678.   
The general issue of the Restoration regime’s reaction to perceived challenges 
has of course attracted a fair degree of historiographical attention, principally as 
regards Presbyterian nonconformity.  The conventional picture, as drawn by Cowan, 
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Buckroyd and G.M. Yould, and more recently re-stated by Brown and Harris, is that 
policy was marked by chronic vacillation between two opposing strategies.  The first 
was oppression, either through punishing dissenters or relying on the military to 
suppress conventicling activity.  The second was conciliation, involving either 
toleration of dissenting activity, or attempts to incorporate Presbyterians within the 
establishment.  The accepted chronology is that repression was practiced before 1666, 
when the shock of the Pentland Rising stimulated a phase of conciliation exemplified 
by the First Indulgence (1669).  Repression returned by 1670, before moderation 
again reasserted itself in the Second Indulgence (1672).  The final phase of 
Lauderdale’s policy was another round of severity from the mid-1670s, culminating 
in the Highland Host (1678), and sparking the Covenanter Rebellion (1679).3  An 
important challenge to this orthodoxy has been offered by Ronnie Lee.  For him, the 
reputed vacillation between severity and moderation was, at best, a public relations 
exercise.  In reality, because the government’s attitude towards disorder was based 
less upon the specifics of Presbyterian militancy than upon Charles II’s own terror of 
all forms of unrest, direct repression remained at the heart of official thinking 
throughout the reign.4  Despite Lee’s contribution, it remains the overall consensus 
that Lauderdale’s regime was unable to formulate a consistent response to militant 
nonconformity, and that this failure sprang from its indecision (mirrored by division 
within the episcopacy) as to whether engagement or repression was the best strategy.  
There is some evidence of comparable strategic uncertainty in reference to the 
Highlands.  Although Charles II had been restored to his thrones in May 1660, the 
republican authorities continued to exercise control in Scotland until 23 August, 
                                                           
3 Cowan, Scottish Covenanters, pp.64-103; Buckroyd, Church and State, pp.57-132; G.M. Yould, 
‘The Duke of Lauderdale’s Religious Policy in Scotland, 1668-79: The Failure of Conciliation 
and the Return to Coercion’, Journal of Religious History, 11:2, 1980, pp.248-68, passim; Brown, 
Kingdom or Province, pp.153-54 and at pp.157-58; Harris, Restoration, pp.16-29. 
4 Lee, ‘Government and Politics’, pp.159-60. 
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when the Committee of Estates, the central executive body of the Covenanting era, 
reconvened in Edinburgh.  It sat for just over four months, and was tasked simply 
with maintaining order until Parliament itself could meet from 1 January 1661.5  
Within this brief, its approach to the Highlands was marked by a predilection for 
indirect control – that is, a desire to engage with local elites, and maintain order 
indirectly through their agency.  On 29 August, it issued a circular letter to a large 
number of landholders in the Highlands or on the Highland periphery, essentially 
delegating to them all control over the region: 
 
Take speciall notice of all such of your Clan kinsmen followers servants and 
tennents, and of all others travelling through your bounds whom yow may 
stop of lett that they cary themselfs peaceably, and doe not in any sort truble 
the peace of this Kingdome, by gathering themselfts together in bands or 
companies, or makeing of any other insolencys privat or publict.6 
 
On a number of subsequent occasions the Committee issued more focused 
commissions for specific purposes.  In August, it wrote to James Grant of Freuchie, 
requesting that he apprehend the notorious cattle-thief Donald MacDonald, better 
known as ‘Halket Stirk’.  Freuchie obliged, and in October the Committee wrote a 
letter of thanks, assuring him that it was ‘very desireous to protect [and] maintaine 
yow [and] your followers for doeing so good a work for his Ma[jes]tie [and] the 
                                                           
5 Dow, Cromwellian Scotland, pp.268-69; Lee, ‘Government and Politics’, pp.11-12. 
6 NRS, PA11/12, ff.10r-v.  The lords to whom the committee wrote were: Kenneth Mackenzie, 
3rd earl of Seaforth; James Murray, 2nd earl of Tullibardine; John Murray, 2nd earl of Atholl; 
James Ogilvy, 1st earl of Airlie; Charles Gordon, 1st earl of Aboyne; John Mackay, 2nd lord 
Reay; Hugh Fraser, 8th lord Lovat; David Ross of Balnagown; Sir Robert Munro of Foulis; 
Duncan Stewart of Appin; Roderick Macleod of Dunvegan; Angus MacDonald of Glengarry; 
James MacDonald of Clanranald; Ewan Cameron of Lochiel; Lachlan Macintosh; James Grant 
of Freuchie; Robert Farquharson of Invercauld; Sir John Campbell of Glenorchy; Sir Dougal 
Campbell of Auchinbreck; Calum MacGregor, tutor of MacGregor; Sir John Colquhoun of 
Luss; Walter Macfarlane; John Buchanan; Archibald Campbell of Kilpunt; Sir Thomas Stewart 
of Garntullie and David Lindsay of Edzell. 
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peace of the Kingdome’.7  John Buchanan of Buchanan also received a commission in 
September, ordering him to apprehend two individuals, Robert og Buchanan and 
John Campbell of Torrie, accused of assaulting and robbing a tenant of Archibald 
Napier, 2nd lord Napier, and a third was given in October to Freuchie for the 
apprehension of all bandits within his lands.8  Perhaps even more tellingly, the 
Committee was forced on at least one occasion to give retrospective approval for a 
peacekeeping initiative undertaken unilaterally in the locality.  On 19 September, it 
agreed to assume responsibility for a group of eight individuals captured in 
Rannoch, Badenoch and Lochaber by Robert Campbell or Glenlyon, limply offering 
him ‘thanks for his service in apprehending [and] secureing of the forsaids 
persones’.9  On 11 September, the Committee commissioned a subcommittee to 
‘consider vpon some overturs for satling the peace of the hielands and preventing of 
roberes’, but the members never reported, and for the duration of its transient 
existence the Committee of Estates was content to exercise authority through, and by 
the sufferance of, local elites.10 
In part, of course, the Committee’s options were constrained by the fact that it 
was very obviously a holding body, but its approach to the Highlands reflected 
wider thinking which stressed the centrality of extensive delegation in the far north 
and west.  This idea was based largely on a sense that a recognised landlord, or more 
broadly an established social hierarchy, was a vital means of controlling the locality.  
In the words of Archibald Campbell, marquis of Argyll, ‘Family, Dependants and 
Vassels’ would only ‘be ever serviceable to their Supreme’ if they were ‘in a due 
                                                           
7 NRS, PA11/12, f.50; Fraser, Chiefs of Grant, ii, pp.19-20; Hopkins, Glencoe, p.30. 
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9 NRS, PA11/12, f.30  
10 Ibid., f.16r. 
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subjection to [...] their immediate Lord’.11  An anonymous memorandum of the 1660s 
illustrated the way in which this thinking was applied to the particular problem of 
Highland banditry: 
 
And If their be any brokin men [...] it must be exactly tryed whair thoes 
Limmeris maks thir residence In the winter tyme, And [th]at the landslordis 
in whoes boundis they ar fund to remaine [...] Be ather oblished to exhibit 
thoes Limeris Or else to produce thair tennentis and servantis whoe resets 
them To the effect that [th]e sadis tennentis and servandis may be sencored 
and punished.12  
 
Such ideas were informed largely by contemporary conceptualisations of Highland 
society.  The region was seen as distant, wild and backward, all of which meant that 
the more sophisticated mechanisms of control which characterised Lowland 
government could not be applied.13  This translated into a clear preference that 
Highland affairs remained confined to the Highland theatre.  In 1665, for example, 
the Chancellor, Rothes, set out his vision for a largely self-governing Highlands, 
based upon delegation to a triumvirate of leading local noblemen: 
 
My lord sefforthe being cald hear [...] I haue mead yous of the opertunatie 
that ther might be a right understanding betuixt him and argayll and trulie I 
Faind argayll uerie redie to du it sins I tould him I did beliff it uold be of 
great aduantage that persons uho had so great intrist should be in a right 
understanding and I thinck they ar nai uerie ueall togeather, and so is my 
lord of atholl and argayll uhich meack me houp that them thrie uill inffluans 
all the most considerabill persons in the haylands.14 
 
Too much should not be read into this.  Rothes’ hands-off approach may well have 
reflected a lack of interest in the minutiae of local business, but it was hardly an 
                                                           
11 Campbell, Instructions to a Son, p.10. 
12 NRS, GD16/41/379. 
13 For a fuller discussion of the Highlands’ image during the Restoration, see chapter 2. 
14, BL, Add. Mss. 23122, f.273. 
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attitude unique to Highland affairs.  It in fact reflected the general ethos of the early 
Restoration across Scotland, which emphasised the resurgence of elite power in the 
localities.15  Nonetheless, notions of devolving authority to local luminaries also 
represented a definite strategy for dealing with the problem of Highland lawlessness.  
  Yet as time wore on, enthusiasm for engaging with regional elites, and 
consequently keeping government at arms length from the locality, began to cool.  In 
part this reflected broader trends, for in the years after the Pentland Rising of 1666 
the government, spurred on by the continuing problem of nonconformity, adopted a 
noticeably more interventionist attitude towards controlling the localities.16  Jackson 
has provided the most sophisticated reconstruction of this as intellectual 
development, discerning two complementary trends in the political culture of 
Restoration Scotland.  The first was an overweening concern that domestic peace 
should be preserved at all costs.  The second, which build upon both sixteenth-
century thinking and the experiences of the mid-century troubles, emphasised the 
role of the monarch (and, by extension, the administrative machinery of an absentee 
King of Scots) as the legitimate agent of order.  When these two impulses collided 
after 1666 with a heightened degree of paranoia over the subversive potential of 
disorder, they stimulated a new stringency and intrusiveness in the government’s 
drive to enforce order.17   
But mistrust of regional elites was also based upon observations peculiar to 
the Highland theatre.  Some individuals were suspected of being lukewarm in their 
willingness to serve.  Huntly, for example, was generally thought to be ‘not 
conserned for securing the peace of the highlands’ and, as a result, was considered 
                                                           
15 Lee, ‘Government and Politics’, pp.26-27. 
16 Ibid., Lee, ‘Government and Politics’ pp.172-73. 
17 Jackson, Restoration Scotland, pp.132-8 and at pp.145-55. 
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reluctant to ‘medle in highland affairs’. 18  Others, though amenable, were unreliable.  
Tweeddale, for example, advised in 1668 that Seaforth’s record in exercising the 
functions of local government was not distinguished: 
 
The earel of seaforths frinds say if he had the trust of a Regiment he uold 
ruine the hole country [...] uhen he is in Rose he lifts all the rents they haue 
for ther Relife or Robs them of it uhen it is colectid [and] to be sent south 
[and] som say he is troubelsom amongst ther wifs.19 
  
Seaforth was not alone in attracting such criticism.  In 1678, Macdonnell was accused 
(admittedly by adherents of Argyll, his enemy) of abusing his judicial commission 
over the Highlands to enforce financial rights over the Camerons.20  More trenchant 
criticism was attached to Argyll himself, who consistently exploited his judicial 
authority in promotion of his own interests.  The Macleans were his most significant 
victims.  An assiduous policy of buying up the family’s debts had made the marquis 
of Argyll its leading creditor, and the earl’s attempts to enforce his rights put them 
under immense pressure.  Armed resistance followed by the early 1670s, and Argyll 
then used his authority as Justiciar of Argyll and the Isles to put all the leading 
clansmen to the horn.21  Aside from mistrusting the regional elite, government also 
grew more concerned about how Highland lawlessness was impacting upon the 
Lowlands.  Two commissions against Highland robbers granted in mid-1666 were 
justified not because such men caused mayhem in their own lands, but because they 
were beginning to trouble the Lowland portions of Dumbartonshire, Stirlingshire 
and Argyll.22  The cumulative effect of these problems was summed in an 
                                                           
18 WSRO, Goodwood Mss 1166, items 2 and 3. 
19 BL, Add. Mss. 23131, f.111r-v. 
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21 RPCS, iv, pp.272-74; JR, pp.36-41; Lauder, Notices, i, p.108; Sinclair, Letters, p.18, pp.73-74 
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anonymous memorandum of 1677 which bluntly complained of the senior Highland 
noblemen that ‘ther Authoritye and Jurisdictione prevealls not in makeing the 
heighlands peaceable’.23  
As a result of such pressures, much more rigorous attitudes towards disorder 
eventually began to emerge.  By 1669, Tweeddale spoke of the need to exploit ‘the 
aue of awtority’ to bring certain recalcitrant Highlanders (particularly Lord 
Macdonnell) to heel, and by the mid-1670s Argyll’s allies were calling for ‘a solide 
Course’ to reduce rebellious Highlanders ‘under his Ma[jes]ties authority’.24  
However, the key champion of a more rigorous Highland policy was John Campbell, 
younger of Glenorchy (the future 1st earl of Breadalbane), who by the 1670s had 
developed an understanding of Highland government which stressed the centrality 
of the Crown.  As he explained to Elizabeth Murray, duchess of Lauderdale, in 1677: 
 
To hav all affairs in the highlands keepit quiet [...] I uill contribut all my 
endeavours for it and uill publiclly declair that to be my opinion as uhat is 
necessar for the Kings service let it displease uhom it uill, and this I have 
asserted.25 
 
Glenorchy set out the details of his vision in a memorandum written probably in the 
mid-1670s.  He made four specific suggestions.  First, he called for a detachment of 
the militia to be quartered in Lochaber for suppressing bandits.  Second, he argued 
that a permanent garrison should be set up at Inverlochy.  Third, he proposed that a 
new royal stewartry of Lochaber should be erected, formed by purchasing with 
public money lands and jurisdictions held by the likes of Huntly, Argyll and Ewan 
Cameron of Lochiel, totalling around £14,000 sterling.  Finally, he stated that the 
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office of steward of Lochaber should always be exercised by an impartial appointee 
of the crown, and never awarded to a local grandee.  However, what is important 
about these proposals is less their specific content – most of which was never 
implemented – but their general tone: 
 
If continowed wnder his Maj[esties] Imediat com[m]and [and] the trwst given 
to fitt persons The dependance of [th]e Camerons [and] Mcdonalds in 
Lochaber [and] the McGregors in Ranoch will be Imediatlie on his Ma[jes]tie 
[and] the persones Imployed as stewart [...] So [tha]t from being the actors 
[and] co[m]mitters of all the mischeifs [and] owtrages in the highlands they 
may be redwced [and] made obedient to his Maj[esties] lawes [and] verie 
wsefull to his service.26 
 
Glenorchy’s thinking represented a Highland application of the more general 
intellectual trend in favour of embracing strong monarchical control.  It also 
represented a fundamentally different way of conceptualising Highland government.  
Received wisdom stressed the importance of wholesale delegation to regional 
grandees, of the primacy of personal authority.  What Glenorchy offered was the 
reverse, a vision of Highland policy in which the lead was taken by the Crown, and 
in which power resided in the public sphere.  This introduced a strategic tension 
between direct and indirect rule which marked policy throughout the Lauderdale 
era.   
Initially, however, indirect theories held the field.  On 18 July 1661, the 
freshly reconvened Privy Council established a committee chaired by Tweeddale, to 
‘consider what is fitt to be done anent the chiftans of the clans’.27  The deliberations of 
this body led, two weeks later on 2 August, to a series of proclamations aiming to 
                                                           
26 NRS, GD112/1/682.  Macinnes, Clanship, pp.138-39. 
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tackle Highland disorder through the conventional expedient of reasserting existing 
laws: 
 
The Lords of his Majesties Privie Councill, by these presents, ordaine that all 
lawes and acts of Parliament made against thefts, robberies, masterful 
depredationes, spuilzed, murthers, and against sorners and vagabonds be 
carefullie observed be the whole lieges and the paines and penalties therof 
levied and execute with all rigour.28 
 
In particular, the Council focused on a statute passed under James VI in 1587, the 
‘Act for the quieting and keping in obedience of the disorderit subjectis, inhabitantis 
of the bordouris, hielandis and ilis.’  The pivot of this fairly substantial piece of 
legislation had been a requirement for chiefs to give bonds of caution for the 
peaceable behaviour of their followers, or for the provision of compensation when 
order broke down, to which end it had included a list of those gentlemen considered 
‘chiefs’ and from whom, consequently, bonds would be required.29  Seizing upon this 
list, the council asked all those named (or, rather, their successors) to deliver bonds 
by 1 October 1661.  Insofar as it was a precise expression of the ideological 
attachment to the pivotal role of the lord in law and order, the policy of bonding 
reflected the ascendency in the early 1660s of indirect control strategies. 
Whatever the underlying thinking, the wisdom of (partially) resurrecting the 
1587 act is open to question, since it is by no means certain that it was particularly 
successful first time around.30  Moreover, there were very real practical problems 
with anchoring government policy in the roll of names accompanying this seventy-
year old statute.  The original act had reflected the political climate of the 1580s 
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(indeed, Lynch posits that it was upon the Borders rather than the Highlands that 
Parliament had been more focused in, and immediately after, 1587), so that many 
lords who by the 1660s had very little to do with Highland politics, such as Thomas 
Scott of Abbotshall and Sir John Moncrieff of that Ilk, found themselves named.31  
Slightly differently, Martin Cameron of Letterfinlay complained in April 1662 that he 
had been called to give caution for the good behaviour of the Camerons, even though 
Lochiel, and not Letterfinlay, was the chief of that name.32   Such slip-ups did not go 
unacknowledged, and at least six individuals who were originally cited were later 
granted exemptions.33  At the same time, the Council itself admitted in August 1661, 
and again in November, that the ‘roll of names of cheifes of clanns, landlords and 
others’ did ‘not comprehend many persons who ought to be bound’.34   
It is therefore hardly surprising that the success of bonding was strictly 
limited.35  By the deadline of 1 October, only nine bonds had been received – a 
response rate of under 10 per cent – and the Council proceeded to put the remaining 
ninety-three individuals to the horn.  A further seventeen men would submit bonds 
over the succeeding four months, but this still left the total level of compliance at less 
that 25 per cent.  Perhaps even more alarmingly, the sheriff of Sutherland wrote to 
the Council early in November stating that five of the men within his jurisdiction 
who had been named in the original list ‘absolutely refused’ to find caution; 
evidently the failure of bonding cannot simply be explained by ignorance.36  The 
policy should not be totally condemned – it did manage to extract sureties from some 
of the major trouble-making clans including the Camerons, MacGregors and 
                                                           
31 Ibid., p.213. 
32 RPCS, i, p.196. 
33 Ibid., pp.55-56 and at p.70. 
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35 Macinnes, Clanship, p.126; Roberts, Clan, King and Covenant, p.134.  
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MacDonalds of Keppoch, and at least one laird not named by the council, James Ross 
of Eye, felt compelled to find caution anyway – but it is nevertheless clear that 
bonding was no shining success. 37  Even on paper, the lacklustre reliance on an 
outdated Jacobean statue looked crude, and in practice, the Council was unable to 
enforce its orders with any consistency. 
Bonding, however, was not abandoned, and a variation on the theme 
emerged on 22 December 1664.  The Council issued another decree, demanding all 
those named on the 1661 list to ‘compear personally before the saids Lords […] 
yearly in tyme coming’.38  Annual accountability was another well-worn device, 
having actually appeared in the 1587 legislation (even if it had remained a dead letter 
for a further nineteen years).  The absence of sufficiently detailed records 
unfortunately makes it impossible to ascertain with any precision how effective was 
this second incarnation of bonding, but the frequency with which it was re-
introduced suggests a repeating cycle of non-enforcement.  By February 1667, only 
about fourteen months after the original decree, Argyll was championing its re-
implementation under a fresh list.  This duly materialised in 1669.  Less than three 
years later, however, the English clerk of Council, Sir Joseph Williamson, was 
informed that annual accountability had been mooted again, and it was re-
introduced on two further occasions before the end of the reign, in October 1678 and 
March 1681, both times using completely revised lists.39   
There were also were numerous instances of citations being flouted.  In 1669, 
three earls – Atholl, Perth and James Murray, 2nd earl of Tullibardine – all absolutely 
refused to give bonds, apparently because they considered such obligations unfair, 
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while the analogous recalcitrance in 1672 of Lochiel, MacDonald, Donald MacDonald 
of Clanranald, Sir James MacDonald of Sleat and Sir Allan Maclean of Duart earned 
each of them a spell of imprisonment in Edinburgh Castle.40  As Macinnes points out, 
such reticence may have had more to do with fear of rapacious creditors than wilful 
flouting of governmental orders, and between 1664 and 1678 the Council issued 
more than sixty safe conducts allowing heavily indebted Highland landlords – 
including the heads of the Frasers, Urquharts, Stewarts of Appin, MacAllisters, 
Camerons, Macleans, Rosses, MacLeods, MacDonalds of Glengarry and MacDonalds 
of Sleat, as well as a range of lesser clan gentry – to make the journey unmolested.41  
Nonetheless, it is obvious that the enforcement of annual accountability fell far short 
of achieving complete or consistent obedience.    
More importantly, the nature and extent of the responsibility implied by the 
oaths remained unclear.  Initially, in 1661 and 1664, this had been defined only in the 
loosest terms; chiefs would endeavour to prevent their followers committing thefts 
or any other crimes.  In 1669, however, the Privy Council issued an approved text to 
which all liable individuals were to subscribe.  It bound its signatories, on behalf of 
themselves and their dependants, to obey all acts of Parliament and to commit no 
crimes.  Principals were also obliged to provide compensation to all persons 
wronged by their dependents, and to present all criminals to the relevant judicial 
authorities.  These terms were carried forward into a second approved text in 1670, 
although with the addition of specified punishments for those who broke their 
bonds, namely fines (pegged to range between 1,000 and 3,000 merks) or horning.  
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1681, however, saw a return to a slightly looser obligation; signatories promised that 
they (and their dependents) would commit no crimes, that they would redress 
wronged parties, and that they would present criminals to justice.42  There also exists 
at least one other model text.  It is undated, but seems to represent the strictest extant 
bond; as well as mirroring the 1669 text, it includes specific terms against receiving 
black-mail money and harbouring known criminals.  It also imposes an obligation for 
chiefs to provide annual lists of all their dependents, which suggests it was produced 
to accompany the renewal of the annual bonds policy in October 1678.43  Although 
each of these texts is linked by the underlying obligation to remain peaceable, the 
fact that the detail of Highland bonds varied so markedly, particularly between 1669 
and 1681, can hardly have engendered a great deal of clarity as to exactly what 
landlords were expected to do. 
In addition, the pool of landlords from whom bonds were required was 
rather unstable.  The initial list, based on the 1587 act, named 102 individuals, but the 
1669 revision cut this to forty-five.  The reasons for the reduction are unclear, 
although Glenorchy’s suggestions that there was little point in pursuing thieves who 
had ‘nothing to loose’, and that there should be an indemnity for some past crimes, 
may have been a factor.44  In any case, by September 1669, a special list relating to 
Lochaber, Badenoch and Perthshire, amounting to fifty-three names, combined with 
a second, eight-strong list, brought the total back up to 106.  Two further additions – 
one in August 1670 naming thirty-five, and one with five names from March 1671 – 
made a final tally of 146, an expansion of over 300 per cent in fewer than two years.  
Such erratic growth seems unlikely to reflect a particularly efficient or effective 
policy, and would seem to suggest a distinct lack of strategic clarity, although it 
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should be noted that the 1678 list, incorporating 142 men, the majority of whom had 
been cited in the past, was apparently an attempt to consolidate and rationalise these 
developments.  
A rather different problem was illustrated by a complaint raised in 1667 at the 
instance of Magdalene Scrymgeour, lady Drum.  Her Aberdeenshire estates had 
suffered a series of attacks by thieves who were tenants of Argyll.  The earl, 
naturally, was held responsible, but he objected on three counts.  First, he claimed 
that only five of the roughly one-hundred robbers were his tenants.  Second, he 
argued that, since he had neither known about nor supported the raid, it was unjust 
to hold him responsible.  Finally, he noted that the wildness of the Highland 
landscape meant that it was a physical impossibility for him either to prevent or 
punish bandit activity in the remote glens.  On this occasion Argyll argued in vain, 
and he was handed a fine in excess of £7,000 Scots, but he was not the only landlord 
to raise such objections.45   One more minor Ross-shire laird, Kenneth Mackenzie, 
made a similar point in December 1677: 
 
Jhon Grant off Corinronges hath stolne out an decret agenst mee for an stolne 
horse q[uhi]ch (he alledges) was Marked in the possesion off An david 
Mccrebiter an mealer off my fathers I can no see whow hee can say any thing 
to mee supose all was trew he aledges agenst Mccrebiter I not being his 
Master.46 
 
These examples underscore perhaps the key weakness in the tactic of landlord 
responsibility.  Identification of a criminal’s legal landlord was far from 
straightforward, nor was there anything to stop a superior from simply denying his 
responsibility.  Equally, the predominance amongst the lawless elements of 
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Highlands society of ‘masterless men’ – that is, individuals who by definition did not 
have a fixed lord – introduced an obvious flaw into the policy.47  
In addition, bonding could be undermined by the perennial tension between 
feudal and clan hierarchies.  In 1666, for example, Alexander Robertson of Struan 
entered a complaint against a group of Camerons, accusing them, under the 
influence of their chief, Lochiel, of raiding his lands.  Some of these men were 
Struan’s own tenants, which put him in the rather anomalous position of being 
legally responsible for settling his own losses.48  All of this demonstrates that the 
central strength of bonding as a policy – its ability to exploit regional power 
networks – was also its key failing.  The concept of control through existing socio-
political networks depended upon the existence of clear, stable hierarchies within 
Highland society, and as this was something of an idealised model, bolting central 
authority to local lordship meant that the government necessarily circumscribed its 
effective jurisdiction. 
Despite the problematic nature of bonding, the general approach of holding 
chiefs and landlords responsible for their subordinates did become a key expedient.  
The government itself often invoked it in response to specific disorders.  Thus, in 
1677, Ludovic Grant of Freuchie and Lachlan Mackintosh were both fined £200 
sterling because ‘their men, for whom they, as the heads of thesse two clans, were 
bound, had comitted a grosse ryot, in burning a house’.49  Perhaps even more 
striking is the extent to which landlords themselves began to exploit the tactic.  
Argyll in 1666 boasted that, because he had introduced a policy of forcing his 
tacksmen to take bonds for the behaviour of their sub-tenants, he was ‘sure ther are 
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none of my tenants theeues or els I know whom to make lyable’.50  Similarly, David 
Ross of Balnagown in 1664 received a letter from George Sinclair, 6th earl of 
Caithness, informing him that:  
 
Ther be divers persons who for [the]r delinquences being declared figitivs 
from this contri are sheltered in Strathocle, and from thence, by associats 
[the]r, mak intrusione upon the borders of this contri.51 
 
Significantly, Caithness suggested that, since the gang’s continued banditry was 
made possible by assistance from some of Balnagown’s tenants, and since those same 
tenants had received much of the stolen livestock, it was the Ross chief’s 
responsibility both to apprehend the thieves, and provide compensation for all 
losses.52  Nine years later, a similar situation arose when tenants of Hugh Campbell 
of Cawdor stole two pigs from Strathavon.  Cawdor received demands from both 
Huntly and Aboyne that he ensure either the return of the animals, or the payment of 
reparations.53  Of course, compliance was not automatic – Sutherland, for example, 
was in 1668 accused of refusing to provide reparations for large-scale thefts 
committed by his tenants within the shire of Caithness – but the very fact that both 
government and local lords made such requests illustrates that the concept of 
landlord responsibility found a significant role in terms of the day-to-day 
administration of justice.54  It is clear nevertheless that the grander design of 
formalising this impulse into an overarching policy proved unworkable. 
If bonding represented the early ascendency of indirect theories of control, a 
second tactic for maintaining order in the Highlands displayed rather more strategic 
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ambiguity.  The granting of judicial commissions was unique neither to the 
Highlands nor to the Restoration, but was rather standard practice in early-modern 
Scotland.55  Between 1660 and 1685, however, fifty-three such commissions for 
dealing with Highland business have been identified.  There are two crucial 
observations to be made about judicial commissions.  They were, firstly, always 
granted with very specific aims.  A commission given on 1 October 1662 was 
representative of this trend.  It empowered a group of six men to ‘meitt at such tymes 
and places as they shall think most expedient, and then and there to use all diligence 
for finding out and trying’ a group of robbers who had been targeting the lands of 
John Lyon of Muiresk and Patrick Strachen of Kinnady.56  The second point is that 
they were invariably legitimised through some rhetorical invocation of royal 
authority.  Thus, a commission of 1671, which charged four men to apprehend a 
group of named thieves, mainly from the Clan Donald, was backed up by letters 
from Charles II stating that the commissioners had been ‘giveand, granted and 
committand […] our full power and commission, expresse bidding and charge’ to 
carry out their duties.57  By invoking the authority of the crown, and focusing it for 
specific purposes, commissions both allowed the government to reinforce its claim to 
a monopoly on judicial authority, and gave practical expression to its responsibilities 
for the preservation of peace.  In this way, they were self-conscious exercises in direct 
control.  
Nevertheless, the extent to which this theoretical position could translate into 
practical control was limited by the continued need to seek the co-operation of local 
elites.  Table 5 sets out the pattern of appointments to judicial commissions with 
reference both to family affiliations and geographical location: 
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Social Status Total Family Affiliation Location 
  Major 
Kindreds 
Others Highland Fringe Lowland/ 
Unknown 
Nobles 87 65 22 41 23 6 
Lairds 239 163 76 211 48 1 
Burgesses 14 1 13 13 1 0 
Unknown/Other 24 9 15 4 5 11 
Totals 364 238 126 269 77 18 
Table 5: Judicial Commissions created in the Highlands, 1661-85.58 
 
The most striking point about this data is the extent to which commissions relied 
upon established local authorities.  Nearly 70 per cent of those named as 
commissioners belonged to major Highland kindreds, with the Campbells (sixty-
seven appointments) and Mackenzies (fifty-five) doing particularly well.  These two 
families had long before 1660 established themselves as government agents in the 
north and west respectively, but it should also be noted that four other families – the 
Gordons (twenty-three, including both the Huntly and Sutherland branches), Grants 
(sixteen), Mackintoshes (fifteen) and MacDonalds (eleven) – secured more than ten 
commissions, while a further twenty-three enjoyed between one and ten 
appointments.  Approaching the data from a different angle, it can be shown that, 
again, more than 70 per cent of appointees were resident within the Highland shires, 
while a further 20 per cent (such as the earls of Moray, Atholl, Tullibardine or 
Aboyne) lived on what might be termed the ‘Highland fringe’ zone, and therefore 
had a personal stake in upholding law and order in their own spheres.  In total, less 
than 5 per cent of appointments were given to men with no discernible connection to 
the Highlands.  All of this indicates strongly that, in appointing commissioners, the 
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government sought to appropriate existing familial and proprietary relationships.  
This, of course, was hardly unique to the Highlands.  The Lowland commissions 
created in 1676 to enforce legislation against conventiclers, for instance, deliberately 
employed leading regional magnates, including Alexander Erskine, 3rd earl of Kellie, 
Patrick Lyon, 3rd earl of Kinghorn and David Wemyss, 2nd earl of Wemyss for Fife, 
George Livingstone, 3rd earl of Linlithgow and John Hamilton, 1st lord Belhaven for 
the south-east, and William Fleming, 5th earl of Wigtown and William Cochrane, 1st 
earl of Dundonald for the south-west.59  Nevertheless, the reliance on Highland elites 
reflected precise strategic continuity with the policy of bonding, and shows that 
government through commission, despite taking the appearance of more immediate 
supervision of the locality, relied in practice on indirect control. 
 The running tension between direct and indirect theories of control inevitably 
blurred the distinction between public and private justice.  Perhaps the most graphic 
illustration of this was the Keppoch murders, probably the most notorious instance 
of clan violence in the entire Restoration period.  In September 1663, the young chief 
of the Keppoch MacDonalds, Alexander MacDonald and his brother, were brutally 
murdered by disaffected elements within his own clan.  For many historians, the 
most important point about this episode was that it illustrates the predatory 
tendencies of groups like the Keppoch MacDonalds; the murders, after all, were 
perpetrated by a titular vassal, Alexander MacDonald of Inverlair, who had objected 
to his chief’s policy of curbing cattle theft.60  But an equally crucial point relates to the 
wider response which the episode provoked.  In the summer of 1665, some fifteen 
months after the murders, the guilty men (although not their reputed patron 
Alasdair MacDonald, the new chief of Keppoch) were hunted down and killed by 
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Alexander MacDonald, brother of Sir James MacDonald of Sleat and a relative of the 
murdered brothers.  In theory, this punishment was sanctioned by a formal judicial 
commission, granted on 22 June 1665 to a group of three nobles and five lairds.  In 
practice, both the securing of the commission, and the killing of the murderers, was 
accomplished solely by Sleat’s private exertions.61  Moreover, the sense that the 
punishment of Inverlair and his associates was interpreted by the local community 
less as an exercise in impartial royal justice than as one in brutal tribal revenge, was 
given typically vivid expression by Iain Lom: 
 
‘S mór an sgainneal ‘s am mìochliu 
Do Chlann Dòmhnaill air fad, 
Ma bhios stad ‘nan dùsgagh 
Gu dìoghaltas grad; 
Tha lagh Dhia agus dhaoine 
Ag òrdach’ sgiosadh gun ghrab 
Air marbhaich’ an uachdrain, 
Righ, ceann teachlaich no treab. 
 
(It is a matter of great reproach and dishonour to the entire MacDonald clan if 
they delay to arouse themselves to exact immediate vengeance.  Human and 
divine law demands unconditional annihilation of one who murders a 
superior, a king, the head of a household or clan).62 
 
Examples such as that of the Keppoch murders illustrated that, in extreme cases, 
judicial commissions merely provided a veneer of centralisation to initiatives which 
were wholly the product of local politics.  
Moreover, its inherent reliance on the local community meant that, in purely 
practical terms, government through commission could be problematic.  It was not 
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always effective.  The largest single grant was the thirty-three-strong commission 
appointed in August 1663 against the Camerons of Lochiel, ostensibly for invading 
Mackintosh lands in Glenloy and Locharkaig (in reality, these estates had been in 
dispute for generations).63  However, the entrenched position of the Camerons in 
Lochaber ensured that nothing came of this formidable body, and the tension was 
only resolved two years later by the private mediation of Argyll and Moray.64  
Alongside mere lethargy there was the problem of active disobedience.  In 1667, the 
heritors of Sutherland refused to allow the three commissioners for the apprehension 
of John Nielson (Seaforth, Caithness and Balnagown) to carry out their orders 
because they did not want to ‘truble the cuntrey with strangeris’, and preferred to 
wait for Strathnaver, their de facto chief, to take action.65  Just as challenging was the 
potential for abuse.  In 1669 Glenorchy was awarded a commission against the long-
term law-breaker William Sinclair of Dunbeath and his associates.  In carrying out 
his obligations, however, he employed such questionable tactics, including drawing 
up a bond for the Sinclair gentry to sign, and then summarily imprisoning anyone 
who refused, that the Privy Council received a litany of complaints the following 
year.66  The net result of all these tensions was summed up in Tweeddale’s laconic 
observations about an earlier, abortive commission against Dunbeath: 
 
This Afternoun at council ther is Letters of Intercomoning [and] comissione of 
fyre [and] sword granted agains dumbaith (he beeing declaird fugitue befor) 
at My lady Raes instance [and] ther ar 6 or 7 persons named in it […] which 
comissione I am affrayed trouble the p[e]a[c]e of thos contrys.67 
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Judicial commissions were a self-consciously more direct form of governmental 
control than bonding, at least insofar as they involved the regime taking an 
immediate concern in local issues.  Nevertheless, their power relied at least as much 
on the prestige of the named commissioners as on the aura of royal authority with 
which they were imbued, and success or failure ultimately rested upon the 
willingness of local society to cooperate.  In practice, if less so in theory, commissions 
were a fundamentally indirect system of control. 
Perhaps the most eye-catching policy employed by the Restoration regime in 
the Highlands was the employment of de facto viceroys.  The renewed prominence of 
the House of Argyll was the earliest manifestation of this tactic.  On the eve of his 
execution, the marquis had not been hopeful about the Campbells’ future prospects.  
‘Many have been the forfeitures of the Scotch Nobility’, he wrote to lord Lorne, ‘yet I 
never knew any so dangerous as yours is like to prove; for I will not dissemble that 
odium and envy against me’.68  The widowed marchioness was equally quick to 
remind her son of the family’s pariah status: 
 
Ye doe not think how much people sheis to be sein to advance any thing for 
yow; the malice of grate persones is so grat against yow [...] tho I and my 
children be rackoned out cast and maid beggers we ar in the hand of our 
good god who can doe us no wrong.69 
 
Lorne himself, in a petition sent to Charles II in 1661, sought to mollify the king with 
grovelling expressions of loyalty, as well as a reminder that the House of Argyll had 
‘alwayes been most willing to sett themselves for bearing doun the insolencie of the 
Remote rebellious lawles men which is much occasioned by the remoteness and 
                                                           
68 Campbell, Instructions to a Son, p.91. 
69 NLS, MS.3138, ff.20-21. 
Engagement and Containment, 1660-1678 
202 
 
distance of thes places’.70  But, like his parents, he does not seem to have been 
optimistic; prior to his father’s execution he asked the advocate George Warrand for 
advice on how best to ‘provyd against ane Act of Forfaultoure’, and by April 1662 he 
was even prepared to consider the idea of emigrating to Jamaica and establishing a 
plantation.71  His position became especially precarious the following summer.  He 
had been lobbying in London both during and after his father’s trial for the 
restoration of the Argyll estates.  In frustration, he wrote a letter to his friend, the 
Privy Councillor Alexander Sutherland, 1st lord Duffus, implying that his family’s 
enemies in the Scottish Parliament were seeking to set the king against him.72  This 
letter was intercepted by Middleton and submitted to Parliament on 24 June 1662 as 
evidence of leasing-making.  The House convicted Lorne on 25 August, and 
sentenced him to death – although an order from the king prevented the execution 
from actually being carried out.73   
Paterson claims that the campaign against Lorne was entirely the brain-child 
of Middleton, and that it was predicated upon his desire to inherit the titles and 
estates of the House of Argyll.74  This was certainly the view taken by Kirkton, 
Burnet and Wodrow, although given their uniform hostility towards the 
Commissioner, such an accusation must surely be treated with caution; it is also 
possible, as Rosehaugh suggested, that Middleton attacked Lorne because the latter 
was an ally of Lauderdale, or even that he genuinely believed the charges were 
justified.75  In any case, Middleton’s party clearly was the primary sponsor of Lorne’s 
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disgrace, something it had earlier been attempting to bring about by suggesting that 
he had connived in his father’s downfall.76  Two days before submitting the 
incriminating letter to Parliament, Middleton was already offering to his ally Tarbat 
cryptic hints that he intended to exploit it to the fullest: 
 
I shall only say, that ther is so mvch of weight in the mater as will deserve his 
Majestie’s consideratione befor he determine anie thing in Lorns bvsiness [...] 
yow may sie with what indvstrie Lorne persueth his bvsiness, and how 
hopefvll his is to accomplish his desires.77 
 
Still more telling was Middleton’s hyperbolic exposition on 25 June of both the 
criminality and the potential consequences of Lorne’s remarks: 
 
Ther is not anie crime that heas so manie standing lawes against it as this; and 
that vpon most excellent and solid grovnds: for if ther be not a good 
vnderstanding betwixt his Majestie and his people, it wold be a sad 
misfortune; so that all fomenters of jealosies, misinformers, and lyers are 
strongly provyded against by ovr lawes.78 
 
These attacks on Lorne commanded little public support.  His close friend Alexander 
Brodie lamented ‘his sufferings’ and ruefully noted the irony that ‘he suffered for the 
King by the usurpers [...] and now [...] he suffers by the King’s authoritie’, while 
Burnet declared that he ‘never knew any thing more generally cried out on than 
this’.79   
If Lorne’s disgrace was rooted in Middleton’s hostility, his restoration as 9th 
earl of Argyll in October 1663 reflected the sympathetic stance of the Lauderdale 
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administration.80  Indeed, the Secretary’s regime instinctively worked to reinforce 
Argyll’s authority.  In 1666, for instance, when the earl and his neighbours were 
embroiled in a number of petty financial and jurisdictional disputes, Charles II’s 
commissioner to the Scottish Parliament, Rothes, wrote unequivocally that ‘your 
Lo[rdship] will have the Benfite of the Law; [and] what Infflewence I Can have wpon 
Any, that is able to sew your Interest: I will Interpose my selft’.81  From the mid-
1670s, this favoured position was emphasised with a pension of £6000 a year.82  The 
re-emergence of Argyll should therefore be interpreted, in part at least, as a 
consequence of the wider sea-change in Scottish government after 1663.   
The restored earl could hardly contain his glee, boasting that ‘one prophecie 
may now be looked on as I euer did to be false that ther should be no more Earle of 
Argyll’.83  Certainly, his ambitions were extensive.  In September 1664, he set out his 
vision: 
 
If [...] ther could be somewhat from his Ma[jes]tie to me, laying his commands 
upon me in termes that I might communicate, with somewhat requiring 
obedience to me, in his Ma[jes]ties name, in such things as I desire to be done, 
by command from him, inviting all to a hearty concurrence in his service, and 
giving some certification against such as I shall complane of, it may very 
much contribut to the advancement of his Ma[[jes]ties service, and make both 
friends and nighbours stand the more in aw.84 
 
Although Argyll never seems to have acquired such wide-ranging formal power, he 
quickly secured a pivotal position, so much so that, as early as July 1664, Lachlan 
Mackintosh of Torcastle could observe that ‘Argyll is a very great man in power at 
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p[rese]ntt’.85  Locally, the terms of his restoration, which included the traditional 
Campbell offices of hereditary Justiciar of Argyll and the Isles, and King’s Lieutenant 
within that same jurisdiction, accorded him unparalleled authority in the western 
Highlands.86  In central government too, Argyll outshone any other Highlander.  
Between 1663 and 1678 he was appointed to at least twenty-six parliamentary and 
consular committees or commissions, some of which, such as his sitting on the Lords 
of the Articles in 1669, placed him at the very heart of the governmental machine.87  
In consequence, Argyll’s influence over the formulation of Highland policy was 
significant.  During the 1660s he was the only Highlander to sit on the Privy 
Council’s Committee for the Highlands, and often his requests, such as his desire for 
the revival of annual accountability (using a list of his own composition), were 
simply imposed wholesale.88   
 However, Argyll’s position was not wholly secure, for if Lauderdale and his 
allies were staunch supporters, others were less enthusiastic.  This was inevitable; the 
traditional acquisitiveness of the Campbells meant thay had acquired an unsavoury 
reputation long before the Restoration. An anonymous pamphlet of 1661, for 
example, argued that ‘the scituation and vast bounds of the estate of Argyle’, along 
with the large number of tenants it supported, made the family ‘in a special manner 
most dangerous’.89  The Privy Council as a whole was at best lukewarm in its 
support, leading Argyll to complain frequently that his authority in the locality was 
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being undermined, and to petition Lauderdale for a grant of wider powers from the 
king.90  Equally, in 1669 Parliament’s ratification of his rehabilitation faced such 
stringent opposition (mainly from his creditors) that Lauderdale decided to force it 
through without a vote.91  Such a hostile climate naturally encouraged resistance.  
The earl complained about public slanders suggesting he was looking after his own 
private interests rather than those of the crown, and in October 1666 he noted to 
Lauderdale that ‘I find myselfe bund to giue your Lo[rdship] ane account of many 
things not worth your paines to read after because euery thing I doe is so carped of 
at’.92    
A perhaps more significant problem was observed by Tweeddale in 1669, 
when he complained that the only contributions Argyll ever made to Privy Council 
discussions concerned protecting his own interests from other Highland lords, 
particularly Caithness and Huntly.93  The potentially distorting impact of Argyll’s 
focus on his personal fortunes was graphically revealed during his officially-
sanctioned campaign of the 1670s against the Macleans of Mull.94  Part of the 
problem was the simple fact that Mull was a distraction – indeed one commentator 
was claiming by 1678 that the entirety of the government’s Highland policy was now 
geared to no other end than the sustenance of Argyll’s war effort.95  Moreover, the 
attack on the Macleans stimulated an intense outbreak of retaliatory violence 
perpetrated by a coalition of other Highland lords including MacDonald, Seaforth 
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and Atholl.96  The disorder thus engendered spread far beyond Mull.  The presbytery 
of Lorne suffered a six month hiatus in its meetings in 1675-76, partly due to the fear 
of invasion by Argyll’s enemies.97  In 1678, Locheil – initially a supporter of the 
Macleans but bribed onto Argyll’s side in that year – complained that his lands were 
being repeatedly harried by armed bands, while the following year  the gentry 
around Inverness, ‘in a great sturre’ because the conflict threatened to creep still 
further north, began to organise watches on the shores of Loch Ness.98  So tense had 
the situation become by mid-1679 that Argyll was forced to establish supplementary 
watches throughout his territory ‘to gward our braes’.99  The damage all this 
uncertainty was doing to Argyll’s reputation was summed up in a candid warning 
written by Glenorchy in February 1677: 
 
 If yo[u]r Lo[rdship] had been pleased to be as observing of yo[u]r freinds 
advyce as they hav been zealous to giv it yo[u]r affairs and credit had not so 
sufferd here as I find at my arryvall, by yo[u]r absence it hes besids the 
miscontructions yo[u]r staying from yo[u]r publict Imployment at such a 
crisis may admitt of.100 
 
Resurrecting an Argyll lieutenancy was an understandable, and perhaps inevitable, 
consequence of the conservative ethos surrounding the Restoration settlement.  
Nevertheless, the Maclean war illustrated that reliance on the House of Argyll to 
maintain order was unstable in practice.  Binding policy to the interests of this one 
noble family rendered control both highly volatile and extremely partial. 
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 This loose framework was given something of a shake-up in the later 1660s.  
The Privy Council decided that the bonding tactic of diffusing authority ‘upon many 
persons’ was not working, and that it therefore needed to appoint a single man who 
would ‘make it his work’ to ensure order in the Highlands.101  There were also wider 
national considerations at work, since the combined pressures of the Second Dutch 
War (1665-67) and the Pentland Rising injected a punitive, militaristic ethos into 
Scottish law and order policy, especially in regard to religious nonconformity, which 
lasted until at least 1669, and possibly much longer.102  As early as autumn 1666, all 
of this had crystallised into a determination to appoint a single commissioner ‘to 
undertake the securing all the Highlands’, and the initial choice, representing very 
much a confirmation of Argyll’s influence, was Colin Campbell of Ardkinglass.103  
But when a commission was finally granted, on 3 August 1667, its recipient was not 
Ardkinglass, or any other representative of the Argyll interest, but Atholl, someone 
described by one historian as a ’rising star’ of Scottish politics whom Lauderdale was 
anxious to woo.104  Atholl’s term ended in February 1669, at which point the 
government fell back upon earlier expedients by ordering subscriptions to a new 
bond, accompanied by orders for landlords to collect further sureties from their 
tenants.105  By November, however, it had been decided to resurrect the commission, 
and it would remain extant for the next nine years.  The first of the new 
commissioners was Sir James Campbell of Lawers.  He lasted until 1 January 1674, 
when he was replaced by another man of middling rank, Major General George 
Grant.  Lawers resumed the office in March 1677, and later that year Lord 
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Macdonnell was added to the commission.  This final, joint commission was renewed 
for a projected fourteen months in August 1678, although in the event it was 
superseded in October by another shift in policy (see chapter 6).106   
The lack of systematic records means that the success of this thief-catching 
experiment can only be judged impressionistically.  Certainly the Privy Council 
congratulated itself profusely, declaring on four separate occasions (1669, 1671, 1672 
and 1674) that its commissioners had enjoyed great success in apprehending 
criminals.107  Others were not so enthusiastic.  Alexander Chisholm, sheriff-depute of 
Inverness, observing in May 1677 that ‘[the]r is Slaught[e]r Comitted in vrq[uha]rt be 
the brea of Lochaber me[n] [and] great Insollencies is lyke to be this su[m]mer’, 
questioned the capacity of the then-commissioner, Lawers, to do anything about it.108  
Moreover, recorded success was highly variable.  Lawers caught eight thieves during 
his first year, and a further twenty-one by the end of 1678, whereas Grant 
apprehended no fewer than forty during his inaugural year.  The government was so 
pleased with his performance that it awarded him a bonus of £1,200.109   
 But if the actual impact of the commissions is difficult to quantify, much more 
can be said about their importance in the development of government strategy.  In 
some ways, they represented a considerable evolution of the regime’s capacity for 
direct control.  As Kincardine observed to Glenorchy, it was important that it ‘be 
seine the law can keipe your contrie in order better then any extraordinary way’.110  
This was reflected in the commissions’ terms.  Atholl in 1667 was empowered to raise 
an independent company which would act as ‘a constant guard for securing the 
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peace in the Highlands’, and would ‘watch upon the braes and in other places where 
he shall think fit and quher thieves and broken men doe resort’.  He was instructed 
to pursue and apprehend anybody accused of theft, and thereafter to present them 
for trial to the relevant judicial authorities.  In addition, it was declared his 
responsibility either to return all stolen goods to their lawful owners or, since it was 
generally assumed that he would have little success recovering livestock, provide 
financial compensation.  Each of the subsequent commissions was couched in nearly 
identical language.111  Insofar as they provided for a glorified policeman, these terms 
clearly signposted a shift away from landlord responsibility and towards the 
imposition of direct government controls.  All this should be read alongside the 
assessment of Atholl’s performance made by Linlithgow in 1669: 
 
Ever since the Earle of Atholl had commission from the councill for 
preserving those of the lowlands from the molestation of the theeves and 
robbers of the highlands, the countrey hath been keept as quyat and free from 
all depredations as att any tyme heretofore.112 
 
The impression that the commissions were perhaps rather more about protecting the 
Lowlands than settling the Highlands was reinforced by the jurisdiction to which 
Atholl and his successors were confined.  Their commissions related to Inverness-
shire and the ‘Highland fringe’ shires of Nairn, Moray, Banff, Aberdeen, Forfar, 
Perth, Clackmannan, Stirling and Dumbarton, although admittedly with the addition 
of Argyll from 1669.113  Although it was reported that a commission had also been 
awarded to Seaforth for the shires of Ross, Sutherland and Caithness, this was not 
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recorded by the Privy Council, which, apparently, was only interested in the more 
southerly jurisdiction.114  Given this Lowland-focused orientation, the commissions 
naturally adopted the punitive aims of punishment and containment.  In this way, 
they represented a conscious change in direction from the more collaborative ideas 
that had underlain bonding and judicial commissions.  
Alongside this more repressive attitude, there was an explicit intention to 
move away from reliance on local personal power.  Already in late 1666 Argyll had 
(apparently with no trace of irony) expressed a preference for placing ‘his Maj[es]ties 
authority’ in the hands of ‘meane persones’ who would not ‘act according to 
interests’,115 and by July 1669, Kincardine confirmed that such thinking had become 
standard on the Council: 
 
There shall be a privat gentleman found […] And who shall serve thus for 
one yeare without any condition but what the councell shall please after the 
proof of his service.  By this meanes the contrie should be rid of that brood of 
theefs for a tyme.116 
 
The popularity of such ideas can partially be explained by the fact that, despite some 
positive assessments of his performance, Atholl’s methods had nurtured some 
disquiet (ably stoked by Argyll).  He was suspected of employing in his watch some 
of the very thieves he was charged with catching, and it was further rumoured that 
he was prepared to use them as a private army to protect his Highland interests.117  
Of crucial importance also was the attitude of Tweeddale, who by 1669 had fallen out 
with both Atholl and Argyll, and used his pivotal position as head of the Privy 
Council’s Highland Committee to bypass them both.  In Lawers, a Campbell laird 
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considered altogether too independent-minded by Argyll, he found his perfect 
appointee: 118 
 
The highland bussnes succeeds weal in laurs hand [...] the two great men ar 
not soe weall pleased to see a lowland comittee [and] a highland Laird 
proceed soo friyly.119   
 
By the end of Lawers’ first term in 1671, Kincardine shared Tweeddale’s enthusiasm, 
proclaiming that ‘I like him most’ because ‘he hath no dependence but upon the 
King's favour and the Councells countenancing him, for all the great men of the 
Highlands hate him, especialy his cheef’.120  Similar relative obscurity surrounded 
Grant, and as an ally of the Huntly Gordons he also represented a counter-balance to 
the Campbell and Murray blocs.121  The reliance after 1669 on lesser men to act as 
commissioners (the brief tenure of Lord Macdonnell notwithstanding) can be seen as 
a conscious effort to circumvent, or at least counter-balance, the hitherto 
unchallenged authority of the high nobility as the dominant government agents in 
the Highlands, and in so doing introduce a more directly accountable form of 
control.  
 A third way in which the commissions can be seen as an exercise in direct 
control relates to the growth of a nascent bureaucracy to reinforce the 
commissioners’ power.  Initially the infrastructure was basic, limited to the 
designation of outposts at which thefts could be reported to the commissioners.  The 
number of these reporting stations was variable: there were five under Atholl and 
Lawers but ten under Grant and seven under the joint commission of Lawers and 
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MacDonald.  Moreover, after 1669 the network was formalised somewhat through 
the designation of specific agents charged with manning the stations.122  As the 
commissions progressed, the Privy Council found it increasingly necessary to 
expand the bureaucratic machinery.  Often this was a simple matter of expedience.  
Lawers, for example, had a dedicated messenger appointed for his use in 1670 (at a 
cost to the Treasury of £120), and by 1677 he was appointing local deputies to share 
the workload.123  Equally, both Lawers and Grant were allotted £300 sterling to cover 
their expenses, slightly more than the £200 sterling allocated to Macdonnell, with a 
contingency for extra funds – such as the £31 12s granted to cover the cost to Lawers 
of maintaining ‘two highland men Imprisoned in Stirling’ – when necessary.124  In 
1677, if not before, the commissioners were also being supplied with arms direct 
from the royal magazine.125  Clearly such awards reflected the fact that Lawers, Grant 
and Macdonnell were all men of fairly modest means, but they also lent an 
increasing veneer of officialdom to their commissions. 
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More telling still was the trend towards developing a judicial infrastructure.  
The first such innovation was a six-man circuit court, established in March 1668, to 
try those thieves captured by Atholl.  The magistrates were empowered to sit 
anywhere within the boundaries of the earl’s jurisdiction, under the rationale that 
‘the shiriffes were at greate distances’, which ran the risk of rendering Atholl’s work 
‘altogether ineffectuall’.126  Proposals written in 1669 under the influence of 
Tweeddale offered a further insight into the commissioners’ emerging judicial 
identity.  They affirmed that ‘the pairtie Imployed’ would be empowered to present 
thieves to existing magistrates, and that his word should be treated as sufficient 
evidence of guilt.  Moreover, the commissioners were to have a blanket right to 
initiate criminal proceedings against any alleged thieves, ‘which shall be esteemed 
alss relivant as if the peirtie did it, who sustained the damnage’.127  Another subtle 
but important shift in the procedure for trying thieves took place from 1669.  Under 
Atholl’s commission, they could equally be tried by the Justice General (Atholl 
himself), or by local magistrates.  But starting with the appointment of Lawers, they 
were to be imprisoned at Edinburgh and tried there – indeed, by 1674 it was felt that 
a special commission was needed in order to give sheriffs the jurisdiction they had 
been assumed to enjoy only seven years previously.128   
Equally, the earlier tactic of erecting a dedicated court remained an option.  In 
September 1677, commission was granted to Argyll, Aboyne, Moray and Glenorchy 
to hold courts at Inverlochy in order to try all those apprehended by Lawers and 
Macdonnell.  Efforts were made to do so, particularly by Moray, who was already 
making preparations for the projected courts in October, but the waning of the 
independent companies policy in 1678 (see chapter 6) eventually rendered all this 
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moot.129  Thomas Gordon, an agent of Huntly’s, grasped the implications of this 
development when he complained to the marquis in 1677 that: 
 
It seems strange [tha]t since the wholl countrie [of Lochaber] be longs to 
yo[u]r lo[rdshi]p and yo[u]r vassalls [the]r should be a Comissione granted 
q[uhai]rin neither yo[u]r Lo[rdshi]p nor anie of yo[u]r freinds are nominat.130   
 
That, of course, was the point, and if the commissioners’ judicial infrastructure 
remained embryonic, the common theme of asserting the primacy of public over 
private jurisdiction ran through all developments after 1668.  This added to the sense 
of bureaucratic expansion, and signalled that ambitions had moved on; the 1667 aim 
of appointing a glorified policeman had by the 1670s given way to a more integrated 
policy which sought to transcend existing jurisdictions and provide a direct response 
to the challenge of banditry.  
Nevertheless, the policy of appointing single commissioners did not signal a 
wholesale abandonment of indirect strategies.  For one thing, it was recognised that 
an effective commissioner would need local knowledge and that, consequently, 
taking direct rule to the logical extreme of appointing an outsider, lacking any 
previous involvement with Highland politics, would be unwise.131  For another, the 
government was adamant that the commissions in no way superseded the earlier 
tactic of landlord responsibility.  In 1673, for instance, it was declared that: 
 
All Landlords, Chiefs of Clans, and others, His Majesties Subjects, are to 
concur with the said Sir James Campbel [of Lawers] in the execution of the 
                                                           
129 RPCS, v, pp.246-48; NRS, GD248/214/2/6. 
130 WSRO, Goodwood Mss 1166, item 1. 
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said Commission, which is granted but Prejudice or Derogation, in any sort, 
from the Bands given for securing the Peace.132 
 
Tweeddale’s 1669 memorandum set out more fully the role local elites were expected 
to play.  In general terms, ‘all who have any power in the highlands or braes’ would 
be required to ‘assist any who hath the Comand for supressing of thift’, partly 
through using their heritable jurisdictions to reinforce the drive against theft, and 
partly by refraining from supporting broken men in any way.  More particularly, the 
memorandum called for ‘all cheifes of Clanes and Lanlords’ to compile lists of their 
tenants and dependants, ‘to [th]e effect it may be Knowen who they are who 
Disturbes the peace of the Countrie and to whom they belong’.  Finally, and perhaps 
most centrally, they were expected to act as informers: 
 
All who have any goodes stollen from tham, be ordained to advertuse the 
persone imployed within twentie four houres Such as are within threttie 
mylles and any who are at a greater distance from him within fourtie eight 
hours Imediatlie after the goodes are stollen.133 
 
This particular duty was reiterated each time a new commissioner was appointed, 
but was perhaps rather easier to command than to achieve.  At least one Privy 
Councillor suspected that many disorders went deliberately unreported because 
landlords did not wish to see their tenants prosecuted and their own reputation 
consequently sullied.134   
In other ways too, there remained a role for local elites.  The appointment of 
Atholl and his successors did not stop the Privy Council from continuing to issue 
one-off judicial commissions, of which there were nearly 130 during the lifetime of 
                                                           
132 Advertisement (1673).  A similar declaration was made during Major Grant’s period of 
office. 
133 NLS, MS.7033, ff.144r-v. 
134 Airy, Lauderdale Papers, ii, pp.136-37. 
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the policy.135  Moreover, the period saw the gradual emergence of a new local agent 
in the form of Glenorchy.  He held no official position in the Highlands, but the 
government nevertheless became increasingly receptive to his personal authority and 
expertise in a manner reminiscent of its carriage towards Argyll.  In April 1669, 
Tweeddale openly sought Glenorchy’s advice on how best Highland policy should 
proceed: 
I intend now a journey for England I intend god willing to returne befor the 
20 of june if you haue any commands for me lett me know [and] for god sak 
betueen [now] [and] that time informe your self the best yow can [and] be 
ripe in your thoughts for ane opinion what is fitt to be done.136 
 
Kincardine similarly maintained correspondence with Glenorchy on Highland issues 
at this time, seeking his ‘hearty concurrence’ with ‘the resolutions of councill 
concerning the setling of the Highlands’, which would ‘do your countrie [and] your 
self both a very good office’.137  Indeed, Glenorchy seems during the 1670s to have 
developed a de facto thief-catching role comparable to the formal jurisdiction of the 
commissioners.  Certainly, a letter written to him by Sir John Colquhoun of Luss in 
January 1672 gives a telling sense of Glenorchy’s position: 
 
I doe acknowledge w[i]t all thankfullnes your noble favour, in getting my 
man Jams, glenns his kye again, and taking the thives, I have secured my own 
man called mc william, of whom yea wrett to me, as for the thives, I 
recomend them to dispose upon them, by yo[u]r selfe [and] lawers as shall be 
thoght best, [tha]t they may be secured, and brought to triall. 138 
 
This continued engagement with, and reliance on, local elites suggests that indirect 
strategies of control coexisted alongside the growing preference for direct 
                                                           
135 See appendix 4 on the attached CD. 
136 NRS, GD112/39/115/9. 
137 NRS, GD112/39/115/6. 
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involvement.  If therefore it can be said that the succession of commissions between 
1667 and 1678 represented an intensification of immediate governmental 
involvement with the Highlands, it should also be stressed that this pattern never 
fully replaced the much older tendency to govern through the cooperation of 
regional grandees.  
Recent historiographic developments have made it clear that the Restoration 
regime in Scotland was deeply fearful of all forms of disorder, a paranoia informed 
by the apprehension that disorder could become sedition, and that sedition could 
lead to a repeat of the disasters that had befallen Charles I in the 1630s and 1640s.  
Less consensus exists about how Charles II and his ministers sought to preserve 
order, certainly in reference to the most visible problem of Presbyterian 
nonconformity, where historians have detected simultaneous and apparently 
contradictory impulses towards repressing dissent on the one hand, and 
accommodating it on the other.  Highland policy in the 1660s and 1670s was marked 
by a comparable degree of strategic uncertainty.  Opinion was divided over whether 
Highland lawlessness was best tackled using wholesale delegation to local elites, or 
by creating some mechanism for establishing a sense of transcendent public 
authority.  The initial policy of bonding, in line with the conservative ethos of the 
Restoration settlement, clearly represented the early ascendency of indirect thinking, 
as did the rehabilitation of Argyll as the government’s key Highland agent.  
Nevertheless, the more strategically ambiguous use of judicial commissions 
indicated that the debate remained ongoing, and the tension became all the more 
visible with the appointment of independent commissioners after 1667.  In short, the 
Restoration regime proved unable to decide whether the ‘Highland problem’ was 
best solved through public or personal power.  Instead, it settled upon a compromise 
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position, and its policies sought to erect a governing framework that accommodated 
and exploited both.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Reaction and Realignment, 1679-88 
  
In 1681, the gentlemen of Inverness and its environs begged James duke of 
Albany to take some firm course for settling Highland disorder: 
 
Notwithstanding the Lords of His Majesties Privie Councill hes thir years 
bygone made many laudable Lawes [and] Actts for suppressing the lyke 
insolencies in tyme comeing [...] yet your Royall Heighnes Petitioners have 
suffered more these four or fyve years Bygone, nor they have done those 
many years before.1 
 
The Invernessian plea can be seen as a microcosm for wider political developments.  
The ‘Restoration Crisis’ of the late 1670s and early 1680s, manifested through the 
‘Popish Plot’ and Exclusionism in England, the collapse of Lauderdale’s religious 
policy in Scotland, and heightened anti-Catholic persecution in Ireland, undermined 
the Restoration regime as it had functioned since 1660.  In its place, a new status quo 
emerged, a ‘second Restoration’ which was fundamentally different in tone and 
ethos, and which endured until the flight of James VII and II in December 1688.  This 
chapter seeks to trace the implications of these developments for the Highlands.  It 
begins with a general historiographical overview of the ‘second Restoration’ in 
Britain.  It then proceeds to examine the various re-orientations of Highland policy 
during the early 1680s.  Finally, it offers a detailed study of the most significant 
initiative of the period, the commission for securing the peace of the Highlands.  
In almost all accounts of Restoration Britain, the years around 1680 are 
treated as a watershed – indeed, Gary De Krey has gone so far as to assert that 
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‘modern British politics began in the crisis of 1678-83’.2  Historians have yet to 
resolve the question of whether the turmoil surrounding the ‘Popish Plot’ and the 
subsequent Exclusion movement was primarily political, religious or ideological in 
nature (or a mixture of all three), but a greater degree of consensus surrounds its 
ramifications.3  In an English context, the most fundamental observation is that 
society became much more partisan.  Tim Harris, for instance, points out that while 
the division between ‘Whigs’ and ‘Tories’ was based upon a range of issues which 
long pre-dated the fabrications of Titus Oates, the political controversies after 1678 
were vital in galvanising this schism into an embryonic party system, both in 
Parliament and throughout society at large.4  Mark Goldie has examined the division 
from an ideological perspective.  He has shown that Tory philosophers gradually 
developed an understanding of the English monarchy as absolute, if limited.  This 
was in fundamental opposition to Whig ideas, which tended to emphasise the 
importance of popular sovereignty as a counter-balance to monarchy.  Moreover, 
Goldie is adamant that such ‘political theorizing’ belonged almost entirely to the 
decade after 1675.5   
All of this has led historians of England to argue that the 1680s were 
characterised by a ‘Tory reaction’.  The situation in central government is well 
understood, exemplified most clearly by the sidelining of Parliament for the final 
                                                           
2 De Krey, Restoration and Revolution, p.145.  Elsewhere, however, De Krey is careful to argue 
that the crisis had important antecedents earlier in the Restoration.  G.S. De Krey, ‘The First 
Restoration Crisis: Conscience and Coercion in London, 1667-73’, Albion: A Quarterly Journal 
Concerned with British Studies, 25:4, 1993, pp.565-80. 
3 For a sample of the differing interpretations, see J.R. Jones, ‘Parties and Parliament’ in J.R. 
Jones (ed.), The Restored Monarchy 1660-1688 (London and Basingstoke, 1979), pp.48-70, at 
pp.57-70; G.S. De Krey, ‘Reformation in the Restoration Crisis, 1679-1682’ in D.B. Hamilton 
and R. Strier (eds.), Religion, Literature and Politics in Post-Reformation England, 1540-1688 
(Cambridge, 1996), pp.231-52, at 231-44; M. Goldie, ‘Restoration Political Thought’ in L.K.J. 
Glassey (ed.), The Reigns of Charles II and James VII and II (Basingstoke and London, 1997), 
pp.12-35, at pp.17-35. 
4 T. Harris, Politics under the Later Stuarts: Party Conflict in a Divided Society 1660-1715 (Harlow, 
1993), pp.80-109. 
5 Goldie, ‘Restoration Political Thought’, pp.17-35. 
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four years of Charles II’s reign, and the loyalist composition of James II’s first 
Parliament in 1685 (ultimately undermined, of course, by the king’s pro-Catholic 
policies).6  More generally, J.R. Western has advanced a thesis of what he calls the 
monarchy’s ‘refurbishment’ after 1680.  Central to this model is the idea that Charles’ 
exasperation with the Whigs caused him to adopt a considerably more authoritarian 
understanding of monarchy that he had hitherto displayed.  This, in turn, prompted 
him to oversee systematic purges of municipal corporations, the higher judiciary, 
and the commissions of the peace, all with a view to excluding Whig sympathisers 
from office.  As a direct consequence, the crown’s ability to suppress dissent – either 
through censorship or summary arrest – was greatly enhanced, all of which reached 
its zenith in the early part of James VII and II’s reign.7  A perhaps rather more 
succinct account has been offered by R.A. Beddard:  
 
[Charles II] had succumbed to the fate which, at the outset of his reign, he 
had most wished to avoid.  He had become the leader of a party – the leader 
of the intolerant, exclusive, high church Tories.8   
 
Importantly, however, historians have been careful to stress the limitations of these 
developments.  This is particularly true for James VII and II’s reign.  The general 
understanding is that both the king’s Catholicising policies, and his high-handed 
methods, worked to undermine the Tory consensus (especially its Anglican 
component) and consequently reverse the previous royalist mood.9  Equally, recent 
historiography has questioned the extent to which the ‘Tory Reaction’ reflected 
                                                           
6 B. Coward, The Stuart Age: England 1603-1714 (London, 2003), p.333 and at pp.336-42. 
7 J.R. Western, Monarchy and Revolution: The English State in the 1680s (Basingstoke and 
London, 1972), pp.46-77. 
8 R.A. Beddard, ‘The Restoration Church’ in J.R. Jones (ed.), The Restored Monarchy 1660-1688 
(London and Basingstoke, 1979), pp.155-75, pp.174-75. 
9 Western, Monarchy and Revolution, pp.194-238; J. Miller, James II: A Study in Kingship 
(London, 1989), pp.135-187; T. Harris, Revolution: The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy, 1685-
1720 (London, 2006), pp.182-236. 
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thinking in society at large, and Newton Key’s investigation into Monmouth 
suggests that some communities, far from lapsing into a Tory consensus, remained 
ideologically divided.10  Yet this does not alter the more fundamental 
historiographical consensus, namely that the crisis which enveloped England after 
1678 led to a period in which government consciously abandoned any hope of 
consensus, and opted instead to rule from a narrow and authoritarian position. 
The nature of the ‘Tory reaction’ in Ireland is generally held to be rather less 
clear-cut.  Pádraig Lenihan stresses the muted impact of the crisis on Charles’ 
western kingdom, arguing that Ireland was only ever involved in the Exclusion 
controversy through the Whigs’ manipulation of rumours about an Irish Catholic 
plot to bolster their position against the king.  In reality, he claims, the nuances of the 
crisis remained distant from Irish politics.11  Harris echoes this line, and as a result 
detects only a very modest royalist reaction in the 1680s, expressed primarily 
through a series of ‘loyal addresses’ to the Crown from many sections of the 
Protestant elite.12  This can be fleshed out slightly by considering the work of J.G. 
Simms, who has shown that, during his second viceroyalty (1677-85), James Butler, 
1st duke of Ormond, followed a calculated policy of building up Ireland ‘as a source 
of financial and military strength for the crown’.13  Insofar as there was a reaction, 
historians’ attention has tended to focus above all on heightened repression of 
dissent.  Sean Connolly notes that the execution in 1681 of Oliver Plunkett, 
archbishop of Armagh, was simply the most sensational manifestation of a general 
trend after 1679 towards clamping down more firmly on Catholics.  This stringency 
was supplemented, in the aftermath of the Rye House Plot of 1683 (an abortive 
                                                           
10 N.E. Key, ‘‘Divided into Parties’: Exclusion Crisis Origins in Monmouth’, English Historical 
Review, 115:464, 2000, pp.1159-83, at pp.1182-83. 
11 Lenihan, Consolidating Conquest, pp.166-67. 
12 Harris, Restoration, pp.386-97. 
13 J.G. Simms, Jacobite Ireland (reprinted Dublin, 2000), pp.15-16. 
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conspiracy to assassinate both Charles and James), by a more robust attitude towards 
Protestant dissent as well.  Importantly, however, Connolly is careful not to overstate 
any of this.  He argues both that the physical extent of the repression was moderate, 
and that most of it had firm parallels earlier in the Restoration.14  Historians have 
therefore reached the superficially surprising consensus that the ‘Popish Plot’ and its 
aftermath was of restricted importance to Ireland, and that it had a noticeable but 
nonetheless limited impact on the conduct of Irish government.     
James VII and II’s Irish reign has attracted rather different comment.  Harris 
states simply that ‘Ireland […] was to become rapidly and dramatically destabilized 
under James II’.15  For Harris, the mere fact of James’ accession disrupted the status 
quo achieved by his brother, and this was exacerbated by the Catholicising policies 
followed by his two viceroys, Henry Hyde, 2nd earl of Clarendon (albeit reluctantly) 
and, in particular, Richard Talbot, 1st earl of Tyrconnell.16 Miller and Lanihan both 
lay still greater stress on the role of Tyrconnell, and argue that he gradually 
succeeded in convincing James that Ireland was best governed by an aggressive 
policy of transferring power from Protestants to Catholics.17  It must however be 
acknowledged that historians are keen not to overstate James’ ambitions.  Connolly 
maintains that his policies consciously stopped short of a full-blown catholicizing 
crusade, and instead aimed simply to augment the position of Catholics in 
preparation for the accession for what, until 1688, was expected to be a Protestant 
successor.18  Simms argues more generally that the king had by 1688 done ‘much to 
                                                           
14 Connolly, Divided Kingdom, pp.152-54. 
15 Harris, Revolution, p.102. 
16 Ibid., pp.105-43. 
17 J. Miller, ‘The Earl of Tyrconnel and James II’s Irish Policy, 1685-8’, Historical Journal, 20:4, 
1977, pp.803-23, at pp.806-16; Lenihan, Consolidating Conquest, pp.173-77. 
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improve the status of Catholics without driving Protestants into open opposition’.19  
Nevertheless, the conventional idea that most Protestants had turned against James 
by 1688, while most Catholics supported him, remains a significant historiographical 
theme.  
In Scotland, crisis was triggered not by the ramblings of Titus Oates, but 
rather by the collapse of Lauderdale’s religious policy, culminating in the 
deployment of the Highland Host in 1678, and the Covenanter rebellion of the 
following year.  For many historians, the most important result of these calamities 
was a thorough changing of the guard in Scottish politics.  Kirsty McAlister points 
out that the basis of this shift was the increasing relegation of Lauderdale to a 
position of powerlessness and, more significantly, the expanding influence of his 
replacement as Commissioner to Parliament (and de facto ruler of Scotland), Albany.  
For McAlister, James’ influence after 1679 was multi-faceted, and succeeded in 
injecting a new vigour and unity of purpose into Scottish government.20  Other 
historians have traced similar personnel changes lower down the administrative 
hierarchy, and MacIntosh asserts that the duke’s willingness to admit previously 
shunned noblemen to the Privy Council (Moray and Atholl) showed that its ‘recent 
role as simply a clique of Lauderdale’s yes-men was at an end’.21  Brown is more 
strident, and claims that, by 1685, Albany had succeeded in staffing the Scottish 
administration with political and ideological allies such as Queensberry and 
Aberdeen.22  There have however been some voices of caution.  John Callow 
downplays Albany’s personal impact, arguing that ‘there is little evidence to suggest 
that […] James did anything more than adhere to existing policies’, especially during 
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20 McAlister, ‘James VII’, pp.10-50. 
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his first visit.  Lee, similarly, contends that the shuffling of office-holders did not 
signal any real break with the governing system of the Lauderdale years, and that 
James, by his arrogance, militarism and authoritarianism, essentially ruled in the 
same way as his predecessor.23  Nevertheless, neither Callow nor Lee question the 
notion that the royal duke was at least nominally in charge, and this reinforces the 
dominant historiographical contention that, as a result of the post-1678 crises, 
political authority in Scotland moved away from Lauderdale and towards Albany. 
Historians have also detected a Scottish version of the ‘Tory reaction’, 
particularly in terms of political thought.  Brown has made the general observation 
that Albany’s two-year residence in Edinburgh stimulated both a ‘minor artistic 
renaissance’ and a pervasive ‘royalist mood’ which dominated the early- to mid-
1680s.24  More detailed analysis is offered by Jackson.  She has shown that the events 
of 1679 were interpreted by the political establishment as an unprecedented and 
deliberate challenge to its authority, and that it consequently became more united in 
its opposition to subversion.  The result was a pervasive sense that, to impose order 
effectively, the government had to be freed from all constraints.  For Jackson, then, 
the crisis produced an intellectual consensus that firm, unfettered monarchical power 
was a fundamental tool for the preservation of order.25  The practical implications of 
all this are exposed both by MacIntosh, who argues that the 1681 session of the 
Scottish Parliament granted the Crown ‘everything that had been demanded’ with 
‘minimal resistance’, and more generally by Harris, for whom Scotland by 1685 was 
‘a loyal and manageable kingdom’.26  Taken together, all of this represents a 
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25 Jackson, Restoration Scotland, pp.133-38. 
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powerful consensus that Scotland after the ‘Restoration Crisis’ was a nation steeped 
in royalist and authoritarian ideology.   
Again, however, some caution is necessary.  For Brown, the trend towards 
absolutist thinking was in fact a limited one, insofar as the king was to be accorded 
very wide powers, but still restrained by both the law and Parliament.  In any case, 
he argues that the royalist reaction was a response to the very particular 
circumstances of the early 1680s – most Scots embraced it not out of genuine 
ideological fervour, but as a pragmatic means of preserving security.27  In a similar 
vein, both Harris and Jackson point out that Scottish submission to the Crown came 
with a number of ‘red lines’, boundaries beyond which royal power would not be 
allowed to pass.  The most obvious, of course, concerned Catholicism, and the 
explicit expectation that Popery should not be allowed to return quickly eroded all 
thoughts of royal absolutism after 1685.28  Indeed, Barry Robertson points out that 
the sheer recklessness of the king’s Catholicising policies even succeeded in 
alienating natural allies such as Huntly.29  This sense that there were limitations to 
both the power and policies of the monarchy after 1679 is summed up by McAlister’s 
assessment that ‘James VII ultimately lost his Crown’ because ‘he introduced 
unpopular religious measures by way of royal prerogative’.30 
The final theme emphasised by Scottish historians is the Crown’s increasingly 
repressive stance towards Presbyterian nonconformity.  Elizabeth Hyman provides a 
concise summary of this issue: 
 
Within a short time, coercion to enforce uniformity and extirpate 
Presbyterianism was renewed and became unremitting […] The official 
                                                           
27 Brown, Kingdom or Province, p.66 and at p.164. 
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campaign to end nonconformity once and for all was marked by more and 
more indiscriminate repression and culminated in the well-known killing 
times of 1684 and 1685.31 
 
For Buckroyd, this development had little to do with dissent itself – which she argues 
was muted after 1679 – but rather reflected Albany’s wider political concerns, in 
particular his desire to damage his great rival (and nephew) James Scott, 1st duke of 
Monmouth by undermining the indulgent policies the latter had pursued in the 
wake of the 1679 rebellion.32  Cowan similarly focuses on the role of Albany, and he 
emphasises two further stimuli.  The first is the duke’s Catholic faith, which, for 
Cowan, made him instinctively less tolerant of Presbyterianism than had been 
Lauderdale.  The second was his drive from 1681 to ensure his future position by 
enforcing obedience to the Succession and Test Acts.33  McAlister’s work has 
however challenged this assessment.  She does not question the existence of 
repressive policies, instead acknowledging that the government ‘was guilty of 
monstrous humanitarian crimes’, but she does contend that Albany’s attitude to 
dissent was more nuanced than either Buckroyd or Cowan allow.  He was, McAlister 
claims, willing to treat low-level nonconformity with leniency, while being 
determined to stamp out any activity that was genuinely seditious.  Indeed, she goes 
so far as to suggest that it was only the absence of the royal duke after 1682 that 
allowed unfettered repression to gain momentum.34  While then there is a degree of 
uncertainty as to where the impulse towards severity originated, the basic idea that 
the 1680s witnessed more intense repression of dissenters has largely gone 
unchallenged.      
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This is the background against which Highland policy after 1678 must be 
viewed.  As affairs farther south became increasingly unsettled, culminating in the 
outbreak of the Covenanter rebellion in May 1679, the government’s unease over 
Highland disorder grew correspondingly more acute.  Its knee-jerk reaction was to 
heighten its reliance on Clan Campbell: in October 1678 Lauderdale begged Argyll 
and Glenorchy to go ‘hand in hand’ in the work of ‘Settling the Highlands’ – and 
within this context, the ongoing resistance of the Macleans to Argyll’s expansionist 
campaign in Mull began to look wholly unacceptable.35  As Sir James Campbell of 
Lawers observed: 
 
The killing of My L[or]d St Andrews w[hi]ch was acted on Saterday last […] 
will prove trublesome, and will occasione that the E[arl] A[rgyll] will get 
asistance of the kings forces and of the militia.36 
 
The policy of deploying independent companies had already in September 1678 been 
overhauled in a manner which strengthened its association with Clan Campbell.  In 
place of the open-ended commissions granted since 1667, Lawers and Colonel James 
Menzies were each ordered to muster a force of 150 men.37  In theory these 
companies, reinforced by a regiment of guards under George Livingston, 3rd earl of 
Linlithgow, were supposed to form a garrison at Inverlochy.  In reality, both Menzies 
and Lawers (the latter soon to be replaced by Glenorchy) were firmly controlled by 
Argyll, and were soon being deployed in Mull.38  Throughout this period, Argyll 
continued to enjoy the vocal backing of the government.39   In August 1679, the Privy 
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Council’s Highland Committee recommended that a process of forfeiture be initiated 
against the Macleans and their MacDonald allies.40  In October, a judicial commission 
was awarded to Argyll, Lawers, Glenorchy and Menzies, alongside Moray and 
Lachlan Macintosh of Torcastle, aiming to try ‘such thieves, robbers and 
malefactours who shall happen to be apprehended’ by the independent companies.41  
The Popish Plot hysteria was a further boon, since Argyll was able to convince the 
government that his enemies were Papists.  In November the judicial commission 
was expanded to include the apprehension of Catholics, while the following April a 
further commission was granted empowering Argyll to disarm the Macleans and 
MacDonalds.42  The crisis of 1678-79, in other words, allowed Argyll’s dominance as 
the Restoration regime’s key Highland agent to reach its zenith.  Well might be boast 
that ‘endeed I sieke peace by all meanes and I resolue to failie in nothing’.43 
Other members of Clan Campbell, however, were growing uneasy about the 
wider ramifications of Argyll’s stranglehold over Highland policy.  Sir Hugh 
Campbell of Cawdor declared in April 1679 that ‘wee wer in this country so alarmed 
with the Highland armies that I minded nothing else […] the truth is I wes not 
without some anxiety quhen I considered all things’.44  Cawdor’s concern was shared 
by both Lawers and Glenorchy, who feared that the earl’s intensive focus upon his 
affairs in Mull ran the risk of destabilising the Highlands more generally, and of 
ruining his (and his family’s) pre-eminence in Highland affairs.45  Certainly, Albany’s 
attitude, upon his arrival in December 1679, was distinctly cooler, something of 
which Archibald Campbell, lord Lorne was circumspectly but unmistakably aware: 
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My Father […] has laid over all his highlands affairs to the Dukes 
Determination [and] ther is no doubt but he will have justice but ther are 
severall reasons why he might have taken another method.46 
 
Albany’s aim was not to oversee an outright Campbell victory in Mull, but rather to 
facilitate reconciliation between Argyll and his enemies.47  To this end, orders were 
issued on 29 December to the most prominent individuals on both sides of the 
dispute – including the chiefs of the Macleans, Camerons and MacDonalds of 
Glengarry, alongside numerous Campbell gentry – to ‘come to Edinburgh and attend 
his Royall Highnes and the Councill’ in order that ‘present course be taken for the 
peace and quyet’ of the Highlands by settling all disputes ‘in the most faire and 
equitable way’.48  This was not in fact the first time the government had attempted to 
broker an amicable settlement.  The idea of paying the Macleans off with one-quarter 
of the rents from Mull had been tabled earlier in 1679, but had been rejected as 
derisory by the family.49  Albany’s policy similarly foundered after his return to 
England in February 1680, although he continued to push for a settlement into the 
summer and autumn – his suggestion was that the Macleans be invested with estates 
in Tiree to the value £500 sterling, with Argyll and the king sharing superiority.50  
Instead, Charles reiterated his full support for Argyll in March.51  By April, studious 
lobbying from Glenorchy and Lauderdale was beginning to convince the king of the 
Macleans’ inveterate perfidy, and in July, sure now that it was unsafe to leave affairs 
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in Mull or Caithness unresolved, Charles ordered that the Highland companies 
remain in existence until both areas were quiet.  In fact, the Campbell companies 
remained extant until April 1681.52  Indeed, by July, when Parliament confirmed his 
possession of the barony of Duart, Argyll seemed finally to have secured his position 
in the west.53  
The victory soon proved illusionary.  Argyll had remained heavily associated 
with Lauderdale long after the effective end of the latter’s hegemony (despite his 
notoriously uneasy relationship with the duchess of Lauderdale), and this gave his 
enemies room for manoeuvre.54  At exactly the same time as the Duart ratification, 
two of the earl’s creditors, Heriot’s hospital (represented by the earls of Erroll, 
Marischal and Strathmore), and Hutcheson’s hospital (represented by the burgh of 
Glasgow) launched claims against him.  Despite robust defences on behalf of Argyll, 
the Lords of the Articles appeared sympathetic, and went so far as to suggest the 
creation of a committee with power to enforce repayment of the debts.55  Another 
petition, this time in the name of the Lord Advocate, Rosehaugh, contained a much 
more wide-ranging assault.  Firstly, Rosehaugh complained that the earl’s huge 
jurisdictional authority meant that ‘a fourt part of the Kingdome of Scotland [is] 
taken off the King’.  Secondly, it was objected that Argyll enjoyed illegal access to 
half of all casualties falling to the crown within his jurisdictions.  Thirdly, it was 
claimed that albeit ‘very many […] persons of great qualitie’ had become direct 
vassals of the Crown as a consequence of the marquis of Argyll’s forfeiture, the earl 
had contrived illegally to intrude himself ‘as superior betuixt his Ma[jes]tie and them 
and therby taking off the immediat dependence of very many and great vassalls 
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from the croune’.  Finally, it was noted that, thanks to some sharp practice, the earl’s 
income had ballooned to more than double the £15,000 in yearly rent which he had 
been allocated at his restoration in 1663.  Essentially, these objections boiled down to 
two broad points.  On the one had, Argyll was simply too rich and too powerful.  On 
the other, he had systematically flouted both the spirit and the letter of his family’s 
restoration.56  Again, the Articles appeared receptive, and suggested another 
committee be created, this time with authority to investigate Argyll’s heritable 
jurisdictions.57  These attacks were ultimately torpedoed by Albany, who was 
unwilling to allow Parliament the freedom either to question royal gifts, or to 
censure royal servants.58  But although Argyll survived on this occasion, the 
parliamentary attack had served to illustrate how vulnerable he had been left by the 
fall of Lauderdale. 
Yet the 1681 Parliament did in fact sow the seeds of Argyll’s destruction.  On 
31 August, Albany accorded royal assent to the Test Act.  Argyll, in his capacity both 
as Privy Councillor and Commissioner of the Treasury, took the Test the following 
November, but only after issuing a brief explanation that he did so only insofar as it 
was consistent with itself and the Protestant religion.  Although not initially 
generating any adverse reaction, this speech was soon seized upon as evidence of 
treason and leasing-making, and Argyll was indicted in December.  Convicted 
unanimously (although with no sentence passed until Charles’ pleasure was known), 
he broke out of his Edinburgh prison, and fled to Holland.59  Contemporary opinion 
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was almost universally horrified by these developments, which were taken 
(particularly by English Whigs) as proof of the inherent arbitrariness of both Scottish 
government, and the Stuart dynasty.60  It escaped nobody’s notice that Argyll was 
hardly alone in baulking at the Test – William Douglas, 3rd duke of Hamilton had 
initially refused, and qualifications had been entered by Queensberry, the clergy of 
Perth and Aberdeen, and even the Privy Council itself.61  Hypocrisy aside, the 
charges (in a no doubt uncomfortable echo of both the marquis’ trial in 1661 and 
Argyll’s own in 1662) seemed vastly over-blown.  One group of English 
commentators, upon receiving a copy of Argyll’s explanation, professed themselves 
puzzled: 
 
We all stood looking upon one another as Josephs Brethren in their grand 
surprize, not knowing, nor able for to Divine wherein the venom and poyson 
of this pestilent Treason should lurk: some thought that as he who would 
needs sell a witty story, had lost all the wit out of it, so the Printer has 
expunged all the Treason out of his Paper.62 
 
Indeed, so extensive was the outcry that the government’s literary attack-dog, 
Rosehaugh, felt compelled to issue a trenchant apology, in which he not only 
affirmed the justness of the proceedings and verdict, but also maintained that all 
those who objected were merely ill-informed about the complexities of Scots law.63  
Despite Rosehaugh’s objections, the obvious dichotomy between the relative 
triviality of Argyll’s offence and the stringency of the punishment roused suspicions 
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that there were other factors working towards the earl’s ruin.  Albany’s influence 
was held to be crucial.64  Argyll was said to have offended James during the drafting 
of the Test Act by suggesting, against his wishes, that the royal family should be 
bound to take it, with the sole exception of James himself.65  Some believed that 
Albany’s resentment had deeper roots, stretching back to a dispute in 1677 over 
ownership of a gold-laden Spanish wreck lying in the seas off the west coast.  
Albany, as High Admiral, claimed right to all wrecks.  Argyll, however, claimed that 
the wreck had been granted to him by a previous admiral, and he was backed by the 
Court of Session.  Sir Richard Maitland, for one, believed that this defeat still rankled 
in the 1680s, and advised Argyll to ‘lett alone the King of Spains gold and come and 
gett some of the King of Britains silver’.66  Personal animosity aside, Burnet claimed 
that the royal duke had long before 1681 decided that Argyll’s power in Scotland, 
and the Highlands in particular, was such that ‘it was necessary for him either to 
gain him or ruin him’.67  In this James was reputedly influenced by allies, particularly 
Tarbat and Haddo, who hoped to secure some of Argyll’s lands and offices for 
themselves.68  In the event, it was widely suspected that the treason process was 
simply intended as a means of breaking up Argyll’s extensive jurisdictional 
authority, and that only his hasty flight oversees forced the king to pass a death 
sentence against him.69   
On the other hand, it is important not to overstate Albany’s animosity.  In 
December 1679, Argyll found Albany ‘very Iust to me and willing to doe me reasone 
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euen so farre that I found it fitte for me’, while the Duchess of Lauderdale, writing in 
February 1680, declared that the duke had for Argyll ‘a most particular affection’.  By 
February 1681, the relationship between the two was apparently convivial enough 
for Albany to spend two nights as a guest at Argyll’s lodgings in Stirling.70  Indeed, 
James revealed a fairly sympathetic stance as late as autumn 1681, when he was 
presented with a proposal to set up a commission for investigating Argyll’s heritable 
rights.  He blocked this scheme (just as he had during the parliamentary attack a few 
months earlier) after being reminded that the earl had used his authority ‘in keeping 
the Countrey in peace, from Thieves and Robbers’.71  If then Albany really did 
sponsor the attacks on Argyll, it seems likely that he did so with the limited aims of 
curbing his power, and securing Albany’s own ascendancy.  The earl’s forfeiture 
was, in other words, probably unintended.  
At the same time, Albany was hardly Argyll’s only predator.  The fevered 
scramble to divide up his estates after 1681 revealed the continuing bullishness of his 
creditors.72  Charles, although prepared to ‘restore the family in blood’, ruled out a 
full restoration of lands and titles.73  As Perth reported, the king was ‘sensible he 
[had] not been well informed when he raised Argyl so high last time he was in this 
condition’, and had no wish to repeat the mistake of 1663.74  Instead, all of Argyll’s 
offices, and much of his estate, were set aside for annexation to the Crown – it was 
hoped this would yield £96,000 per year.75  Lord Lorne was to receive an endowment 
worth £15,000 annually (although this was later reworked so that the Crown would 
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simply wadset these lands to him), while Argyll’s younger children (three sons and 
two daughters) were to be given monitory settlements totalling £8,400.76  By March 
1682, a judicial commission had been set up with power to rank Argyll’s creditors in 
order of precedence.77  Despite genuine efforts – including the examination of 
Argyll’s estate papers – this process soon became bogged down, unable to balance 
the claims of the greater and lesser creditors.78 In the meantime, on the advice of the 
Privy Council, the Crown retained stewardship of the estates, and appointed 
chamberlains to uplift their revenues.79  Claims also flooded in from parties wishing 
to secure control over parcels of land.  Donald MacDonald of Moidart, invoking 
memories of his family’s royalism during the 1640s and 1650s, petitioned that his 
lands, hitherto held from Argyll, should in future be ‘holden of his Ma[jes]tie’ in 
order to ensure that he was never ‘made slave by any man for serving his 
Ma[jes]tie]’.80  Both the Macleans and the MacNaughtons secured the re-granting of 
estates previously lost to Argyll.  Atholl entered a claim on Argyll’s fishing rights in 
the Isles, ultimately unsuccessfully, while Lochiel and Gordon both claimed 
ownership of the estate of Mamore in Lochaber, a dispute which was still unresolved 
in 1688.81  Argyll’s fall thus created major financial opportunities for a wide range of 
individuals and interests. 
The sudden and quite possibly unintended disappearance of Argyll left the 
government with another major headache in terms of security, and for the rest of the 
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decade it wallowed in a state of near paranoia over the potential rebelliousness of the 
south-western Highlands.  Argyll himself was repeatedly implicated in plots against 
the king.82  William Campbell, a Glaswegian skipper, declared in August 1682 that 
his ship had been commandeered by Argyll’s men to smuggle arms into the western 
Highlands, while six separate testimonies – of Alexander Gordon of Earlston, Major 
Abraham Holmes, Robert Baillie of Jerviswood, Zachariah Bourn, Thomas Shepherd, 
Robert West and William Carstares – confirmed that the earl had been in consort 
with radical English Whigs throughout 1683, in an unsuccessful attempt to raise 
£30,000 sterling to fund a Scottish insurrection.83  He was even accused, rather 
hysterically, of direct complicity in the Rye House Plot.84  These details had become 
public from the end of 1683, after a series of encrypted letters from Argyll to his 
agents and co-conspirators was intercepted.  They had been partly decoded in 
England, but remained opaque.  The countess of Argyll was swiftly dragged before 
the Privy Council and ordered to provide the cipher, but when she proved of limited 
assistance, attention turned to William Spence, one of Argyll’s servants and 
reputedly his chief encoder.  Spence only provided the cipher after three rounds of 
judicial torture, and with this information the government was able to uncover the 
extent of Argyll’s plotting.85  What made all of this so worrying was the possibility 
that, if the erstwhile earl rose, he could carry Argyllshire with him.  Rosehaugh, not 
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without a degree of hindsight, claimed that, even before his fall, Argyll had ‘fix'd the 
Clergy and Laity’ of the shire in ‘seditious Sentiments’, ready to support him against 
the king.86  Equally, it was reported that, by the end of 1682, subscriptions totalling 
£50 sterling had been collected from the Campbell gentry of Kintyre and Islay.87  
Tarbat summed up the feeling when he declared that a Scottish rebellion was ‘none 
so probable […] as in that shyre’.88  By 1684, therefore, the threat posed by Argyll 
was at the very forefront of the regime’s mind. 
In response to these threats, real or perceived, the government throughout the 
1680s introduced a succession of policies for settling Argyllshire.  The initial tactic 
had simply been to appoint James Graham, 3rd marquis of Montrose as sheriff of 
Argyll in March 1683 (the office seems to have been dormant throughout the 
previous year), but his death thirteen months later necessitated a fresh strategy.89  
The advocate and sheriff-depute Robert Stewart was raised to the sheriffship on an 
interim basis while new ideas were explored.90  The first proposal, in the spring, was 
to split the shire into seven lieutenancies, centred on Cowal, Inveraray, Bute, Kintyre, 
Craigness, Dunstaffnage and Tarbert.  This policy, however, does not seem to have 
been implemented, with Perth and Charles Erskine, 6th earl of Mar being the only 
candidates ever advanced.91  Instead, Atholl was in June appointed as lieutenant and 
sheriff of all Argyll and Tarbert.  As the most senior nobleman in the southern 
Highlands Atholl was a fairly logical choice, and his appointment had the added 
bonus of compensating him for losing out on the chancellorship for the second time 
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in two years (Perth had been appointed after the fall of Aberdeen).92  He took up the 
commission in August and promptly marched into Argyll with a force of 1,000 
Highlanders.  When he left two months later, he reported that he had arrested a 
number of senior Campbells (and extracted cautions from many others), disarmed 
the shire, settled a garrison at Inveraray and forbidden all indulged ministers from 
preaching.  The Privy Council declared itself ‘very well satisfied’. Atholl also spent 
time investigating the extent of the deposed earl’s plotting, and it was in no small 
part thanks to his endeavours (especially the confiscation of Argyll’s papers) that 
Tarbat could claim in September that the ‘plott for riseing in Scotland is now fully 
discovered’.93  The invasion went ahead regardless in May 1685, but it turned out to 
be something of an anti-climax; Argyll was never able to raise a substantial force, and 
government troops, led again by Atholl, defeated him with relative ease.  The earl 
was captured in June, and executed shortly thereafter.94 
Atholl’s lieutenancy was formally renewed just before the rebellion, and 
immediately afterwards it was reinforced by a commission to protect Argyllshire 
from robbers.95  The robustness with which his forces went about suppressing the 
rebellion became notorious.  The ‘Atholl raids’ (often conducted less by the marquis 
than by the various clan levies under his nominal command) were reckoned to have 
caused £64,000 of damage to the estates of Ardkinglass alone, and there were 
numerous smaller claims; Duncan Smith of Inveraray suffered the theft of nearly 
£800 of goods and animals to ‘Lochaber men’ in the summer of 1685, while Colin 
Campbell of Gleman lost a wide range of foodstuffs and weaponry both to Atholl’s 
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forces and to his various Maclean, Cameron and MacDonald allies.96  Such stringency 
greatly pleased Iain Lom, who viewed it as glorious revenge for Argyll’s dominance 
of the Highlands since 1663: 
 
Buail an teud sin gu sealbhail 
‘S na dean searbh port na binneas, 
Na cum t’aghaidh neo-shealbhaidh 
Ri neach nach earb thu do shlinnein; 
O thug an Rìgh an t-slat sgiùrsaidh 
An glaic do dhùirn ‘s nach tu shir i, 
Uair mu seach air an tùirneal 
Mar bhuaileas ùird air an inneain. 
 
(Pluck that string harmoniously and do not cause the melodious strain to jar, 
do not unpropitiously keep your face turned to one to whom you could not 
entrust you back.  Since the King has placed in the grasp of your hand the 
scourging rod, and it was not of your asking, let it be time about with the 
blow, as hammers strike on the anvil).97 
 
In the months after Argyll’s defeat, however, Atholl’s activities were rather more 
measured, despite extremely stringent orders from the government that he should 
execute all guilty heritors, and select ‘a hundred of the chief ringleaders of the 
tennents and commons and execute them to death’.98  In June the marquis issued an 
indemnity to all ‘commons of those tua Shyrs of Argyll [and] Tarbert’ who had been 
‘forced and prest by the rebells to Joyne with them’, provided they submitted 
themselves to him.99  The following month, he ordered the local ministers to compile 
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lists of all their parishioners, and to name all the men who had fought for the earl.100  
A lieutenancy court, sitting at Lochhead (Campbeltown) in August and September, 
and presided over by Atholl’s deputies, John Boyle of Kelburn and John 
McNaughton, fined some seventy-five individuals for adherence to the rebellion – 
although interestingly the major transgression with which they were all charged was 
not raising arms against the Crown, but attending two seditious sermons given by 
‘vagrant preatchers’ accompanying Argyll.101  Further punishments were eventually 
meted out, but by other authorities.  Around twenty individuals, including Argyll 
himself, were sentenced to execution by the Justiciary Court in Edinburgh; the Privy 
Council banished or transported a further sixty or so (although Wodrow put the 
figure at 100-200); and Inveraray Sheriff Court eventually prosecuted over 240 for 
offences connected to the rebellion (mainly theft), some 90 per cent of whom were 
convicted, most receiving financial penalties.102 
These relatively restrained reprisals did not however do anything to soften 
the brutal reputation Atholl had already acquired, and by the autumn his 
lieutenancy had been allowed to lapse in favour of renewing the Highland 
commission (see below).103  Lochiel, who had allegedly acted as a double-agent 
within Atholl’s camp throughout the rebellion, did not help matters by claiming (no 
doubt in an attempt to deflect attention away from himself) that the marquis had 
botched his commission, and missed several attempts to destroy Argyll (a gratifying 
accusation for Atholl’s rivals in Edinburgh, who had long been hoping to exploit, as 
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Tarbat put it ‘[th]e least mischance’).104  In any case, although John Drummond, 1st 
earl of Melfort assured the marquis that his conduct was officially considered above 
reproach, the government, when it chose in September 1686 to resurrect the 
lieutenancy, awarded it not to Atholl, but to Lieutenant General William Drummond 
of Cromlix, newly ennobled as Viscount Strathallan.105  His appointment was 
accompanied by a general indemnity to those involved in the rebellion, and part of 
his responsibility was to decide who should receive this pardon, and who should 
not.  The remainder of the twenty-six instructions with which he was encumbered 
focused on sorting out the disruption (administrative, financial and proprietary) 
caused by the rebellion, but he was also to affect the settlement of the late earl’s 
forfeited estates.  More generally, he was empowered to ‘doe everything proper and 
necessary for the peace and quiet’ of Argyllshire.  Strathallan was clearly very 
diligent – he reportedly ‘without suspensions or stop, descerned restitution of all that 
was robb’d and stollen’, and he certainly presided over at least one meeting of the 
commissioners of supply in Argyllshire – but his claim to have reduced the area to ‘a 
full quiet and peace’ by the end of the year was probably a little overdone.106 
If the fall of Argyll naturally dominated Highland affairs in the early- to mid-
1680s, he was not the only prominent individual to face difficulties.  Glenorchy was 
similarly straitened on account of his possession since 1672 of the estates pertaining 
to the earldom of Caithness and, from 1677, the title of earl itself.  Repeated attempts 
to secure his rights had been doggedly supported by the government, and this 
continued into 1680.107  In June that year, Charles made plain his resolve ‘to 
maintaine and secure the said Earle in the just possession of his said estate’.  The 
                                                           
104 Murray, Atholl and Tullibardine, i, pp.260-61; NRAS234, box 29/I/4, item 58.   
105 RPCS, xii, pp.401-2; HMC, Athole, p.35; Wodrow, History of the Sufferings, iv, p.310. 
106 Lauder, Notices, ii, p.752; NRS, SC54/20/3/2/31; RPCS, xii, pp.461-64 and at p.525. 
107 NRS, GD112/39/132/6. 
Reaction and Realignment, 1679-1688 
244 
 
Privy Council responded by ordering one of the Highland companies, still ensconced 
in Mull, to travel to Caithness in support of Glenorchy.  It also instructed all the 
gentlemen of Caithness to support him.108  Later that year, however, the situation 
began to change.  In September, after George Sinclair (his rival for the title of earl) 
complained that he had ‘committed several acts of oppression and killed many of his 
Majesty’s good subjects’, Glenorchy was summoned before the Privy Council to 
explain himself.  Two months later, a committee was established in order to examine 
the complaint.  Although it initially appeared sympathetic towards Glenorchy, 
orders were issued in January 1681 authorising treason processes to be initiated.109  
These never progressed, largely because Rosehaugh sabotaged them, but the 
Sinclairs were already pursuing a new strategy.  George Sinclair petitioned in July 
that he be allowed to assume the style ‘earl of Caithness’.  This was granted in 
August, with Glenorchy being given the new earldom of Breadalbane by way of 
compensation.  Parliament then heard a request for the new 7th earl of Caithness to 
be restored to his family lands of Keiss, Tister and Northfield and, after being 
referred to the Privy Council, this request too was granted.110  Breadalbane, however, 
retained those portions of the Caithness estate which he had acquired in settlement 
of the debts owed to him by the late 6th earl. 
But the Sinclairs – or at least the more militant members of the kin, such as 
James Sinclair of Murkle, John Sinclair of Ratter and Caithness himself – remained 
determined to regain control of the entire region.  By March 1683 they had succeeded 
in compiling a libel for treason against Breadalbane, in which he was accused of 
illegally invading Caithness (thereby causing extensive damage and loss of life), 
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garrisoning Castle Sinclair, raising illegitimate taxes, gathering bonds of manrent 
from the local heritors, and even harbouring a necromancer and warlock named John 
Auriray.111  Breadalbane himself was dismissive of the charges, and initially it was 
thought by his supporters that ‘this process will not in the Least bring any danger to 
my Lords person Honour or estate’.112  Such complacency was quickly shattered, and 
within days Breadalbane was told by his agent in Edinburgh, Colin Campbell of 
Carwhin, that Atholl (Breadalbane’s staunchest ally in Edinburgh) sensed very real 
danger: 
 
He finds [the]r is a solid resolutione sett downe to forfault yow as to Caithnes 
if it be posible and [tha]t nothing cane hinder but yo[u]r absenting yo[u]rself; 
He sayes he thinks yo[u]r lo[rdship] will be forced to poyt Caithnes to [the]m 
at q[uha]tt raite they please or tak yo[u]r hazard.113 
 
As with the attacks on Argyll, there were suspicions that Albany secretly sponsored 
the campaign against Breadalbane as a means of rendering the earl dependent upon 
him.  This was the conclusion reached at the time by Rosehaugh: 
 
[The]r was no way to saive yow but to com in heir and sie [th]e D[uke] befor 
he went away seing he knows yow are at hom And [tha]t yo[u]r own 
presence u[i]t q[uhi]lk assurance ye could give the D[uke] of yo[u]r standing 
be him might doe much to putt a stope to [the]r Career […] For [tha]t he 
knew yo[u]r lo[rdship] to [be] a person [who] could mak a great interest to 
[th]e D[uke] in the highlands (at which he wes now dryveing) and he himself 
hes bein all this tym giveing the best characters off yow to [th]e D[uke] he 
could.114   
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Certainly, Glenorchy’s stock had experienced the same temporary dip as Argyll’s 
during Albany’s drive for negotiated settlements in the winter of 1679-80, before 
Charles reiterated his attachment to the Highland companies the following summer.  
It is equally telling that when in July 1683 Breadalbane eventually did make a 
personal submission to Albany (after repeated appeals by letter), James contrived to 
have all legal processes against him dropped.  By August, Breadalbane had received 
a full remission for his actions in Caithness, much to the embarrassment of Perth, 
who had been studiously buying up Breadalbane’s debts with a view to securing 
control of his estates once they were forfeited.115  By October Breadalbane felt 
confident enough to petition for a government pension.  ‘He has got pretty fair by 
this business’ grumbled John Drummond of Lundin (later Earl of Melfort) ‘and 
therfor may the better rest satisfied, for if others had got their uills of him, he had 
bein peiled to the skin’.116 
 The campaigns against Argyll and Breadalbane have tended to be seen as 
quintessentially reactionary in origin, predicated upon Albany’s need to undermine 
the basis of Lauderdale’s regime.  This was certainly the case, but it is important not 
to assume that it represented a general anti-Campbell bias.  James’ concern was 
limited to cementing his own position as Lauderdale’s successor, and his aim was 
largely to force the two Campbell earls into dependence upon him.  Recognising 
their importance as agents of order in the locality, he wanted submission, not 
destruction.  Breadalbane understood this, and so survived.  Argyll did not, and so 
fell – thereby creating for the government an ongoing headache in the south-western 
Highlands which it had almost certainly not anticipated.  
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James’ campaign for bringing Clan Campbell to heel coincided with his first 
attempt to establish a fresh Highland policy.   In January 1680, he reported to the 
Privy Council his intense personal interest in settling the Highlands, a position which 
he reiterated about a fortnight later with the observation that ‘the King is not entirely 
King of the whole kingdome’ so long as the region remained unsettled.117  In 
February, he introduced his solution.  Noting that previous Highland policies had 
not been as successful as hoped because ‘the persons entrusted with the execution 
thereof had not that command and interest suteable to so great ane undertaking’, 
Albany suggested instead that the Highland be split into five divisions.  Within each 
of these, a regional magnate would be given authority to apprehend and try all 
thieves.  The nobles in question were Argyll, Atholl, Kenneth Mackenzie, 4th earl of 
Seaforth, Huntly and Moray.  Argyll’s jurisdiction would be Stirlingshire, 
Dumbartonshire, Argyll, Breadalbane and western Inverness-shire as far north as 
Kintail; Atholl’s Perthshire (Breadalbane excepted), Clackmannshire and Forfar; 
Moray’s eastern Inverness-shire, Nairnshire and Moray; Huntly’s the Mearns, 
Aberdeenshire, Banffshire and his own estates in Badenoch and Lochaber; and 
Seaforth’s Caithness, Sutherland, Ross, Cromarty, northern Inverness-shire, and the 
isles of Skye and Lewis.118  This was in fact a slight reworking of Albany’s original 
plan, which had envisaged merely four ‘high [and] mighty Theif catchers’, as 
Lauderdale termed them, and had accorded to Huntly everything from Lochaber to 
Aberdeen.  But the king vetoed this after representations from Lauderdale, ostensibly 
because the projected jurisdiction was ‘too large for one person to oversee’, but also 
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to avoid alienating Moray and, no doubt, because ‘it seemd tooe bearr faced to 
intrust [...] a pappist uith men and munitions the pappist plott nott yett crushed’.119 
As a policy this had its critics.  Argyll resented sharing authority in the 
Highlands, while Mar, petitioning unsuccessfully that he should be accorded 
jurisdiction over Aberdeen and Banff, declared that ‘my interest in the Highlands is 
intirely broken, and my men a prey to nighbours, that uould be glade too see it’.120  
Nevertheless, the Privy Council went through the motions of confirming the new 
commission.  In March 1680 its start-date was fixed for 1 May, and each of the 
commissioners was allocated £200 sterling for their expenses.  The Council also 
ordered that each of them find caution for the prosecution of their tasks, and all but 
Argyll did so.121  Moreover, it appears that the scheme did gain a degree of 
acceptance; on 29 April 1680, Argyll received a petition from the heritors of Lennox, 
asking that he use his new jurisdiction to hunt down a large gang of robbers who 
were terrorising the area.122  Ultimately, however, the scheme had been a natural 
corollary to Albany’s attempted loosening of Campbell dominance over Highland 
policy (indeed, the expenses currently paid to the Highland companies under 
Glenorchy and Menzies were specifically earmarked for the new commissioners), 
and Lauderdale’s success in convincing Charles to retain the companies necessarily 
put the five-divisions scheme on hold.  By the time the companies finally disbanded 
in April 1681, the imminent fall of Argyll effectively ensured that the prorogation 
became permanent.  Nevertheless the scheme, by seeking to exploit personal 
authority in the locality while avoiding the pitfalls of a dominant viceroy, revealed 
the shape of Albany’s thinking.  This would have major implications for the most 
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significant development in Highland affairs during his tenure, the commission for 
securing the peace (see below). 
In the meantime, policy entered something of a holding pattern.  In March 
1681 a proclamation was issued with the familiar aim of re-imposing all existing 
Highland legislation.  In particular, the practices of bonding and annual 
accountability were again reaffirmed, using a fresh list and bond.123  At the same 
time, the destabilisation of the Campbells provided a window for the government’s 
other traditional agents in the Highlands, the Mackenzies and the Gordons, to 
reassert themselves.  In 1680, Seaforth allied himself with the Sinclairs’ attempts to 
eject Glenorchy from Caithness.124  Just under two years later, after the fall of Argyll, 
Tarbat seized the opportunity to advertise Seaforth’s credentials as a potential 
Highland agent.  ‘Remember his influence in the Highlands’, he told the new 
Chancellor, Haddo, ‘Argyl being forfeited, Huntly being incapacitated, and Athole 
not well pleased’.125  In addition, Tarbat argued (somewhat unconvincingly) that the 
Mackenzies record as royal adherents in the 1640s and 1650s was so constant as to 
merit public trust.  Although Tarbat’s ambitions went unfulfilled, Seaforth did secure 
a pension of £2,400, as did David Ross of Balnagown.126   
The Gordon interest was more aggressive, despite the fact that Huntly 
himself proved singularly unable to exert much influence in public life until the reign 
of James VII.127  Instead it was Haddo, the upstart Chancellor (and earl of Aberdeen 
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from 1682) determined to secure for himself a regional power-base, who led an 
attempted Gordon revival in the Highlands.  He had already had himself added to 
the Highland Committee in 1680.128  In 1683 he tried to win the keepership of Stirling 
Castle, hitherto possessed heritably by Mar, as a means of controlling what was still 
the major pass into the Highlands.  Similarly, he sought to secure for Huntly Mar’s 
lands in Braemar.129  Alongside trying to augment his own position, Aberdeen was a 
guiding influence in the attacks on Breadalbane, as Atholl reported to the earl in 
August 1683: 
 
You know of a letter the Chanclor writ against you to [th]e Duke with all the 
reflexions [tha]t his malice [and] envie could suggest […] I heare you have 
made some proposals concerning Argile-shire [and] [th]e Highlands pray 
take care it be for his Ma[jes]ties service [and] y[ou]r own interest [and] 
y[ou]r friends for the Chancelor is turning it in redicule.130   
 
As well as attempting to undermine Breadalbane’s credentials as a Highland agent, 
Aberdeen played a key role in the treason processes of 1683.  The libel itself was the 
work of the Sinclairs, and had been in preparation for at least a year.  It had however 
failed to gain any traction until Aberdeen threw his weight behind it, and pushed it 
through in the face of trenchant opposition from fellow Privy Councillors, such as 
Rosehaugh, Lundin, Perth and Atholl.131  The Sinclairs grew suspicious, and began to 
fear that Aberdeen had his own designs on Caithness.  The Chancellor denied this, 
and stated merely that he wished the processes to run because ‘the law wes patent, 
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and no subject could be denyed the benefite of it’.132  In private, however, he 
genuinely was locked in intense negotiations to buy the Caithness estates (at a 
knock-down price, according to Breadalbane), while Huntly was simultaneously in 
talks with the countess of Breadalbane for the same purpose.133  In all his 
machinations the Chancellor was ultimately unsuccessful, but they represented a 
concerted effort to exploit the temporary destabilisation of Campbell hegemony in 
the Highlands.  They were also by far the Gordons’ most assertive interference in 
Highland affairs since the Restoration.  
By 1682, Albany had repeatedly signalled his intention to broaden out the 
government’s pool of agents in the Highlands.  The next governmental scheme, the 
commission for securing the peace, announced on 5 August, continued this trend, 
although it is not clear if the scheme was devised by Albany himself.  It split the 
region into four divisions: the northern encompassed Caithness and Sutherland; the 
central covered the shires of Ross, Cromarty, Inverness, Nairn and Moray; the 
eastern involved Banff, Aberdeen, Kincardine and Forfar; and the southern 
incorporated Perth, Stirling, Dumbarton and Argyll (see map 5).  Within each of 
these areas, a group of named commissioners (sixty-seven in all) was empowered to 
apprehend all thieves, and try them in justice courts to be held at least twice 
yearly.134  The Highland commission remained active for the remainder of the reign, 
and was renewed by James VII five months after his accession.135  Historians have 
tended to view it in a positive light.  For Harris, it was simply more successful at 
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curbing disorders than any previous initiative.136  Hopkins agrees, calling the 
commission ‘probably the Restoration regime’s most effective and honest attempt to 
check highland robberies’.137  Not all commentators have been quite so effusive, 
however.  Stevenson, for one, is ambivalent, admitting that the commissioners ‘did 
have greater success in suppressing raids and violence in the Highlands than any 
other body since the Restoration’, but maintaining also that its effectiveness was 
confined largely to the south-east and has, in any case, been greatly exaggerated.138  
John Callow is still less impressed, and he states bluntly that the government’s 
authority in the Highlands remained ‘directly proportional to the strength of [its] 
troops on the ground’.  The commission, in this reading, was an exercise in futility.139 
 The impact of the commission was certainly curtailed by the enormously 
varying industriousness of its four divisions.  The southern division – the only one to 
leave systematic records – was much the most active.  It first convened at Comrie, 
west of Crieff, on 6 October 1682, and its minutes show that it met on at least twenty-
five further occasions before January 1687, circulating between sites such as Crieff, 
Killin, Balquhidder, Kenaclacher and Achallader.  Moreover, although the minutes 
cease at this point, it was clearly still meeting in the autumn of 1688, when the 
Chancellor, Perth, attended personally and praised the ‘great good which the 
Com[issione]rs of Iusticiary for the highlands have done towards the keeping of the 
peace of the Countrey and redressing of injuries comitted by theives and Robers’.140  
Even so, problems were encountered in getting commissioners to attend meetings.  
Indeed, by 1684 there were fears that some of its courts could collapse through want 
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of a quorum.141   There was in fact a ‘hard core’ of individuals who attended 
regularly, such as Lawers, John Drummond of Pitkelloney and Alexander Robertson 
of Struan, but many others turned up on a mere handful of occasions.  Equally, 
numbers swung wildly.  One court, in September 1682, boasted only three 
commissioners, while the very next meeting three months later was graced by 
fourteen.142   
 The activities of this southern division were further complicated after 1684, 
when the establishment of Atholl’s Argyllshire lieutenancy introduced an obvious 
jurisdictional overlap.  Both had the same powers to hold courts, issue decrees and 
extract bonds of caution, and many of the marquis’ officers, such as Struan, the tutor 
of Appin, and Andrew Spalding of Ashintully, were also commissioners.143  In fact, 
the southern division ceased meeting in November 1684, and remained dormant for 
eleven months.  In the meantime, a commission for preserving Perthshire from 
thieves (similar to that granted to Atholl for Argyll) was in May 1685 granted to 
James Drummond of Drumendernoch, Patrick Murray of Keilor, John Mitchell, 
Thomas Crichton, Alexander Stewart of Annanto, Sir Robert Moray of Abercairnie, 
and Lawers.144  The same pattern of temporary abeyance, seemingly lasting around 
ten months, accompanied Strathallan’s lieutenancy in late 1686.  All of this would 
suggest, as Atholl himself suspected, that the government viewed the powerful 
lieutenancies as appropriate emergency measures in times of particular disorder, but 
was more comfortable in normal circumstances with diffusing authority widely 
amongst the commissioners.145   
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The central division was obviously active in 1682, when it issued orders for 
the apprehension of all suspected robbers within its bounds, and in June 1684 it 
reported that twenty courts had been held in total, albeit that ‘very few of the 
number of the com[missione]rs appoynted for that Iurisdictione did attend [the]r 
meittings or Imploy ther neccessarie diligence for executeing [the]r comissione And 
some of them did not accept [the]rof’.146  More oblique evidence that the central 
division was functioning can be found in the Court Books of the burgh of Inverness, 
which record fifty-nine licences issued to cattle traders between 1683 and 1686.  
These passes included a testimony from the traders’ landlords as to how many cattle 
they had permission to sell, as well as a record of who had bought their animals, and 
for how much.147  A call for such testimonies had been one of the subsidiary terms of 
the Highland commission, and the fact Inverness was so scrupulous in recording 
them (not to mention that no such passes are extant from the years before 1683) 
suggests that the commissioners were having an impact.148  The eastern 
commissioners too were meeting by March 1683, but fifteen months later it was 
noted that the they had ‘not unanimusly concurrd for wseing [the]r outmost cair and 
diligence In execu[ti]one of the kings commission’.149  Unfortunately, no minutes 
seem to have survived from any meetings in either of these jurisdictions.  As for the 
northern division, it seems never to have met at all, and by 1686 had been dropped 
from official consciousness.150  If therefore success is to be measured in terms of 
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commissioners’ diligence in convening the required courts, then the record of the 
Highland commission was patchy at best.  
  Nevertheless, the minutes of the southern division reveal a broad and multi-
faceted approach to controlling the Highlands.  Its activities fell into three broad 
classes.  Firstly, in response to its remit to interrupt the illegal transportation of 
livestock to and from the Highlands, it attempted to seal off waterways.  One of its 
first actions, in October 1682, was to order a survey of all the ‘ferry boats of Loch 
Lowmons [Lomond] and Loch kathrein [Katrine] And other passages by water’, 
through which thieves moved their goods, whereby ‘there is ane constant trade of 
thift keep’d up and maintained’.  All public boats were to be stored each night in ‘ane 
sufficient staine dyck […] and Loched w[i]t ane Irone chayne and a sufficient Lock’.  
All private boats, meanwhile, were to be confiscated until their owners found caution 
that they would never be used by thieves.151  By December, this policy had been 
extended to include Lochs Tay, Awe, Etive, Lyon and Rannoch, Rivers Tay and 
Tummel, and the various waterways of Appin.  In 1684 it was widened still further 
with the inclusion of Atholl, from where five bonds were gathered.152  While it seems 
unlikely that this rather grandiose scheme met with any great success, it does at least 
reveal an honest attempt on the part of the commissioners to understand and rectify 
Highland lawlessness.  
The second tactic was punishment of offenders.  The commissioners were 
conscious that well-targeted, public executions (or at least the threat thereof) would 
act as ‘monuments of Iustice’, and in total sixteen individuals were hanged between 
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1682 and 1684.153  But lesser punishments were also imposed where deemed 
appropriate.  Patrick Macfarlane, for instance, was imprisoned in June 1683, rather 
than being tried for the capital offence of animal theft, because of his young age.154  
Others suffered banishment, including Thomas Anderson, exiled from the shires of 
Argyll, Perth, Stirling and Dumbarton in October 1682, or transportation, as in the 
case of Donald Mackintosh, Malcolm McVorish and Donald MacGregor, all of whom 
were sent to New Jersey in 1684, ‘wher they will be serviceable’.155  The 
commissioners also attempted to punish those who flouted their authority.  In June 
1683, fines of £100 were levied upon all individuals who failed to answer summonses 
to court, and at the same meeting, the most persistent and notorious repeat offenders 
were summarily outlawed.156   
Perhaps more striking was the commissioners’ use of amnesties.  At the end 
of 1682, they suggested to the Privy Council that, instead of outlawing thieves, 
protections might be issued for them to ‘come in and inact themselves’ to ‘banish 
themselves forever out of the kingdome’, an idea to which the Council acquiesced.157  
By the summer of 1684, a broader policy had taken shape.  The commissioners 
wished to isolate the most incorrigibly lawless elements by bringing more peaceable 
individuals back into the fold.  To this end, two policies were mooted.  Firstly, they 
suggested that a general indemnity be offered for all past crimes, provided that 
guilty individuals agreed to pay restitution.  In addition, they asked: 
 
That power be granted to the Com[missione]rs to receive in fugitives and 
p[er]sones Intercomuned be [the]m, upon sufficient security And other good 
considera[ti]ones for preventing the conjunctione of such desperat 
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wagabounds who will out of necessity Committ Insolencies upon the poor 
country people.158 
 
This tactic of differentiating between classes of lawbreaker was considerably subtler 
than previous policies, which had tended to treat them as a homogenous mass, and 
its potential was revealed by the case of the MacGregors.  That family had 
consistently failed to give bonds, but in November 1684, ‘eight or nyne persones of 
the said clanne who were understood to be honest responsa[bi]ll and Law bidding 
men’ asked that they be allowed to give ‘ane particuler band for securing of the 
peace’, because they did not feel able to become bound for some of their more 
incorrigible kinsmen.  Although the commissioners refused to accept this proposal 
‘Least it showld prove prejudiciall to the s[ai]d g[e]n[erall] band’, it did illustrate the 
potential of a conciliatory attitude for encouraging rapprochement.159 
The third class of activity was arbitration.  Starting at Kenaclacher in June 
1683, the commissioners heard individual complaints about stolen goods, rendered 
judgement as to who was to blame and, in some cases, ordered compensation to be 
provided.  The prospect of being dragged before the commissioners’ court and 
forced to pay damages was, they believed, ‘ane greater awe band then hanging, The 
terror q[uhai]rof will bring the highlanders To ane greater conformity for the tyme to 
come’.160  By March 1686, at least 200 judgements had been rendered, and one, of 
June 1683, illustrated the kind of claims involved.161  Donald MacDonald of Moidart 
asserted that in 1681 Duncan Macgillesbeg had been responsible for the theft of 
seven of his cows, then en route to market in Edinburgh.  He had then approached 
one of Moidart’s agents with a devious offer: 
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[He] said to him that he was at much Heedless paynes and expenss in 
searching for the s[ai]d seven kowes, And that if he would agree with him for 
ane certaine sowme of taskell mo[n]ey He would gett him back the s[ai]d 
seven kowes.162 
 
 The commissioners imposed a fine of 500 merks upon Macgillesbeg, alongside a 
charge of twenty-five merks per animal stolen.  The sheer number of cases brought 
before the commissioners, as well as the diversity of the claimants – both Highland 
clans such as the Campbells, Camerons, MacGregors, MacDonalds, Mackenzies and 
Macnabs, and Lowland families like the Menzies and Drummonds, made use of the 
service – illustrates the receptiveness of the locality to the kind of immediate access 
to justice offered by the commissioners’ arbitration panels.163   
The southern commissioners themselves were delighted with the success 
these varied methods seemed to bring.  They had been unable to penetrate beyond 
the Highland fringe until 1683, but within a year thereafter they felt secure enough to 
boast that ‘The countreyes adjacent to the highlands have not bein in such quyet and 
security for above 20 yeirs’, and they concluded that ‘the Task to banish away 
theefing and Robeing is not soe dificult as we supposed’.164  They were particularly 
pleased with the apparent eagerness of local elites, particularly in Argyll, to 
cooperate with them.  Allowances must of course be made for exaggeration, but 
there was a palpable sense by 1684 that the commission was making real progress in 
settling the Highlands.165  Such confidence, however, was severely shaken by the 
widespread disruption caused by Argyll’s rebellion, and in March 1686 the 
commissioners complained that: 
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Wee find the highlands by reasone of the Late trowbles [the]rin and the 
Libertie q[uhi]ch the highlanders did then take to themselves Have theirby 
casten off much of [th]e obedience to q[uhi]ch they were formerly reduced.166 
 
Perhaps the southern division really could have lived up to its boast and facilitated 
lasting peace in the Highlands.  But its manifest loss of vigour after 1684 – two 
recorded meetings in 1685-86, compared with twenty-three in 1682-84 – rendered the 
point academic.  
However, historiographical attention has tended to be caught less by the 
Highland commission’s methods than by its general ethos.  Macinnes concludes that 
it was ‘the only phase of conciliation in the Highlands during the Restoration era’, a 
reading which is based upon the argument that the commission thrived on a greater 
degree of cooperation with regional elites than had hitherto been practised.167  
McAlister is in broad agreement, and describes the commission as ‘progressive’.168  
This basic idea of cooperation has been expanded by Hopkins and Roberts, both of 
whom argue that the commissioners’ willingness to look beyond the highest reaches 
of the Highland elite, and engage directly with lower-level heritors, was central to its 
success.169  Such assessments are however problematic, not least because the idea of 
working with the local community had in fact been a key tenet of Highland policy 
throughout the 1660s and 1670s – cooperation was not suddenly invented in 1682.  It 
would in fact be more meaningful to view the commission as the Restoration’s most 
effective marriage between the intellectual constructs of direct and indirect control. 
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There can be little doubt that the commission was intended, in part at least, to 
ensure that law and order policy bypassed local power networks.  Its terms implied 
strongly that its courts were to be considered superior to all existing local 
jurisdictions.  Thus, ‘all sheriffs, stewarts, baillies of royalties, regalities and 
barronies’ were ordered to be ‘aiding and assisting […] as they shall be required’.170  
Moreover, the Privy Council’s interaction with the commissioners made it clear that 
they were viewed emphatically as agents of central government, rather than as local 
lieutenants with a free rein.  Regular reports were demanded (the southern division 
submitted accounts of its activities in December 1682, June 1684, August 1684 and 
March 1686), and a close eye was kept on the commissioners’ proceedings.  As early 
as October 1682, for instance, the Council demanded a list of all those commissioners 
who had so far not attended meetings.171  More striking still, Perth, as Justice 
General, personally attended meetings of the southern commission on at least three 
occasions in 1683 and again in 1688.172   
Counciliar supervision was also maintained through designated agents, at 
least amongst the southern division’s commissioners.  Cromlix was the first of these.  
In December 1682, he was appointed as a standing interval convener, and served as 
praeces for all the division’s meetings at which he was present until June 1684.  He 
was further charged ‘to keip correspondence with the com[missione]rs of the other 
Iurisdictiones’, and it was Cromlix also who transmitted reports from the 
commissioners to the Council, and orders in the other direction.173  In 1684, however, 
Breadalbane was added to the commission (the only nobleman appointed), and he 
soon replaced Cromlix as the key figure.  That autumn he began presiding over 
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meetings, and issuing arrest warrants in his own name.174  By late 1688 Perth, now 
Chancellor, writing to Breadalbane with instructions for the commissioners, had 
seemingly accepted that the latter was their de facto leader: 
 
I desire that yo[u]r Lo[rdshi]p would be pleased to advertise Vrckle or 
Pittkilanie and the rest of the Commissioners to keep the diet punctualy 
which you appointed at yo[u]r last sitting at Creiff And that you vigorously 
putt in execution all instructiones which have been formerly given to you.175 
 
Cromlix and Breadalbane therefore served as bridges linking the commissioners with 
the Privy Council, allowing both bodies to communicate with each other.  In this way 
they furthered the design of fashioning the Highland commission into an instrument 
for transmitting government authority directly into the locality.  
Efforts were also made to ensure that the bureaucracy of the commission ran 
as smoothly and professionally as possible.  Court officials, including clerks, 
messengers and notaries, were appointed; the Privy Council in October 1682 
confirmed that the commissioners, in common with ordinary commissioners of 
justiciary, were to have full power to grant protections to those whom they cited; the 
Council further ordered that citations were to be made within the jurisdiction in 
which a crime was committed, rather than the one in which an offender lived; and in 
1686 it was declared that ‘all executiones given in aga[ins]t any pairtie wher they are 
not personally apprehendit’ would be considered void unless properly worded and 
witnessed.176  Such procedural precision speaks of a genuine desire to create a stable 
and formal infrastructure, as does the recurrent desire to maintain communication 
between the four divisions.  At the end of 1682, the commissioners of the southern 
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division expressed their opinion that the notorious trouble-spot of Lochaber would 
best be served through co-ordinated meetings of the southern and central courts.  
The Privy Council endorsed this idea, and also instructed that representatives from 
each division should liaise regularly ‘so as persones proceided against in ane district 
may not be receaved nor intertained in another’.177  Such concepts soon developed, 
and by 1683 the southern commissioners advocated something much more wide-
ranging: 
 
The Com[missione]rs of the se[ver]all districts [should] be Comanded be 
order off Counsell To send 3 or 4 of their number once a yeir To meit the Lord 
Iustice generall at ane convenient place and on ane certain day To give ane 
accompt of their diligence and of the conditiones of the shyres within their 
re[s]p[ecti]ue Iurisdictiones That all necess[a]r resolutions may be taken for 
the generall peace and quyet of the countrey.178 
 
This proposal would have seen the Highland commission develop into a formal 
federation of justice courts, but also suggested ambitions towards the wholesale 
devolution of Highland policy to it.  Some movement in this direction was made; the 
southern and central divisions held a week-long joint court at Inverlochy in August 
1683, and a year later a general meeting of representatives from the southern, central 
and eastern divisions was held.  By 1686, however, the southern commissioners had 
manifestly lost patience with the sluggish response all their overtures received, and 
they informed the central division that, in order to crack down on disorders in 
Lochaber, they themselves intended to hold courts within the latter’s jurisdiction, at 
Rannoch, Inverlochy and Keppoch.  Their colleagues in the central region were 
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invited to assist them, but it was clear that the heady aspirations for a Highland-wide 
federation were very much on the wane.179 
In other ways too, the drive towards efficiency and professionalisation should 
not be overstated.  Not least, the commissioners’ pleas that they be given allowances 
for expenses were studiously ignored, although they were permitted to offset some 
of their costs using revenue from fines.180  More generally, it was assumed that ‘seing 
thes commissioners are granted for public conveniency and preserveing the peace of 
the Highlands’ their ‘procedore is not to be quarrelled upon the niceties and 
formalities of law’.181  The sense that the commissioners should be allowed a certain 
flexibility of approach was graphically illustrated by the case of Alasdair roy 
MacGregor, ‘ane notorious hectoring thieff hounder out and resaiter of thift’.  He had 
been summoned to a court at Crieff in June 1684, but failed to attend.  He did, 
however, descend upon the streets of the town during the night, whereupon ‘ordor 
was Immediatlie given to ane sergant with a small pairtie of his ma[jes]ties forces 
that were attending the court To endeavour to aprehend him’.  In the ensuing 
struggle, ‘on of the p[air]tie with his ballgoneit in the muzell killd him dead’.  The 
Privy Council saw absolutely nothing wrong with this kind of rough justice, instead 
declaring their approval of the commissioners’ actions.182  Despite the obvious 
intention that the commission should offer a firm and professional framework for 
justice, there remained a lingering assumption that, where unruly Highlanders were 
concerned, more questionable tactics were still occasionally acceptable. 
If professionalisation and conciliar supervision highlighted the influence of 
direct theories of control, there was a limit to how far this centralising agenda could 
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be pressed.  Local magnates were, as always, keen to protect their vested interests.  In 
October 1682, David Murray, 5th viscount of Stormont wrote to Breadalbane on 
behalf of the southern division (barely a week into its existence), defending its right 
to summon any of the earl’s vassals suspected of theft, and complaining that ‘the 
sojers who wer at Achallader complained of ill useage by your people ther’.  
Stormont went on to plea that Breadlabane should throw his weight behind the 
commissioners: 
 
The Com[m]issioners […] ar hoopfull your lo[rdship] wil cause them be 
civilly used and provyded for their money at reasonable rats.  I know the 
Com[m]issioners lookes for yowr self to come hither and not only 
contwnance their Meeting but also give them your best advyse for the good 
of the kings service and if your lo[rdship] come not it wilbe ill represented.183 
 
The seriousness of this tension was illustrated by a list of ten demands drawn up 
around 1684, aimed at curtailing the commissioners’ influence.  Although its 
authorship is unclear, this document plainly demonstrated the anxiety of regional 
elites that the commission was eroding their authority.  It demanded that ‘in All the 
districts, uhere the Marquis of Atholl […] The duke of Gordon, The Earles of Mar 
and Airly has interest some Gentlemen may be added to the Highland commission 
uhom they shall name’.  It also asked that the procedures of the commissioners’ 
courts be tightened up, so as to curtail their powers, and, crucially, that they respect 
the jurisdictions and judgements of all ‘Courts of Regality, Barron and Baylivry’.184  
That such anxieties existed at all perhaps reflected the relative success of the 
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commission as a centralising agency, but they are also a reminder that local power 
networks were too robust to be ignored completely.   
As a result, the Highland commission also drew upon indirect thinking.  
Around half of the men appointed in 1682 belonged to major Highland families 
(including some traditionally trouble-making groups such as the Camerons, 
Macleans and MacDonalds), with seven of them - Ewan Cameron of Lochiel, Randal 
MacDonald of Glengarry, Ludovick Grant of Freuchie, Lachlan Mackintosh of 
Torcastle, Alexander MacNaughton of Dunderawe, Alexander Robertson of Struan, 
and David Ross of Balnagown – actually being clan chiefs.  Moreover, practically all 
of the commissioners were resident either in the Highlands, or on the Highland 
fringe.185  Such patterns show the continuing importance of local power defined more 
widely than simply the peerage, and indeed the government was fully aware that the 
commissioners’ success would ultimately rest upon the cooperation of the locality.  
In adding Breadalbane to the commission in 1684, the Council observed that ‘the 
considerable interest which he has in severalls of those shires’ would make him ‘very 
instrumentall to prevent such disorders in those parts in the future’.186  The 
commissioners, in their report to the Council of June 1683, were equally sensible of 
the importance of local goodwill: 
 
[The] comissioners of Iusticiary desyred [to] accquant the Lords of his 
ma[jes]ties privie counsell That they mett with a more frequent number of 
heretors and all sorts of other people then they reasonabllie could have 
expected And found a greater Incina[ti]one in them to comply and concurr 
with any means that could be proposed for suppressing of thift and robrie 
Then they could have conceaved Wherby they have hopes that if courts of 
Iusticiarie of this nature be Incouradged and frequently keiped, That 
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barbarous countrie may be reduced to greater Civilitie then hes bein knowne 
Amongst them in many years.187 
 
Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that the thief-catching activities of the Highland 
commission routinely relied upon local collusion, both in terms of requiring heritors 
to report thefts and, on occasion, asking them physically to apprehend bandits and 
present them to the justice courts.  In 1684, for instance, ‘the Laird of mcgrigor and 
ten or tuelve mor of his name’ were ordered to catch a group of fugitive 
MacIlphatriks, while two years later the commissioners issued a general order to all 
landlords, requesting them to apprehend a group of ‘several hielanders in armes’ 
who were ranging across the country under pretence of begging, but in actuality 
committing thefts.188  
 The most obvious manifestation of the Highland commission’s continuing 
attachment to indirect rule was its use of bonding.  It advertised its determination to 
begin collecting sureties as early as December 1682, and the Privy Council rubber-
stamped this two months later by delegating all responsibility for collecting bonds, 
save only that noblemen would still be required to report to Edinburgh.  There was 
more to this than merely changing the organisation responsibly for collecting bonds.  
The groundwork for a  thoroughly overhauled policy had already been laid in 
October 1682, after the commissioners discovered that invoking existing sureties – 
that is, those gathered in the 1660s and 1670s – simply resulted in ‘divers heretors 
and heads of clanes endeavouring to disclaime persones given up to the 
com[missione]rs’.  They therefore demanded that ‘the lands lords [and] heritors of 
the heighlands give in ane sub[scribi]t list to them wpone oathe of all p[er]sones 
reseiding within thair bounds’, along with inventories of all their weapons.  This call 
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reflected the commissioners’ decision to cast their net much wider than had the Privy 
Council; alongside senior chiefs and landlords, they were also determined to take 
bonds from heritors, life-renters and wadsetters, and to do so on a systematic, parish-
by-parish basis. 189  Collection of these bonds took place in 1683 and 1684.  Perthshire 
yielded 178 from twenty-one parishes; Argyllshire 208 from twenty-six; Stirlingshire 
and Dumbartonshire twenty-three between them; and seven were taken from 
individuals of uncertain residence.  On top of this, there were three special cases.  
The leading men of the landless clan Gregor in June 1683 gave general security for 
their subordinates ‘q[uhai]rsoeever they duell within the Kingdome’.  Nine bonds 
were collected in 1684 from individuals who had been declared fugitive but wished 
to submit themselves to the commissioners (which of course went some way to 
vindicating the commissioners’ faith in amnesties).  Also in 1684, forty-one sureties 
were collected from the marquis of Atholl’s wadsetters.190  In total, the 
commissioners collected c.460 bonds in a year.  This was by a considerable margin 
the most ambitious and rigorous bonding exercise since 1660, and so encapsulated 
the hybrid identity of the Highland commission.  It was a body which, by using 
powers delegated from Edinburgh, sought firmly to impose public authority upon 
the locality, yet it did so using the well-worn strategy of indirect control, allowing it 
to work in cooperation with a range of regional luminaries and exploit their personal 
authority. 
The great confluence of traumas which beset the British Isles between 1678 
and 1682 fundamentally changed the Restoration regime.  Although historians of 
England, Scotland and Ireland point to different national experiences, they concur 
that the 1680s produced a ‘second Restoration’ which saw government become more 
                                                           
189 NRS, PC8/7, f.6r, ff.7v-9r and at f.10r; RPCS, viii, pp.58-60 and at pp.196-97. 
190 NRS, PC8/7, ff.110v-147r.   
Reaction and Realignment, 1679-1688 
268 
 
authoritarian than it had been hitherto.  In Scotland, the fall of Lauderdale and the 
attendant rise of Albany disrupted the political status quo, and this had fundamental 
implications for the Highlands.  Albany abandoned the reliance on single lieutenants 
which had been a key feature of Lauderdale’s policy, and he expanded his Highland 
client-base beyond the two Campbell earls who, by the 1670s, had become the 
government’s pre-eminent agents.  It would be tempting to slot all of this into the 
‘second Restoration’ construct – an attack on the vested interests of the Lauderdale 
era, followed by a movement away from over-mighty nobles.  But this would be far 
too schematic.  Albany’s own engagement with Highland issues was largely limited 
to ensuring that the key local players answered to his interest, and the attack on the 
Campbells was more about cementing the duke’s position than changing the local 
balance of power.  In truth, the shifting focus and policies of the 1680s concealed 
strong continuities.  James continued Lauderdale’s scheme of attempting to create a 
transcendent sense of public authority running through Highland governance, but 
this remained in constant symbiosis with the personal power of nobles and kin elites.  
Such as there was one, the ‘second Restoration’ in the Highlands was a phase of 
tactical change but strategic continuity.  The mechanisms by which James exercised 
control were different from those used by Lauderdale.  But in his simultaneous 
reliance upon both public and private power, upon both direct and indirect means of 
control, his approach closely mirrored that of his predecessor. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The Highlands and the ‘Fiscal-Military’ State 
 
In November 1684, James Renwick, a minister attached to the radical 
Presbyterian sect known as the ‘Cameronians’, published An Apologetical Declaration 
and Admonitory Vindication of the True Presbyterians of the Church of Scotland.  This 
inflammatory document, which asserted the Cameronians’ determination to defend 
the covenants against all threats, has been described by Cowan as a ‘declaration of 
war’ against the government.  The regime, in response, threatened execution on 
anybody who refused to abjure the Apologetical Declaration.1  So began the 
Restoration’s most intense phase of persecution against nonconformists, a period of 
harsh and often summary punishment which formed the centrepiece of the ‘Killing 
Times’.  This heightened repression, scarring much of the 1680s on either side of its 
zenith in 1684-85, has often been understood as the culmination of the conflict 
between Episcopalians and Presbyterians which, in many conventional narratives, 
was the overarching theme of Scottish history throughout the Restoration.  More 
recently, however, the ‘Killing Times’ have also been viewed as part of a second 
meta-narrative, focused on the growing coercive capacity of the Scottish state.  By 
this thesis, the Restoration regime injected a new militancy into government, 
something which was allied to increased fiscal acquisitiveness.  This chapter will 
seek to assess the place of the Highlands in this model through exploration of two 
broad issues.  First, it will consider the Highland contribution to the fiscal and 
military resources of the Scottish state.  Second, it will then look at the role of the 
military in the government of the region, focusing in particular on why force was 
used, and the manner in which it was deployed. 
                                                           
1 Cowan, Scottish Covenanters, pp.120-21; McAlister, ‘James VII’, pp.164-65. 
The ‘Fiscal-Military’ State in the Highlands 
270 
 
The concept of a ‘military revolution’ remains one of the most familiar 
debates in the historiography of early-modern Europe.  In its basic form, the model 
was first proposed by Michael Roberts.  For him, technological advances in the 
century after 1560 forced rulers to create larger, more permanent, and more 
professional armies.  This, in turn, had a transformative impact on society at large, 
not least in that it stimulated the development of inflated, centralised and financially 
voracious government bureaucracies.  Thus developed the ‘fiscal-military’ state.2  
Roberts was primarily an historian of Sweden, and it was particularly to that 
kingdom that he applied his model.  Subsequent historians of Sweden, if not quite 
accepting the grandiose sweep of his argument, have nonetheless echoed several 
aspects of it, particularly in relation to the absolutist system imposed after 1680 by 
Karl XI (r.1660-97).  This king’s ruthless application of the reduktion (by which 
previously alienated Crown lands were reclaimed) is usually credited with first 
stabilising and then vastly increasing the state’s financial resources.  This, in turn, 
underpinned his military reforms, which used knektehåll (provincial contracts for 
levies of troops) and the indelningsverk (permanent allocation of farms to finance 
specified military expenditure) to provide by the end of the seventeenth century a 
standing army of around 40,000 men.3  With these reforms, it is generally agreed, 
Karl XI (building upon the efforts of his predecessors, particularly Gustav II and Karl 
X) transformed Sweden into one of the most effective ‘fiscal-military’ states of 
seventeenth-century Europe. 
 Yet Sweden is not the only country to which the ‘fiscal-military’ state model 
has been applied.  France was at war for most of Louis XIV’s reign (1643-1715), and 
                                                           
2 M. Roberts, ‘The Military Revolution, 1560-1660’ in M. Roberts (ed.), Essays in Swedish 
History (Minneapolis, 1967), pp.195-225, passim. 
3 Upton, Charles XI, pp.51-89; Lockhart, Sweden, pp.130-34; Kirby, Northern Europe, pp.219-22; 
R.I. Frost, The Northern Wars: War, State and Society in Northwestern Europe, 1558-1721 (Harlow, 
2000), pp.216-23. 
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by the 1690s warfare accounted for more than three-quarters of government 
expenditure.  This yielded an army of some 400,000 men by the end of the century, 
and was paid for through ruthless exploitation of France’s chaotic fiscal system, 
particularly by expanding indirect taxation and public borrowing.4  The gradual 
recovery of Brandenburg-Prussia from the devastation of the Thirty Years War (1618-
48) owed much to the Friedrich Wilhelm’s (r.1640-88) creation of an increasingly 
formidable army which, in the 1680s, peaked at 30,000 men.  This, in turn, was 
facilitated by a rationalised structure of revenue collection under the Amtskammer 
(Office for the Domains), and a new excise tax.5  In the Dutch Republic, the string of 
catastrophic military defeats suffered in 1672 spurred a recalled House of Orange, 
represented by Pince William III (r.1672-1702), to impose very high levels of taxation 
in order to support a huge army (roughly 100,000 men at its height), a general trend 
which continued for the remainder of the stadholder’s life.6  Even Spain, usually 
regarded as the ‘sick-man’ of Europe during the reign of Carlos II (1665-1700), 
responded to its military commitments against Portugal and France with concerted 
(although admittedly not wholly successful) attempts at fiscal reform throughout the 
1680s, especially by reducing juros (annuities paid for loans to the Crown).7  Across 
Europe, then, the broad notion of expanded military capacities sustained by heavier 
fiscal exaction resonates strongly.8 
 These ideas have also been applied to Stuart Britain.  In England, the 
demands of the Civil War and Interregnum stimulated the development of a 
                                                           
4 D. Sturdy, Louis XIV (Basingstoke, 1998), pp.52-60 and at pp.126-27. 
5 Clark, Iron Kingdom, p.43 and at p.61. 
6 J.I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall 1477-1806 (Oxford, 1995), p.818. 
7 Kamen, Spain, pp.367-69. 
8 There were, of course, notable exceptions.  Jan III’s near-trebling of the military capacity of 
Poland-Lithuania was achieved with virtually no reforms to either the military or fiscal 
machinery of the state.  Instead, Sobieski relied upon the established system of magnate 
contributions.  N. Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland (Oxford, 1981), i, p.478. 
The ‘Fiscal-Military’ State in the Highlands 
272 
 
massively inflated military establishment, yielding a standing army which peaked at 
nearly 50,000 men.  This was sustained by an enhanced fiscal apparatus, 
incorporating more effective taxation (primarily the assessment and the excise) as 
well as increased public borrowing.9  Yet because this ‘fiscal-military’ revolution was 
intimately associated with the parliamentary and republican regimes of 1642-60, the 
position of the Restoration state was weaker.  Indeed, J.D. Davies has argued that 
political pressures, principally the fear that a militarily strong monarchy was also an 
arbitrary one, ensured that the army shrank to such an extent that it became ‘not a 
particularly significant factor in domestic or international politics’.  The navy, being 
less associated in popular imagination with arbitrary rule, fared a little better, but 
even it suffered a marked contraction in the 1660s.10  None of this should be pushed 
too far, however.  For Braddick, reductions in the size of both the army and the navy 
simply masked the fact that England’s military capacity had been permanently 
enhanced.  This latent expansion, he argues, was confirmed not only by the retention 
of small standing forces, but by periodic mobilisation against the Dutch and, after 
1688, William III’s rapid success in getting England prepared for major warfare on 
the Continent.11 
If the military resources of Restoration England were somewhat equivocal, 
fiscal developments were equally complex.  Some historians have noted a distinct 
trend towards fiscal rationalisation.  Howard Tomlinson maintains that advances 
were made in three areas.  Firstly, the decision to put the Treasury into commission 
from 1667 allowed it to regularise its book-keeping, as well as to assert its pre-
eminence in public financial matters.  Secondly, more rigorous supervision of 
                                                           
9 Braddick, State Formation, pp.213-21 and at pp.253-65. 
10 J.D. Davies, ‘International Relations, War and the Armed Forces’ in L.K.J. Glassey (ed.), The 
Reigns of Charles II and James VII & II (Basingstoke and London, 1997), pp.211-34, at pp.218-21. 
11 Braddick, State Formation, pp.221-26. 
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revenue collection, particularly through abandoning tax-farming for the major 
indirect taxes, heightened efficiency.  Finally, the introduction of credit orders 
allowed the government to extend its pool of lenders, even if the system became 
somewhat problematic after the ‘Stop of the Exchequer’ in 1672.12  But if Tomlinson 
emphasises the increasing sophistication of the fiscal regimen in England, others 
have highlighted its ongoing limitations.  Tim Harris and Lionel Glassey both argue 
that lax collection meant the Crown never enjoyed the ordinary annual income of 
£1,200,000 laid down as part of the Restoration settlement, a situation exacerbated by 
the expense of the Dutch Wars and, to some extent, Charles II’s personal 
extravagance.  Nevertheless, both also concede that the reforms outlined above, 
combined with economic growth from the early 1670s, meant that Charles II’s 
finances grew increasingly healthy towards the end of this reign, while James II’s 
ability, in the aftermath of Monmouth’s rebellion in 1685, to wring further indirect 
taxes from Parliament made his position still more comfortable.13  If then it is 
questionable whether England after 1660 can be described as a ‘fiscal-military’ state, 
historians have nevertheless located some evidence to suggest that the reforms of the 
1640s and 1650s had permanently expanded the state’s resources, even if this 
potential was rarely exploited to the fullest. 
 In Scotland, any notion of a ‘fiscal-military’ state would seem to be 
undermined by historians’ focus on the country’s unimpressive bureaucratic 
                                                           
12 H. Tomlinson, ‘Financial and Administrative Developments in England, 1660-88’ in J.R. 
Jones (ed.), The Restored Monarchy 1660-1688 (London and Basingstoke, 1979), pp.94-117, at 
pp.95-105. 
13 Harris, Restoration, p.60; Glassey, ‘Politics, Finance and Government’, at pp.40-51.  J.P. 
Norrey’s study of south-western England illustrates the interplay of these issues in 
microcosm.  He concludes that revenue-collection remained woefully inefficient throughout 
the Restoration, and that such improvements as were made can almost exclusively be 
credited to the pressure imposed by a reformed Treasury.  P.J. Norrey, ‘The Restoration 
Regime in Action: The Relationship between Central and Local Government in Dorset, 
Somerset and Wiltshire, 1660-1678’, Historical Journal, 31:4, 1988, pp.789-812, at pp.796-803. 
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structure.  Jackson, focusing particularly on the excise tax, notes that widespread 
inefficiency and corruption in the system of collection circumscribed the 
government’s ability to maximise its income.14  Harris agrees that the regime proved 
consistently unable to manage its finances properly, and adds that this in turn 
militated against maintaining substantial military resources, save a small standing 
army of around 1,200 men.15  Yet if Scotland was hardly a classic ‘fiscal-military’ state 
during the Restoration, it has been suggested that movement in this direction was 
being made.  Although acknowledging its limitations, Brown makes the point that 
taxation became much more ubiquitous than it had been under earlier Stuart kings, 
whether through the excise (1661), land tax (1665) or, ultimately, the reintroduction 
of the assessment (1667).16  In the military sphere, similarly, Lenman contends that 
the state was able to maintain an enhanced capacity, despite its financial difficulties, 
through the establishment of the militia (1668-69), a device which allowed it to 
mobilise and arm forces at private rather than public expense.17  However, it is Lee 
who has provided the most detailed assessment of Scotland’s fiscal and military 
resources.  He argues that the chaotic state of the public finances before 1667 
(exacerbated by the Second Dutch War) stimulated a period of intensive reform 
under a sizeable Treasury Commission which had, by 1671, performed ‘possibly the 
most determined and sweeping attempt at financial reform in the seventeenth 
century’.  For Lee, these reforms (only partially successful) were aimed squarely at 
sustaining the military, which was consistently the largest single item of 
                                                           
14 Jackson, Restoration Scotland, pp.81-82. 
15 Harris, Restoration, pp.111-12. 
16 Brown, Kingdom or Province, p.143. 
17 B.P. Lenman, ‘Militia, Fencible Men, and Home Defence, 1660-1797’ in N. MacDougall (ed.), 
Scotland and War AD79-1918 (Edinburgh, 1991), pp.170-92, at pp.170-84. 
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expenditure.18  In this reading, then, there was a clear intent to transform Scotland 
along the lines of the ‘fiscal-military’ state model, even if the design was never fully 
accomplished. 
 It is straight-forward enough to establish the contribution made by the 
Highlands to the Restoration regime’s haphazard drive towards expanding its 
financial and military resources, at least on paper.  To take the financial sphere first, 
the two principal public revenue streams in Restoration Scotland were the excise and 
the assessment (or cess).19  The excise was granted to Charles II for life in 1661, and 
was set at an annual levy of £480,000, or £40,000 per month.  Shire valuations were 
revised two years later, although the overall total remained unchanged.  The 
assessment was levied by the Committee of Estates in 1660, using valuations from 
the 1640s.  It was then abandoned, before being reintroduced using a fresh valuation 
in 1667.  This new valuation formed the basis of further impositions, in 1670 and 
1672, before fresh valuations in 1678 underpinned a new levy in that year, and a 
further one in 1681.  Although the duration of grants varied, from six months in 1660 
to five years in 1678 and 1681, the annual valuation for Scotland always stood at 
£864,000 (£72,000 each month).  Table 6 (overleaf) summarises the projected 
Highland share of these monthly impositions under each valuation.  In general 
terms, the financial burden placed upon the Highlands remained fairly stable across 
the Restoration, although each revaluation, with the exception of the 1678 
amendment to the cess, imposed a slightly higher contribution.  Yet within this total 
there were a number of significant shifts.  Most strikingly, the excise recalculation in 
                                                           
18  Lee, ‘Government and Politics’, p.129 and at pp.130-31.   This model of impressive treasury 
reform after 1667 echoes an earlier argument presented by Athol Murray, and is generally 
followed in the subsequent work of Lee, see Murray, ‘Scottish Treasury’ and Lee, ‘Dearest 
Brother’, pp.122-23. 
19 For fuller details on the composition of the Crown’s revenues in this period, see Lee, 
‘Government and Politics’, chapter 3. 
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1663 saw modest falls in the levies from Cromarty and Sutherland, offset by 
increases in Caithness (£20), Inverness and Ross (£100) and Argyll (£250 – a jump of 
more than 200 per cent).  Comparable discontinuity affected the assessment.  
Caithness, and Inverness and Ross saw their valuations increase between 1660 and 
1667 (although in the case of Inverness and Ross the levy was reduced again by 
1678).  As for the burghs, the burdens on Inverness and Dornoch fell progressively 
over the period: Tain’s liability fell by nearly one-third after 1667; while Fortrose, 
Cromarty and Wick, which had not been valued in 1660, all made appearances in 
1667 and 1678. 
 
Area Excise (£ s d Scots) Assessment (£ s d Scots) 
 1661 1663 1660 1667 1678 
Argyllshire 193 16 0 443 16 0 1950 0 9 1947 10 09 1947 10 9 
Caithness 133 4 0 153 4 0 485 5 0 599 5 0 599 5 0 
Cromartyshire 30 0 0 24 0 0 67 16 0 68 5 0 68 5 0 
Inverness-
shire 
694 8 0 794 8 0 2590 19 0 
(including 
Ross) 
2782 7 0 
(including 
Ross) 
2590 19 0 
(including 
Ross) 
Ross 204 0 0 204 0 0 - - - 
Sutherland 94 12 0 72 12 0 336 0 0 336 0 0 336 0 0 
Cromarty   11 10 06 12 0 0 12 0 0 
Dingwall - - 29 8 0 12 0 0 18 0 0 
Dornoch - - - 30 0 0 30 0 0 
Fortrose - - - 30 0 0 30 0 0 
Inverness - - 294 5 0 264 0 0 216 0 0 
Tain - - 59 15 6 60 0 0 42 0 0 
Wick - - - 30 0 0 20 0 0 
Totals 1554 0 0 1682 0 0 5824 19 9 6171 7 9 5909 19 9 
Table 6: Monthly taxation valuations in the Highlands, 1660-78.20 
 
Perhaps a more important point relates to the modesty of the Highland 
contribution to the king’s revenue.  The six Highland shires represented about half of 
the territory of Scotland, but were expected to contribute only about 8 per cent of the 
                                                           
20 See appendix 6 on the attached CD for a full breakdown of taxation levies in the Highlands. 
The ‘Fiscal-Military’ State in the Highlands 
277 
 
assessment revenue, and a mere 4 per cent of the excise.  The assessment was levied 
on valued rents, so low impositions imply low rental values, and surviving valuation 
rolls would seem to bear this out.  A valuation of Inverness-shire, dated 1667, 
reckoned that the shire’s rents were worth around £73,188.  Argyll, in a valuation 
from the mid-1680s, was totalled at £128,418.21  This compared unfavourably with 
other, geographically smaller shires, such as Perth (valued at £341,626 in 1667), 
Aberdeen (£236,240, 1674), Berwick (£216,223, 1680), Dumfries (£238,000, 1671), 
Forfar (£171,519, 1683) or Lanark (£162,000, 1667), all of which faced correspondingly 
higher assessment levies.22  The low excise figure was equally unremarkable.  
Composed mostly of a tax on the brewing industry, but also from duty on imports, it 
was heavily associated with conventional trade, something in which the Highlands 
was singularly deficient.  In short, the relatively small amount of revenue sought 
from the Highlands tended to reflect and confirm the region’s perceived marginality.  
Whatever the grants of taxation show about the government’s fiscal 
intentions, it is clear that they do not reveal a great deal about the reality.  Across 
Scotland, the money actually received by the government was probably always 
substantially less than the levies implied, and in the Highlands the situation was no 
different.23  This, certainly, was the perception behind the Scottish Parliament’s 
observation in 1669 that: 
 
Diverse persons within the shires of Ross, Sutherland, Caithnes, Argyll, 
Invernes and burghs within the same, ar in arrear and deficient in payment of 
a considerable parte of the annuitie of excise granted to his majestie in the 
yeer 1661, the taxation and assessment imposed by the conventions of estates 
                                                           
21 NRS, E106/3/1; E106/17/1. 
22 PKA, Commissioner of Supply Documents, CC1/1/8; NRS, E106/2/1; E106/6/1; 
E106/12/1; E106/16/3; E106/21/1. 
23 Lee, ‘Government and Politics’, p.110. 
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in the yeers 1665 and 1666, notwithstanding of all legall diligence used for 
inbringing therof.24 
 
Although the surviving records are extremely patchy, there are indications that this 
complaint had some basis in fact.  The assessment voted in January 1667 was for 
twelve months.  An account of the first nine months reported that the Highland 
shires, liable for about £51,000, were already in arrears to the tune of nearly £40,000.  
The Highland burghs, meanwhile, had paid only about £300 of their £3,943 liability.25  
Later collections encountered similar difficulties; the £2,436 6s 9d of arrears from the 
five-month levy of 1670 were blamed on ‘some Remote shires and Burghs’, while the 
£22,928 still owing in 1679 from the twelve-month levy of 1672 was specifically tied 
to the Highland shires (with the addition of Orkney and Shetland).26  By 1680, the 
Highland burghs and shires were nearly £20,000 in arrears.27   
Payment of the excise is still more difficult to trace, but there appear to have 
been some similar problems.  Firm references exist to deficiencies in the burghs of 
Tain (1668), Fortrose (1669) and Inverness (1681), as well as in Mull (1674), Ross-shire 
(1684) and Caithness (1685).28  Argyllshire also seems to have been in arrears for most 
of the 1670s.29  There are, however, clues that, under James VII, collection of the 
excise may have been becoming more reliable.  Roughly £2,000 was collected from 
Caithness in the year from 1 November 1685, about £160 more than the shire’s 
liabilities under the 1663 valuation.30  Over the same period, Sutherland yielded its 
entire liability of £871 4s; Cromarty paid its full £288; and Inverness-shire handed 
                                                           
24 RPS, 1669/10/57. 
25 NRS, Supply Accounts, E67/6/1. 
26 NRS, E67/7/1, E67/9, f.1 and at f.14. 
27 NRS, GD112/43/14/12. 
28 MacPhail, Highland Papers, i, pp.263-64; MacGill, Old Ross, i, pp.117-18; RPCS, vii, p.73; 
RPCS, viii, pp.472-73; NRS, SC14/81/1. 
29 Cameron et al, Justiciary Records, i, pp.46-48 
30 NRS, Excise Collectors’ Accounts, E79/5/2-3. 
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over nearly £100 more than its bill of £8,980 16s.31  The situation was slightly less 
encouraging in Argyll, which registered an under-payment of around £1,000 for the 
period May 1683 to November 1685.  Ross-shire was even worse, apparently 
underpaying by about £2,000 in 1685-86.32  While there is simply not enough data to 
draw firm conclusions, it seems likely that this spurt of relatively studious collection 
was the exception, rather than the rule.  In all probability, the excise, like the cess, 
flowed in only sluggishly from the Highlands, if at all. 
There were a number of explanations for such deficiencies, one being simple 
evasion.  There was apparently a widespread culture in Tain of avoiding the excise 
on beer, to the extent that the burgh council in 1663 threatened the town’s brewers 
with imprisonment.33  Inverness burgh council complained in 1666 that it was forced 
to carry most of the burden for paying the excise because ‘the Shyre of Innernes 
payes little or nothing, nor for any thing can be sein be this Counsell are also like to 
do no dutie’.34  Farther south, the inhabitants of Inveraray hit upon an ingenious 
method of tax-avoidance in the early 1680s.  Noticing that the parks of Inveraray 
were lying waste in 1682 and 1683 and so free from all public dues, several town 
inhabitants began pasturing their livestock on this land, thereby avoiding the 
necessity of paying rent and duties.35 
At the same time, the government’s own fiscal machinery was far from 
perfect.  The lack of a designated collector in Inverness-shire, for instance, was by 
1669 forcing the sheriff clerk, George Leslie, to undertake the task.36  Similarly, there 
was clearly no collector on the western seaboard during the early 1670s, when 
                                                           
31 NRS, E79/10/2-3 and at 5-7. 
32 NRS, SC54/20/3/3/11; NRS, E79/10/4. 
33 MacGill, Old Ross, ii, p.77. 
34 Mackay et al, Records of Inverness, ii, p.230. 
35 NRS, SC54/20/3/3/6. 
36 RPCS, iii, pp.8-9. 
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Macdonnell was awarded nearly £3,000 in compensation for his services in collecting 
royal revenues from that region, particularly Skye and Sleat.37  Collections could also 
be interrupted by administrative wrangles.  The decision to impose a single burden 
jointly on Inverness-shire and Ross, despite the fact that the two shires were officially 
disjoined in 1661, caused tension because the commissioners of supply, most of 
whom were from Inverness-shire, imposed a lighter burden upon themselves (34s 
per £100 of valued rent) than upon their counterparts in Ross (46s per £100).38  A 
rather different problem paralysed Argyllshire in 1686.  Here, the commissioners of 
supply could not agree how best to divide up the shire’s liabilities.  The commission 
splintered as a result, leading to rival meetings issuing contradictory instructions.  
Eventually an appeal to the Privy Council resulted in the appointment of an outside 
convener.39 
Moreover, office-holders could not always be trusted.  Some were simply 
unwilling to perform a duty which would make them unpopular.  When it imposed 
a stent of £1,000 to cover the cost of public dues (amongst other expenses) in 1663, 
the burgh of Tain felt it necessary to accompany its appointment of Alexander Ross 
and John Manson as collectors with the threat that they would be fined £4 if they 
refused to serve.40  In other cases, officials under-performed.  Sometimes this resulted 
from simple human error: Colin Campbell, collector of Argyll, mistakenly granted a 
full discharge to John Lamont for the supply from Cowal in 1683-84, despite the fact 
that £42 was still outstanding.41  Other shortcomings were more serious.  John 
MacLeod of Milton was imprisoned in 1681 for failing to collect the excise from Ross-
                                                           
37 NRS, E26/11/2, f.204. 
38 RPCS, ii, pp.295-96. 
39 RPCS, xii, pp.191-92. 
40 MacGill, Old Ross, ii, pp.77-78.  Similarly in Argyll, where there were difficulties in 
establishing a quorum at commissioner of supply meetings, a fine of £20 was imposed on all 
commissioners who failed to attend.  NRS, SC54/20/3/2/16 
41 NRS, SC54/20/3/2/33.  The error was quickly identified and a new discharge issued. 
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shire – by 1684, he was said to be responsible for arrears of perhaps £9,000.42  
Corruption was far from unknown.  The inhabitants of Lochhead complained in 1664 
that one Captain Donald Maclean and his deputy, Donald Macmarcus, were 
collecting the excise of Argyll and the Isles by virtue of a fraudulent commission 
from the collector, Sir Walter Seaton.43  Alexander Mackintosh of Connage, sheriff-
depute of Inverness, was put to the horn in 1669 after embezzling a portion of the 
shire’s revenue.44  Problems such as these inevitably curtailed the government’s 
ability to collect public revenue with any efficiency. 
A weak infrastructure was not the only problem.  There were also a number 
of claims about incorrect valuation.  The heritors of Caithness claimed in 1670 that 
many of their lands were ‘most exorbitantly over valued’, and that ‘a number of 
Lands given out in proper wadsett and possest be oth[e]r persones’ were included in 
their valuations.45  Argyllshire made a similar complaint in 1685-86, and succeeded in 
winning licence from the Privy Council to conduct a complete revaluation of the 
shire.46  The burghs too frequently felt aggrieved, the standard complaint being that 
they were sometimes compelled to pay twice, once as a burgh and once as part of 
their shire.  Wick made this point in 1678, claiming that the heritors of Caithness 
forced them to contribute towards the shire’s cess liability.47  A similar problem 
formed one of the grievances raised by Cromarty during its successful petition of 
1681 to be relieved of royal burgh status.  It was claimed that the Urquhart lairds, 
who were hereditary sheriffs of Cromarty, had since 1661 forced all those heritors 
holding lands within the burgh to contribute their liabilities on these lands towards 
                                                           
42 MacGill, Old Ross, i, p.118 
43 NRAS1209, bundles 54 and 100 
44 RPCS, iii, pp.10-11.  
45 NRS, PA7/10, f.33. 
46 NRS, SC54/20/3/3/3. 
47 RPCS, vi, pp.500-1. 
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paying the dues of the shire, rather than the burgh.  This necessarily reduced the 
town’s ability to meet its own obligations, leaving it ‘ruind [and] beggered’.48  Of 
course, complaints such as these were neither unique to the Highlands nor wholly 
trustworthy; the royal burghs in particular had a venerable tradition of pleading 
inability to meet their financial burdens, and for historians a degree of caution is 
therefore necessary.49  Nonetheless, the gaps in the government’s machinery of 
collection were clearly matched by confusion as to exactly how the burden was to be 
divided up.  Added together, all of these challenges (none of them unique to the 
Highlands) made collection of taxation a daunting task.  James Menzies, whose 
duties as captain of one of the Highland company involved the collection of more 
than £20,000 in tax arrears across the region, declared in exasperation in 1680 that ‘I 
am so trowbled with this effair I have in hand that iff I hade knowen I hade never 
undertaken it’.50  His understandable despair reflected the government’s general 
inability to extract from the Highlands the levels of taxation it desired. 
The heightened financial acquisitiveness of Scottish government after 1660 
was intimately related to its burgeoning military capacity.  Charles II was the first 
Scottish monarch to have a standing army at his disposal.  In terms of size it was not 
an especially large force: it numbered around 900 at the beginning of the 1660s, 
reaching a peak of perhaps 3,000 in the 1680s.51  Within the officer corps of this 
relatively modest force, there was a limited Highland presence.  Kenneth Mackenzie 
of Suddie was appointed a lieutenant in the earl of Mar’s regiment in 1671, before 
being promoted to captain ten years later.  Hugh Mackay, third son of Hugh Mackay 
of Scourie, was given a major’s commission in 1685 (and, in 1689, would be 
                                                           
48 NRS, PA7/11, f.47; RPS, 1681/7/85. 
49 Toller, ‘‘Now of little significancy’?’, pp.113-14. 
50 NRS, GD112/39/132/12. 
51 Lee, ‘Government and Politics’, pp.153-54. 
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appointed commander-in-chief in Scotland by William II).  Robert Mackenzie, a 
cousin of Seaforth, served as a captain in Mar’s regiment in 1688, succeeding his 
father.  Most strikingly of all, Sir George Munro of Culcairn and Newmore, brother 
to the Munro chief, Sir Robert Munro of Foulis, served as major-general of the king’s 
forces between 1674 and 1677.52  Below the officer level it is impossible to ascertain 
the extent of Highland involvement in the regular army, although it seems likely that 
there was a scattered Highland presence.  The muster roll of the seventy-strong 
company gathered by Suddie at Inverness in 1686, for example, contained a range of 
Highland surnames, including Fraser, Robertson, Macrae, MacDonald, Maclennan, 
Mackintosh, Cameron, Mackenzie, Maclean, Colquhoun, Grant, Macpherson, 
Campbell, Stuart, MacGregor, Macmillan, Gray and Chisholm.53 
If the Restoration was notable for yielding the first standing army in Scottish 
history, it also produced another military innovation: the militia.  This force was 
based upon a declaration issued by the Scottish Parliament in September 1663, by 
which the king was offered a force of 20,000 foot and 2,000 horse.  The liabilities 
thereby imposed upon the Highlands are set out in Table 7: 
 
Area Foot Horse 
Inverness-shire (Seaforth’s and Lovat’s spheres) 666 88 
Sutherland, Caithness and the remainder of Inverness 1,066 88 
Argyll, Dumbarton and Bute 800 0 
Total 2,532  176  
Table 7: Highland liabilities under the offer of forces, 1663.54 
 
In practice this declaration did not lead to the raising of any forces; its purpose was 
more to offer a rhetorical assertion of the Crown’s right to use force as a means of 
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preserving order.  Not until the aftermath of the Second Dutch War (1665-67) and the 
Pentland Rising (1666), when internal security was at the forefront of the 
government’s mind, was any real effort made to settle a national militia.  In May 
1668, the king ordered that forces be raised in accordance with the 1663 declaration, 
but only from a small number of specified shires.  The Highlands do not seem to 
have been considered trustworthy enough for such employment; as Tweeddale 
noted, until it was known ‘uhat obedienc they giue to publike orders [...] it is best 
kiping them disarmed’.55  The only Highland representation, in fact, came from 
Argyll.  In concert with Dumbarton and Bute, it was required to raise 800 foot, a 
force that seems to have been outfitted by at least 1670.  In practice Argyllshire 
yielded the majority of its troops (500) throughout the 1670s and early 1680s.56  
Argyll would remain the sole Highland representation until 1678, when 
proposals were introduced for a ‘new model’ militia.  This provided for a force 
which was smaller, just 5,000 foot and 500 horse, but also better equipped and more 
frequently mustered.  These proposals included provision for 660 Highland infantry 
(160 from Inverness, 100 from Ross, 200 from Sutherland and Caithness, and 200 
from Argyll, Dumbarton and Bute) and forty-four Highland cavalry (shared between 
Inverness, Ross, Sutherland and Caithness).57  In practice, little progress was made 
establishing the new militia, despite sustained pressure from the duke of Albany, 
and the proposal was quietly dropped in 1681.58  The Highland shires, meanwhile, 
seem to have avoided contributing to the existing militia until at least 1683 – and 
even then, levies came only from Inverness and Cromarty, which together outfitted 
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ten companies of foot.59  In short, the government’s attempts to settle the militia seem 
to have had a very limited impact in the Highlands. 
If attempts to exploit the military potential of the Highlands through the 
standing army and the militia met with little success, there remained a third option.  
The government could try to work through the structures of lordship; as James VII 
put it in 1685, ‘Hyland men never do so good service as uhen ther chife is upon ther 
heads’.60  Local elites were likewise very keen to stress their own centrality in 
harnessing the Highlands’ military potential.  George Sinclair, 6th earl of Caithness, 
for example, upon hearing in 1668 that there were plans to settle a militia with 
Seaforth as colonel of everything north of Ardersier, demanded that ‘noe other be 
intruded in the shyr of Caithnes bot my self’, since nobody else had the necessary 
innate authority.61  Likewise, Ludovick Grant of Freuchie in 1685 excused his practice 
of appointing family members to command the local militia because ‘our countrey 
men are never significant without ther native officers’.62  The extent to which this was 
a distinctly Highland phenomenon is open to question; the militia, after all, was 
organised on a territorial basis, and the men appointed as colonels were always local 
elites, usually noblemen.63   
Nevertheless, from the late 1670s in particular, the government proved itself 
willing to rely upon the structures of lordship and clanship as a means of drawing 
manpower from the Highlands.  The most infamous such project was the 
deployment of the ‘Highland Host’ in 1678.  When the idea of deploying the Host 
was first mooted in the autumn of 1677, there were widespread fears that it would 
constitute little more than a Gaelic horde.  In a letter received in October 1677 by 
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William Douglas, 3rd duke of Hamilton, the extent to which clan musters were 
expected to underpin the Host was made clear:  
 
The wholl nobilety who hav any interest in the Hylands, as Huntly, Atholl, 
Argyll, Marshall, Moray, Mar, Kintoir, Caithnes [and] c[o] ar ordered 
instently to hav all the Hylanders in reddines upon a call to march to Stirling 
[...] and itt appears ther ar non invyted hether, militia or Lolanders, bott 
Hylanders only, McDonalds, McCleans, McGregors, McEntoshes, McClouds, 
McForbesses, McCouls.64 
 
In actuality, when the Host was eventually commissioned in December 1677, its 
‘Highland’ identity was rather more limited.  The earls of Atholl, Moray, Perth, Mar 
and Caithness (Glenorchy) were empowered to muster the Highlanders within their 
lands, meaning that only the southern and eastern fringes of the Highlands were 
involved.  In addition, the Host, which ultimately reached around 8,000-strong, was 
fortified with the militia of Angus, and with regular forces, which together accounted 
for around one-third of its strength.65  Despite these qualifications, the raising of the 
Highland Host clearly signalled that the government was willing to work through 
the more informal authority networks provided by native lordship in an effort to tap 
the Highlands’ manpower potential. 
 Moreover, this was an expedient which resurfaced in the 1680s, particularly 
during the crisis of Argyll’s rebellion.  In May 1684, at the same time as it confirmed 
the scheme of dividing Argyllshire into seven lieutenancies (see chapter 6), the Privy 
Council issued orders providing a 4,700-strong reservoir of manpower for the 
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lieutenants’ use.  This force was to be composed of personal levies from named 
individuals, broken down as in Table 8:  
 
Lieutenancy Person Size of Levy 
Cowal William Graham, 8th earl of Mentieth 200 
Humphrey Colquhoun of Luss 100 
Inveraray John Murray, 1st marquis of Atholl 300 
John Campbell, 1st earl of Breadalbane 300 
Kintyre Sheriff of Bute 200 
Sir John Maclean of Duart 200 
MacLeod of Harris 200 
Sir Hugh Campbell of Cawdor (Islay) 200 
Craigness George Gordon, 4th marquis of Huntly 300 
James Drummond, 4th earl of Perth 300 
Lachlan Mackintosh of Torcastle 200 
Sir Lachlan Mackinnon 100 
Duncan Stewart of Appin 100 
Dunstaffnage George Gordon, 4th marquis of Huntly 300 
James Drummond, 4th earl of Perth 300 
Ewan Cameron of Lochiel 200 
Donald MacDonald of Moidart 200 
Coll MacDonald of Glengarry 100 
Tarbert Charles Erskine, 5th earl of Mar 300 
Alexander Menzies of Weem 100 
Kenneth Mackenzie, 3rd earl of Seaforth 300 
Sir Donald MacDonald of Sleat 200 
Table 8: Proposed personal levies for lieutenants of Argyll, 1684.66 
 
Just as the multiple-lieutenancies scheme quickly proved abortive, this force seems 
never to have been raised.  Nevertheless, it represented a much more ambitious 
policy than had been applied in 1677-78.  Whereas the ‘Highland’ elements of the 
Highland Host had been drawn from the resources of a very small group of trusted 
noblemen on the Highland fringe, the 1684 proposals involved a much broader range 
of individuals, many of whom (such as Lochiel and Glengarry) were the heads of 
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traditionally troublesome clans in the region’s deep interior (not to mention old 
enemies of the Campbells).  This trend was to continue during the raising of forces to 
head off Argyll’s rebellion in 1685 (when James VII explicitly stated that he wished 
the rebel forces to be confronted not by the standing army, but by ‘Highlanders, and 
melitia, and what troups may be had from Irland’).67  That May, levies were 
demanded from Gordon (600 men), Torcastle (200), Freuchie (300), Lovat (300), 
Seaforth (400), Glengarry (100), Moidart (200), Duart (300), Sleat (300), John 
Mackenzie, master of Tarbat (300), George Gordon, lord Strathnaver (300), Caithness 
(400), Lochiel (200) and the Tutor of Maclean (300).68  Breadalbane also undertook to 
muster 6-700 men, while Atholl, the commander of the royal army, himself gathered 
around 2,000 Highlanders.69  Again it is uncertain just how much of the projected 
force was actually raised, particularly given the speed with which the rebellion 
collapsed, but Campbell, Cameron, Gordon, Maclean and MacDonald contingents 
certainly served.70    
Three years later, as James VII faced William of Orange’s impending 
invasion, exploitation of clan levies again came to the fore.  Orders for gathering a 
force of Highlanders at Stirling to defend against the ‘insults of some neighbouring 
states’ began to be issued in October 1688.  About 1,000 Highlanders were gathered, 
although cost implications forced the government to disband half of them on 15 
November.  This left a force of 518 soldiers, mustered through the efforts of Atholl 
(200), Sir Thomas Stewart of Grandtully (50), Weem (50), Breadalbane (100), Perth 
(50), Alexander Robertson of Struan and Andrew Macfarlane of Macfarlane (together 
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48) and Montrose (20).  Mar would provide 100 more by mid-December.71  So, in the 
late 1670s and 1680s the Restoration regime proved itself quite capable of tapping the 
military potential of the Highlands, but it was forced to do so by working through 
the existing structures of lordship.  It found itself in this position because neither the 
expansion of the regular army, nor the introduction of the militia, offered a secure 
channel for accessing the region’s manpower.  What emerged instead was a 
compromise: the government’s coercive capacity was augmented, but the local 
supremacy of the Highland elite was reinforced in return.  In the military sphere, as 
in the political, direct and indirect methods of control were inextricably intertwined. 
The notion that ‘fiscal-military’ states began to emerge in early-modern 
Europe links to another important theme.  Jeremy Black has argued that larger and 
more permanent armed forces provided governments with stronger coercive 
machinery, enhancing their ability to enforce internal obedience.72  Certainly, 
examples abound of militaries being used in this way.  Louis XIV readily used his 
formidable army to crush dissent – some 10,000 soldiers were quartered in Brittany 
following a tax revolt in 1675.73  Friedrich Wilhelm overcame the unwillingness of 
Prussia to help fund his participation in the First Northern War (1655-60) by 
stationing his army within the duchy and simply forcing payment.74 
The military accrued crucial coercive functions in the Restoration British Isles.  
Most obviously, government authority in Ireland was underpinned by a relatively 
large standing army of around 6,000 men, overwhelmingly Protestant and strongly 
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English in composition.75  Within England itself, military coercion was principally 
associated with the local militias, whose responsibility for maintaining domestic 
order became more pronounced after 1660.76  For Anthony Fletcher, indeed, the 
militia was a central feature of Restoration government.  Not only does he view it as 
an effective peace-keeping institution, whose efficiency only increased as the 
Restoration wore on, but, perhaps more importantly, he stresses its politicisation.  
The militias, in this view, became ‘the principal link between centre and locality’, 
giving them a vital role in implementing government policy – particularly in 
suppressing nonconformity.77  Some caution is necessary, however.  Although 
militias certainly performed policing duties, and although the Crown retained 
ultimate control over appointments, they remained semi-autonomous, representing 
the interests of the local gentry as much as those of the king, whose bidding they did 
not unquestioningly do.78  Moreover, the quality of militias varied.  Some counties, 
like Lancashire and Norfolk, produced fairly active and effective forces, but others 
were less successful.  In the south-western counties of Dorset, Somerset and 
Wiltshire, unenthusiastic officials and hostile populations produced weak and 
lethargic militias which enjoyed little success in policing, and even less in home 
defence.79  If then the existence of the militias undoubtedly gave the government 
tangible access to the tools of military coercion, the effectiveness and responsiveness 
of this resource is much less certain.80 
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In Scotland, the relevance of the military rule model tends to have been seen 
in a much more straight-forward way.  Lee states quite baldly that ‘The Scottish 
government in the mid-1670s came to resemble that of continental monarchies rather 
than England: an arbitrary regime dependent on military force’.81  Above all, this 
argument has been applied to governmental policy on religious dissent, particularly 
after the deployment of the ‘Highland Host’ in 1678.  For Rosalind Mitchison, the 
regime’s policies after this point were so reliant on military force that they were ‘the 
equivalent of martial rule’.82  In this Mitchison echoes the assessment offered by 
Donaldson, who views the overt militarism of the post-1678 period as the logical 
conclusion of an ecclesiastical policy which had been growing steadily more 
intolerant since 1673.83  McAlister offers a rather more detailed analysis of this 
militaristic phase.  She points out that the extensive judicial machinery used by the 
government to pacify south-western Scotland after the Covenanter rebellion of 1679 
was reinforced by the heavy use of the militia.  These forces, McAlister notes, could 
either be placed in fixed garrisons, with a view to deterring potential trouble-makers, 
or used to hunt down suspected rebels.84  A slightly different perspective has been 
offered by Lenman.  He does not question the militarism of the Stuart regime after 
1678, but he does implicitly question the accuracy of treating that year as the start-
date.  Like McAlister, he notes that the core of the royal forces in this period was the 
militia, which had been used for internal peace-keeping since its inception a decade 
earlier.85  Lee pushes the start-date still further back, and convincingly argues that 
force had been a key feature of government from the very earliest days of the 
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Restoration, beginning with the modest standing army raised in 1661-62.86  The 
militarism of the Restoration regime in Scotland has therefore been widely 
recognised, particularly after 1678 but arguably extending over the entire period.   
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the use of the military in the 
government of the Highlands has also attracted attention; both Lee and McAlister 
point out that the militaristic trends they discuss extended across the Highland line, 
albeit with thieves, rather than Presbyterians, as the intended targets.87  The most 
extensive analysis has however been produced by Macinnes.  He bases his 
assessment upon the observation that, across Scotland, the overriding aim of 
Lauderdale’s regime was to ensure domestic order as cheaply as possible, and that 
the preferred tool for achieving this end was always military force.  Such an 
aggressive stance required a pretext, and Macinnes argues that the government 
manufactured one by deliberately inflating reports of both lawlessness and tax 
evasion within the Highlands, particularly after the deployment of the first 
independent company in 1667.  In Macinnes’s reading, then, the Highlands was a 
‘training ground’ for the kind of militaristic regime Lauderdale would increasingly 
introduce into the Lowlands from the end of the 1660s.88 
Certainly, the authorities made frequent reference to the necessity of 
deploying the military in the Highlands.  As early as the mid-1660s, William 
Bellenden, 1st lord Bellenden was urging Lauderdale to deal with the Highlands by 
settling the militia.89  A memorandum penned in the mid-1670s under the influence 
of Argyll put the case more strongly, warning that without the immediate 
deployment of a 500-strong royal force, the region would soon be overcome by an 
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unholy combination of rebels, broken men, outlaws and thieves.90  The Privy Council 
had explicitly embraced the notion that a military presence was indispensible by 
1677 at the latest, a position to which the Secret Committee was still clinging in 
1685.91  While clearly part of the broader militaristic ethos of the Restoration regime 
across Scotland, this attachment to the military option was reinforced by the 
prevailing understanding of the ‘Highland problem’.  Glenorchy, in his proposals of 
the 1670s, neatly enunciated this: 
 
It will be necessarie that [...] Ther be ane order to a partie of his Maj[esties] 
forces to March to Lochaber [and] other places requisite For swppressing of 
Thifts [and] robberies [and] preserving the peace of [th]e Countrie For all the 
broken men will tak occasione to combyne together in parties [and] fall on the 
Cowntrie [and] the tyme [and] season of the yeir favo[u]rs [the]m Wheras a 
partie of his Maj[esties] forces being sent to the highlands to continow [the]r 
till the first of dec[embe]r The peace of [th]e Cowntrey will be [the]rby 
preserved.92 
 
In this view, it was the sheer lawlessness of the Highlanders themselves that 
demanded a forceful policy – nothing else stood a chance of cowing them.  This 
would seem to support Macinnes’s thesis that disorder was exaggerated in order to 
provide a pretext for military repression.  Yet there was a degree of tension inherent 
in Glenorchy’s proposal, something made more explicit by an anonymous 
memorandum of 1678, which justified the use of force on the grounds that ‘many 
peaceable Land lords [are] being appressed by theives and sorners possessing their 
estates’.93  The implication was not that all Highlanders were incorrigibly lawless, 
but that the region was being terrorised by a hard core of elusive, ‘masterless’ men 
whose very isolation was what made the problem insoluble without recourse to 
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armed intervention.  Rather than Highland disorders being exploited to excuse 
military rule, therefore, this stringent policy was in fact validated by a relatively 
enlightened recognition that not all Highlanders were criminals.   
Whatever the justification, once the policy of using military force had been 
decided upon, it could be used in a number of ways.  At the most fundamental level, 
it could serve to reinforce other initiatives.  Judicial commissions often benefited 
from this kind of augmentation, and many of them included specific provisions for 
coercive machinery.  The 1663 commission against the Camerons of Lochiel was 
accompanied by an order for the muster of all fencible men in the shires of Inverness, 
Ross, Nairn and Perth; Glenorchy was given the assistance of a troop of Linlithgow’s 
foot during his commission against Dunbeath in 1669; and Argyll was in 1671 
empowered to call upon the militias of Inverness (as yet nonexistent), Dumbarton, 
Bute, Argyll and Perth in fulfilment of his commission against the MacDonalds, with 
provision for calling in the regular army should it prove necessary.94  Noticing this 
trend, some local elites began specifically to seek military assistance in pursuit of 
private interests, which they argued were of public concern.  In 1683, Lachlan 
Maclean of Lochbuie successfully lobbied for the assistance of the royal forces 
stationed in Mull and Tiree in order to eject his son Hector, allegedly an associate of 
Argyll, from the Maclean estates at Moy.95  The following year, Lachlan Mackintosh 
of Torcastle adopted a similar approach, although apparently without success, by 
seeking to have ‘30 or at least 25’ of the royal troops attending the Highland 
commissioners at Inverness dispatched to Lochaber, in order to assist him in 
securing Keppoch against Coll MacDonald.96  If such requests underline the extent to 
which commissions blurred public and personal power (see chapter five), they also 
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illustrate the government’s willingness to stiffen its control of the locality with 
military force. 
The use of the military to reinforce judicial authority became much more 
systematic following the introduction of independent commissioners in 1667.  A key 
term in the original commission to Atholl was that, in order to help him fulfil his 
brief of curbing theft, murder, arson and other such crimes, he should ‘raise and keip 
such a number of men as he shall think fitt, who are to be commanded by him’.  This 
provision was repeated exactly in the commissions to Sir James Campbell of Lawers 
(1669) and Major George Grant (1674), as well as the joint commission to Lawers and 
Macdonnell (1677).97  The size of these independent companies was not specified, but 
the fact that Lawers and Macdonnell were in 1677 awarded the use of ‘one hundred 
fyre Locks [...] out of His Ma[jes]ties Magasin within his Castle of Ed[inbu]r[gh]’ 
suggests an expected presence comparable to one company in the regular army (100 
men).98  It is also uncertain where the soldiers came from, although it seems likely 
that Atholl mustered his own tenants, while Lawers, Grant and MacDonald relied 
upon their respective kin networks.  What is clear, however, is that the independent 
companies represented a much more formal, not to mention permanent, military 
presence than had existed hitherto. 
When in late 1678 the policy of appointing single commissioners lapsed, 
military rule was not similarly abandoned.  Instead, ‘independent companies’ gave 
way to ‘Highland companies’.  There were to be two of these, each with a strength of 
150 men (all Highlanders) and commanded by Lawers and Colonel James Menzies 
respectively.  Crucially, they were also to be part of the regular army, and were thus 
given a defined structure.  Each soldier would be paid 5d per day for 336 days each 
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year.  There was to be a formal officer corps consisting of one captain (paid 8s per 
day), as well as one lieutenant (4s), one ensign (3s), three sergeants (1s 6d each) and 
four corporals (1s each).  There were also to be four drummers and a surgeon, and 
these costs were met by the government.  Over the course of their roughly eighteen 
month existence, the Highland companies drew from the Treasury £615 16s to pay 
for bayonets, drums and company colours, and a further £88,360 8s in wages.99  
These forces, as had been the independent companies, were to be responsible for 
deterring and punishing lawlessness, but with the crucial difference that they 
represented a standing (and expanded) military establishment directly responsible to 
government. 
In actuality, the distinction between the semi-private ‘independent 
companies’ and the government-funded ‘Highland companies’ was not quite so 
clear-cut.  The companies quickly became the private playthings of Clan Campbell, 
particularly Argyll.  Menzies’ company was sent to Inveraray in October 1678, 
putting it squarely under Argyll’s influence.100  The other commission had been 
transferred from Lawers, who found the prospect of command too burdensome, to 
Glenorchy before January 1679.  This new commission, however, was entrusted into 
Argyll’s keeping, and by the simple expedient of not handing it over he was 
effectively able to take control of the second company until at least April.  Even 
thereafter, despite Glenorchy’s extreme reluctance to become involved in Argyll’s 
war with the Macleans – he had long argued that it would be safer to keep one of the 
companies on the border between Argyllshire and Perthshire, and repeatedly 
attempted to avoid mustering throughout 1679 – Mull remained the key 
preoccupation, and by May, when the companies were ordered to obey Argyll’s 
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instructions, any pretence of independence had been dropped.101  Not that 
Glenorchy’s affairs were ignored; in June 1680 he was granted permission to take his 
company to Caithness in order to settle his affairs there.102   By the time of Charles II’s 
decree the following month that neither Highland company was to be disbanded 
until the situations in Mull and Caithness had been settled, it was already clear that 
the expansion of the regime’s military presence in the Highlands did not reflect a 
new impartiality in policy so much as closer alignment (albeit temporary) between 
the regime and the Campbells.103  Nonetheless, it also reinforced and indeed 
formalised the trend, begun during the 1660s and 1670s, of using long-term military 
occupation to back up policy. 
Even the Highland commission of 1682, often celebrated as the most 
enlightened of the Restoration’s Highland policies, made extensive use of military 
reinforcement.  Detailed plans were set down five days after the commission’s 
creation.  The commander-in-chief, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Dalyell, was to 
dispatch a company of 150 men to Inverlochy as soon as practicable.  Once there, the 
party would be dispersed between the three southern divisions of the commission.  
One group, consisting of twenty-three men led by a sergeant and a corporal, would 
be stationed within the central division at the head of Loch Ness.  Two further, 
identical forces would take up lodgings in the southern and eastern divisions, at 
Achallader and Braemar respectively.  The remaining eighty or so men would stay at 
Inverlochy.  The raison d’être of these small forces was clear: 
 
The parties are hereby ordered and commanded to be obedient to the said 
commissioners in prosecution of ther commission and in searching for and 
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apprehending of thieves recovering of spreatches [cattle] poinding upon 
sentences Assisting of the countrey people in searching their goods and in 
every other thing relateing to the said commission as the saids 
Commissioners shall order.104 
 
This remained a consistent feature of policy: in February 1683, the Privy Council 
decreed that ‘pairties consisting of tuentie four men’ were to ‘attend the se[ver]all 
Iurisdictiones in the Comissione [...] To be comanded each of [the]m by a fitt officer 
who is to receive ordors from the re[s]p[ecti]ue Com[missione]rs’, while in July 1686 
a company of 100 men was assigned ‘to be sent to the Highlands for asissting the 
comissioners of the severall districts and preventing thefts, robberies and 
depredationes’.105  Moreover, it was not mere rhetoric.  The Justiciary courts certainly 
did have military escorts; by 1684 there were fifty men stationed at Inverness for the 
specific purpose of attending the courts of the central division, while in January 1687 
a party of soldiers under Ensign Walter Sharp was dispatched from their quarters at 
Dunblane to Creiff with instructions to ‘attend a Court of Justitiary’.106  These escorts 
were not simply defensive, and they proved perfectly capable to taking proactive 
steps to enforce the commissioners’ authority.  As we have seen above, soldiers were 
used at Creiff in 1684 to apprehend the ‘notorious hectoring thieff’ Alexander Roy 
MacGregor after he had refused to answer a court summons.107  Judgements were 
similarly liable to be backed up with force.  Alexander Robertson of Struan was in 
October 1686 granted the use of a small party of the forces at the commissioners’ 
disposal in order to enforce a decreet against ‘The Laird of Ardgowre and se[ver]all 
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persones in the braes of Lochaber [and] Glencoas’ which could not otherwise be 
enforced ‘against those rude people’.108  As discussed in chapter six, the commission 
for pacifying the Highlands was a typical example of the kind of strategic 
compromise that marked the Restoration regime’s approach to Highland issues.  At 
the same time, it encapsulated the government’s consistent willingness to back up its 
policies using military coercion.    
Beyond merely adding weight to other initiatives, military rule could 
function as a policy in its own right.  The earliest manifestation of this trend in the 
Restoration Highlands was the propensity for forming ‘watches’, a policy which 
found its fullest expression in an anonymous memorandum of the mid-1660s.  It 
proposed that Highland lawlessness would be restrained by a network of small 
armed forces ‘in all the bray and hiland Cuntreys’, manned from local communities 
and charged with guarding their own localities.  These watches would discourage 
theft by their very presence, but they would also be expected to ‘persew and follow 
efter all Limmers in [th]e recover[y] of honest mens goodis takin away’.  
Furthermore, each local watch would maintain dialogue with its counterparts in 
other localities, allowing for co-operation across the Highlands.109  This plan, then, 
sought to exploit local military resources in order to create what was effectively a 
chain of local police forces.  
In all probability such a scheme was simply too grandiose – and vague – to be 
practicable, and nothing quite so ambitious ever seems to have been attempted.  
Nevertheless, a scaled-down alternative, whereby watches were formed in order to 
guard specific trouble-spots, did emerge.  Initially, they tended to be created by the 
government, even if they were formed from, and armed using, local resources.  Three 
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were established in 1666, a year in which, due in no small part to the challenge of the 
Pentland Rising, militaristic policies came very much to the fore.  In April, Montrose 
was empowered to raise a watch of up to thirty men in order to guard his own 
lordship of Cowal from ‘the many and frequent robberies and depredations daylie 
committed be certain vagabonds, robbers and louse men’.  This watch was to be 
financed through a voluntary stent on the local heritors, and was empowered to 
pursue and apprehend all thieves, before handing them over to sheriffs, justices of 
the peace, or other magistrates.110  In June, similar instructions were issues for a sixty-
strong watch in Stirlingshire and Dumbartonshire, and in July Argyllshire was 
added to the list.111  The watches policy re-emerged in 1679, that other year of crisis 
for the Restoration regime, with the establishment of a watch to guard the passes of 
Mentieth.112  The government’s policy, in other words, was to raise watches as a 
short-term, emergency measure in times of heightened national tension.  
However, the government did not have a monopoly over using local military 
resources in this manner.  Throughout the Restoration, local society itself proved 
willing to use armed protection for specific purposes.  The burghs, of course, had a 
long-standing tradition of self-defence.  Nairn demanded that all its male inhabitants 
be armed and ‘alwayes in readieness’ to defend the town ‘vpon ane call’.  Burgesses 
should posses a gun and a sword, under pain of a £5 fine, while everybody else 
judged able-bodied should have a sword, axe, or half-pike if they wished to avoid a 
penalty of twenty shillings.113  Something rather more formal existed in the larger 
burgh of Inverness.  Here, around a dozen captains of the watch were appointed, 
who took it in turn to guard the town gates and patrol the streets after dark.  Their 
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primary duty was clearly to keep the peace, but their existence was also explicitly 
justified in terms of the ‘looseness’ of the surrounding country.114   
Similar precautions were also taken outwith the burghs.  Indeed, by 1669 it 
had been calculated for Tweeddale that there existed such a patchwork of private 
watches ‘betuixt dumbartane and Abirdeine’ that the money outlaid ‘amounts to 
more then the pey of fyve companyes’.115  The accuracy of this assertion is difficult to 
gauge, but there certainly were examples of large-scale private watches being 
established.  Argyll in 1676 established one in Appin (which, grumbled Duncan 
Stewart of Appin, was ‘trwblesome and expensive’ to the locals), and three years 
later he instituted one throughout Argyllshire to guard against thieves acting under 
the protection of the Macleans and their allies.116  Both the marquis of Montrose and 
the earl of Perth set up watches in 1680 with the blessing of the Privy Council, the 
former for Stirlingshire and the latter for Perthshire, Dumbartonshire and 
Clackmannanshire.117  Forming private watches had therefore become an established 
part of local control by the end of the Restoration, and one which the government 
was perfectly willing to encourage.  The policy, however, had one striking weakness 
(aside from its cost).  In 1675, John Mackintosh of Delmigavie, Paul Macbain of 
Kinchyll and Donald MacGillivray of Dumnaglass undertook to mount a guard on 
behalf of all those persons residing between Strathnairn and Starthearn.  They would 
only do so, however, in return for ‘ane certaine soume of money’.  Rather than 
reflecting entrepreneurial zeal, this bond illustrated that the tradition of extorting 
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blackmail could easily be modified to fit the language of private watches.118  If then 
the trend for protecting the locality with armed guards represented an important 
means of exploiting local resources to create a firm military presence, it was a policy 
which could give only short-term security and which could not realistically offer a 
comprehensive solution to the problem of governing the Highlands 
Despite the importance of both military reinforcement and armed watches, 
they were not the most prominent of the Restoration regime’s military tactics in the 
Highlands.  That dubious honour fell to the formation (or attempted formation) of 
fixed garrisons.  This was not of course a specifically Highland policy.  Major 
garrisons were maintained at Edinburgh, Stirling, Dumbarton and the Bass Rock for 
most of the Restoration (Edinburgh alone cost in excess of £13,000 every year), with 
smaller ones, such as the garrison at Shetland erected in the mid-1660s, being 
established when deemed necessary.119  In the Highlands, the thinking behind 
garrisons was straightforward enough; permanent strongholds would terrify 
recalcitrant locals into remaining law-abiding, and would also offer a stable channel 
for transmitting and enforcing government authority.120  They would further ensure 
that lawless individuals could not simply melt away in the face of a one-off 
campaign, only to reappear once attention had shifted elsewhere.121   
The notion of settling garrisons at various locations throughout the 
Highlands surfaced repeatedly throughout the Restoration.  As early as 1664, the 
Privy Council tabled the idea of establishing three, at Braemar, Inverlochy and 
Ruthven.122  The earl of Linlithgow was in 1671 ordered to station 200 troops, 
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accompanied by fifteen  men from Atholl’s regiment, in Lochaber ‘to obey and 
presecute such orders and instructions as they shall receave’.123  In September 1681 
the Highland Committee, building upon a proposal tabled by Albany in March, 
suggested replacing the recently-disbanded Highland companies by permanently 
stationing two companies from the regular army in the Highlands, one at Kilchumin 
and one at Auchintore, ‘where there will be aboundance of convenient houses to 
lodge them without any manner of danger’.124  In 1688, Mackintosh of Torcastle, 
along with a company of the army under Mackenzie of Suddie, sought to establish a 
stronghold in Lochaber as a means of cowing the Keppoch MacDonalds.125  All of 
these proposals proved abortive, but they illustrate that garrisoning had established 
itself as a favoured tactic for reducing particularly recalcitrant localities to 
obedience.126 
By far the most common suggested site for a garrison was Inverlochy.  The 
Scottish Parliament itself had as early as September 1661 ‘recommended to his 
majesty to settle a garrison in Inverlochie’.127  Lachlan Mackintosh of Torcastle 
echoed this call in 1663, opining that a garrison of 100 men would swiftly resolve his 
conflict with the Camerons.128  As noted above, the Privy Council made a comparable 
suggestion in 1664 when it proposed that Inverlochy be garrisoned alongside 
Braemar and Ruthven.  The theme was taken up by the Highland Committee in 1671, 
when it called for Lawers to be given the power to repair and garrison Inverlochy 
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Castle.129  In the mid-1670s, Glenorchy made a slightly different suggestion, namely 
that the Highlands, and Lochaber in particular, could only be pacified by repairing 
the now-derelict Cromwellian fortifications, which had been constructed from 1654 
with the intention of housing three companies.130  An old outpost situated on the 
shores of Loch Linnhe at Ardgour – ‘ane inconsiderable spott of ground yeilding no 
rent Inclosed w[i]t[h] the sea on the one hand [and] the river on the other’ – would be 
expensive to repair, requiring a voluntary contribution from ‘all the shyres betwixt 
Dunbarton [and] Sutherland’, but its situation would allow it to control access to the 
area’s waterways.131  The 1670s also saw two further voices added to the chorus, 
when a pair of anonymous memoranda argued that a force of 500 men, composed of 
the two Highland companies alongside two regular companies, should be stationed 
in the Highlands, headquartered at Inverlochy.132  The commissioners for pacifying 
the Highlands thought along similar lines, declaring in 1684 that they thought it 
‘absolutelie necess[a]rie That a garisone be with all convenient diligence placed at 
Innerlochie without q[uhi]ch the quyet of the highlands will not be Long durable’.133   
The regularity with which pleas to garrison Inverlochy were repeated 
suggests that in practice little progress was ever made.  Success came closest in 1677-
79.  In September 1677, the Privy Council ordered Linlithgow to dispatch a company 
of 100 men to garrison Inverlochy.  It was initially objected that the medieval keep, in 
which the soldiers were intended to be housed, could not be used for this purpose 
until Huntly, as its hereditory keeper, was consulted, but these qualms were 
overcome by Glenorchy, who pointed out that the house ultimately belonged to the 
king.  The castle, which was actually in a ruinous state, was ordered to be repaired 
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by 1 May 1678, and in the meantime the 100 troops were to be barracked at 
Dunolly.134  The deadline passed unmet, and in September 1678, as an 
accompaniment to the introduction of the Highland companies, fresh orders were 
issued for the repair of the castle.  In an effort to expedite the process, £500 was given 
to Lawers and Menzies to prepare accommodation for up to 500 soldiers (that is, for 
their own 300 Highlanders, Linlithgow’s 100 regular soldiers, and a contingency of 
100 additional troops).135  The following month, the Privy Council ordained that the 
newly-repaired garrison should be further supplemented through fortified outposts 
at Duart, Kinlochan, Dunnolich and Barcaldine.136  Over the autumn and winter, 
genuine efforts were made to establish the stronghold.  John Campbell of Inveraray 
was commissioned to go to Glasgow in September to collect a long list of provisions, 
including tools, crockery, bedding, fuel, food and drums.  Eventually nearly £7,000 of 
provisions were collected, enough to sustain 100 men for six months.137  In 
November, a survey of Loch Linnhe was carried out ‘for setting down a secure place 
for a garison with a swift landing’.138  Despite this toil, little was achieved.  Lochiel 
noted in March 1679 that there was still no garrison, and Lawers said the same thing 
that September.139  Indeed, Menzies, the garrison’s prospective commander, was 
imprisoned in January 1683 until he repaid the money given to him in 1678 (plus 
interest), ‘seing the fort was never built’.140  In something of a paradox, then, the need 
to establish a permanent military presence at Inverlochy was a consistent feature of 
public discourse throughout the Restoration, but it never spawned anything tangible. 
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The final use to which the government put the military was the enforcement 
of the tax regimen.  The tactic of choice was to quarter troops on the lands of non-
payers at their expense, something which was by no means unique to the Highlands.  
In 1661, the Scottish Parliament legislated for the use of free quarter to collect arrears 
of both the excise and the cess, and as early as 1661 Glasgow and Fife were already 
hosting troops.141  In such quartering the Highlands shared fully.  General orders for 
quartering in the Highland shires were issued in 1666, and each of the period’s major 
military initiatives – independent companies, Highland companies and the Highland 
commission – included blanket provision for collecting tax arrears through free 
quarter.142  Moreover, numerous specific examples of quartering can be traced: 
Moniack (1662), Tain (1665), Argyll (1668, 1674 and 1675), Fortrose (1669), Cromarty 
(1669), Lochaber (1671), Assynt (1671), Logierait (1672), Mull (1680), Cromarty (1681), 
Inverness (1681) and Caithness (1685) all certainly suffered, and it seems likely that 
there were far more instances for which evidence has not survived.143  Quartering 
certainly had the capacity to elicit speedy payments.  In 1662, when Thomas Fraser of 
Strichen was suffering quartering on his estates at Moniack, he sent a delegation to 
the troops’ commander, John Cullen, seeking a few days respite.  Cullen’s response 
was to double the size of the quartering party, leading Strichen’s agent to report 
ruefully that ‘[th]e best coursse [is] to mak peyment’.144  Farther south, one dose of 
free quarter in 1683-84 was enough to make the commissioners of supply for Argyll 
hand over 4,000 merks to clear their arrears.145  Indeed, the mere threat of quartering 
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rapidly established itself as a highly effective motivator.  When in 1680 Lord 
Macdonnell faced the prospect of hosting a party of troops commanded by James 
Menzies, he quickly promised to ensure that all outstanding dues were paid within a 
fortnight, either by the deficient heritors themselves or, failing that, by him.146  
Equally suggestive of the power of quartering to focus the mind is the fact that, by 
1684, Hugh Fraser of Kinnaries was using his barony court to check that all his 
tenants had paid their assessment dues.147 
But quartering was also vulnerable to abuse.  Not least, it could be used as a 
weapon in private disputes.  Argyll was for instance accused of fabricating more 
than £3,000-worth of tax arrears in Mull in order to have troops dispatched against 
the Macleans in 1673-74.148  Certainly, the fact that, in 1675, a party of sixty foot 
dispatched to collect arrears in Argyllshire was also ordered to assist Argyll in 
keeping the peace suggests that the earl was more than capable of bending the 
system to his advantage.149  Nor were the troops themselves always above reproach.  
The commissioners of supply for Caithness received a petition from George Sinclair 
of Barrock in 1685, complaining that the soldiers quartering in the shire, in concert 
with the former collector, James Innes, were guilty of extortion by charging a fee 
before they would grant payment discharges. 150  This was not the only kind of 
questionable behaviour of which soldiers were guilty.  Moidart was informed that 
Captain Patrick Wishart, dispatched to extract free quarter from the Highlands in 
1674, would be willing to overlook his £500 or so of outstanding liabilities in return 
for a ‘gratuity’.151  And in at least one case from 1680, five soldiers from the earl of 
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Mar’s regiment were arrested for allegedly murdering the Inverness-shire heritor, 
William Fraser of Balbeny.152  Effectively, free quarter was a blunt tool.  It was 
certainly an effective means of terrifying the locality into meeting its financial 
obligations.  But it also left ample scope for imprecision and sharp practice. 
It would however be wrong to understand quartering as an oppressive 
measure forced upon the locality by an acquisitive central government.  Often, the 
troops were called in by local authorities themselves.  Fortrose Burgh Council asked 
that troops be sent to quarter in Rosemarkie on at least two occasions, in 1674 and 
1685.153  The commissioners of the excise in Caithness sought to impose free quarter 
on a number of heritors who were in arrears in 1676.154  A similar decision was made 
by the commissioners of supply in Argyll, when they ordered in 1686 that everybody 
who was taking advantage of the tax loophole involving the park of Inveraray (see 
above) should play host to a body of soldiers.155  This local collaboration was clearly 
not unique to the Highlands, since commissioners of excise and supply across the 
country had a statutory right to impose free quarter if they so chose.  Nor need it 
occasion any surprise.  As discussed in chapter two, government in the Restoration 
Highlands, as across Scotland, depended upon an intimate partnership between 
central and local elites.  Free quarter adhered to this construct, and did not represent 
the oppression of centre over locality.  Rather, it reflected the formidable potential of 
a governmental framework which integrated local elites into the systems of national 
control. 
Despite local collaboration, there is no doubt that free quarter, quite aside 
from its dubious legality, was deeply unpopular.  In extreme cases, it could occasion 
                                                           
152 RPCS, vi, p.454. 
153 NRS, B28/7/3, f.10v and at ff.110v-111v. 
154 NRS, SC14/87/1. 
155 NRS, SC54/20/3/3/6. 
The ‘Fiscal-Military’ State in the Highlands 
309 
 
full-scale tax revolts.  One of the earliest took place in Mull in 1666, where a party of 
troops sent to quarter for excise arrears were imprisoned by the Macleans, and 
subsequently presented with a written undertaking by which the latter promised ‘to 
opose that party and euery other party [that] entered Mull for quartering’, if 
necessary by mustering a force of eighty men.  Only when one of the quartering 
soldiers escaped and prepared to gather reinforcement did the Macleans withdraw 
their band and promise to pay.156  Resistance was also encountered in the wilder 
portions of Inverness-shire (Lochaber, Badenoch, Knoydart, Moidart and Glengarry), 
where it was reported in 1669 that the inhabitants, particularly Camerons, had 
repelled a party led by Captain Wishart ‘uith very bige words and Threats’, and in 
Argyll in 1675.157  Yet the most infamous tax revolt took place in the 1680s, in a 
predictable enough locale.  On 6 March 1682, the Privy Council received word of ‘a 
deforcement committed upon a party of his Majesties souldiers quartered in 
Loquhaber’.  After a week a clearer picture had emerged: a party of soldiers sent 
under the command of John Murray to quarter in Inverness-shire had been attacked 
at Inverlochy by several hundred Highlanders.  Large-scale resistance such as this 
admittedly appears to have been quite rare, but it no doubt reflected a wider feeling 
of resentment against the practice of free quarter.158  This, in turn, highlights the 
primary drawback of the policy – it may well have enjoyed a degree of local elite 
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collusion which allowed it to raise considerable sums of money, but it was hardly 
likely to win any supporters for the government. 
The thesis of the early-modern ‘fiscal-military’ state seeks to make sense of 
the vastly expanded size and reach of many European governments in this period.  
At its heart lies the notion that, spurred on by the pressures of war, rulers sought 
more direct control over fiscal and military resources, leading in turn to a relative 
rebalancing between public, centralised power and personal, local authority, in 
favour of the former.  Across the continent, however, the shift was tentative and 
halting, and did not in any simple way produce modern ‘impersonal’ states.  
Nowhere was this truer than in Britain, and Scotland in particular, where the new 
always went hand-in-hand with the old.  The Highlands’ experience was still more 
equivocal.  The Stuart drive towards fiscal expansion was muted beyond the 
Highland line, partly because expectations were low and partly because of 
bureaucratic under-development.  Military mobilisation was just as unimpressive; 
neither the regular army nor the militia was able effectively to tap the region’s 
potential.  But if the Highlands made little apparent contribution to the Scottish 
‘fiscal-military’ state, it did find itself on the receiving end of that state.  Military rule, 
whether through policy reinforcement, watches, garrisons, or free quarter, was 
ubiquitous.  Yet this model of a passive Highlands, victimised by an alien 
government, is altogether too simplistic.  Rather, the situation should be understood 
in terms of the overarching interplay between public and personal authority which 
characterised the Restoration period.  Militaristic policies relied at least as much 
upon the collusion and cooperation of local elites as upon the regime’s own 
proclivities, and were at their most effective when they embraced this dynamic.  
Similarly, when the government was able to exploit the military resources of the 
Highlands, it did so by working through established channels of lordship.  In this 
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way, the Highlands did experience Scotland’s ‘fiscal-military’ state, not as a crude 
imposition from above, but as a wider project in which the locality was heavily 
invested. 
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Conclusion 
 
Although it is not quite the gaping chasm it once was, the Restoration 
remains one of the darker stretches of Scottish history.  The Whiggish, Presbyterian 
stamp of traditional historiography did not favour the period, and it tended to be 
dismissed as an unenlightened, irrelevant prelude to the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 
1688-89.  More recently it has been rehabilitated as a respectable subject of academic 
enquiry, and this has led to a considerably more sophisticated understanding of its 
social, political and ecclesiastical dynamics.  This renaissance, however, has not fully 
impacted upon historians’ understanding of the Highlands.  Here the problem was 
not so much disinterest in the Restoration as complacency about the place of the far 
north and west in the wider Scottish and British contexts.  The Highlands, many 
historians were content to assume, existed in introverted isolation, controlled by a 
quaint patchwork of petty chieftains and displaying at best intermittent interest in, 
and engagement with, the outside world.  But this idea was itself a product of 
outdated Whiggish thinking, which needed to emphasise the backwardness of the 
Highlands in order to rationalise its supposed modernisation after the ’45 rebellion.  
This orthodoxy has now been comprehensively overturned, and historians are 
increasingly willing to acknowledge that the early-modern Highlands were much 
more cosmopolitan than has been assumed.  As yet, however, little attempt has been 
made to re-examine the Restoration Highlands in light of this newer thinking.  This 
thesis has attempted to correct that oversight.  
Any understanding of Highland government in this period must be based, in 
the first instance, upon a realistic appraisal of the region’s place within the broader 
Scottish and British contexts.  While recognising that relations between peripheral 
societies and core states, shaped by the unique peculiarities of political, socio-
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economic and cultural circumstances, were almost infinitely variable, the 
historiography provides two opposing conceptual frameworks.  ‘Imperial’ models 
tend to stress the primacy of the centre.  Under this view, the impetus towards 
peripheral integration is seen to come from the centre, meaning that localities find 
themselves governed by, and in the interests of, the core state.  The ‘imperial’ model, 
in other words, views state formation as an essentially aggressive and expansionist 
process directed by central governments. 
The ‘collaborative’ model stands in opposition to ‘imperial’ readings.  Such 
an approach tends to stress the parity of centre and locality by acknowledging, first 
and foremost, that peripheral integration could be sought just as fervently by local 
society as by central government.  As a result, ‘collaborative’ approaches usually 
offer a more mutual vision of centre-periphery interaction, stressing the cooperation 
of local society rather than its abject subordination.  Through the ‘collaborative’ 
model, state formation is seen not as an imposition from above, but as a project 
shared between central government and peripheral elites. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Highland experience under Charles II and James 
VII displays features from both schools.  Some markers of an ‘imperial’ relationship 
can be discerned, the most obvious being the perception of Highlanders and the 
Highlands.  Contemporaries tended to view the Highland landscape as rough, wild 
and unproductive, which in tern led them to characterise Highlanders as an internal 
‘other’.  Moreover, in an age which viewed human society as a sliding scale between 
civility and barbarity, this ‘otherness’ became synonymous with inferiority, so that 
Highland society was denigrated as archaically tribal and militaristic.  Nor was this 
perception challenged by native image-makers.  Vernacular poets were only too 
happy to emphasise the ‘fighting and feasting’ character of traditional Gaelic society, 
while many local elites continued to embrace a range of conventional cultural 
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markers surrounding language, costume and the trappings of militaristic lordship.  
In short, for both contemporaries and historians the Restoration Highlands were 
encumbered with the kind of derogatory reputation for cultural difference that 
formed a necessary prerequisite to ‘imperial’ projects of centre-periphery interaction.  
Equally suggestive of an ‘imperial’ relationship was the marked weakness of 
Highland involvement in the structures of central government.  Admittedly, 
attendance at Parliament was fairly stable, although of course the Highlands only 
comprised about one-fifth of parliamentary representation.  But involvement in all 
other organs of central government – such as parliamentary and Privy Council 
committees, or the offices of state – was restricted to a very small group of select 
individuals, such as Argyll and Tarbat.  The Highland Committee, overwhelmingly 
Lowland and aristocratic in composition, provided further testimony to the general 
exclusion of Highlanders from the Edinburgh administration, something which 
would seem to confirm that the Highland locality really was governed under the 
aegis of an alien centre. 
All this, however, is only part of the story.  The limitations of the ‘imperial’ 
approach, and the consequent value of a ‘collaborative’ perspective, should be 
acknowledged.  For a start, it is crucial to recognise that cultural denigration did not 
tend to involve characterisation of Highlanders as ‘barbarous’; colourful language 
may often have been invoked, but in general the locality was seen as wild and 
lawless, but not fundamentally uncivil.  This does not preclude the existence of an 
‘imperial’-style relationship, but it does throw into question the extent to which the 
Highlands were treated as an ‘internal colony’.  Perhaps more tangibly, the discourse 
of cultural separation masked what was, in reality, a far more fluid situation.  The 
Restoration Highlands cannot be divided into clear-cut ‘Gaelic’ and ‘Lowland’ 
cultural zones, and we should not try to categorise its inhabitants as such.  In 
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actuality, the region espoused a hybrid identity, whereby those of traditionally 
Highland stock were perfectly comfortable engaging with the trends and mores of 
Lowland society, while non-Gaels (especially in the east) were not slow to embrace 
some conventionally Gaelic cultural markers.  On closer inspection, then, the 
characterisation of the Highlands as an internal ‘other’ begins to look increasingly 
superficial. 
Moreover, the ostensibly ‘imperial’ relationship between central government 
and local communities was mitigated by a pattern of ‘magistracy’.  In common with 
much of contemporary Europe, Scottish government functioned through the 
partnership of public and personal power.  Holding local government office granted 
renewed prestige and legitimacy to regional elites, and the government, for its part, 
was able to expand its influence by harnessing pre-existing power networks.  This 
held true beyond the Highland line; government was careful to award offices to the 
most influential local lords, and Highlanders were assiduous in amassing and 
defending local jurisdictions.  The pattern was repeated whether the offices in 
question were administrative, judicial, military or financial in character, and it served 
to emphasise that, far from being bypassed by an imperialistic centre, Highland elites 
were fully integrated into the governing structure, and were fundamental to its 
survival. 
Given the pattern of widespread local elite integration, the notion of a 
‘Highland problem’ begins to look unsustainable.  That is not to say, of course, that 
controlling the Highlands was free of challenges.  Banditry was clearly a major issue 
(although, in the absence of sufficient research, the extent to which it was more 
serious than in the Lowlands must remain indeterminate), and feuding, often 
involving a great deal of violence, remained prominent.  But the ‘Highland problem’ 
model implies more than just unruliness.  It suggests that control of the locality was 
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handicapped by challenges that were both endemic and uniquely ‘Highland’.  This is 
patently not the case.  Banditry was concentrated in (although admittedly not 
restricted to) one locality, Lochaber, and was therefore hardly ‘endemic’ – in fact, it 
was nurtured in part by well-established local jurisdictional peculiarities.  At the 
same time, animal theft was often rooted in individual social stresses which had little 
to do with the supposed peculiarities of Highland society.  The same applies to 
feuding.  Few conflicts in this period fitted the classic pattern of land-based 
competition, and most were complemented by a judicial campaign on behalf of one 
side, or both.  Even clanship, the institution usually held up as the leitmotif of the 
‘Highland problem’ – not to mention the explanation of Highland lawlessness – had 
a much more limited role than is often assumed.  Certainly clans represented 
unofficial nexus of identity and authority, but they were equivocal and often brittle, 
and it is by no means certain that, in practice, they differed greatly from the kin 
networks that dominated much of contemporary European society.  In any case, it 
was exactly this kind of personal power that the system of ‘magistracy’ attempted to 
exploit; if a local office-holder could use clan ties to extend the influence of his office, 
then so much the better.          
Accordingly, government policy did not aim to affect a transformation of 
Highland society along Lowland lines for the simple reason that it did not need to.  
The Highlands had already located itself within the framework of the Scottish and 
British polities while retaining a distinct, hybridised local identity.  The model of 
introducing transformative policies with a view to tightening political control, 
however important it may have been under James VI, or would be under the 
Hanoverian dynasty, was not therefore of particular relevance during the 
Restoration.  Instead, government aims were more circumspect.  On the one hand, 
there was a desire to curb the banditry of ‘broken men’.  On the other, there was a 
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definite drive towards opening up the Highlands to fiscal and military exploitation.  
The policy developments of the period only make sense if we acknowledge these 
modest and limited aims. 
That policy was reworked several times, usually responding to broader 
national developments.  In line with the conservative and laissez-faire ethos of the 
Restoration settlement, it began with a conventional expedient.  Bonds of caution 
were a well-established mechanism for bolting public authority onto the structures of 
personal lordship – essentially an extension of the under-lying magisterial pattern.  
Conservatism also inspired the restoration of the House of Argyll, although this was 
in addition a consequence of the regime-change of 1663.  In the aftermath of the 
Pentland Rising (1666), the use of single commissioners and independent companies 
injected policy with a more direct, militaristic ethos.  This trend was intensified in 
response to the ‘Restoration crisis’ after 1678, although the creation of the ‘Highland 
companies’ also represented a reactionary reliance on the trusted agency of Clan 
Campbell.  With the arrival in Scotland of James, duke of Albany, concerted attempts 
were made to broaden out the client base.  The abortive ‘five divisions’ scheme 
signalled this intention, and the commission for securing the peace of the Highlands 
realised it.  Running through all of these developments was an ever-growing reliance 
on military coercion to reinforce policy.  
The government’s scatter-gun approach looks at first glance singularly 
eccentric and inconsistent.  But these tactical shifts should be assessed alongside a 
much deeper strategic vision.  Political thinking in Restoration Scotland gradually 
came to embrace the notion that strong monarchical government was the best 
bulwark against disorder, and Highland policy mirrored this development.  Two 
strategies thus developed.  The first, in evidence from the very beginning of the 
Restoration, conservatively sought to preserve order through the agency of local 
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elites – an ‘indirect’ approach.  The second, gaining in prominence from the later 
1660s, favoured policies that would bypass local power and rule with a sense of 
transcendent public authority – a ‘direct’ approach.  Had they been imposed 
wholesale, these two strategies would have been mutually exclusive, but the 
government instead sought a middle way.  All of its policies from 1667 onwards 
sought in the last analysis to balance the entrenched authority of local elites with the 
pretensions of a pseudo-absolute monarchy, and this basic conceptual thread was 
never lost.  Implicit in this was an admission that government in the Restoration 
Highlands was not something summarily imposed from Edinburgh, but was rather a 
project shared between centre and periphery. 
On balance, therefore, the Highland experience during the Restoration would 
seem to have had more in common with the ‘collaborative’ model of centre-
periphery interaction than with the ‘imperial’.  True, the rhetoric of Highland 
distinctiveness, even ‘otherness’, was relentless, and there was little place for 
Highlanders at the pinnacle of the Edinburgh administration.  Yet the active 
involvement of the local elite was fundamental to the systems of local control.  They 
themselves recognised the advantages of integration, and were as enthusiastic about 
the process as anybody else.  Crucially, then, once the polemic is set aside, the 
Highlands’ place within the Scottish state was broadly similar to that of any other 
locality.  Certainly there were local peculiarities that had to be accommodated, but 
these differences were not fundamental.  This, in turn, raises larger questions about 
the early-modern Highlands.  With a centre capable of accommodating such cultural 
diversity, and a locality able to adapt and hybridise with relative ease, does the 
model of a stark Highland/Lowland divide still convince?  This thesis has dealt with 
only one brief timeframe.  But the patterns it has uncovered suggest that notions of a 
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Highland ‘them’ and a Lowland ‘us’ in early-modern Scotland may need to be 
revisited.  
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The following appendices can be found on the CD attached to this thesis 
(PDF format).  They contain the raw data upon which the various statisitcal analysis 
exercises in chapters 2 to 7 are based.  The thesis cites these appendices in the 
footnotes where appropriate.  
 
Appendix 
Number 
Description Source(s) In-text 
References 
1 Parliamentary Attendance, 1661-86 RPS p.61, p.152 
2 Local Office-Holding, 1661-88 
(i) Administrative Office 
(ii) Judicial Office 
(iii) Financial Office 
RPS; RPCS; RGSS; 
NRS, PA7/10; 
NRS, PA11/12; 
NRS, SC54 
p.74 
3 Central Office-Holding, 1661-88 
(i) Administrative Office 
(ii) Judicial Office 
(iii) Commissions to the 
Highlands Committee 
RPS; RPCS p.77 
4 Judicial Commissions, 1661-85 RPCS p.195, 
p.215 
5 The Commission for Securing the 
Peace of the Highlands, 1682 
RPCS p.263 
6 Taxation Levies, 1661-81 RPS; NRS, PA11/12 p.274 
 
 
Key to appendices 2, 3, 4 and 5: 
H = Highland resident   
L = Lowland resident 
F = Highland Fringe resident   
U = Unknon residency 
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